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Estoppel - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 21 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.


 
 Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited; CA 1932 - [1932] 1 KB 371

 
 Greenwood v Martin's Bank Ltd; HL 1933 - [1933] AC 51
 
Grundt v Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Limited (1937) 59 CLR 641; [1937] HCA 58
8 Oct 1937

Dixon J
Commonwealth, Estoppel
(High Court of Australia) Parties to a transaction may choose to enter into it on the basis that certain facts are to be treated as correct as between themselves for the purpose of the transaction, although both know that they are contrary to the true state of affairs, in which case the necessary convention for an estoppel will be established.
Dixon J said: "The justice of an estoppel is not established by the fact in itself that a state of affairs has been assumed as the basis of action or inaction and that a departure from the assumption would turn the action or inaction into a detrimental change of position. It depends also on the manner in which the assumption has been occasioned or induced. Before anyone can be estopped, he must have played such a part in the adoption of the assumption that it would be unfair or unjust if he were left free to ignore it. But the law does not leave such a question of fairness or justice at large. It defines with more or less completeness the kinds of participation in the making or acceptance of the assumption that will suffice to preclude the party if the other requirements for an estoppel are satisfied."
and "It is important to notice that belief in the correctness of the facts or state of affairs assumed is not always necessary. Parties may adopt as the conventional basis of a transaction between them an assumption which they know to be contrary to the actual state of affairs. . . Parties to a deed sometimes deliberately set out an hypothetical state of affairs as the basis of their covenance in order to create a mutual estoppel."
Latham CJ said: "The line between estoppel, which precludes a person from proving and relying upon a particular fact, and waiver which involves an abandonment of a right by acting in a manner inconsistent with the continued existence of the right, is not always clearly drawn."
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[ Austlii ]
 
Greer v Kettle [1938] AC 156; 158 LT 433
1938
HL
Lord Maugham, Lord Russell of Killowen
Contract, Estoppel, Equity
A corporate borrower agreed to repay £250,000 with interest and to charge certain specified shares in another company as security. A guarantee was procured from another company, Parent Trust. The deed of guarantee recited that the lender had made the advance to the borrower "on the security of a charge dated March 1929 on the shares, particulars of which are set out in the schedule hereto". Held: Recitals may also give rise to an estoppel in respect of specific facts stated and adopted as the basis of a transaction, provided that the facts as stated are "certain, clear and unambiguous". However, Parent Trust had never become liable under the guarantee because a charge had never in fact been given over the shares. Where a person guaranteed a loan which was expressed to be secured by a charge on certain shares, and the shares had not been validly issued, it was held that the surety was not liable.
Lord Killowen explained: "the legal rights and liabilities of these parties depend upon the true construction and effect of the agreement of guarantee . . Once it is realized that the debt which Parent Trust are undertaking to guarantee is a debt described as a debt the repayment of which by the principal debtor is secured by a charge on (amongst other shares) the 275,000 shares in Iron Industries, Ld, the case (apart from the question of estoppel, to which I will refer) becomes in my opinion a simple one . . It is not a case, as Bennett J seems to have treated it, of seeking to imply a condition, the implication of which is alleged to be inconsistent with other provisions in the document. In other words, as Romer LJ said, it is not a case of Parent Trust being released from a contractual engagement. It is a case of an attempt to impose upon them a liability which they have never undertaken. The only debt, the repayment of which by the principal debtor they undertook to guarantee, was a debt secured by a charge on the 275,000 shares in Iron Industries, Ld, and a debt so secured never in fact existed. The language of Knight Bruce LJ in Evans v Bremridge (i) may well be applied to the present litigants. In that case it was sought to make a surety liable who became a surety on the footing that a co-surety would join in the covenant with him. The co-surety had not done so, and the surety was held to be under no liability. As the Lord Justice truly said: "The defendants seek to charge the plaintiff with "a contract, into which he did not enter."
Lord Maugham referred to the qualification imposed by equity on the doctrine of estoppel by deed: "The position in equity is and was always different in this respect, that where there are proper grounds for rectifying a deed, e.g., because it is based upon a common mistake of fact, then to the extent of the rectification there can plainly be no estoppel based on the original form of the instrument. It is at least equally clear that in equity a party to a deed could not set up an estoppel in reliance on a deed in relation to which there is an equitable right to rescission or in reliance on an untrue statement of an untrue recital induced by his own representation, whether innocent or otherwise, to the other party. Authority is scarcely needed for so clear a consequence of a rectification order or an admitted or proved right to such an order. The well known rule of the Chancery Courts in regard to a receipt clause in a deed not effecting an estoppel if the money has not in fact been paid is a good illustration of the equity view . . "
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Trade Indemnity Co Ltd v Workington Harbour and Dock Board (No 2) [1938] 2 All ER 101
1938
HL
Lord Atkin
Estoppel
The plaintiffs' action was derived from a bond given by the defendants guaranteeing a contractor's performance in building a dock for the plaintiffs. The bond provided that a certificate which complied with certain criteria would prove the amount due. In the action on the bond the plaintiffs relied upon a certificate which they said complied with the criteria and was thus conclusive evidence of the defendants' liability under the bond. The action failed because the certificate did not specify a relevant act or default as required by the bond. The plaintiffs brought a second action relying, not upon the certificate, but upon the underlying facts, which they said amounted to breaches of the contract and thus triggered liability under the bond. Held: The action failed on a plea of res judicata. Lord Atkin described the position: "The question will always be open whether the second action is for the same breach or breaches as the first, in which case the ordinary principles governing the plea of res judicata will prevail. In the present case, in my opinion, the plaintiffs are suing on precisely the same breaches as those in the first action, and for the same damages, though on different evidence. . I am satisfied that the first action raised the issue of all the contractors' breaches, and treated, and meant to treat, the engineers' certificate as conclusive proof of both the breaches and the losses arising therefrom. . The result is that the plaintiffs, who appear to have had a good cause of action for a considerable sum of money, fail to obtain it, and on what may appear to be technical grounds. Reluctant, however, as a judge may be to fail to give effect to substantial merits, he has to keep in mind principles established for the protection of litigants from oppressive proceedings. There are solid merits behind the maxim nemo bis vexari debet pro eadem causa."
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 Lissenden v CAV Bosch Ltd; HL 1940 - [1940] AC 412; [1940] 1 All ER 405

