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Equity - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 50 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Archer Shee v Garland 15 TC 693; [1930] UKHL 2; [1931] AC 212
15 Dec 1930
HL
Lord Buckmaster, Viscount Dunedin, Lord Warrington of Clyffe, Lord Tomlin, Lord Thankerton
Income Tax, Equity, Wills and Probate
The parties disputed the taxpayer's liability to income tax on income coming due to her on an American based family trust. Held: A beneficiary in a fully administered deceased estate has an equitable interest in property which is the subject of a benefit devised or bequeathed to him or her under the will.
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1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 United Motor Service v Tropic-aire; 1932 - (1932) 57 F 2d 479

 
 In re Sir Thomas Spencer Wells; Swinburne-Hanham v Howard; CA 1933 - [1933] Ch 29

 
 Shipley Urban District Council v Bradford Corporation; ChD 1936 - [1936] Ch 375

 
 Massine v de Basil; CA 1936 - [1936-45] MCC 233; (1938) 82 Sol Jo 173

 
 Morgan v Ashcroft; CA 1937 - [1938] 1 KB 49; [1937] 3 All ER 92
 
Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666; [1937] HCA 52
11 Jun 1937

Dixon J, Latham CJ
Wills and Probate, Contract, Trusts, Equity
(High Court of Australia) Cases of mutual wills are only one example of a wider category of cases, for example secret trusts, in which a court of equity will intervene to impose a constructive trust. Latham CJ described a mutual will arrangement as "a trust which is declared by the law to affect the conscience of [the survivor's] executor and of the volunteers who are devisees or legatees under his will." and "Those who undertake to establish such an agreement [ie of mutual wills] assume a heavy burden of proof".
Dixon J set down the principles for mutual wills: "It has long been established that a contract between persons to make corresponding wills gives rise to equitable obligations when one acts on the faith of such an agreement and dies leaving his will unrevoked so that the other takes property under its dispositions. It operates to impose upon the survivor an obligation regarded as specifically enforceable. It is true that he cannot be compelled to make and leave unrevoked a testamentary document and if he dies leaving a last will containing provisions inconsistent with his agreement it is nevertheless valid as a testamentary act. But the doctrines of equity attach the obligation to the property. The effect is, I think, that the survivor becomes a constructive trustee and the terms of the trust are those of the will he undertook would be his last will . . The purpose of an arrangement for corresponding wills must often be, as in this case, to enable the survivor during his life to deal as absolute owner with the property passing under the will of the party first dying. That is to say, the object of the transaction is to put the survivor in a position to enjoy for his own benefit the full ownership so that, for instance, he may convert it and expend the proceeds if he choose. But when he dies he is to bequeath what is left in the manner agreed upon. It is only by the special doctrines of equity that such a floating obligation, suspended, so to speak, during the lifetime of the survivor can descend upon the assets at his death and crystallize into a trust. No doubt gifts and settlements, inter vivos, if calculated to defeat the intention of the compact, could not be made by the survivor and his right of disposition, inter vivos, is, therefore, not unqualified. But, substantially, the purpose of the arrangement will often be to allow full enjoyment for the survivor’s own benefit and advantage upon condition that at his death the residue shall pass as arranged.”
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[ Austlii ]
 
