The Court considered the interpretation of a consent order on an application to vary its terms. The terms were incorporated within a consent order. It was argued that the variation could be based on CPR 3.1(7) which provides that the Court has power to vary or revoke an order. It was also argued that the variation could be made under an express provision which gave ‘liberty to apply’.
Held: Arden LJ relied on Ropac for the proposition that, even when the parties had come to a consent order, there was an exceptional jurisdiction under which the court could still vary the order. She continued: ‘I will proceed on the basis (without deciding the point) that CPR 3.1(7) applies to paragraph 10 of the order of 23 January 2003. I would accept that the Court should accede to an application for variation where it is just to do so but in my judgment one of the aspects of justice is that a bargain freely made should be upheld. Mr Weston clearly obtained benefits under the order of 23 January 2003. It may well be that those benefits are not as great as he thought, but that is not a matter for the court. In those circumstances I do not consider it would be right for this court to exercise its discretion to vary the order as sought.’
Judges:
Arden LJ, Brooke LJ VP, Wall LJ
Citations:
[2006] EWCA Civ 1165
Links:
Statutes:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Ropac Ltd v Inntrepreneur Pub Co and Another ChD 7-Jun-2000
There had been a consent order in the terms of an unless order giving the landlord an order for possession unless the tenant paid sums by a certain date, time being of the essence. The order was not complied with and the tenant applied for a . .
Cited by:
Cited – Community Care North East (A Partnership) v Durham County Council QBD 29-Apr-2010
The parties had settled their dispute and sealed it in a Tomlin Order. The court now asked as to its power to vary such an order. The order required the defendant to reopen a tendering process, but other tenderers now objected, and the council felt . .
Cited – Watson v Sadiq and Another CA 16-Jul-2013
The appellant and defendant said that the agreement compromising their action, and embodied within a Tomlin schedule, had been reached by duress and was vitiated. He said that the Recorder had exercised undue influence in advising the need for a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Litigation Practice, Civil Procedure Rules
Updated: 07 July 2022; Ref: scu.244459