swarb.co.uk - law index
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Evidence - From: 1994 To: 1994
This page lists 20 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.
Molnlycke AB v Procter and Gamble Ltd [1994] RPC 49
1994
CA
Evidence, Intellectual Property
The court said that in patents cases, the primary evidence will be the opinion evidence of properly qualified expert witnesses, all other evidence being secondary to that primary evidence.
1 Citers
Regina v Keane; CACD 15-Mar-1994 - Independent, 16 March 1994; Times, 15 March 1994; [1994] 1 WLR 746; [1994] 2 All ER 478; (1994) 99 Cr App R 1
Regina v Quinn; CACD 15-Mar-1994 - Ind Summary, 04 April 1994; Times, 15 March 1994; [1995] 1 Cr App Rep 480
KPMG Peat Marwick McLintock v The HLT Group; QBD 18-Mar-1994 - Independent, 18 March 1994; [1995] 2 All ER 180
In Re G (Minors) (Medical Experts) Times, 04 April 1994
4 Apr 1994
FD
Children, Evidence
The court is to exercise control over proceeedings with particular regard to unnecessary investigations carried out by medical experts.
Children Act 1989
Vernon v Bosley (1); CA 8-Apr-1994 - Times, 08 April 1994; [1994] PIQR 337
In Re W v G (Paternity); In Re A (A Minor); CA 18-May-1994 - Times, 18 May 1994; [1994] 2 FLR 463
Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society v Grant Ind Summary, 23 May 1994; Times, 09 May 1994
23 May 1994
CA
Housing, Litigation Practice, Land, Evidence
The District Judge is to exercise his discretion informally on suspending possession, and need not apply the rules of evidence rigidly. He may consider that the defendant has sufficent means to support a clearance of the arrears over a reasonable period of time and thus to suspend the rder for possession, without taking direct evidence from him.
Administration of Justice Act 1970 - Administration of Justice Act 1973 8
Regina v Gordon (Michael); CACD 27-May-1994 - Times, 27 May 1994; Independent, 09 June 1994
Regina v Khan (Sultan) Independent, 14 June 1994; Times, 01 June 1994; Gazette, 13 July 1994
1 Jun 1994
CACD
Evidence
An unlawful bug of a private conversation on private property, was nevertheless correctly admitted into evidence if it was not unfair to do so within the context of the trial.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 78
1 Cites
1 Citers
Regina v Murray Ind Summary, 11 July 1994; Times, 24 June 1994; [1995] RTR 239
10 Jun 1994
CACD
Evidence, Road Traffic
If one defendant claims a defence of duress from fear of the other's driving, the other driver's driving convictions are relevant and can be admitted in evidence. Evidence of the convictions of the other driver should have been admitted even though he did not give evidence because they were relevant. Knowledge of his character might well have coloured the jury's deliberations and bolstered the credibility of Murray's account. Unless there is simply no nexus whatever between the previous convictions sought to be adduced and the offence alleged against the accused, they should be admitted and admitted in these particular circumstances without any nice distinctions being drawn between the various individual offences recorded in the record.
1 Citers
Webb and Hay v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41; (1994) 122 ALR 41; (1994) 68 ALJR 582
30 Jun 1994
Mason CJ and McHugh J
Commonwealth, Natural Justice, Evidence
(Australia) Criminal Law - Jury - Impartiality - Murder trial - Juror giving flowers to victim's mother - Whether juror or jury to be discharged Appropriate test - Reasonable apprehension of lack of impartiality or real danger of lack of impartiality.
Evidence - Criminal trial - Accomplice inculpating accused - Whether accomplice warning necessary - Nature of warning.
The test of whether a bias was found in a member of court because of personal links is whether such links give rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion on the part of a fair minded and informed member of the public that there might have been such a bias.
As to the test laid down in Gough: "In considering the merits of the test to be applied in a case where a juror is alleged to be biased, it is important to keep in mind that the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality is necessary to retain confidence in the administration of justice. Both the parties to the case and the general public must be satisfied that justice has not only been done but that it has been seen to be done. Of the various tests used to determine an allegation of bias, the reasonable apprehension test of bias is by far the most appropriate for protecting the appearance of impartiality. The test of 'reasonable likelihood' or 'real danger' of bias tends to emphasise the court's view of the facts. In that context, the trial judge's acceptance of explanations becomes of primary importance. Those two tests tend to place inadequate emphasis on the public perception of the irregular incident.