 
 Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd; KBD 1947 - [1947] 1 KB 130; [1956] 1 All ER 256; [1947] LJR 77; [1947] 175 LT 332; [1947] 62 TLR 557
 
EH Lewis and Son Ltd v Morelli [1948] 2 All ER 1021
1948


Landlord and Tenant, Estoppel
Where somebody with no legal estate purports to grant a tenancy, he can only create a tenancy by estoppel which continues until the true land-owner asserts his interest. Such a tenancy can be created even if only by word of mouth.

 
Macley v Nutting [1949] 2 KB 55
1949


Landlord and Tenant, Equity, Estoppel
Where the grant of a lease has been equitable only, because of an absence of title of the landlord, a later acquisition of the title 'feeds the estoppel' creating a lease in law.


 
 Wolfe v Hogan; CA 1949 - [1949] 2 KB 194

 
 Foster v Robinson; CA 1950 - [1950] 2 All ER 342; [1951] KB 149

 
 Combe v Combe; CA 1951 - [1951] 2 KB 215

 
 Fung Kai Sun v Chang Fui Hing; PC 1951 - [1951] AC 489

 
 Universal Permanent Building Society v Cooke; CA 1951 - [1952] Ch 95; [1951] 2 All ER 893; [1951] 2 TLR 962
 
In re Estate of Park (deceased), Park v Park [1954] P 89; [1953] 2 All ER 408; [1953] 97 Sol Jo 491
1953
ChD

Estoppel
The deceased had executed his will in which he was described as a widow, whereas in fact he had recently re-married. He was elderly and physically and mentally infirm. A relative alleged that the most recent marriage had been invalid for his lack of capacity. Held: Pleadings in the ealier proceedings had not raised the issue of capacity, and the claimant was therefore now not estopped from asserting incapacity.
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 Tool Metal Manufactuing Company Ltd v Tungsten Electric Company Ltd; HL 16-Jun-1955 - [1955] UKHL 5; [1955] 1 WLR 761; [1955] 2 All ER 657

 
 Sidney Bolsom Investment Trust Ltd v E Karmios and Co (London) Ltd; CA 1956 - [1956] 1 QB 529; [1956] 1 All ER 536; [1956] 2 WLR 625
 
