The defendant husband had promised his wife to allow her andpound;100 a year free of tax, without his wife furnishing any consideration for the promise. On his failing to pay, she sued on the promise.
Held: Her claim failed. The court declined to treat the principle in High Trees as extending to cover such a case. Promissory estoppel is a defence not itself a cause of action. It is a shield not a sword.
Birkett LJ adopted a phrase of the husband’s counsel that the principle is ‘one to be used as a shield and not as a sword’.
Denning LJ said that the principle ‘does not create new causes of action. It only prevents a party from insisting upon his strict legal rights, when it would be unjust to allow him to enforce them, having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties’
Having considered case law on the need for consideration, he said: ‘In none of these cases was the defendant sued on the promise, assurance, or assertion as a cause of action in itself. He was sued for some other cause, for example, a pension or a breach of contract, or possession, and the promise, assurance, or assertion only played a supplementary role, though, no doubt, an important one. That is, I think, its true function. It may be part of a cause of action, but not a cause of action in itself. The principle, as I understand it, is that where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he himself has so introduced, even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration, but only by his word.
Seeing that the principle never stands alone as giving a cause of action in itself, it can never do away with the necessity of consideration when that is an essential part of the cause of action. The doctrine of consideration is too firmly fixed to be overthrown by a side-wind. Its ill effects have been largely mitigated of late, but it still remains a cardinal necessity of the formation of a contract, although not of its modification or discharge. I fear that it was my failure to make this clear in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd which misled Byrne J in the present case. He held that the wife could sue on the husband’s promise as a separate and independent cause of action by itself, although, as he held, there was no consideration for it. That is not correct. The wife can only enforce the promise if there was consideration for it. That is, therefore, the real question in the case: Was there sufficient consideration to support the promise?
Judges:
Denning LJ, Birkett and Asquith LJJ
Citations:
[1951] 2 KB 215
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Explained – Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd KBD 18-Jul-1946
Promissory Estoppel Created
The plaintiff leased a block a flats to the defendant in 1939, at an annual rental of pounds 2500. High Trees had difficulty in filling the flats because of the war, and the parties agreed in writing in 1940 to reduce the rental to a half. No time . .
Cited by:
Cited – WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature) and Another v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc CA 2-Apr-2007
The parties had disputed use of the initals WWF, with a compromise reached in 1994 allowing primary use by the Fund with restricted use by the Federation. The Federation now appealed an award of damages made after a finding of a breach of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Family, Contract, Estoppel
Updated: 25 September 2022; Ref: scu.250976
