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Crime - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 141 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Albert v Lavin Unreported
1980
QBD
Hodgson J
Police, Crime
The defendant (A) and the prosecutor (L), an off duty constable not in uniform, awaited a bus. A pushed past the queue, whose members objected. L stood in his way. A pushed past onto the step of the bus, turned, grabbed L's lapel and made to hit him. L in self defence pulled A from the bus and away from the queue. A again tried to hit L, who said he would arrest him unless he stopped struggling, but A struck the constable several times and the constable arrested him for assaulting a constable in the execution of his duty. Before the justices, the defendant contended that L had not been acting in the execution of his duty. The magistrates convicted A because, given the reactions of the other members of the queue when the defendant pushed past, L had reasonably expected a breach of the peace to be about to take place and so he had been entitled to use reasonable force to prevent the breach of the peace. Held: A constable could detain a man against his will without arresting him. The court addressed the question whether the defendant knew or should have known that L was a constable.
Hodgson J said: "It is however clear law that a police officer, reasonably believing that a breach of the peace is about to take place, is entitled to take such steps as are necessary to prevent it, including the reasonable use of force: King v Hodges [1974] Crim LR 424 and Piddington v Bates [1961] 1 WLR 162. If those steps include physical restraint of someone then that restraint is not an unlawful detention but a reasonable use of force. It is a question of fact and degree when a restraint has continued for so long that there must be either a release or an arrest, but on the facts found in this case it seems to me to be clear that that point had not been reached. Obviously where a constable is restraining someone to prevent a breach of the peace he must release (or arrest) him as soon as the restrained person no longer presents a danger to the peace. In this case the justices found that the defendant continued in breach of the peace up to the time when he assaulted the constable."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Governor of Pentonville Prison ex parte Khubchandani; QBD 1980 - (1980) 71 Cr App R 241
 
Regina v Berwyn Justices, Ex parte Edwards [1980] 1 WLR 1045
1980


Crime, Magistrates

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Barnard; CACD 1980 - [1980] 70 Cr App R 28

 
 Jaggard v Dickinson; QBD 1980 - [1980] 3 All ER 716; [1981] QB 527
 
Regina v Machin [1980] 71 Cr App R 166
1980

Eveleigh LJ
Crime
Eveleigh LJ discussed the elements making up the offence of perverting the course of justice: "The particular acts or conduct in question may take many different forms including conduct that amounts in itself to some other criminal offence."

 
Regina v Murphy [1980] QB 434
1980
CACD

Crime, Road Traffic
The court considered the constituent elements of causing death by reckless driving.

 
Attorney General's Reference (No 5 of 1980) (1980) 72 Cr App R 71; [1981] 1 WLR 88
1980
CACD
Lawton LJ
Crime
The court was asked whether a person who provides screen images derived from a video tape "publish[es] an obscene article" contrary to section 2 of the 1959 Act. Held: Such a publication came within the Act. The court rejected the defendants' arguments that an offence under section 2 was only committed when a conventional i.e. celluloid film was "shown, played or projected" onto a screen. The article was a video cassette containing magnetised tape. When it was played, electric signals caused images to be displayed on the screen. The system "did not involve the projection of light onto a screen". The cassette was an article which produced pictures or sounds within the embrace of the Act. The words "play or project", if not "show" also, in section 1(3)(b) of the Act were wide enough to cover what happens when pictures are produced by this means.
Lawton LJ said: "the word "project" would be apt to cover what happens when a video cassette was brought into use, because what is happening is that the electrical impulses recorded on the video tape are thrown onto the television screen by means of the use of an electric current. In ordinary parlance, they are projected on to the television screen." The Court recognised that it "should be slow to apply the words to a piece of electronic equipment which probably had not been within the contemplation of Parliament" . . "but if the clear words of the statute are sufficiently wide to cover the kind of electronic device with which we are concerned in this case, the fact that that particular form of electronic device was not in the contemplation of Parliament in 1959 is an immaterial consideration. In any event in 1959 Parliament would almost certainly have had in mind the fact that electronic equipment for reproducing words and pictures was something likely to come about in the near future. In those circumstances it is not all that improbable that words were chosen which were wide enough to embrace any developments in the electronic field. But speculation as to what Parliament had in mind and what it probably had not got in mind is neither here nor there. It is the duty of this Court to consider the wording of the Act and to construe the words in it (if they are words of ordinary English usage) in the ways in which they would have been understood by ordinary literate persons at the material time, namely 1959".
Obscene Publications Act 1959 1(2) 2
1 Citers


 
Regina v Soul (1980) 70 Cr App R 295
1980
CACD

Crime
The appellant, had been convicted of conspiring to cause a public nuisance had agreed with others to secure the unlawful release of a restricted Broadmoor patient. Held: The appeal failed. The court rejected an argument, based on R v Madden that the Crown had failed to prove any actual danger.
1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Daley; PC 1980 - [1980] AC 237
 
Keane v Gallagher [1980] ScotHC HCJAC - 4
11 Jan 1980
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
The Queen v Johns (TS) (1980) 143 CLR 108; [1980] HCA 3
7 Feb 1980

Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ
Commonwealth, Crime, Criminal Sentencing
High Court of Australia - Criminal Law (N.S.W.) - Accessory before the fact - Liability - Possible consequences of venture planned with principal in first degree - Sentence of accessory - Whether judge may impose sentence of less duration than life - Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.), ss. 19, 346, 442 (1).
The appellant had been convicted of murder and assault with intent to rob. His role was to drive the principal offender, W, to a rendezvous with a third man, D. The appellant was to wait while the other two men robbed a known receiver of stolen jewellery. Afterwards the appellant was to take possession of the proceeds and hide them in return for a share. The appellant knew that W was carrying a pistol, and W told him that he would not stand for any nonsense if he met any obstacle during the robbery. In the event the victim resisted and W shot him dead.
The judge had directed the jury that the appellant and D would be guilty if the act constituting the offence committed was within the contemplation of the parties as an act done in the course of the venture on which they had embarked. It was argued on the appellant's behalf that while this was an appropriate direction in the case of D, who was present and therefore a principal in the second degree, it was a misdirection in the case of the appellant, who was an accessory before the fact. It was submitted that in his case it was necessary for the jury to conclude that it was a likely or probable consequence of the way in which the crime was to be committed that the gun would be discharged so as to kill the deceased. Held: The High Court unanimously rejected the argument that any distinction was to be drawn between the liability of a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact. There was no reason as a matter of legal principle why such a distinction should be drawn. They also said: "The narrow test of criminality proposed by the applicant is plainly unacceptable for the reason that it stakes everything on the probability or improbability of the act, admittedly contemplated, occurring. Suppose a plan made by A, the principal offender, and B, the accessory before the fact, to rob premises, according to which A is to carry out the robbery. It is agreed that A is to carry a revolver and use it to overcome resistance in the unlikely event that the premises are attended, previous surveillance having established that the premises are invariably unattended at the time when the robbery is to be carried out. As it happens, a security officer is in attendance when A enters the premises and is shot by A. It would make nonsense to say that B is not guilty merely because it was an unlikely or improbable contingency that the premises would be attended at the time of the robbery, when we know that B assented to the shooting in the event that occurred.
In the present case there was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the applicant gave his assent to a criminal enterprise which involved the use, that is the discharge, of a loaded gun, in the event that [the victim] resisted or sought to summon assistance. We need not recapitulate the evidence to which we have already referred. The jury could therefore conclude that the common purpose involved resorting to violence of this kind, should the occasion arise, and that the violence contemplated amounted to grievous bodily harm or homicide."
[ Austlii ]
 