Greer v Kettle [1938] AC 156; 158 LT 433
1938
HL
Lord Maugham, Lord Russell of Killowen
Contract, Estoppel, Equity
A corporate borrower agreed to repay £250,000 with interest and to charge certain specified shares in another company as security. A guarantee was procured from another company, Parent Trust. The deed of guarantee recited that the lender had made the advance to the borrower "on the security of a charge dated March 1929 on the shares, particulars of which are set out in the schedule hereto". Held: Recitals may also give rise to an estoppel in respect of specific facts stated and adopted as the basis of a transaction, provided that the facts as stated are "certain, clear and unambiguous". However, Parent Trust had never become liable under the guarantee because a charge had never in fact been given over the shares. Where a person guaranteed a loan which was expressed to be secured by a charge on certain shares, and the shares had not been validly issued, it was held that the surety was not liable.
Lord Killowen explained: "the legal rights and liabilities of these parties depend upon the true construction and effect of the agreement of guarantee . . Once it is realized that the debt which Parent Trust are undertaking to guarantee is a debt described as a debt the repayment of which by the principal debtor is secured by a charge on (amongst other shares) the 275,000 shares in Iron Industries, Ld, the case (apart from the question of estoppel, to which I will refer) becomes in my opinion a simple one . . It is not a case, as Bennett J seems to have treated it, of seeking to imply a condition, the implication of which is alleged to be inconsistent with other provisions in the document. In other words, as Romer LJ said, it is not a case of Parent Trust being released from a contractual engagement. It is a case of an attempt to impose upon them a liability which they have never undertaken. The only debt, the repayment of which by the principal debtor they undertook to guarantee, was a debt secured by a charge on the 275,000 shares in Iron Industries, Ld, and a debt so secured never in fact existed. The language of Knight Bruce LJ in Evans v Bremridge (i) may well be applied to the present litigants. In that case it was sought to make a surety liable who became a surety on the footing that a co-surety would join in the covenant with him. The co-surety had not done so, and the surety was held to be under no liability. As the Lord Justice truly said: "The defendants seek to charge the plaintiff with "a contract, into which he did not enter."
Lord Maugham referred to the qualification imposed by equity on the doctrine of estoppel by deed: "The position in equity is and was always different in this respect, that where there are proper grounds for rectifying a deed, e.g., because it is based upon a common mistake of fact, then to the extent of the rectification there can plainly be no estoppel based on the original form of the instrument. It is at least equally clear that in equity a party to a deed could not set up an estoppel in reliance on a deed in relation to which there is an equitable right to rescission or in reliance on an untrue statement of an untrue recital induced by his own representation, whether innocent or otherwise, to the other party. Authority is scarcely needed for so clear a consequence of a rectification order or an admitted or proved right to such an order. The well known rule of the Chancery Courts in regard to a receipt clause in a deed not effecting an estoppel if the money has not in fact been paid is a good illustration of the equity view . . "
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 Spence v Crawford; HL 1939 - [1939] 3 All ER 271; [1939] SC (HL) 52

 
 Dies v British and International Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd; 1939 - [1939] 1 KB 724

 
 Greenwood County v Duke Power; 1939 - (1939) 107 F(2d) 484
 
Crane v Hegeman-Harris Co Inc [1939] 1 All ER 662
1939
ChD
Simonds J
Equity, Contract
A continuing common intention of the parties to a document alone will not suffice to justify rectification. For rectification to be appropriate, there must be convincing proof that the concluded instrument does not represent the common intention of the parties. Where there has been prolonged negotiations resulting in a formal instrument, with parties having their own legal advisors, there is a strong assumption that the instrument represents their real intention.
Simonds J said: "Before I consider the facts and come to a conclusion whether the defendants are right in their contention, it is necessary to say a few words upon the principles which must guide me in this matter. I am clear that I must follow the decision of Clauson J, as he then was, in Shipley Urban District Council v. Bradford Corpn, the point of which is that, in order that this court may exercise its jurisdiction to rectify a written instrument, it is not necessary to find a concluded and binding contract between the parties antecedent to the agreement which it is sought to rectify. The judge held, and I respectfully concur with his reasoning and his conclusion, that it is sufficient to find a common continuing intention in regard to a particular provision or aspect of the agreement. If one finds that, in regard to a particular point, the parties were in agreement up to the moment when they executed their formal instrument, and the formal instrument does not conform with that common agreement, then this court has jurisdiction to rectify, although it may be that there was, until the formal instrument was executed, no concluded and binding contract between the parties. That is what the judge decided, and, as I say, with his reasoning I wholly concur, and I can add nothing to his authority in the matter, except that I would say that, if it were not so, it would be a strange thing, for the result would be that two parties binding themselves by mistake to which each had equally contributed, by an instrument which did not express their real intention, would yet be bound by it. That is a state of affairs which I hold is not the law, and, until a higher court tells me that it is the law, I shall continue to exercise the jurisdiction which Clauson J, as I think rightly, held might be entertained by this court.
Secondly, I want to say this upon the principle of the jurisdiction. It is a jurisdiction which is to be exercised only upon convincing proof that the concluded instrument does not represent the common intention of the parties. That is particularly the case where one finds prolonged negotiations between the parties eventually assuming the shape of a formal instrument in which they have been advised by their respective skilled legal advisers. The assumption is very strong in such a case that the instrument does represent their real intention, and it must be only upon proof which Lord Eldon, I think, in a somewhat picturesque phrase described as "irrefragable" that the court can act. I would rather, I think, say that the court can only act if it is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the instrument does not represent their common intention, and is further satisfied as to what their common intention was. For let it be clear that it is not sufficient to show that the written instrument does not represent their common intention unless positively also one can show what their common intention was. It is in the light of those principles that I must examine the facts of this somewhat complicated case."
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 Derrick v Williams; CA 1939 - [1939] 2 All ER 559

