Two summonses came before the court arising form wills of a Mr Snowden and a Mrs Henderson. Norman Snowden, had made sales adeeming bequests but, in consequence, pecuniary legacies and bequests of shares of residue were greater than contemplated. The pecuniary and residuary legatees were six charities who agreed, if the Attorney-General had no objection, that various sums should be paid to the specific legatees. In Mrs Henderson’s case a manuscript but unattested addition to the will was omitted from probate. The proved will gave the residue after payment of various pecuniary legacies was left to charity generally. The administrators sought the approval of the Court, if the Attorney-General consented, to give effect to the manuscript alteration. The A-G argued: ‘It has been a long established view that the Attorney-General has no power to authorise the application of the funds of a charity for non-charitable purposes. This precise problem has been put to counsel for the Attorney-General for over 40 to 50 years. Each counsel has treated it as clear law. In the present case the point of moral obligation has been raised.’
Held: The court would not dissent from that view unless satisfied that it was wrong. He was so satisfied: ‘In the result I am satisfied that the court and the Attorney-General have power to give authority to charity trustees to make ex gratia payments out of funds held on charitable trusts. It is however a power which is not to be exercised lightly or on slender grounds but only in cases where it can fairly be said that if the charity were an individual it would be morally wrong of him to refuse to make the payment.’ There were four reasons for that conclusion: (1) As charity depends for its continued existence on the recognition by others of moral obligations to give it would be odd if a charity could not likewise give effect to its own moral obligations. (2) Analogous powers exist in other cases, such as the management of the property of mental patients and what is for the benefit of an infant. (3) In sanctioning compromises on behalf of charities the Court does pay regard to moral obligations. (4) The Attorney-General has power to relieve trustees from their strict legal obligations to make full restitution for breaches of trust committed by them. The Court or the Attorney-General may authorise: ‘a payment…out of charity funds which is motivated simply and solely by the belief of the trustees or other persons administering the funds that the charity is under a moral obligation to make the payment’,
Judges:
Cross J
Citations:
[1970] Ch 700
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Attorney General v British Museum ChD 27-May-2005
The trustees brought a claim against the Attorney-General seeking clarification of their duties and powers to return objects which were part of the collection in law, but where a moral duty might exist to return it to a former owner. Here drawings . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Charity
Updated: 17 May 2022; Ref: scu.225528