Maxwell and others v HM Advocate [1980] ScotHC HCJAC - 3
21 Mar 1980
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Phillips v Brown Unreported, 20 June 1980; 424/78
20 Jun 1980
QBD
Donaldson LJ, Woolf J
Education, Crime
DONALDSON LJ: Mr. Phillips appeals by case stated against his conviction and a fine of £5 imposed by Mr Loy, the Leeds Stipendiary Magistrates, in September 1978 for failure to comply with a School Attendance Order. It is not the conviction or the fine which irks Mr. Phillips. His irritation, and perhaps even anger, is based upon his belief that the local education authority has exceeded its powers under the Education Act 1944.
The facts can be stated relatively briefly, but it is necessary to refer to the correspondence which is exhibited to the case.
Mr. Phillips and Mrs. Reah, who was also charged and convicted, are the parents of Oak, who was born on or about 24th June 1971. At the relevant time Oak was thus of compulsory school age.
In October 1976 the local education authority (to whom I shall hereafter refer to as the "L.E.A."), became aware that Oak was not attending any school. They wrote to the parents who replied by letter dated 11th October 1976 as follows: "Oak Reah receives efficient, full time education (from Mrs. R.H. Reah and Mr. J.D. Phillips) which is suitable to his age, aptitude, and ability: he receives this education otherwise than by regular attendance at school: he has already received this education since (and inclusive of) his 5th birthday: such education falls in accordance with current Educational Law."
The authority then served a School Attendance Notice on the parents, which they ignored. However, when the matter came before the Leeds Magistrates Court on 6th April 1977, no evidence was offered and the complaint was dismissed.
This was the end of the first round in the contest. The second round, with which we are primarily concerned, opened less than two months later. Oak was still not attending any school and on 14th June 1977 the L.E.A. wrote to the parents as follows:
"As your son, Oak, is now of compulsory school age, the Education Authority is required to satisfy itself that he is being educated in accordance with his age, ability and aptitude.
"I must therefore request that you submit to the Education Authority details of the educational programme which Oak is now following, together with any relevant information which may assist the Authority in satisfying itself that the education being provided is appropriate in the circumstances."
A copy of this letter has been forwarded to your Solicitor . . " Somewhat surprisingly the reply came from solicitors, Victor D. Zermansky & Co., and was in the following terms: "We can do no more than reiterate what we have said previously. Your powers under the Education Act 1944 only come into operation if 'it appears . . that the parents of any child . . are failing to perform their duty.'
"In this case there has been nothing to give any such appearance. Our clients are conscious of their duty expressed in Section 36 of the Education Act 1944 to educate their child in accordance with that Section and confirm that they are so educating him."
There followed a lull in hostilities and then on 24th January 1978 the L.E.A. wrote to the parents: "It would appear that you, being the parents of the above-named child have failed to cause your child to receive full-time education, suitable to his age, ability and aptitude, either by regular attendance at school or otherwise. "I therefore serve this notice upon you that you are required under section 37 of the 1944 Education Act to satisfy my authority by the 8th February 1978, that your child, Oak Reah, is receiving efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude either by regular attendance at school or otherwise."
Reply came there none and on 22nd February 1978 the L.E.A. again wrote to the parents and said that the authority noted their failure to satisfy the authority about the child's education and continued: "The Authority therefore propose to serve upon you, under the provisions of section 37(2) of the Education Act, 1944, a School Attendance Order which will require you to cause the child to become a registered pupil at a particular school to be named in the Order. If you fail to comply with the Order, you will be guilty of an offence, and it will be the duty of the Authority to take proceedings against you."
They later went on to deal with the rights of the parents to express view about the school concerned.
The School Attendance Order itself was dated 3rd April 1978 and required the parents to cause Oak to forthwith become a registered pupil of a named school in the Leeds area. The parents did not comply with this order.
At the hearing before Mr. Loy, the Senior Education Welfare Officer of the L.E.A. gave evidence that Oak was not a registered pupil at a Leeds school and that no information had been forthcoming from the parents regarding the child's curriculum, timetable, subjects to be studied and whether these were appropriate to his age, ability and aptitude. She said that, from these facts, it appeared to the L.E.A. that the parents were failing to perform their duty under section 36 of the Education Act, 1944, and that accordingly, a section 37(1) notice had been served upon them. This was the letter dated 24th January 1978. The parents gave no evidence concerning Oak's education, but took the point that before an L.E.A. could issue a notice under section 37(1) of the Act, something positive must have come to its notice as a result of which it could and did appear to the L.E.A. that there was a failure by the parents in their duty under section 36 of the Act. The parents contended that there was no evidence of any such matter. It followed that it could not appear to the L.E.A. that the parents were failings in their duty, the section 37(1) notice was invalid and so was the School Attendance Order based upon that notice.
The learned Magistrate's conclusions were set out in paragraph 6 of the case as follows: "I was of the opinion: (a) That at the time the letter dated 14th June, 1977 was written the child was not attending school and the Local Authority had no information regarding his teaching. (b) That the letter written by the Local Education Authority dated 14th June 1977 was a perfectly proper request for information and one that they were entitled to make. (c) That the words 'if it appears to a Local Education Authority' in Section 37(1) of the Education Act 1944 make the respondents the judges on the question of whether or not there has been a failure on the part of the parents to perform their duties under the Education Act, and that the court cannot enquire into its judgment. (d) That in any event the failure to send the child to any school and to give any, or any satisfactory, information about the child's schooling when asked by the respondents was sufficient evidence of 'failure' to make it their duty to serve notice under Section 37(1) of the Education Act 1944 asking for details of the child's education. (e) Being satisfied that the respondents had carried out the statutory procedure and requirements of Section 37 of the Act, that the School Attendance Order had been served properly upon the appellants, that the appellants had failed to comply with the requirements of such order and no evidence being adduced before me by, or on behalf of either appellant to prove that the child was receiving efficient full-time education at school or otherwise, I found the summons proved against both defendants and fined them each the sum of £5.00."
Two questions are referred to this Court, namely the interpretation of the words "if it appears" in section 37(1) of the Education Act 1944, and whether the respondent's judgment was a matter about which the Court could enquire and if so whether there was sufficient evidence before the Court, or any evidence upon which it could be established that it did appear to the Local Education Authority.
Mr. Phillips has argued this case with conspicuous skill. In general terms he has two complaints. The first is that an L.E.A. exceeds its powers if it asks parents to prove that they are discharging their duty to ensure that their children are properly educated, unless it has some reason to doubt that this is the case. The second is that the learned Magistrate has held that the L.E.A. is the sole judge of whether it appears to it that parents have failed to discharge this duty, whereas Mr. Phillips contends that the Courts have at least a supervisory jurisdiction.
The starting point for Mr. Phillips's argument is that the Education Act 1944 has placed the duty of securing that children are properly educated fairly and squarely upon the parents. This I accept. The duty is imposed by and expressed in section 36 of the Act, which provides that: "It shall be the duty of the parent of every child of compulsory school age to cause him to receive efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude, either by regular attendance at school or otherwise."
Mr. Phillips says that no similar general duty is imposed upon L.E.A.S. This also I accept. However, it is not correct to conclude, and Mr. Phillips did not suggest, that L.E.A.s were not concerned with whether parents discharge this duty. In the circumstance prescribed by section 37(1) of the Education Act 1944, it is their duty "to serve upon the parent a notice requiring him, within such time as may be specified in the notice not being less than fourteen days from the service thereof, to satisfy the authority that the child is receiving efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude either by regular attendance at school or otherwise". The prescribed circumstance is that "it appears to a local education authority that the parent of any child of compulsory school age in their area is failing to perform the duty imposed on him by the last foregoing section".
Mr. Phillips submits that unless and until something comes to the notice of a local authority which causes it to conclude that prima facie particular parents are in breach of their duty under section 36 of the Education Act 1944 it is neither bound nor entitled to make inquiries of those parents. He claims than an L.E.A. is in the same position as a policeman and says that policeman do not go from house to house inquiring whether a burglary has been committed. Similarly L.E.A.s should not oppress parents by inquiring whether there has been a breach of section 36. In Mr. Phillips's submission the L.E.A. in this case is seeking to invert section 37(1) and to treat it as if it authorised and required the making of inquiries of parents before and in order that the L.E.A. may consider whether it appears that there has been a breach of section 36.
Whilst I acknowledge the force of this argument, it seems to me that where an authority has a duty to take action in particular circumstances, it also has a duty to be alert in order to detect the possibility that those circumstances exist.
It needs to know what children of school age live in its area in order that it may perform its statutory duty to provide sufficient schools (section 8 of the Education Act 1944) and to ascertain what children require special educational treatment (section 34). It knows which of these children attend its own schools. It follows that an L.E.A. will or should know that certain children in its area are in a different category -- namely being educated at other schools, being educated otherwise than by attendance at school or not being educated properly or even at all. Unless the L.E.A. knows into which sub-category a particular child falls, it is put on inquiry.
What should it do? I do not accept that it should do nothing. This would rightly be criticised as an attempt to because like an ostrich -- to put its head in the sand in order that it should not learn of anything which might place upon it the burden of discharging its duty to consider making and, in appropriate cases, to make School Attendance Orders. The most obvious step to take is to ask the parents for information. Of course such a request is not the same as a notice under section 37(1) of the Education Act 1944 and the parents will be under no duty to comply. However it would be sensible for them to do so. If parents give no information or adopt the course adopted by Mr. Phillips of merely stating that they are discharging their duty without giving any details of how they are doing so, the L.E.A. will have to consider and decide whether it "appears" to it that the parents are in breach of section 36. In this context there is no reason why it should necessarily accept the parents' view -- opinions differ on what has to be done in discharge of the duty -- and if the parents refuse to answer, it could very easily conclude that prima facie the parents were in breath of their duty.
If the L.E.A., having considered the matter, is in a state of mind which can be described by saying that it appears to them that the parents are in breach of their obligation under section 36 of the Education Act 1944 it has no alternative but to serve notice on the parents under section 37(1) requiring the parents to satisfy them within a specified period, not being less than fourteen days, that the child is receiving efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude either by regular attendance at school or otherwise. What happens next is set out very clearly in section 37(2) in these terms: "If, after such a notice has been served upon a parent by a local education authority, the parent fails to satisfy the authority in accordance with the requirements of the notice that the child to whom the notice relates is receiving efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude, then, if in the opinion of the authority it is expedient that he should attend school, the authority shall serve upon the parent an order in the prescribed form (hereinafter referred to as a 'school attendance order') requiring him to cause the child to become a registered pupil at a school named in the order". "Expedient" in this context means "advantageous, fit, proper or suitable to the circumstances of the case" (see the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary).
If the parents fail to comply with the School Attendance Order, they commit an offence unless they prove that they are causing the child to receive efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude otherwise than at school. This is a matter which falls to be proved to the satisfaction of the magistrates to whom complaint is made that an offence has been committed.
Life would have been much easier for all concerned, including Mr. Phillips, if he had seen fit to place evidence before the Magistrate designed to prove this point, but he did not do so. Instead he sought to argue that the School Attendance Order itself should not have been made because it did not in fact appear to the L.E.A. that he and Mrs. Reah were it breach of their section 36 duty and accordingly the L.E.A. had not been entitled to issue the order. Alternatively, he would like to have contended that the L.E.A. could not have formed the opinion that it was expedient that Oak should attend school. The learned Magistrate held that it was not open to him to consider such an argument. Here I think that he erred.