We do not think that it is possible to reconcile the decision in Gough with the decisions of this Court. In Gough, the House of Lords specifically rejected the reasonable suspicion test and the cases and judgments which had applied it in favour of a modified version of the reasonable likelihood test. In Watson, faced with the same conflict in the cases between the two tests, this Court preferred the reasonable suspicion or apprehension test. That test has been applied in this Court on no less than eight subsequent occasions. In the light of the decisions of this Court which hold that the reasonable apprehension or suspicion test is the correct test for determining a case of alleged bias against a judge, it is not possible to use the 'real danger' test as the general test for bias without rejecting the authority of those decisions.
"Moreover, nothing in the two speeches in the House of Lords in Gough contains any new insight that makes us think that we should re-examine a principle and a line of cases to which this Court has consistently adhered for the last eighteen years. On the contrary, there is a strong reason why we should continue to prefer the reasoning in our own cases to that of the House of Lords. In Gough, the House of Lords rejected the need to take account of the public perception of an incident which raises an issue of bias except in the case of a pecuniary interest. Behind this reasoning is the assumption that public confidence in the administration of justice will be maintained because the public will accept the conclusions of the judge. But the premise on which the decisions in this Court are based is that public confidence in the administration of justice is more likely to be maintained if the Court adopts a test that reflects the reaction of the ordinary reasonable member of the public to the irregularity in question. References to the reasonable apprehension of the 'lay observer', the 'fair-minded observer', the 'fair-minded, informed lay observer', 'fair-minded people', the 'reasonable or fair-minded observer', the 'parties or the public', and the `reasonable person' abound in the decisions of this Court and other courts in this country. They indicate that it is the court's view of the public's view, not the court's own view, which is determinative. If public confidence in the administration of justice is to be maintained, the approach that is taken by fair-minded and informed members of the public cannot be ignored. Indeed, as Toohey J. pointed out in Vakauta (1989) 167 CLR. at p.585 in considering whether an allegation of bias on the part of a judge has been made out, the public perception of the judiciary is not advanced by attributing to a fair-minded member of the public a knowledge of the law and the judicial process which ordinary experience suggests is not the case. That does not mean that the trial judge's opinions and findings are irrelevant. The fair-minded and informed observer would place great weight on the judge's view of the facts. Indeed, in many cases the fair-minded observer would be bound to evaluate the incident in terms of the judge's findings."
1 Cites
1 Citers
[ Austlii ]
Freemantle v The Queen Ind Summary, 29 August 1994; Gazette, 12 October 1994; Times, 07 July 1994; [1994] 1 WLR 1437
7 Jul 1994
PC
Evidence, Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
The judge's warning to the jury about its dangers is needed, when the jury were being asked to consider uncorroborated visual identification evidence, unless, and exceptionally, the evidence is of such good quality as to stand without a warning. In this case though, although the direction was defective, the two eye witnesses had known the defendant for several years.
1 Citers
Regina v Rogers; CACD 14-Jul-1994 - Times, 14 July 1994
International Business Machines Corporation v Phoenix International (Computers) Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 413
28 Jul 1994
ChD
Aldous J
Evidence
The defendant had, by mistake, included in bundles of documents produced on discovery opinions and other legally privileged material. Held: A competent solicitor would see immediately that these had been disclosed by mistake, and an order was made restraining their use.
1 Citers
Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim and Others (Number 9); ChD 29-Jul-1994 - Times, 11 October 1994; [1994] CLY 3555
Regina v Gray, Liggins, Rowlands, Ridings Times, 05 August 1994; Gazette, 26 October 1994
5 Aug 1994
CACD
Evidence, Crime
Without an allegation of conspiracy, there are severe limitations on the use of the evidence of one defendant against other co-defendants. Evidence against one defendant was inadmissible against others without an allegation of a common enterprise.
In Re AB (A Minor) (Medical Issues: Expert Evidence) Times, 17 August 1994; (1995) 1FLR 192
17 Aug 1994
FD
Children, Evidence
An expert witness in child abuse cases was to explain all aspects of any controversial theory.
1 Citers
Regina v Derby Magistrates Court Ex Parte B; QBD 31-Oct-1994 - Times, 31 October 1994
Muller and Another v Linsley and Mortimer (A Firm); CA 8-Dec-1994 - Gazette, 18 January 1995; Times, 08 December 1994; [1996] PNLR 74; [1994] EWCA Civ 39