 
 Lissenden v CAV Bosch Ltd; HL 1940 - [1940] AC 412; [1940] 1 All ER 405
 
Wallrock v Equity and Law Life Assurance Society [1942] 2 KB 82
1942


Equity

1 Citers



 
 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver; HL 20-Feb-1942 - [1967] 2 AC 134; [1942] UKHL 1; [1942] 1 All ER 378
 
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32; [1942] UKHL 4
15 Jun 1942
HL
Lord Wright, Viscount Simon
Equity, Contract
A contract for the supply by the respondents of special machinery to be manufactured by them was treated as an ordinary contract for the sale of goods. It began valid, but suffered frustration by the outbreak of war. Held: Lord Wright restated in the English language the maxim 'nemo debet locupletari aliena jactura of the civil law: "It is clear that any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should keep. Such remedies in English law are generically different from remedies in contract or in tort, and are now recognised to fall within a third category of the common law which has been called quasi-contract or restitution."
Viscount Salmon said: "when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and of the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that ground, it is, generally speaking, not the promise which is referred to as the consideration, but the performance of the promise. If this were not so, there could never be any recovery of money, for failure of consideration, by the payer of the money in return for a promise of future performance, yet there are endless examples which show that money can be recovered, as for a complete failure of consideration, in cases where the promise was given but could not be fulfilled." and "In English law, an enforceable contract may be formed by an exchange of a promise for a promise, or by the exchange of a promise for an act . . . but when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and of the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that ground, it is, generally speaking, not the promise which is referred to as the consideration, but the performance of the promise."
Viscount Simon LC said that: "In English law an enforceable contract may be formed by the exchange of a promise for a promise or by the exchange of a promise for an act . . but when one is considering the law of failure of consideration and the quasi-contractual right to recover money on that ground, it is, generally speaking, not the promise that is referred to as the consideration but the performance of the promise."
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[ Bailii ]
 
Transvaal and Delagoa Bay Investment Co Ltd v Atkinson [1944] 1 All ER 579
1944


Equity
Money stolen from a company was paid by the thief into a bank account of his wife. All the money was expended, mostly by being returned to the husband.
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 Re Schebsman; CA 1944 - [1944] Ch 83
 
Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] KB 65
1945
CA
du Parq LJ
Equity, Contract, Torts - Other
An action was brought for the wrongful conversion of machine tools delivered under hire purchase agreements which contravened wartime statutory orders. The plaintiff established its legal title to the goods at issue without relying upon the illegal contract pursuant to which it had hired the goods to the defendant. A party to an illegality can recover by virtue of a legal or equitable property interest if, but only if, he can establish his title without relying on his own illegality. The court stated the general rule that a man's right to possession of an article will be enforced notwithstanding the fact that the article came into his possession by reason of an illegal contract. "a man’s right to possess his own chattels will as a general rule be enforced against one who, without any claim of right, . . has converted them to his own use, even though it may appear from the pleadings, or in the course of the trial, that the chattels in question came into the defendant’s possession by reason of an illegal contract between himself and the plaintiff, provided that the plaintiff does not seek, and is not forced, either to found his claim on the illegal contract or to plead its illegality in order to support his claim." and "It must not be supposed that the general rule which we have stated is subject to no exception. Indeed there is one obvious exception, namely that class of cases in which goods claimed are of such a kind that it is unlawful to deal in them at all, as for example, obscene books. No doubt there are others, but it is unnecessary, and would we think be unwise, to seek to name them all or to forecast the decisions which would be given in a variety of circumstances which may hereafter arise".
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In re Fry [1946] Ch 312; [1946] 2 All ER 105
1946
ChD
Romer J
Equity, Company
A settlor executed a transfer of shares but failed to obtain the consent of the Treasury under the Regulations. The transferees argued that the testator had executed documents which were appropriate to the subject matter of the gift, namely the share transfers, that those documents being under seal were irrevocable and that the settlor had done everything he could that was necessary for him to do to divest himself of the legal and equitable interest in the shares in favour of the transferees. Further they argued that even if the donor had failed to succeed in his purpose, so far as the legal title was concerned, he must be regarded as having passed his equitable interest in the shares. Held: The gift was incomplete, and there is no equity to perfect an imperfect gift. "The testator had not done everything that was required to be done by him at the time of his death. He had not obtained permission from the Treasury. The Treasury might have required further information or answers supplemental to those which he had given in reply to it; and he might have refused to concern himself with the matter further, in which case I do not know how anyone could have compelled him to do so. At the time of the testator’s death a complete equitable assignment had been effected. The interest in the shares so acquired by the assignees would indubitably be an “interest in securities” within the meaning of reg. 3A and inasmuch as they are prohibited from acquiring such an interest except with permission granted by the Treasury, this court cannot recognise a claim to such an interest where the consent of the Treasury was never given to its acquisition. The assignment and acceptance of the interest would both be equally incapable of recognition in the absence of Treasury sanction, and that sanction was never in fact obtained; it might indeed (although the probabilities are certainly otherwise) never have been forthcoming at all."
The Defence (Finance) Regulations 1939
1 Citers


 
In re Diplock's estate [1948] Ch 465
1948
CA
Lord Greene MR
Equity, Limitation
After considering a situation in which trust money had been applied in making alterations to the property of an innocent third party but had not added to the value of the property, Held: The origin of the equitable rules of tracing were described: "the metaphysical approach of equity coupled with and encouraged by the far-reaching remedy of a declaration of charge that enabled equity to identify money in a mixed fund." and
"In the absence of authority to the contrary, our conclusion is that as regards the Diplock money used in these cases it cannot be traced in any true sense; and, further, that even if this were not so, the only remedy available to equity, viz., that of a declaration of charge, would not produce an equitable result and is inapplicable accordingly"
and "In the case of adaptation of property of the volunteer by means of trust money, it by no means necessarily follows that the money can be said to be present in the adapted property. The beneficial owner of the trust money seeks to follow and recover that money and claims to use the machinery of a charge on the adapted property in order to enable him to do so. But in the first place the money may not be capable of being followed. In every true sense the money may have disappeared. .... The result may add not one penny to the value of the house. Indeed the alteration may well lower the value of the house. .... Can it be said that in such cases the trust money can be traced and extracted from the altered asset? Clearly not for the money will have disappeared leaving no monetary trace behind. ...."
As regards limitation, the 12 year period for enforcing a will trust runs from the date of the death, even though a personal representative is not bound to distribute within a year from death.
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 RB Policies at Lloyd's v Butler; 1949 - [1950] 1 KB 76; [1949] 2 All ER 226
 
Macley v Nutting [1949] 2 KB 55
1949


Landlord and Tenant, Equity, Estoppel
Where the grant of a lease has been equitable only, because of an absence of title of the landlord, a later acquisition of the title 'feeds the estoppel' creating a lease in law.

