The parties had negotiated through solicitors a compromise of ancillary relief claims on their divorce. They agreed that the house should be transferred to the wife in consideration of her release of all other financial claims. The wife however became engaged to a new partner before the consent order was made, and remarried two days after. Disclosure had been given, but the House was now asked whether there remained a continuing duty to disclose material changes which occurred after the disclosure but before a consent order was made, and if such a duty existed, what effect that had on the order itself.
Held: There is an enhanced duty of full and frank disclosure upon legal professionals acting in family proceedings, and particularly in ancillary relief proceedings. The duty continued after disclosure until any final order was made. W was under a continuing duty to disclose the fact of her engagement as soon as it took place. Her failure was relevant to the validity of the consent order, and since the undisclosed fact undermined the basis of the consent order, the order was set aside
Lord Hailsham LC, Lord Scarman, Lord Keith, Lord Bridge, Lord Brandon
[1985] AC 424, [1984] UKHL 3, [1985] FLR 813, [1985] 1 All ER 106, [1985] 2 WLR 47
Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Minton v Minton HL 1979
Establishing Clean Break on Divorce
The House set out the principles for establishing a ‘clean break’ financial settlement on a divorce. Once a capital claim in a divorce has been given effect in a court order, the court does not have jurisdiction to vary it. Lord Scarman said: ‘Once . .
Criticised in part – Wales v Wadham FD 1977
H and W agreed a consent order following a divorce under which H was to pay W andpound;13,000 from his half-share of the matrimonial home in settlement of W’s claims for financial provision for herself. Both consulted solicitors and the agreement . .
Cited – de Lasala v de Lasala PC 4-Apr-1979
No Revisiting of Capital Claim after Compromise
(Hong Kong) Where capital claims are compromised in a once-for-all court order they cannot be revisited or reissued in the absence of a substantial mistake. Capital orders are ‘once-for-all orders’. The legal effect of the order derives not from the . .
Cited – Tommey v Tommey FD 1983
W asked the court to set aside a consent financial relief order. She was to transfer her half of the home to H, in return for andpound;8,000 paid by H in settlement of her financial provision. She said that in the negotiations leading up to the . .
Cited – Robinson v Robinson (Disclosure) Practice Note CA 1982
The court considered the duty of parties in finacial relief proceedings to give full disclosure.
Held: In proceedings for ancillary relief, there was a duty, both under the rules and by authority, on the parties to make full and frank . .
Cited – Practice Direction (Family Division: Financial Statement) 1984
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Jenkins v. Livesey (formerly Jenkins) … is a reminder that in all cases where application is made for a financial provision or property adjustment order the court is required to have before it an agreed . .
Cited by:
Cited – P v P (Ancillary Relief: Proceeds of Crime) FD 8-Oct-2003
The parties sought guidance from the court on the circumstances which arose in ancillary relief proceedings where a legal representative came to believe that one party might be holding the proceeds of crime. In the course of ancillary relief . .
Cited – Kelley v Corston CA 20-Aug-1997
The plaintiff employed the defendant barrister to pursue her claim for ancillary relief in divorce. She sought to recover damages for his alleged negligence.
Held: A barrister’s immunity from suit for negligence in advocacy extends to . .
Cited – Soulsbury v Soulsbury CA 10-Oct-2007
The claimant was the first wife of the deceased. She said that the deceased had promised her a substantial cash sum in his will in return for not pursuing him for arrears of maintenance. The will made no such provision, and she sought payment from . .
Cited – Hildebrand v Hildebrand 1992
The parties in ancillary relief proceedings sought orders for discovery. H had been to the wife’s flat surreptitiously on five occasions, and taken photocopies of so many documents obtained by him in the course of those visits (but returned after . .
Cited – Ridehalgh v Horsefield; Allen v Unigate Dairies Ltd CA 26-Jan-1994
Guidance for Wasted Costs Orders
Guidance was given on the circumstances required for the making of wasted costs orders against legal advisers. A judge invited to make an order arising out of an advocate’s conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the fact that an . .
Cited – S v S (Ancillary Relief: Consent Order) FD 4-Mar-2002
An order for ancillary relief had been made by consent. Later the House of Lords issued a judgment which changed the law which had been the basis of the decision to accept the settlement. The wife now sought to set aside the consent order, and . .
Cited – Tchenguiz and Others v Imerman CA 29-Jul-2010
Anticipating a refusal by H to disclose assets in ancillary relief proceedings, W’s brothers wrongfully accessed H’s computers to gather information. The court was asked whether the rule in Hildebrand remained correct. W appealed against an order . .
Cited – NG v SG FD 9-Dec-2011
The court considered what to do when it was said that a party to ancillary relief proceedings on divorce had failed to make proper disclosure of his assets. H appealed against an award of a capital sum in such proceedimngs.
Held:
Held: . .
Cited – Wyatt v Vince SC 11-Mar-2015
Long delayed ancillary relief application proceeds
The parties had divorced some 22 years before, but no ancillary relief order had been made to satisfy the application outlined in the petition. The parties when together had lived in relative poverty, but H had subsequently become wealthy. W applied . .
Cited – Gohil v Gohil SC 14-Oct-2015
The Court was asked ‘Do the principles referable to the admissibility of fresh evidence on appeal, as propounded in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, have any relevance to the determination of a spouse’s . .
Cited – S v S FD 29-Apr-2013
W sought to re-open a sttlement of the financial arrangement on her divorce, saying that there had been substantial non-disclosure by H.
Held: ‘any order which would have been made if proper disclosure had taken place would not have been . .
Cited – Sharland v Sharland SC 14-Oct-2015
The Court considered the impact of fraud upon a financial settlement agreed between divorcing parties where that agreement is later embodied in a court order? Does ‘fraud unravel all’, as is normally the case when agreements are embodied in court . .
Cited – Sharland v Sharland CA 10-Feb-2014
Appeal against the order of Sir Hugh Bennett dismissing the application of the appellant wife to resume the hearing of her claim for financial provision following her divorce from the respondent.
Held: (Briggs LJ dissenting) The appeal failed. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Litigation Practice, Family
Updated: 19 November 2021; Ref: scu.187045