In The Secretary of State for Employment v. ASLEF (No. 2) [1972] 2 Q B 455, [1972] 2 All ER 949 the Court of Appeal was concerned with a statute which authorised the making of an application to the Court "if it appears to the Secretary of State . ." The Court held that this did not put the Minister's decision beyond challenge. It was open to a respondent to the application to seek to show that the Minister had not acted bona fide or that he must have misdirected himself in law. Similarly, in the case of proceedings brought for non-compliance with a School Attendance Order, in my judgment it is open to the defendant parent to place evidence before the Court designed to show that it could not have appeared to a reasonable L.E.A., correctly directing itself as to what matters were relevant, that the parent was in breach of his section 36 duty or, as the case may be, that it was expedient that the child should attend school and that the making of the School Attendance Order was therefore unauthorised and a nullity. But Courts should not readily accede to such an argument in the absence of evidence that in fact the parents are discharging their section 36 duty and, if this is once proved, the defendant would in any event be entitled to be acquitted and the Court may make an order under section 37(6) of the Education Act 1944 that the School Attendance Order shall cease to be in force. In the circumstances parents would be well advised to concentrate upon the defence which is available to them under section 37(5) rather than to take on the very much heavier burden of seeking to attack the School Attendance Order in limine.
On the facts of this case the learned Magistrate should have applied his mind to the question of whether it could properly have appeared to the L.E.A. that the parents were in breach of their section 36 duty and whether it could properly have been of opinion that it was expedient that Oak should attend school and I answer the questions set out in the case stated accordingly. The conviction will be set aside and the matter remitted to the learned Magistrate for further consideration should the L.E.A. wish him to do so. However, if we were correctly informed by Mr. Phillips that Oak is no longer in his care and custody, it may be that the L.E.A. will think that no further action is called for in relation to this particular School Attendance Order.
Mr. Phillips also contended that he was in effect entitled to plead autrefois acquit on the basis of his acquittal of the complaint based upon the earlier School Attendance Order. Here he is wrong. The offence alleged in the second proceedings was a different offence, namely non-compliance with the second order. All that can be said is that if, which may or may not have been the case, no evidence was offered in support of the first complaint because the L.E.A. was satisfied that the parents were discharging their section 36 duty at that time, the Magistrate, in the absence of some explanation, might wonder why the positions was different at the time of the issue of the second School Attendance Order.
Finally, I should mention that Mr. Phillips expressed concern lest, if the Magistrate's view of the law was right, it would be open to an L.E.A. to persecute a parent by issuing a series of School Attendance Orders at short intervals, making complaints that the orders were not complied with and on each occasion requiring the parent to prove that he was discharging his section 36 duty. There is no evidence whatsoever that this has happened in this case or in any other case. But Mr. Phillips need have no fear. Apart altogether from the power of the Magistrates Court to order that a particular School Attendance Order shall cease to be in force pursuant to section 37(6), the Divisional Court, in an appropriate case, has the necessary power and would have no hesitation in restraining such conduct by an L.E.A. by means of judicial review.
WOOLF J: I agree.
: Conviction set aside, case remitted to the Magistrates.
Education Act 1944 36 37(2)
1 Cites


 
Dean v John Menzies Ltd [1980] ScotHC HCJ - 1
3 Oct 1980
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Guzzardi v Italy (1980 Series A No 39); 7367/76; [1980] ECHR 5; (1980) 3 EHRR 333
6 Nov 1980
ECHR

Human Rights, Crime
The applicant, a suspected Mafioso, had been detained in custody pending his trial. At the end of the maximum period of detention pending trial, he had been taken to an island where, he complained, he was unable to work, keep his family permanently with him, practise the Catholic religion or ensure his son's education. Held: Confinement on such a small island was a deprivation of liberty under the convention. "The difference between deprivation of and restriction upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance. Although the process of classification into one or other of these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure opinion, the Court cannot avoid making the selection upon which the applicability or inapplicability of Article 5 depends." and "The starting point must be [the] concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question." The procedure did not however involve the determination of a criminal charge against him within the meaning of article 6.
European Convention on Human Rights 5 6
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Milne v Tudhope [1980] ScotHC HCJ - 2
13 Nov 1980
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Sheppard [1981] AC 394
1981
HL
Lord Diplock
Crime, Children
The section made it an offence for anyone having care of a child to wilfully neglect the child "in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to health". Held: The section speaks of an act or omission that is ‘likely’ to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to health. This word is imprecise. It is capable of covering a whole range of possibilities from ‘it’s on the cards’ to ‘it’s more probable than not’, but having regard to the ordinary parent’s lack of skill in diagnosis and to the very serious consequences which may result from failure to provide a child with timely medical attention, it should be understood as excluding only what would fairly be described as highly unlikely.
Lord Diplock: "To "neglect" a child is to omit to act, to fail to provide adequately for its needs; and, in the context of section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, its physical needs rather than its spiritual, educational, moral or emotional needs. These are dealt with by other legislation."
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 1
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Howell (Errol); CACD 1981 - [1982] 1 QB 416; [1982] QB 416; [1981] 73 Crim App R 31
 
Attorney-General's Reference (No 6 of 1980) [1981] 2 All ER 1057; [1981] 3 WLR 125; [1981] QB 715
1981
CACD
Lord Lane CJ
Crime
The court considered a reference on a point of law as to whether consent could be a defence to a charge of assault arising out of a fight in a public place to which the other party consented. Held: Lord Lane CJ said: "It is not in the public interest that people should try to cause, or should cause, each other actual bodily harm for no good reason. Minor struggles are another matter. So in our judgment, it is immaterial whether the act occurs in private or in public; it is an assault if actual bodily harm is intended and/or caused. This means that most fights will be unlawful regardless of consent."
1 Citers



 
 JBH and JH (minors) v O'Connell; QBD 1981 - [1981] Crim LR 632

 
 Regina v Malcherek and Steel; CACD 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 690; [1981] 2 All ER 422, CA; (1981) 73 Cr App R 173
 
Faulkner v Talbot [1981] 1 WLR 1528
1981
CACD

Crime
An indecent assault includes an intentional touching of one person by another in circumstances of indecency, whether or not (where the person touched is a girl under 16) she consents.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Phekoo; CACD 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 1117; [1981] 3 All ER 1117

 
 Regina v Grossman; CA 1981 - (1981) 73 Cr App R 302
 
Regina v Jobling [1981] Crim LR 625
1981
CACD
Taylor J
Crime
The court considered an appeal against a conviction for possession of a prohibited automatic weapon. Held: It was insufficient to ask whether the weapon was originally designed to fire continuously; the question was whether it remained so.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Large (1981) 3 Cr App R(S) 80
1981
CACD
Griffiths LJ
Crime
The court considered disparities between sentencing of different defendants in the same case: "If there be honour among thieves and armed robbers, let him who has been properly and severely sentenced rejoice in the good fortune of his companion who has received a lenient sentence. Let him not complain that he himself has received a proper sentence."
1 Citers



 
 Kaur v Chief Constable for Hampshire; CACD 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 578

 
 Regina v Lawrence (Stephen); HL 1981 - [1981] 2 WLR 524; [1982] AC 510; (1981) 73 Cr App R 1; [1981] 1 All ER 974
 
Regina v Selvage, Morgan [1982] QB 372; [1982] 1 All ER 96; (1981) 73 Cr App R 333
1981
CACD
Watkins LJ
Crime
A conspiracy to effect some other unlawfulness but which has no tendency to cause a miscarriage of justice in curial proceedings, is not a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. If no proceedings of any kind are in contemplation at the time the relevant act by the accused was done, then there is no interference with the course of justice.
Unless the principles governing the offence of perverting the course of justice which emerge from the reported cases are well recognised and properly applied there is a danger of bringing into existence a hitherto unrecognised and unwarranted extension of the ambit of this offence. Caution is required in extending the ambit of this offence.
Watkins LJ gave an illustrative list of instances of perverting the course of justice: "That conduct includes giving false information to the police with the object of among other things putting the police on a false trail, obstructing the police in their inquiries into crime, the destruction of or other interferences with evidence and bringing wrongful influence to bear upon witnesses or potential witnesses." He went on to urge caution in extending the ambit of the offence to new fact patterns: "In our judgment unless the principles governing the offence of perverting the course of justice which emerge from the reported cases are well recognised and properly applied there is a danger of bringing into existence a hitherto unrecognised and unwarranted extension of the ambit of this offence."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Longman and Cribben; CACD 1981 - [1981] 72 Cr App 121

 
 Attorney General's Reference (No 1 of 1980); CACD 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 34; (1981) 72 Cr App R 60

 
 Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security; HL 2-Jan-1981 - [1981] AC 800; [1981] 1 All ER 545 CA and HL(E); [1981] 2 WLR 279; [1980] UKHL 10
 
Criminal Proceedings Against Rene Joseph Kugelmann R-108/80; [1981] EUECJ R-108/80
5 Feb 1981
ECJ

European, Crime
ECJ Approximation of legislation - preservatives which may be used in foodstuffs intended for human consumption - duty of member states - scope - right of individuals to rely upon the provisions of Directive 64/54/EEC - limits
(Council Directive 64/54/EEC)
At the present stage in the approximation of legislation in the field of preservatives , member states are not bound to authorize for use in foodstuffs all the substances the use of which is permitted by Directive 64/54/EEC. They have retained a certain discretion to determine their own rules concerning the addition of preservatives to foodstuffs, subject to the twofold condition that no preservative may be authorized unless it appears in the list annexed to the directive and that the use of a preservative which is listed there may not be totally prohibited except in special cases where there is no technological necessity.
In these circumstances, an individual who is prosecuted for using sorbic acid in certain foodstuffs intended for human consumption cannot rely upon the provisions of Directive 64/54/eec authorizing the use of that preservative if the applicable national legislation permits the use thereof in other foodstuffs intended for human consumption.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Commissioner of Police v Caldwell; HL 19-Mar-1981 - [1982] AC 341; [1982] UKHL 1
 
Attorney General's Reference No 6 of 1980 [1981] EWCA Crim 1
7 May 1981
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Criminal Proceedings v Rinkau R-157/80; [1981] EUECJ R-157/80
26 May 1981
ECJ

European, Crime
ECJ 1. The concept of an offence which was not intentionally committed appearing in article II of the protocol annexed to the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters must be regarded as an independent concept which must be explained by reference, first, to the objectives and scheme of the convention and, secondly, to the general principles which the national legal systems have in common. It covers any offence the legal definition of which does not require, either expressly or as appears from the nature of the offence defined, the existence of intent on the part of the accused to commit the punishable act or omission.
2. The right to be defended without appearing in person, granted by Article II of the aforementioned protocol, applies in all criminal proceedings concerning offences which were not intentionally committed, in which the accused's liability at civil law, arising from the elements of the offence for which he is being prosecuted, is in question or on which such liability might subsequently be based.
[ Bailii ]
 
Olugboja, Regina v [1981] EWCA Crim 2; 73 Cr App R 344; [1982] QB 320
17 Jun 1981
CACD

Crime
The actus reus of the offence of rape was an act of sexual intercourse to which the complainant did not consent at the time it occurred.
Sexual Offences Act 1956 3
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Lambie; HL 25-Jun-1981 - [1981] UKHL 4; [1982] AC 449; [1981] 2 All ER 776; [1981] 3 WLR 88

 
 Regina v Cunningham; HL 8-Jul-1981 - [1982] AC 566; [1981] UKHL 5; [1981] 2 All ER 863; (1981) 145 JP 411; [1981] 3 WLR 223; (1981) 73 Cr App R 253
 