 
In re Re Rose, Midland Bank Executor and Trustee Company Limited v Rose [1949] Ch 78
1949
ChD
Jenkins J
Company, Wills and Probate, Equity
The testator handed a transfer of the relevant shares to the donee, Mr Hook, together with the relevant certificates. The transfer had not been registered by the date of his death. Held: Equity will not compel an imperfect gift to be completed. Nevertheless, the testator had done everything in his power to divest himself of the shares in question to Mr Hook. He had executed a transfer. It was not suggested that the transfer was not in accordance with the company’s regulations. He had handed that transfer together with the certificates to Mr Hook. There was nothing else the testator could do. Mr Hook’s legal title would not be perfected until the directors passed the transfer for registration, but that was not an act which the testator had to do, it was an act which depended on the discretion of the directors. The gift was effective
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 Solle v Butcher; CA 1950 - [1950] 1 KB 671
 
Whiteside v Whiteside [1950] Ch 65
1950
CA
Lord Evereshed MR
Equity
The husband had executed a deed in favour of his former wife after dissolution of their marriage covenanting to pay a specified sum per annum free of income tax up to but not exceeding a stated amount. This provision was in substitution for one drafted by the wife’s solicitors that provided for the payment of such an amount that after the deduction of income tax not exceeding the stated amount would represent the specified sum. The husband sought rectification to restore the deed to the terms of the draft. After the proceedings had been commenced but before the matter came before the Court, the parties executed a supplemental deed rectifying the error so that as between themselves the deed then took the form, and was thereafter to be treated as having always taken the form, that the obligation was to pay such an amount as, after deduction of tax, would leave the specified sum per annum. Held: Without a dispute between the parties, rectification was refused. Rectification may be available where a document contains the very wording that it was intended to contain, but where it has in law or as a matter of true construction an effect or meaning different from that which was intended. The jurisdiction to rectify documents is one which is ‘cautiously watched and jealously guarded’.
Evershed MR commented on a passage from Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 6th ed, at 620: “The passage is this: 'Though the court will rectify an instrument which fails through some mistake of the draftsman in point of law to carry out the real agreement between the parties, it is not sufficient in order to create an equity for rectification that there has been a mistake as to the legal construction or the legal consequences of an instrument.' I do not read that passage as meaning that if the mistake made is in using language to perfect an agreement which in law has some result different from the common intention, that is not a case in which there can be rectification. I do not read the passage as so stating, and I think, as at present advised, that if it did it would be too wide. I think it may well be that if the mistake has arisen from the legal effect of the language used that may provide a ground for the exercise of the court’s reforming power. Subject however to that qualification, I think that the passage cited is correct”
1 Citers


