A woman had killed her husband, but been convicted of manslaughter rather than murder on grounds of diminished responsibility. A hospital order was made under the Mental Health Act 1959. It was argued that in these circumstances the forfeiture rule should not apply.
Held: The court rejected any attempt to limit the common law rule to cases involving real moral culpability.
Sir John Pennycuick V-C said: ‘Now I do not think that I am concerned to analyse the ground upon which the courts have established the rule of public policy. It is sufficient to say that the rule has been established and that the deserving of punishment and moral culpability are not necessary ingredients of the type of crime to which the rule applies, that is, culpable homicide, murder or manslaughter’ and ‘In the present case, the widow was convicted pursuant to section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. It is contended, on her behalf, that such a conviction does not fall within the general principle laid down in the cases to which I have referred. On the face of it, it seems to me that such a conviction does plainly fall within the scope of that principle. The principle is, to use a summary expression of Lord Atkin in the Beresford case [1938] AC 586, 599 that the ‘courts will not recognise a benefit accruing to a criminal from his crime’. It is accepted that a person convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility has indeed been convicted of a crime. Therefore, on the face of it, such a person in the present connection is in precisely the same position as anyone who was convicted of manslaughter under the law as it stood before the introduction of the Homicide Act 1957. And the cases have established beyond question that a person so convicted of manslaughter is disqualified from taking a benefit under the will or intestacy of the person whom he has killed.
Mr Whitehead for the widow, has sought to exclude these cases of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility from the scope of the principle. What he contends is that the principle, only applies to crime deserving of punishment or, to use another phrase, crime carrying a degree of moral culpability, and that where the crime does not deserve punishment and carries no degree of moral culpability, then the principle does not apply. It is true that sentence of detention for hospital treatment under section 60 of the Mental Health Act 1959 is not in the nature of a punishment but is a remedial order. The answer, certainly in this court, is that neither the deserving of punishment nor carrying a degree of moral culpability has ever been a necessary ingredient of the crime the perpetrator of which is disqualified from benefiting under the will or intestacy of the person whom he has killed. That is an entirely new conception and it is actually contrary to the words used by Hamilton LJ in In re H. [1914] P.1, 7.’
Judges:
Sir John Pennycuick V-C
Citations:
[1972] Ch 554
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Dunbar (As Administrator of Tony Dunbar Deceased) v Plant CA 23-Jul-1997
The couple had decided on a suicide pact. They made repeated attempts, resulting in his death. Property had been held in joint names. The deceased’s father asked the court to apply the 1982 Act to disentitle Miss Plant.
Held: The appeal was . .
Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Cited – D v L and Others ChD 16-Apr-2003
The claimant had been found guilty of the manslaughter by diminished responsibility of the deceased. He now sought disapplication of the 1982 Act.
Held: The application failed: ‘The reforms introduced by the Homicide Act 1957 were designed to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Wills and Probate, Crime
Updated: 13 May 2022; Ref: scu.199529