Ibrams, Regina v [1981] EWCA Crim 3
27 Jul 1981
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Dip Kaur v Chief Constable of Hampshire [1981] 1 WLR 578; [1981] 2 All ER 430; [1981] Crim LR 259; (1981) 72 Cr App R 359; (1981) 145 JP 313
10 Oct 1981

Lord Lane CJ
Crime
Lord Lane CJ said: 'the court should not be astute to find that a theft has taken place where it would be straining the language so to hold, or where the ordinary person would not regard the defendant's acts, though possibly morally reprehensible, as theft.'
Theft Act 1968

 
Regina v Denton [1982] 1 All ER 65; [1981] 1 WLR 1446; [1981] EWCA Crim 4
22 Oct 1981
CACD
Lord Lane LCJ, Mustill, McCullough JJ
Crime
The defendant was charged with criminal damage by setting fire to a building. It was owned by a company which in turn he owned. Held: There is nothing unlawful about destroying one's own property
Criminal Damage Act 1971 1(2) 1(3)
[ Bailii ]

 
 Dudgeon v The United Kingdom; ECHR 22-Oct-1981 - 7525/76; [1981] 4 EHRR 149; [1981] ECHR 5
 
Regina v Arthur (Unreported 5-Nov-1981)
5 Nov 1981

Farquharson J
Crime

1 Citers


 
Sayers and others v Her Majesty's Advocate [1981] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
27 Nov 1981
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Albert v Lavin; HL 3-Dec-1981 - [1982] AC 546; [1981] 3 WLR 955; [1981] 3 All ER 878; [1981] UKHL 6

 
 Regina v Graham (Paul); CACD 18-Dec-1981 - [1982] 1 WLR 294; [1981] EWCA Crim 5; (1982) 74 Cr App R 235; [1982] 1 All ER 801
 
Regina v Richman and Richman [1982] CLY 544
1982


Crime

Criminal Justice Act 1925 47
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Graham; CACD 1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 294
 
Green v Moore [1982] 1 All ER 428
1982

Donaldson LJ
Crime
The respondent, a probationer police constable was convicted for obstructing police officers in the execution of their duty under s51(3) of the 1964 Act. He was a regular in a bar he knew was to be raided. He warned the landlord who complied with the law that evening. A plain clothes constable was to drink there to observe if drinking was allowed after licensing hours, and let in uniformed constables who would be on patrol outside if that was the case. The Crown Court allowed his appeal saying that to establish the offence, the prosecution had to prove that the person aided by the alleged obstruction was at the time of the obstruction in the course of committing or had committed an offence, and since the alleged obstruction, namely, the warning, took place during licensing hours, no offence had been or could have been committed by the licensee at the time of the obstruction. The prosecutor appealed. Held: To give a warning to a person so that he could postpone the commission of a crime until the danger of detection had past, was just as much an obstruction of a constable as was giving a warning in order that a crime already in the course of being committed could be suspended until the danger of detection had past. Donaldson criticised the case of Bastable: "If Bastable v Little has never yet been criticised, this is a situation which is capable of being remedied. It seems to us to be a very curious decision based on a highly eccentric view of the facts. The decision seems to have proceeded on the basis that prior to the warning the motorists concerned had not exceeded the speed limit and that the warning was intended to discourage them from ever so doing. If that were indeed the position, we would agree that no offence was committed. Far from obstructing the police in the execution of their duty, Mr Little would have been assisting them in one of their most important duties, namely, crime prevention. But a more realistic view of the facts is that the warning was based on a lively anticipation that even if the motorists were not then exceeding the speed limit, they were likely to do so over the measured distance and the warning was intended to discourage them from doing so until after they had passed out of the area of the police trap. However, the court never considered that hypothesis. We cannot see any distinction between a warning given in order that the commission of a crime may be suspended whilst there is danger of detection, which is an offence (see Betts v Stevens) and one which is given in order that the commission of a crime may be postponed until after the danger of detection has passed. We are, of course, bound by Bastable v Little and it must be left to others to consider overruling it. However, it is an authority which, in our judgment, should be strictly confined to the facts as the court found them."
Police Act 1964 51(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v McIvor; CA 1982 - [1982] 1 WLR 409; [1982] 1 All ER 491

 
 Thomas v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago; PC 1982 - [1982] AC 113; (1981) 32 WIR 375; [1981] 3 WLR 601

 
 Regina v Raven; CACD 1982 - [1982] Crim LR 51

 
 Regina v Landy; Regina v White etc; CACD 1982 - [1981] 1 WLR 355; [1981] 1 All ER 1172

 
 Regina v Whitehead; CACD 1982 - [1982] 3 WLR 543; [1982] QB 1272; [1982] 3 All ER 96; (1982) 75 Cr App R 389
 
Regina v Pannell [1983] 76 Cr App R 53; [1982] Crim LR 752
1982
CACD

Crime
The defendant had been found in possession of the disassembled parts for three prohibited automatic firearms. Held: The appeal failed despite the fact that the ability of the carbines to fire automatically required an operation of some delicacy achieved only by an expert in re-assembling the parts.
Firearms Act 1968 5
1 Citers



 
 Campbell v Campbell; CC 1982 - [1982] Crim LR 595
 
Regina v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23 CA
1982


Crime

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Dalby; CACD 1982 - [1982] 74 Cr App Rep 348; [1982] CLY 639; [1982] 1 WLR 425

 
 Ajodha v The State; PC 1982 - [1982] AC 204; [1981] 2 All ER 193; [1981] 3 WLR 1

 
 Regina v Boyesen; HL 1982 - [1982] AC 768
 
Gilham v Breidenbach [1982] RTR 328
1982
QBD

Road Traffic, Crime
Whether telling a police offer to 'Fuck off' was a withdrawal of the officer's implied licence to be on private land. Held: The meaning to be inferred from such words was to be worked out in the context of the particular case.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Swan Hunter Shipbuilders Ltd; CA 1982 - [1982] 1 All E R 264

 
 Regina v Reed; CACD 1982 - [1982] Crim LR 819

 
 Dillon v The Queen; PC 25-Jan-1982 - [1982] AC 484; [1982] UKPC 1a
 
Regina v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161; [1983] 2 WLR 539; [1983] 1 All ER 978; [1982] UKHL 6
17 Mar 1982
HL
Lord Diplock, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook and Lord Brightman
Crime
The defendant, a vagrant, fell asleep in an empty house. His lighted cigarette fell onto his mattress, and a fire started. Rather than put it out, he moved to another room. He was accused of arson. Held: He was guilty. A defendant would be guilty even though he did not know he had started the fire. He was, in doing nothing about it, reckless as to what further damage would be caused. Lord Diplock said: "I see no rational ground for excluding from conduct capable of giving rise to criminal liability, conduct which consists of failing to take measures that lie within one's power to counteract a danger that one has oneself created, if at the time of such conduct one's state of mind is such as constitutes a necessary ingredient of the offence. I venture to think that the habit of lawyers to talk of actus reus, suggestive as it is of action rather than inaction, is responsible for any erroneous notion that failures to act cannot give rise to criminal liability in English Law."
Criminal Damage Act 1971 1(1)(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Heron; Regina v Storey; Regina v Thomas [1982] UKHL 9; [1982] 1 All ER 993; [1982] 1 WLR 451; (1982) 75 Cr App R 7; [1982] Crim LR 430 House of Lords
25 Mar 1982
HL
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Scarman, Lord Bridge of Harwich
Crime
The defendants appealed against their convictions for conspiracy to counterfeit gold coins. They said no evidence had been brought to suggest their intention to commit any dishonest act. The House was asked whether the offence was one of specific or basic intent. Held: The appeal was dismissed. The offence was one of basic intent.
A provision in a consolidating Act, must be taken to have incorporated the law as it stood. Lord Scarman said: "The earlier statute law, therefore, and judicial decisions as to its meaning and purpose are very relevant, if there be any difficulty or ambiguity."
Coinage Offences Act 1936 1(1)(a)
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Ghosh; CACD 5-Apr-1982 - [1982] 1 QB 1053; (1982) 75 Cr App R 154; [1982] 2 All ER 689; [1982] EWCA Crim 2; [1982] 3 WLR 110
 
Kelly (John Joseph) v Mackinnon [1982] ScotHC HCJAC - 2; 1982 SCCR 205; 1983 SLT 9; 1982 JC 94
11 May 1982
HCJ
Lord Justice-General Emslie
Scotland, Crime

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Sutcliffe (Peter) Unreported, 24 May 1982
24 May 1982
CACD
Lord Lane CJ
Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for 13 murders and 7 attempted murders saying that his plea of diminished responsibility should not have been rejected. Held: The appeal failed. Lord Lane CJ said: "The psychiatrists all substantially agreed that in a case such as this, the diagnosis was necessarily based very largely, if not entirely, upon what the accused man had told them. Again there was a general consensus of opinion between the medical men that if the accused man really believed that what he was telling the doctors was true, namely that he was on a divinely inspired mission to kill prostitutes, then the diagnoses would be correct. There was also a consensus that if on the other hand what this man told them upon the more important features of the case was to his knowledge false and was a deliberate lie, then their diagnosis in its turn would be falsified." and "The matter was thrashed out at great length before the jury and the jury came to the conclusion that . . this man was probably not telling the truth to the doctors and accordingly their diagnosis was falsified, through no fault of theirs."
1 Citers


 
Fitzmaurice, Regina v [1982] EWCA Crim 1; [1983] 1 All ER 189; [1983] 2 WLR 227; [1983] QB 1083; [1982] Crim LR 677; (1982) 76 Cr App R 17
8 Jul 1982
CACD
O'Connor LJ, Neill, Taylor JJ
Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for inciting others to commit robbery. The men he was said to have incited were not convicted.
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Halai [1983] Crim LR 624
15 Jul 1982
CACD

Crime
The defendant went to his solicitor, who was also an agent of a building society, to raise a mortgage to purchase a house. The defendant gave false details in the form which was intended to induce the building society to make an advance. He signed the document. He was charged with dishonestly attempting to obtain from the building society a service, namely a mortgage advance, by deception. He was convicted. Held: His conviction was quashed. A mortgage advance cannot be described as a service. A mortgage advance is the lending of money for property and can properly be charged under section 15 of the 1968 Act, if the facts support it. The services which the defendant was alleged to have obtained, or to have attempted to obtain, were respectively the opening of a savings account; a mortgage advance: and the increase of an apparent credit balance in a savings account.
Theft Act 1978 1 15
1 Citers