 
Ministry of Health v Simpson; In re Diplock dec [1951] AC 251; (1950) 2 All ER 1137
1950
HL
Simonds L
Equity, Wills and Probate
The will of Cable Diplock purported to make a gift to charity, and was distributed accordingly. The house however found the gift to be invalid. Held: A personal remedy existed for the recovery of amounts wrongly paid in the distribution of an estate.
Lord Simonds was clear that the principles with which he was dealing related to the administration of assets of a deceased person, and: "The broad fact remains that the Court of Chancery in order to mitigate the rigour of the common law or to supply its deficiencies established the rule of equity which I have described and this rule did not excuse the wrongly paid legatee from repayment because he had spent what he had been wrongly paid."
Lord Simonds did not accept that a claim should not lie against a person who had received a legacy in good faith and then spent it, without knowledge of any flaw in his title: "My Lords, I find little help in such generalities. Upon the propriety of a legatee refusing to repay to the true owner the money that he has wrongly received I do not think it necessary to express any judgment. It is a matter on which opinions may well differ. The broad fact remains that the Court of Chancery, in order to mitigate the rigour of the common law or to supply its deficiencies, established the rule of equity which I have described and this rule did not excuse the wrongly paid legatee from repayment because he had spent what he had been wrongly paid. No doubt the plaintiff might by his conduct and particularly by laches have raised some equity against himself; but if he had not done so, he was entitled to be repaid. In the present case the respondents have done nothing to bar them in equity from asserting their rights. They can only be defeated if they are barred at law by some Statute of Limitations."
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George Cohen Sons and Co Ltd v Docks and Inland Waterways Executive (1950) 84 Lloyds Rep 97
1950
CA
Sir Raymond Evershed MR
Equity, Contract
The landlord negotiating a new lease proposed to the tenant that "the terms and conditions contained in the present lease to be embodied in the new lease where applicable." The tenant accepted this offer, but the new lease as executed made the tenant liable for repairs which under the old lease had been the responsibility of the landlord. In answer to a claim for rectification, the landlord said that the new lease was in accordance with what he had understood to be the effect of his offer. Held: This was irrelevant. What mattered was the objective meaning of what the landlord had written. Sir Raymond Evershed MR said: "If the defendants . . did misconstrue [the letter] that is unfortunate for them, but at least they cannot be heard to say that their letter was intended to mean anything other than that which the words convey to the reader as a piece of ordinary English."
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Workington Harbour and Dock Board v Towerfield (Owners) ('The Towerfield') [1951] AC 112
1951
HL
Lord Radcliffe, Lord Normand
Transport, Equity
The occasions upon which the master is called upon to exercise his reserve of authority either by interfering with the conduct of the ship or by taking the navigation out of the hands of a competent pilot are rare and should the master exercise that reserve authority he must justify his action. Section 15 was not limited to cases where the owners of a vessel under compulsory pilotage were facing claims by third parties but extended to a claim by the owners themselves.
Lord Normand discussed the Latin maxim: frustra petis quod mox es restiturus ("it is no good trying to get something which immediately afterwards you are going to have to hand back"), saying "But if the shipowner might have recovered as damages in an action in negligence the sum paid to the harbour authority under section 74, the decision would be saved frustra petis quod mox es restiturus."
Pilotage Act 1913 15
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Hawks v McArthur [1951] 1 All ER 22
1951


Equity, Company
A transfer of the equitable interest in shares in breach of article 8(B) would nonetheless be effective.


 
 Jones v Maynard; 1951 - [1951] Ch 572

 
 Turner v Bladin; 20-Apr-1951 - (1951) 82 CLR 463; [1951] HCA 13

 
 In re Rose, Rose v Inland Revenue Commissioners; CA 1952 - [1952] 1 Ch 499; [1952] EWCA Civ 4; [1952] 1 All ER 1217; [1952] 1 TLR 1577; (1952) 31 ATC 138; [1952] TR 175

 
 Pallant v Morgan; ChD 1952 - [1953] Ch 43; [1952] 2 All ER 951

 
 Frederick E Rose (London) Ltd v William H Pim Jnr and Co Ld; CA 1953 - [1953] 2 QB 450
 
D'Avigdor-Goldsmid v Inland Revenue Commisioners [1953] AC 347
1953
HL

Equity, Insurance
A contingency which makes money payable under a chose cannot affect the proprietary interests in the chose in action and therefore in its proceeds. No fresh beneficial interest in a policy of life assurance accrues or arises on the death of the life assured. The sum assured belongs to the person or persons who were beneficial owners of the policy immediately before the death.
A charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language.
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 Frederick E Rose (London) Limited v William H Pim Junior and Co Limited; 1953 - [1953] 2 QB 450
 