Central Newbury Car Auctions Limited v Unity Finance Limited [1957] 1 QB 371
1957
CA
Lord Denning MR, Hodson LJ
Estoppel
The defendant finance company alleged that the plaintiff car dealer, by its conduct, was estopped from denying the authority of their (rogue) customer to sell the car at issue, because they had permitted the customer, unkown to them, to take possession of the car and its registration book without having made any or sufficient inquiries about him and before he was accepted as a client by the hire purchase company. Held: By entrusting the car to the stranger together with a document which clearly stated that it did not prove legal ownership, the plaintiffs were not making any representation that the stranger was entitled to deal with the car as his own, so as to estop them from asserting their own title. The only issue fell to be decided in that case was one of the nature of representation, if any, made by the true owner by giving possession of the car and the registration book to a stranger. The question of estoppel by negligence was specifically ruled by the court not to be the issue to be determined.
Hodson LJ (majority) said: "In my judgment the case fell to be decided not upon a consideration of negligence but upon what is the nature of the representation made by the delivery of the registration book. The book itself is not a document of title; its terms negative ownership and it contains no representation by the plaintiffs or anyone else that the thief was entitled to deal with the car as his own. I think (counsel for plaintiffs) was right in saying that while a person in possession of a chattel may reasonably be thought to be the owner when he offers it for sale, the case of a person in possession of a motor-car does not differ in kind although the absence of the registration book detracts from the signification of possession."
Denning LJ (dissenting) referred to Dixon J's ‘well-considered analysis' of estoppel in Grundt as ‘the most satisfactory that I know.'
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Ideal General Supply Co Ltd v Louis Edelson and Edelson (t/a Ideal Clothing Co) [1957] RPC 252
1957

Diplock J
Jurisdiction, Estoppel, Defamation, Damages
The plaintiff had started an action for passing off and slander in the county court. The county court judge declined jurisdiction on the basis he thought they were equity proceedings and the claimant withdrew the proceedings and started again in the High Court. The question was whether this created an estoppel Held: It did not. Diplock J expressed no opinion on the view of the county court judge that he had no jurisdiction. Diplock J refused to award any damages because the plaintiff managed to put an end to the defendant’s passing-off by an injunction after 4 advertisements in a local evening newspaper and the plaintiff had suffered no damage at all. He was prepared to grant injunctive relief in respect of probable damage which would occur if the defendants continued their conduct.


 
 Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Ltd; 1957 - [1957] 2 QB 344; [1957] 2 All ER 343
 
Armstrong v Sheppard and Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384; [1959] 2 All ER 651; [1959] 3 WLR 84; (1959) 123 JP 401; (1959) Sol Jo 508
1959
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Estoppel, Equity, Nuisance, Torts - Other, Land
The plaintiff had a path at the rear of his property. The defendant constructed a sewer under the path, and asked the plaintiff for permission. He gave it informally, not knowing at the time that he owned the land. The sewer was constructed. Though suffering no inconvenience, on discovering his ownership, the plaintiff requested the removal of the sewer and its manhole, and an associated injunction. The judge at trial found a trespass, but gave only nominal damages and refused an injunction. Held: The plaintiff was not debarred from objecting when his acquiescence arose through ignorance. However the trespass was trivial, and no injunction was granted.
As to the cross appeal, though the trespass was forgiven by the consent, that could not answer the claim as to the continuing discharge since that would amount to an easement which would require a formal grant.
Lord Evershed MR said: "it is true to say that if a man, having a proprietary right, proves an infringement of that right, prima facie he is entitled to an injunction: but that needs some qualification. It is not a matter of unqualified right; and one ground for denying an injunction would be that the wrong done is, in the circumstances, trivial. That proposition is founded on the well-known case of Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. (Directors) v. Broadbent . . The judge was here dealing with the claim as I have formulated it: and he came to the conclusion that the circumstances of this case were special, and, as his judgment shows, that the damage was trivial . . But there were other good grounds, and formidable grounds (as I think) for refusing the plaintiff an injunction. That he misled the defendants is beyond a peradventure. It is no less clear that he attempted to mislead the court. He asserted - contrary to the fact - that he had never had any conversation with the defendants about the matter at all; and in his evidence in chief he so swore, untruly. It is not, therefore, surprising that the judge came to the conclusion that he should grant no equitable relief; and in my judgment, on the facts of this case, he was well entitled to take that view."
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