 
The Director of Public Prosecutions v Stewart [1982] UKPC 32; [1982] 3 WLR 884; [1983] 2 AC 91
28 Jul 1982
PC

Crime
The Board heard an appeal regarding the criminal elements of Exchange Control regulations.
[ Bailii ]
 
Sweeney v X [1982] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
22 Oct 1982
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Tan [1983] QB 1053
1983
CA
May LJ and Parker and Staughton JJ
Crime
Tan and others were accused of keeping a disorderly house having advertised: "Humiliation enthusiast, my favourite past time is humiliating and disciplining mature male submissives, in strict bondage, lovely tan coloured mistress invites humble applicants, TV, CP, BD and rubber wear." Held: The court upheld convictions which were dependent on Gloria Greaves, a post-operative male to female transsexual, still being in law a man, despite having undergone treatment to make him a female trans-sexual. The court rejected a submission that if a person had become philosophically or psychologically or socially female, that person should be held not to be a man. Parker J said: "In our judgment both common sense and desirability of certainty and consistency demand that the decision in Corbett v Corbett should apply for the purpose not only of marriage, but also for a charge under Section 30 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 or Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 1967."
Before a conviction the jury had to be satisfied that the services provided were open to members of the public who wished to partake of them, and were "of such a character and conducted in such a manner (whether by advertisement or otherwise) that their provision amounts to an outrage of public decency, or is otherwise calculated to injure the public interest to such an extent as to call for condemnation and punishment". The provision of what was described as "straightforward sexual intercourse" would not be sufficient to constitute the offence.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
J J C (A Minor) v Eisenhower [1983] 3 All ER 230; [1983] Crim L R 567
1983
QBD

Crime
The defendant shot an airgun at a group of people. He hit someone just below the eye, causing bruising, but not breaking the skin. One blood vessel at least below the skin burst. Held: His conviction was set aside. A conviction under section 20 for wounding required evidence of a break in the continuity of the skin. A scratch is insufficient, there needed to be a breach in the whole of the skin, and not merely the outer layer called the epidermis or the cuticles, in order to establish a wound.
Offences Against the Persons Act 1861 20
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Wilson (Clarence); Regina v Jenkins; HL 1983 - [1984] AC 242; [1983] 3 WLR 686; [1983] 3 All ER 448
 
Elliott v C [1983] 1 WLR 939; [1983] 2 All ER 1005
1983

Robert Goff LJ, Glidewell J
Crime
A 14-year old girl of low intelligence entered a shed, poured white spirit on the floor and set it alight. The fire destroyed the shed after she left. The allegation was that she was reckless. The justices applied Caldwell but inferred that in his reference to "an obvious risk" Lord Diplock had meant a risk which was obvious to the particular defendant, and acquitted her. Finding she had given no thought to the possibility of a risk that the shed and contents would be destroyed, and this risk would not have been obvious to her or appreciated by her if she had thought about the matter. Held: Appeal allowed. (Glidewell J) "if the risk is one which would have been obvious to a reasonably prudent person, once it has also been proved that the particular defendant gave no thought to the possibility of there being such a risk, it is not a defence that because of limited intelligence or exhaustion she would not have appreciated the risk even if she had thought about it." (Robert Goff LJ) was reluctantly constrained by the authorities and plainly did not consider the outcome to be just.
Criminal Damage Act 1971 1
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Ewing [1983] 2 All ER 645; [1983] 3 WLR 1; [1983] QB 1039
1983
CA

Crime
The admissibility of a handwriting comparison depended upon the control sample being "proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine". Held: This meant that the judge had to apply the criminal standard of proof to the question.
Criminal Procedure Act 1865
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Wayte; 1983 - [1983] 76 Cr App Rep 110

 
 Regina v Miller and Glennie; Miller v- Glennie; 1983 - [1983] 1 WLR 1056; [1983] 1 All ER 978

 
 Hodgetts v Chiltern District Council; HL 1983 - [1983] 2 AC 120
 
Regina v Kimber [1983] 1 WLR 1118; [1983] 3 All ER 316; (1983) 77 Cr App R 225
1983
CACD
Lawton LJ
Crime
For mens rea, it is the defendant's belief, not the grounds on which it is based, which goes to negative the intent. The guilty state of mind was the intent to use personal violence to a woman without her consent. If the defendant did not so intend, he was entitled to be found not guilty. If he did not so intend because he believed she was consenting, the prosecution will have failed to prove the charge, irrespective of the grounds for the defendant's belief. There had to be evidence that the appellant had intended to do what he did unlawfully. However, “recklessness” is established by “indifference” to the woman’s wishes, “aptly described in the colloquial expression, ‘Couldn’t care less’”.
Lawton LJ said: "The offence of indecent assault is now statutory: see section14 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. The prosecution had to prove that the appellant made an indecent assault on Betty. As there are no words in the section to indicate that Parliament intended to exclude mens rea as an element in this offence, it follows that the prosecution had to prove that the appellant intended to commit it. This could not be done without first proving that the appellant intended to assault Betty. In this context assault clearly includes battery. An assault is an act by which the defendant intentionally or recklessly causes the complainant to apprehend immediate, or to sustain, unlawful personal violence . . In this case the appellant by his own admissions did intentionally lay his hands on Betty. That would not, however, have been enough to prove the charge. There had to be evidence that the appellant had intended to do what he did unlawfully. When there is a charge of indecent assault on a woman, the unlawfulness can be proved . . by evidence that the defendant intended to cause bodily harm. In most cases, however, the prosecution tries to prove that the complainant did not consent to what was done. The burden of proving lack of consent rests upon the prosecution: see Reg v May [1912] 3 KB 572, 575, per Lord Alverstone CJ. The consequence is that the prosecution has to prove that the defendant intended to lay hands on his victim without her consent. If he did not intend to do this, he is entitled to be found not guilty; and if he did not so intend because he believed she was consenting, the prosecution will have failed to prove the charge. It is the defendant's belief, not the grounds on which it was based, which goes to negative the intent."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Barry and Barry [1983] 5 Cr App R (S) 11
1983


Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Greensmith [1983] 1 WLR 1124
1983
CACD
Lawton LJ
Crime
The word "cocaine" when used in Part I of Schedule 2 to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 is used in the generic sense so that it includes the specific forms, derivatives or preparations of it which come within the wording of paragraphs 2 to 5 of Part I of the Schedule.
Lawton LJ said: "It follows that 'cocaine' can be a natural substance or a substance resulting from a chemical transformation; but both substances are cocaine. In our judgment the word 'cocaine' as used in paragraph 1 is a generic word which includes within its ambit both the direct extracts of the coca leaf, the natural form, and whatever results from a chemical transformation. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of Part I of the Schedule, in our judgment, deal with the various kinds of substance which can result from chemical transformations. It is significant that in each of these paragraphs what is referred to is a chemical form 'of a substance specified'. What sections 2 and 5(3) are dealing with are 'substances or products'. This case is concerned with the substance 'cocaine' which may have a number of forms but they are still cocaine."
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971
1 Citers


 
McKenzie v Skeen 1983 SLT 121
1983
HCJ

Crime, Scotland

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 28(2)
1 Citers


 
Brazil v Chief Constable of Surrey [1983] 3 All E R 537; [1983] 1 WLR 1155
1983
QBD
Robert Goff LJ, McNeill J
Police, Crime, Human Rights, Torts - Other
The appellant had been convicted of assaulting a female police officer in the course of her duty when attempting to search her at a police station under section 23(2). She said that the police officers had not been acting in the execution of their duty because a search imposed a restraint on a person's freedom and also an interference with the right to privacy under Article 8(1) of the ECHR. Held: A police constable was not normally entitled to carry out such a search without first telling the victim of the search why it was necessary in the particular case. The reason for a police officer exercising a search is to allow the person to be searched to object that the reason is inadequate: Counsel: "If persons do not know why they are being searched, they have no basis on which to form a view whether or not that search is justified in the circumstances." Robert Goff LJ: "I can see no difficulty in general terms in the officer explaining to the person no doubt in the simplest and most ordinary language, why the search is proposed. In my judgment, generally speaking, that ought to be done. Consistent with the speech of Viscount Simon in Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573, there may well be circumstances where the giving of such reasons would not be necessary. To give an example, the circumstances may be such that it is perfectly obvious why a search is necessary. If so, it would be otiose for the officer concerned to give an explanation." and "In general terms, the citizens of this country should not have their freedom interfered with unless it would be lawful to do so, and, in my judgment, an explanation should generally be given to persons why a personal search is to be carried out."
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 23(2)
1 Cites


 
Parkin v Norman [1983] 1 QB 92
1983
QBD

Crime
The court had to construe the meaning of 'likely' in the section reading: "Any person who in any public place . . uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour . . with intent to provoke a breach of the peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence." Counsel submitted that "likely" meant "probably". Held: "Our task is to construe the words of section 5 in the light of the Act as a whole, including its long title, to which reference can properly be made if the words of the section are ambiguous." and "It is to be noted that the words of the statute are: 'whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned' and not 'whereby a breach of the peace is liable to be occasioned'. This is a penal measure and the courts must take care to see that the former expression is not treated as if it were the latter."
Public Order Act 1936 5
1 Citers


 
Regina v Tan [1983] QBD 1053
1983
CA

Crime
The defendant appealed against a conviction for living from the earnings of prostitutes. He was a male to female trans-sexual, and said that the offence was only capable of applying to a man. Held: A person born male was correctly convicted under a statute penalising men who live on the earnings of prostitution, notwithstanding the fact that the accused had undergone gender reassignment therapy. Biological criteria should be used to determine the sex of a party.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Mitchell; 1983 - [1983] QB 741
 
Regina v Taaffe [1983] 1 WLR 627
1983
CACD
Lord Lane CJ
Crime
The defendant appealed a conviction for having been knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on the importation of cannabis resin. He said he had done so at the request of a someone but that he believed the substance to be currency which he thought was not controlled. The recorder had ruled that he would be obliged to direct the jury that, even upon the defendant's version of events, they would be obliged to convict. He pleaded guilty. Held: The appeal was allowed. While it was not essential for a conviction for the Crown to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the goods that were being imported, he was to be judged on the facts as he believed them to be.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Smith v Chief Superintendent, Woking Police Station; 1983 - (1983) 76 Cr App R 234

