The applicant wife had been shown to have been guilty of considerable misconduct of the financial case. It was submitted that, as a result of that misconduct, the court should reduce the wife’s award on the application of the Section 25(2)(g) criterion.
Held: The appropriate penalty was in costs, not in a reduction in the assets awarded. Thorpe J said: ‘There was no principle that serious non-disclosure would always be penalised in costs.’
The wife was shown under cross examination to have made a serious under-disclosure in her ancillary relief application. H argued that this should be reflected in the award to be made to her.
Held: Thogh not invariably so, the consequences should be in an appropriate order for costs: ‘It seems to me that in that case such price as is to be paid by the dishonest litigant is a price in costs, not in reduction of the appropriate share of the available assets. The suggestion contained in the last sentence of Lincoln J’s judgment that maxims of equity should be applied to deny or reduce relief I cannot follow. It seems to me that the court has a duty to discharge a statutory function on the application of statutory criteria, and maxims of equity have nothing to do with it.’
Judges:
Thorpe J
Citations:
[1994] 1 FCR 293
Statutes:
Matrimonial Cause Act 1973 25(2)(g)
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – B v B 1988
When the husband’s sole asset is a business which cannot be sold for the ancillary relief proceedings, it would be pointless to order its valuation. . .
Cited by:
Cited – Tavoulareas v Tavoulareas (2) CA 19-Nov-1996
Both husband and wife had independent means, and neither worked. The wife had spent pounds 100,000k on Children Act proceedings, and sought ancillary relief. The judge had made an order on capital to reflect the fact that if those costs had not been . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Family, Costs
Updated: 03 November 2022; Ref: scu.235326