Stockloser v Johnson [1954] CLY 1463; [1954] 1 QB 476
1954
CA
Romer, Denning and Somervell LJJ
Contract, Equity
Romer LJ said that, in the absence of pressure or duress, or other vitiating elements, there was no jurisdiction to provide for relief against forfeiture in the event of the purchaser's default in contracts other than those relating to land.
Denning and Somervell LJJ doubted the correctness of Farwell J and held that where the sum forfeited was out of all proportion to the damage and it was unconscionable for the vendor to retain it, then equity would intervene : even though at common law there was no cause of action whereby the purchaser could have recovered the money paid over.
Denning LJ asked: "Suppose a buyer has agreed to buy a necklace by instalments, and the contract provides that, on default in payment of any one instalment, the seller is entitled to rescind the contract and forfeit the instalments already paid. The buyer pays 90 per cent. of the price but fails to pay the last instalment. He is not able to perform the contract because he simply cannot find the money. The seller thereupon rescinds the contract and retakes the necklace and resells it at a higher price. Surely equity will relieve the buyer against forfeiture of the money on such terms as may be just"
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Barclays Bank Ltd v Bird [1954] 1 Ch 274
1954

Harman J
Land, Equity
An equitable chargee has an immediate right to possession, subject only to his first obtaining an order for possession from the court: "An equitable mortgagee . . has no right to possession until the court gives it to him."
1 Citers



 
 Re Shephard, Shephard v Cartwright; HL 1-Dec-1954 - [1954] UKHL 2; [1955] AC 431; [1954] 3 All ER 494

 
 Tool Metal Manufactuing Company Ltd v Tungsten Electric Company Ltd; HL 16-Jun-1955 - [1955] UKHL 5; [1955] 1 WLR 761; [1955] 2 All ER 657

 
 Alati v Kruger; 29-Nov-1955 - (1955) 94 CLR 216; [1955] HCA 64; [1955] ALR 1047

 
 Behrens v Heilbut; 1956 - (1956) 222 LJ Jo 290
 
Williams v Greatrex [1956] 3 All ER 705; [1957] 1 WLR 31
1956
CA
Denning and Hodson LJJ
Equity
A purchaser agreed to buy land to be laid out in building plots. On payment of a deposit and giving notice, the purchaser was to be entitled to enter onto a particular plot in order to build on it. The arrangement met with difficulties, with the result that the purchaser was forced in 1956 to start proceedings for specific performance to require conveyance of plots 3 and 4. The defendant contended that the time for purchase of those plots had passed and that any case for specific performance was barred by delay or laches.
Denning LJ said: "The second point is on delay or laches. Counsel for the vendor said that there had been too much delay to enable the purchaser to get specific performance. On this point it is necessary to remember that when the deposit was paid there was a binding contract - binding on the vendor - whereby he let the purchaser into the land for the purpose of erecting the buildings. It was binding even though the vendor kept the cheque in his pocket. It was a contractual licence which the vendor could not repudiate at will. It created an equity. The purported repudiation by the vendor in April, 1947, was entirely inoperative. He could not renounce a binding contract in that way. The purchaser did not accept the repudiation as a rescission of the contract. He stopped building, but he did not take down his fence. He still remained in possession of the land, and, being in possession under a contractual licence, he had an equity to remain there. . . . But then it is said: When the vendor repudiated this contract, surely the purchaser ought to have taken him to court; he ought to have brought an action for specific performance then and there to compel him to perform his contract. I confess that argument did appeal to me at one time in the course of the case. ... But I think the answer to it is this: once the purchaser went into possession of the land, having the contractual right to be there, he had not only an equity to be there. He had more. He had the benefit of a contract to sell him these two plots. That was not only an equity: it was an equitable interest in the land. He was in a sense the equitable owner of the land. So long as he was in possession of the land, he did not lose his rights simply by not proceeding at once for specific performance. . . . [reference to Crofton -v- Ormsbty ] Likewise we have here possession which is taken under a contract of purchase with an equitable right to be there. All that needs to be done is for the legal title to be perfected. In such a case, laches or delay is not a bar." Lord Justce Hodson: "I myself attach great importance to the putting round these plots 3 and 4 of a fence. What more can a man do ordinarily, if he buys or agrees to buy a piece of freehold land, in order to show that it is his land and mark it off from the neighbouring land than put a fence round it in that way. This is not the case of a man who had taken a lease and had to pay rent. He has nothing further to do. Land is not capable in the ordinary way of being reduced into possession except in such manner by the inclusion of it in a boundary fence. That is the first thing one is likely to do in any event and perhaps in many cases it may be the only thing one does. In this case the purchaser did a bit more: he started some building; he put up some sheds and did some road works. But the fence, to my mind, was sufficient intimation that he was claiming possession of that land. . . What is the position if the purchaser was in possession? In Fry LJ's book on SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (6th Edn)... para. 1110 reads: 'Where the contract is substantially executed, and the plaintiff is in possession of the property, and has got the equitable estate, so that the object of his action is only to clothe himself with the legal estate, time either will not run at all as laches to debar the plaintiff from his right, or it will be looked at less narrowly by the court...'"
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 William Lacey (Hounslow) Ltd v Davis; 1957 - [1957] 1 WLR 932; [1957] 2 All ER 712
 
Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169; [1957] 1 All ER 371; [1957] 2 WLR 123
1957
ChD
Upjohn J
Land, Equity
The Court was asked whether the covenant to pay an appropriate proportion of the costs of keeping in good repair the roadways, sea wall, drains and sewers in respect of a common development was enforceable. Held: The defendants could not be under any liability to pay their obligations if they did not desire to take the benefit of the deed. On the other hand if they wanted the benefit they must pay. the defendants could not have a right, apart from the deed, to use the roads of the park which led to their particular house. Upjohn J. went on to find that the defendants could not rely on any way of necessity because he held that, when the house was originally sold to the predecessors in title of the then current occupants, same was conveyed subject to a covenant to bear a proper proportion of the expenses in respect of the maintenance of the roads as a condition for being entitled to make use of those roads and other services.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Hanak v Green; CA 1958 - [1958] 2 QB 9; [1958] 2 WLR 755; [1958] 2 All ER 141
 
Armstrong v Sheppard and Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384; [1959] 2 All ER 651; [1959] 3 WLR 84; (1959) 123 JP 401; (1959) Sol Jo 508
1959
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Estoppel, Equity, Nuisance, Torts - Other, Land
The plaintiff had a path at the rear of his property. The defendant constructed a sewer under the path, and asked the plaintiff for permission. He gave it informally, not knowing at the time that he owned the land. The sewer was constructed. Though suffering no inconvenience, on discovering his ownership, the plaintiff requested the removal of the sewer and its manhole, and an associated injunction. The judge at trial found a trespass, but gave only nominal damages and refused an injunction. Held: The plaintiff was not debarred from objecting when his acquiescence arose through ignorance. However the trespass was trivial, and no injunction was granted.
As to the cross appeal, though the trespass was forgiven by the consent, that could not answer the claim as to the continuing discharge since that would amount to an easement which would require a formal grant.
Lord Evershed MR said: "it is true to say that if a man, having a proprietary right, proves an infringement of that right, prima facie he is entitled to an injunction: but that needs some qualification. It is not a matter of unqualified right; and one ground for denying an injunction would be that the wrong done is, in the circumstances, trivial. That proposition is founded on the well-known case of Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. (Directors) v. Broadbent . . The judge was here dealing with the claim as I have formulated it: and he came to the conclusion that the circumstances of this case were special, and, as his judgment shows, that the damage was trivial . . But there were other good grounds, and formidable grounds (as I think) for refusing the plaintiff an injunction. That he misled the defendants is beyond a peradventure. It is no less clear that he attempted to mislead the court. He asserted - contrary to the fact - that he had never had any conversation with the defendants about the matter at all; and in his evidence in chief he so swore, untruly. It is not, therefore, surprising that the judge came to the conclusion that he should grant no equitable relief; and in my judgment, on the facts of this case, he was well entitled to take that view."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Kiriri Cotton Co Ltd v Dewani; PC 1-Dec-1959 - [1960] AC 192; [1959] UKPC 27; [1960] 2 WLR 127; [1960] 1 All ER 177
 
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