 
 Regina v Seymour; HL 1983 - [1983] 2 AC 493; 1983] 2 All ER 1058

 
 Gibson v Wallace; 1983 - [1983] 1 WLR 393
 
Regina v Morris (David) [1983] 2 All ER 448; [1983] 2 WLR 768; [1983] QB 587
1983
CACD

Crime
Two defendants worked together to alter the labels on joints of meat in a supermarket, and to present the one with the now reduced price at the till. The appealed convictions for theft saying that since the purchase transferred the property in the meat to them, no appropriation had taken place within the section. Held: The convictions were appropriate. There had been an assumption of the rights of the owner.
Theft Act 1968 1
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Morris (David); Anderton v Burnside [1984] AC 320; [1983] 3 WLR 697; [1983] 3 All ER 288; [1984] UKHL 1
2 Jan 1983
HL
Lord Roskill
Crime
The defendants had been accused of theft. One switched labels on a joint of pork in a supermarket, and the other presented the meat with the now cheaper label for purchase. Held: The appeals were dismissed. There can be no conviction for theft unless all four elements contained in section 1(1) are proved; (b) for the purposes of section 3(1) it is sufficient to prove the assumption of any of the rights of the owner in the goods in question; (c) the substitution of a label showing a lesser price on goods for one showing a greater price constitutes an assumption of one of the rights of the owner of the goods and amounts to an appropriation of those goods.
Theft Act 1968 1(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Pagett, Regina v; CACD 3-Feb-1983 - [1983] EWCA Crim 1; (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; [1983] Crim LR 394

 
 Bailey, Regina v; CACD 11-Mar-1983 - [1983] EWCA Crim 2; [1983] Crim LR 353; [1983] 1 WLR 760

 
 Sibartie, Regina v; CACD 21-Apr-1983 - [1983] EWCA Crim 3; [1983] Crim LR 470
 
Attorney-General v Able and Others [1983] 3 WLR 845; [1984] 1 QB 795; [1984] 1 All ER 277
28 Apr 1983
QBD
Woolf LJ
Crime, Administrative, Criminal Practice, Media
The Attorney General sought a declaration as to whether it would be the crime of aiding and abetting or counselling and procuring suicide, to distribute a booklet published by the respondent which described various effective ways of committing suicide. The stated aim of the booklet was to help readers overcome the fear of dying. Held: The offence would be committed only in the particular circumstances of the booklet being supplied to a particular individual considering suicide and with the intent of assisting or encouraging him. The offence was not committed by the general distribution of the booklet. However the court should also be reluctant to make declarations in advance as to the legality or otherwise of particular acts. That risked usurping the function of the court which considered a particular set of circumstances.
Suicide Act 1961 2(1)
1 Cites

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Thomson v H.M. Advocate [1983] ScotHC HCJ - 1
25 Jul 1983
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Khaliq v HM Advocate [1983] ScotHC HCJ - 2; 1984 JC 23
17 Nov 1983
HCJ

Scotland, Crime
K appealed against his conviction on a libel of culpable and reckless conduct. Held: Lord Justice-General said: ‘There is ample authority for the view that the wilful and reckless administration of a dangerous substance to another causing injury or death, is a crime at common law in Scotland. Examples are to be found in cases such as HM Advocate v Brown and Lawson, HM Advocate v Jean Crawford. In these cases the victims were young children but it does not appear to me that the relevancy of the charges there made depended essentially on the age, state of knowledge, or attitude of the victim. In the passage in Alison, Criminal Law, Vol 1, p 629, dealing with this topic it is not suggested that the criminal character of the administration is affected by the absence of any pretence as to the nature of the substance administered, or by the knowledge of the victim of the properties of the substance administered. The case of HM Advocate v Milne and Barry throws further light upon the problem. In that case a charge libelling the wicked and felonious administration of jalap—a powerful purgative, dangerous when taken in quantity—to an adult to his injury was held to be irrelevant because it was not said to have been administered with criminal intent. The point was that the jalap could have been administered for a good medical reason. Lord Cowan was of opinion that had the charge libelled that the jalap had been administered "wilfully and culpably" it might have amounted to a criminal charge, and it is to be noted that the charge did not libel any pretence nor that the jalap was administered without the knowledge and consent of the victim. Upon the matter of the consent of a victim to conduct causing injury to him, or his death, the law is perfectly clear. Consent on the part of the victim—even instigation by the victim—is of no importance at all. Clear authority is to be found for that proposition in the cases of HM Advocate v Rutherford (murder); Smart v HM Advocate (assault) and Finlayson v HM Advocate (culpable homicide by injection of a controlled drug causing death). In light of what I have said so far I have no doubt whatever that had charge (1) libelled that the appellants had, culpably, wilfully and recklessly, held the containers supplied to the noses of the children to enable them to inhale the vapours of the solvents to their injury, the relevancy of such a charge, bearing in mind the state of knowledge attributed to the appellants, would be beyond question. I go further and say that the relevancy of such a charge would not have been impaired had the alleged consenting victims of the alleged conduct of the accused been of full age. It is nothing to the point either that the victims might, without committing any criminal offence, have inflicted the same injury upon themselves, for the question is simply whether the accused has, by wilful and reckless conduct on his part, caused real injury to a third party.’
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 Regina v Williams (Gladstone); CACD 28-Nov-1983 - (1983) 78 Cr App R 276; [1987] 3 All ER 411; [1983] EWCA Crim 4
 
S and Another, Regina v [1983] EWCA Crim 5
5 Dec 1983
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Gammon v The Attorney-General of Hong Kong (1985) 1 AC 14; [1984] 2 All ER 503; [1984] UKPC 17; (1985) 80 Cr App R 194; (1984) 81 LSG 1993; (1984) 26 BLR 159; [1984] Crim LR 479
1984
PC
Lord Scarman
Crime
(Hong kong) The court considered the need at common law to show mens rea. A Hong Kong Building Ordinance created offences of strict liability in pursuit of public safety which strict liability was calculated to promote. Held: Lord Scarman summarised the principles: "(1) there is a presumption of law that mens rea is required before a person can be held guilty of a criminal offence; (2) the presumption is particularly strong where the offence is 'truly criminal' in character; (3) the presumption applies to statutory offences, and can be displaced only if this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute; (4) the only situation in which the presumption can be displaced is where the statute is concerned with an issue of social concern, and public safety is such an issue; (5) even where a statute is concerned with such an issue, the presumption of mens rea stands unless it can also be shown that the creation of strict liability will be effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance to prevent the commission of the prohibited act."
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Regina v Whitefield (1984) 79 Cr App R 36
1984


Crime
The two accused agreed to break into a flat, but before entry was achieved, W said he withdrew. The other burgled the flat with another. Held: The appeal was allowed. The judge was wrong to tell the jury that communication of his withdrawal to a co-accused was insufficient.
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Regina v Taaffe [1984] AC 539
1984
HL
Scarman L
Crime
For the purpose of section 170(2) of the 1979 Act a defendant must be judged on the facts as he believed them to be, such matter being an integral part of the inquiry as to whether he was knowingly concerned in a fraudulent evasion of a prohibition on importation. The principle that a man must be judged upon the facts as he believed them to be was an accepted principle of the criminal law when the state of a man's mind and his knowledge are ingredients of the offence with which he is charged.
Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 170(2)
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Regina v Yuthiwattana [1984] 128 SJ 661; [1984] Crim LR 562
1984
CACD

Landlord and Tenant, Crime
The defendant appealed against his convictions under the 1977 Act. Held: Under section 1(2) the deprivation of occupation for one day was insufficient. To constitute an offence, the deprivation had to take the character of an eviction. However, the appeal against the offence under section 1(3) failed. It was sufficient to establish that the acts, including in this casse an omission to act, complained of were calculated to interfere with the peace and comfort of the occupier and done with the intention of causing him to leave. In this case, the landlord's failure to replace a lost key was found to be an "act" of harassment against a tenant.
Protection from Eviction Act 1977 1(2) 1(3)
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HM Advocate v Paxton 1984 JC 105
1984
HCJ

Crime

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Regina v Thompson (1984) 79 Cr App R 191
1984


Crime
The appellant, in Kuwait, had fraudulently caused a bank there to credit his bank balances in England. Held: The court discussed its jurisdiction: "It is of course a basic principle of our criminal law that no British subject can be tried under English law for an offence committed on land abroad, unless there is a statutory provision to the contrary. In so far as offences under section 15 of the Theft Act are concerned, it is accepted on both sides in this appeal that the question on the issue of jurisdiction in this territorial context is whether the obtaining of the property concerned occurred within the jurisdiction. If authority is required for that proposition it is to be found in HARDEN (1962) 46 Cr. App.R. 90; [1963] 1 Q.B. 8 and in Governor of Pentonville Prison, ex parte Khubchandani (1980) 71 Cr. App.R 241."
Theft Act 1968 15
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Wings Ltd v Ellis [1984] 1 All ER 1046; [1984] 1 WLR 731
1984
QBD
Mann J
Crime, Consumer
Mann J said: "The most that could be said for the respondent is that the members of this class [those ruling the company], although establishing a system, failed to establish a system which would have prevented the mistake which occurred. That failure cannot, in our judgment, constitute 'recklessness'. There may be cases where the system is such that he who establishes it could not be said to be having regard to the truth or falsity of what emerged from it, but that is not this case."
Trade Descriptions Act 1968
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 In re Nielsen; HL 1984 - [1984] AC 606; [1984] 2 All ER 81; (1983) 79 Cr App R 1; [1984] 2 WLR 737

 
 Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v A-G of Hong Kong; PC 1984 - [1985] AC 1; [1984] 2 All ER 503; [1984] 3 WLR 437; [1984] Crim LR 479; (1984) 80 Cr App R 194; [1985] LRC (Crim) 439
 
Regina v Caswell [1984] Crim LR 111
1984
Crwn

Crime
Crown Court at Wakefield
1 Citers


 
Regina v Beck (1984) 80 Crim App R 355
1984
CACD
Watkins LJ
Crime
Stolen travellers' cheques were cashed in France and then presented through normal banking channels to a bank in England. The first and main ground of appeal was that no offence had been thereby committed within the jurisdiction of the Crown Court, because the "execution" of the valuable security, by its "acceptance", had taken place in France. Held: "we see no good reason why there should not be a series of acceptances, ie executions, in respect of a traveller's cheque, and provided the last of them, namely when the final act of payment on the cheque is made, occurs here, the Crown Court has jurisdiction to deal with the offence. " The court held that, on the facts of that case, that is what had happened, and therefore the court had had jurisdiction to try the case
Theft Act 1968 20(2)
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Attorney-General's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1985] QB 182; [1984] Crim LR 570; (1984) 79 Cr App R 288; [1984] 3 WLR 686
1984
CACD

Crime
The defendant, a police woman, had received an overpayment of wages. She recognised it as such. She did not withdraw any part of he money, but did not return it. She was accused of theft. Held: A conviction for theft was possible even though the money had not been wihdrawn. A debt owed by the bank to the customer is a chose in action, which is "property" and as such capable of being misappropriated or misapplied. The defendant had a legal obligation to return the sum.

