These several applications raised a single ground of appeal namely that the sentencing court failed to give credit under section 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as amended, for one half of the time spent by the offender on qualifying curfew before sentence. This was asked in a context where there had been delay in applying for extensions of time, responsibility for which did not lie with the appellant.
Held: The appeals were allowed according the particulars of each case: ‘At the Crown Court each of the defendants was entitled to have calculated the number of days to be credited towards the sentence. The court failed to make the calculation. The responsibility for the error lay elsewhere than with the defendant personally. In each case the defendant was entitled to a substantial number of days credit. The best information available to the court is that as soon as a defendant became aware of the entitlement the matter was drawn to the attention of legal advisors. In none of the cases is it suggested on behalf of the respondent that the interval between discovery and the application for leave was excessive, or that the effect upon sentence would have been insignificant, or that it is no longer possible to ascertain the defendant’s entitlement. It is possible that, in some cases, the court will consider that having regard to the sentence imposed no injustice would be done by refusing an extension of time. It is not possible to anticipate the precise circumstances of each individual case. However, if the applicant was entitled under section 240A to a significant number of days credit we do not consider that it would be right in principle to refuse an extension of time by reason only of the proportion that those days bear to the total sentence imposed. ‘
There is a duty on the court imposing a qualifying curfew to complete the appropriate form, for court officials to ensure that the form travels with the defendant from court to court and for those representing the defendant to ensure that they have all the necessary details to hand at the time of sentence. It is for the parties to make the calculations, agree the result and inform the judge.
The court set out the steps to be taken: ‘Step 1 – Add up the days spent on qualifying curfew including the first, but not the last if on the last day the defendant was taken into custody.
Step 2 – Deduct days on which the defendant was at the same time also (i) being monitored with a tag for compliance with a curfew requirement and/or (ii) on temporary release from custody.
Step 3 – Deduct days when the defendant has broken the curfew or the tagging condition
Step 4 – Divide the result by 2
Step 5 – If necessary round up to the nearest whole number’
Pitchford LJ, Popplewell, Edis JJ
[2015] EWCA Crim 1
Bailii
Criminal Justice Act 2003 240A, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offences Act 2012 109
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Irving; Regina v Squires CACD 4-Feb-2010
Both defendants appealed against sentence saying that the court had not given proper allowance on sentencing for the time that had spent awaiting trial under curfew and electronically tagged.
Held: The appeals succeeded. Greater effort should . .
Cited – Johnson (RT) v Regina; Nnaji v Regina CACD 17-Mar-2009
The court considered the difficulties arising in trying under section 240 to calculate the credit to be given for time spent in custody awaiting trial, and put forward a suggested formulation. . .
Cited – Hoggard, Regina v CACD 20-Jun-2013
The court gave its reasons for allowing an appeal by the defendant as to the time to be held to go towards service of his sentence of imprisonment after had had spent time before sentence subject to curfew.
The sentence, imposed on 13 December . .
Cited – Leacock and Others, Regina v CACD 12-Nov-2013
The defendants sought leave to appeal against their sentences, saying that the time served calculations had not included time spent subject to curfew and otherwise.
Held: ‘if a prisoner is serving a sentence for another offence at the time on . .
Cited – Gordon, Regina v; Regina v Taylor etc CACD 8-Feb-2007
The court considered the interaction of sections 240 of the 2003 Act, and 67 of the 1967 Act as applied to time spent on remand.
Held: The court laying down the sentence should address this issue, and declare whether all time or otherwise . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Sentencing
Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.541568