 
Regina v Gittens [1984] QB 698; [1984] Crim LR 554
1984
CACD
Lord Lane CJ
Crime
Lord Lane set out the directions to be given to a jury on the defence of diminished responsibility: "Where a defendant suffers from an abnormality of mind arising from arrested or retarded development or inherent causes or induced by disease or injury and has also taken drink before the killing, the abnormality of mind and the effect of the drink may each play a part in impairing the defendant's mental responsibility for the killing. The task for the jury is to decide whether, despite the disinhibiting effect of the drink on the defendant's mind, the abnormality of mind arising from a cause specified in subsection 2(1) nevertheless substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his fatal acts. Accordingly it is not correct for the judge to direct the jury that unless they are satisfied that if the defendant had not taken drink he would have killed, the defence of diminished responsibility must fail. Such a direction is incorrect because it fails to recognise that the abnormality of mind arising from a cause specified in the subsection and the effect of the drink may each play a part in impairing the defendant's mental responsibility for the killing."
Homicide Act 1957 2
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JM (A Minor) v Runeckles (1984) 79 Cr AppR 255
1984
QBD
Mann J
Crime, Children
Mann J considered the conditions for criminal responsibility in a child under 14 and said: "I would respectfully adopt the learned judge's use of the phrase 'seriously wrong'. I regard an act which a child knew to be morally wrong as being but one type of those acts which a child can appreciate to be seriously wrong. I think it is unnecessary to show that the child appreciated that his or her action was morally wrong. It is sufficient that the child appreciated the action was seriously wrong. A court has to look for something beyond mere naughtiness or childish mischief."
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Regina v Delgado [1984] 1 WLR 89
1984
CACD
Skinner J
Crime
The court considered the meaning of 'supply' under the 1971 Act: "Thus we are driven back to considering the word 'supply' in its context. The judge himself relied upon the dictionary definition, which is a fairly wide one. This court has been referred to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, which gives a large number of definitions of the word 'supply', but they have a common feature, viz.: that in the word 'supply' is inherent the furnishing or providing of something which is wanted. In the judgment of this court, the word 'supply' in section 5(3) of the Act of 1971 covers a similarly wide range of transactions. A feature common to all of those transactions is a transfer of physical control of a drug from one person to another. In our judgment questions of the transfer of ownership or legal possession of those drugs are irrelevant to the issue whether or not there was intent to supply. "
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 4 5
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Regina v Stephen Malcolm R (1984) 79 Cr App R
1984


Crime
Malcom had thrown petrol bombs at the outside wall of the bedroom of a girl who he believed had informed on him in relation to a series of burglaries. He had admitted throwing the bombs but claimed he had done so to frighten the girl and without realising that if a bomb had gone through the window it might have killed her. He was charged on the basis of recklessness. He submitted that when considering recklessness the jury could only convict him if he did an act which created a risk to life obvious to someone of his age and with such of his characteristics as would affect his appreciation of the risk. The trial judge ruled against him and pleaded guilty. Held: If the House had wished to modify the Caldwell principle to allow for the age of the defendant, the opportunity had existed in Elliott v C. Though concerned at the principle the court had little doubt that on the facts of the case the answer would have been the same even if the jury had been able to draw a comparison with what a boy of the defendant's age would have appreciated.
Criminal Damage Act 1971 1(2)
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Perka v The Queen [1984] 2 SCR 232; 13 DLR (4th) 1
1984

Dickson J, Wilson J
Crime, Commonwealth
(Canada) The court analysed the defence of necessity. The concept of necessity is used as an excuse for conduct which would otherwise be criminal. The defence arose where, realistically, the individual had no choice, where the action was "remorselessly compelled by normal human instincts", and (Dickson J) "I agree with this formulation of the rationale for excuses in the criminal law. In my view this rationale extends beyond specific codified excuses and embraces the residual excuse known as the defence of necessity. At the heart of this defence is the perceived injustice of punishing violations of (Canada) The law in circumstances in which the person had no other viable or reasonable choice available; the act was wrong but it is excused because it was realistically unavoidable." The involuntariness of the actor's conduct "is measured on the basis of society's expectation of appropriate and normal resistance to pressure" and "If the defence of necessity is to form a valid and consistent part of our criminal law it must, as has been universally recognised, be strictly controlled and scrupulously limited to situations that correspond to its underlying rationale." Wilson J: "... The ethical considerations of the "charitable and the good" must be kept analytically distinct from duties imposed by law. Accordingly, where necessity is invoked as a justification for violation of the law, the justification must, in my view, be restricted to situations where the accused's act constitutes the discharge of a duty recognised by law. The justification is not, however, established simply by showing a conflict of legal duties. The rule of proportionality is central to the evaluation of a justification premised on two conflicting duties since the defence rests on the rightfulness of the accused's choice of one over the other."
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Regina v Seers (1984) 79 Cr App R 261
1984
CACD
Griffiths LJ
Crime
The court considered whether the defendant's depression could amount to an impairment.
Griffiths LJ said: "It is to be remembered that in Byrne . . all the doctors agreed that Byrne could be described as partially insane; he was a sexual psychopath who had hideously mutilated a young woman he had killed. In such a case the evidence justifies inviting a jury to determine the degree of impairment of mental responsibility by a test of partial insanity. But it is not a legitimate method of construing an Act of Parliament to substitute for the words of the Act an entirely different phrase and to say that it is to apply in all circumstances. We are sure that this was not the intention of the court in Byrne . . , and the phrase was used as one way of assisting the jury to determine the degree of impairment of mental responsibility in an appropriate case, and no doubt to point out that Parliament by the use of the word 'substantial' was indicating a serious degree of impairment of mental responsibility."
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 Collins v Wilcock; QBD 1984 - [1984] 3 All ER 374; [1984] 1 WLR 1172; (1984) 79 Cr App R 229; [1984] Crim LR 481; (1984) 148 JP 692
 
Regina v D [1984] AC 778; [1984] 2 All ER 449; (1984) 79 Cr App R 313
1984
HL
Brandon L
Crime
The House defined the common law offence of kidnapping as the taking or carrying away of one person by another, either by force or by fraud, without the consent of the person taken or carried away and without lawful excuse.
Lord Brandon said: "From this wide body of authority six matters relating to the offence of kidnapping clearly emerge. First, the nature of the offence is an attack on, and infringement of, the personal liberty of individuals. Secondly, the offence contains four ingredients as follows: (1) the taking or carrying away of one person by another; (2) by force or by fraud; (3) without the consent of the person so taken; and (4) without lawful excuse. Thirdly, until the comparatively recent abolition by statute of the division of criminal offences into the two categories of felonies and misdemeanours, the offence of kidnapping was categorised by common law as a misdemeanour only. Fourthly, despite that, kidnapping is always regarded, by reason of its nature, as a grave and (to use the language of an earlier age) heinous offence. Fifthly, in earlier days, the offence contained a further ingredient, namely that the taking or carrying away should be from a place within the jurisdiction to another place outside it; this further ingredient has, however, long been obsolete, and forms no necessary part of the offence today. Sixthly, the offence was in former days described not merely as taking or carrying away a person, but further or alternatively as secreting him; this element of secretion has, however, also become obsolete, so that, although it may be present in a particular case, it adds nothing to the basic ingredient of taking or carrying away."
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Regina v Sullivan [1984] AC 156; 1983] 2 All ER 673; (1983) 77 Cr App R 176; [1983] 3 WLR 123
1984
HL
Lord Diplock
Crime
The burden of establishing insanity in a criminal trial is on the defence on the balance of probabilities.
Lord Diplock said: 'I agree with what was said by Devlin J. in Reg. v. Kemp (1957) 1 QB 399, 407, that 'mind' in the M'Naghten Rules is used in the ordinary sense of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding. If the effect of a disease is to impair these faculties so severely as to have either of the consequences referred to in the latter part of the rules, it matters not whether the aetiology of the impairment is organic, as in epilepsy, or functional, or whether the impairment itself is permanent or is transient and intermittent, provided that it subsisted at the time of commission of the act. The purpose of the legislation relating to the defence of insanity, ever since its origin in 1800, has been to protect society against recurrence of the dangerous conduct. The duration of a temporary suspension of the mental faculties of reason, memory and understanding, particularly if, as in Mr. Sullivan's case, it is recurrent, cannot on any rational ground be relevant to the application by the courts of the M'Naghten Rules, though it may be relevant to the course adopted by the Secretary of State, to whom the responsibility for how the defendant is to be dealt with passes after the return of the special verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity.' To avoid misunderstanding I ought perhaps to add that in expressing my agreement with what was said by Devlin J. in Kemp, where the disease that caused the temporary and intermittent impairment of the mental faculties was arteriosclerosis, I do not regard that learned judge as excluding the possibility of non-insane automatism (for which the proper verdict would be a verdict of 'not guilty') in cases where temporary impairment (not being self-induced by consuming drink or drugs) results from some external physical factor such as a blow on the head causing concussion or the administration of an anaesthetic for therapeutic purposes.'
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Regina v Morris and King (1984) 79 Cr App R 104
1984
CACD
Dunn LJ
Crime
The court was asked to say what was required to be shown in deciding whether an object had the appearance of a firearm. Held: The court rejected an objective test, saying: "In considering whether or not the thing looked like a firearm at that time, the jury are entitled to have regard to the evidence of any witnesses who actually saw the thing at that time, together with their own observation of the thing itself, if they have seen it."

 
Davideg -v Bunnett [1984] Crim LR 297
1984


Crime


 
Regina v Courtie [1984] 1 All ER 740 HL(E); [1984] 2 WLR 330; [1984] AC 463
1984
HL
Lord Diplock
Criminal Sentencing, Crime
The House considered how to frame an indictment in a case of buggery where the prescribed punishment differed depending on the particular factual ingredients. Held: Lord Diplock said: "Where it is provided by a statute that an accused person's liability to have inflicted upon him a maximum punishment which, if the prosecution are successful in establishing the existence in his case of a particular factual ingredient, is greater than the maximum punishment that could be inflicted on him if the existence of that particular factual ingredient were not established, it seems to me to be plain beyond argument that Parliament has thereby created two distinct offences, whether the statute by which they are created does so by using language which treats them as being different species of a single genus of offence, or by using language which treats them as separate offences unrelated to one another. . The statement of offence in the instant case may therefore just pass muster, provided that it is supplemented by adequate particulars of offence which give to Courtie reasonable information as to which of the particular species of offences falling within the genus buggery, was the offence with which he was charged."
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Regina v Brown (K) [1984] 79 Cr App R 115
1984
CACD
Eveleigh L
Crime
The defendant was accused of fraudulently inducing the investment of money. The means by which that investment was induced was an essential ingredient. A number of matters were specified in the charge as together constituting that ingredient. Held: To convict of an offence under the section, the jury must be agreed as to when the account was used. It was enough that any one of them was proved, but that had to be to the satisfaction of the whole jury. In the case of sections 2(1) and 3(1) the result is what the jury must be agreed about. So long as they are agreed on that, they do not need to be agreed on all the details of the evidence.
Theft Act 1978 1(1)
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Regina v Morris (1984) 79 Cr App R 104
1984
CACD

Crime
The defendant had with him, with intent to commit robbery, a separate object, namely two metal pipes bound together, which had the appearance of a double-barrelled shotgun. Held: He was properly convicted of possession of an imitation firearm.
1 Citers


 
Attorney-General's Reference (No. 2 of 1982) [1984] QB 624; [1984] 2 WLR 447; [1984] 2 All ER 216; (1983) 78 Cr App R 131; [1984] Crim LR 241; [1984] BCLC 60
1984
CACD
Kerr LJ
Crime, Company
Two men were charged with theft from a company which they wholly owned and controlled. The court considered the actions of company directors in dishonestly appropriating the property of the company, and whether since the title to the goods was transferred, the goods had remained the property of the company. Held: The actions of the directors were ultra vires. The principle that the dishonesty of the directors was not to be imputed to the company applied also in criminal law. The issue of dishonesty was for the jury. Where as here there was an effective identity between the dirtector appropriating the property and the company, whether the acts were ultra vires in the context of the company's articles of association was not conclusive. The acts of the defendants could amount to stealing.
The decision in Belmont Finance "directly contradicts the basis of the defendants' argument in the present case. There can be no reason, in our view, why the position in the criminal law should be any different".
Theft Act 1968 2(1)(a) 2(1)(b)
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Attorney-General's Reference (No 2 of 1983) [1984] 1 All ER 988; [1984] EWCA Crim 1; [1984] QB 456
3 Feb 1984
CACD
Lord Lane CJ
Crime
The defendant, a shop-keeper, found his shop to be in the middle of serious rioting. His shop had been damaged badly and he suffered looting. Fearing further attacks he stayed in his shop, making 10 petrol bombs for protection. Held: A defendant might set up the statutory defence of showing that he possessed an explosive substance "for a lawful purpose" if he could establish on the balance of probabilities that his purpose was to protect himself or his family or property by way of self-defence against an imminent and apprehended attack by means which he believed to be no more than reasonably necessary to meet the attack.
Lord Lane CJ said: "The defendant in this case said that his intentions were to use the petrol bombs purely to protect his premises should any rioters come to his shop. It was accordingly open to the jury to find that the defendant had made them for the reasonable protection of himself and his property against this danger. The fact that in manufacturing and storing the petrol bombs the defendant committed offences under the Act of 1875 did not necessarily involve that when he made them his object in doing so was not lawful. The means by which he sought to fulfil that object were unlawful, but the fact that he could never without committing offences reach the point where he used them in self-defence did not render his object in making them for that purpose unlawful. The object or purpose or end for which the petrol bombs were made was not itself rendered unlawful by the fact that it could not be fulfilled except by unlawful means. The fact that the commission of other offences was unavoidable did not result in any of them becoming one of the defendant's objects.
In our judgment a defendant is not left in the paradoxical position of being able to justify acts carried out in self-defence but not acts immediately preparatory to it. There is no warrant for the submission on behalf of the Attorney General that acts of self-defence will only avail a defendant when they have been done spontaneously. There is no question of a person in danger of attack "writing his own immunity" for violent future acts of his. He is not confined for his remedy to calling in the police or boarding up his premises. He may still arm himself for his own protection, if the exigency arises, although in so doing he may commit other offences. That he may be guilty of other offences will avoid the risk of anarchy contemplated by the reference. It is also to be noted that although a person may 'make' a petrol bomb with a lawful object, nevertheless if he remains in possession of it after the threat has passed which made his object lawful, it may cease to be so. It will only be very rarely that circumstances will exist where the manufacture or possession of petrol bombs can be for a lawful object."
Explosive Substances Act 1883 4
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Regina v Moloney [1985] AC 905; [1984] UKHL 4; [1985] 1 All ER 1025; [1985] 2 WLR 648
21 Mar 1984
HL
Lord Bridge of Harwich
Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder. Held: The appeal was allowed and a conviction for manslaughter substituted.
Lord Bridge of Harwich discussed the case of Hyam: "But looking on their facts at the decided cases where a crime of specific intent was under consideration, including Hyam . . they suggest to me that the probability of the consequence taken to have been foreseen must be little short of overwhelming before it will suffice to establish the necessary intent." In the rare cases in which it might be necessary to direct a jury by reference to foresight of consequences it would be sufficient to ask two questions: "First, was death or really serious injury in a murder case (or whatever relevant consequence must be proved to have been intended in any other case) a natural consequence of the defendant's voluntary act? Secondly, did the defendant foresee that consequence as being a natural consequence of his act? The jury should then be told that if they answer yes to both questions it is a proper inference for them to draw that he intended that consequence."
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De Boucherville v The State of Mauritius [1994] 2 AC 324; [1994] UKPC 5
18 Apr 1984
PC
Lord Templeman, Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle, Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Woolf, Lord Lloyd of Berwick
Commonwealth, Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder.
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Regina v Allen [1985] 3 WLR 107; [1984] UKHL 6; [1985] AC 1029; [1984] 2 All ER 641
13 Jun 1984
HL
Lord Hailsham LC, Lord Scarman, Lord Diplock, Lord Bridge of Harwich, Lord Brightman
Crime
The defendant had left his hotel without paying, and was charged with making off without payment. He said he intended to pay the bill later after making some business transactions. The judge had directed the jury that the intent to avoid payment need not be permanent. Held: The House could look to the Law Commission report which had led to the Act in order to determine the mischief, but not to interpret the section as enacted. On the words of the section an intention to deprive had to be permanent in order to come within the section.
Theft Act 1978 3
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Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1984] Crim LR 549; [1985] AC 168; [1984] 3 WLR 677; [1984] 3 All ER 877; [1984] UKPC 27; (1985) 80 Cr App R 117; (1984) 81 LSG 216
21 Jun 1984
PC
Sir Robin Cooke, Keith of Kinkel, Bridge of Harwich, Brandon of Oakbrook, Templeman LL
Crime, Commonwealth
The appellant and co-accused were charged with murder. They said they had gone to meet the deceased to collect a debt, but had been attacked with a knife by the deceased. Two of the three had knives and knew of the other knife. Held: All were taking part in a joint and unlawful enterprise. Each had sufficient intent if they foresaw the possibility of death or serious bodily injury to the accused during the unlawful enterprise, but that had to be shown against each of them.
Sir Robin Cooke described the simplest form of joint enterprise: "a person acting in concert with the primary offender may become a party to the crime, whether or not present at the time of its commission, by activities variously described as aiding, abetting, counselling, inciting or procuring it. In the typical case in that class, the same or the same type of offence is actually intended by all the parties acting in concert. In view of the terms of the directions to the jury here, the Crown does not seek to support the present convictions on that ground. The case must depend rather on the wider principle whereby a secondary party is criminally liable for acts by the primary offender of a type which the former foresees but does not necessarily intend.
That there is such a principle is not in doubt. It turns on contemplation or, putting the same idea in other words, authorisation, which may be express but is more usually implied. It meets the case of a crime foreseen as a possible incident of the common unlawful enterprise. The criminal liability lies in participating in the venture with that foresight.
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 Regina v Allen; CACD 23-Jul-1984 - [1985] 1 WLR 50
 
Hardie, Regina v [1984] EWCA Crim 2
31 Jul 1984
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Leung Kam-Kwok v The Queen [1984] UKPC 53
17 Dec 1984
PC

Crime
Hong Kong
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Roffel [1985] VR 511; [1985] VicRp 51
19 Dec 1984

Young CJ, Crockett, Brooking JJ
Commonwealth, Crime
(Australia - Supreme Court of Victoria) A couple ran a clothing manufacturing business. They then formed a limited company of which they became the sole directors and shareholders and sold the business to the company. The price remained unpaid. The company's premises were destroyed by fire and the proceeds of insurance were paid into the company's bank account. The company's debts exceeded the proceeds of the insurance. The husband drew cheques on the company's account and was prosecuted for theft from the company and convicted. Held: (Majority) The court quashed the conviction. Under the Crimes Act 1958 the necessary element of appropriation required proof of adverse interference with or usurpation of some right or rights of the owner (Regina v. Morris). As the company was a separate legal entity, and in the particular circumstances (through its directing mind and will) had consented to the husband's drawing the cheques, it could not be said that he had appropriated the company's property.
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