Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Criminal Sentencing - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 30 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Regina v Roth (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 65
1980
CACD

Criminal Sentencing
Sentencing for theft
1 Citers


 
Regina v Nazari (1980) 2 Cr App R (S) 84; (1980) 71 Cr App R 87
1980
CACD
Lawton LJ
Criminal Sentencing, Immigration
The CACD heard several appeals together, giving guidance as to the general principles to be applied in deciding on recommendations for deportation under the Act. Lawton LJ said that "no court should make an order recommending deportation without making full enquiry into all the circumstances", and gave guidance, according to the seriousness of the offence and the criminal record. The courts should not be concerned with the political systems which operate in other countries, having no knowledge of them, and should not express views about external regimes. It is for the Home Secretary to decide whether an offender's return to his country of origin would have consequences which would make his compulsory return unduly harsh. The Home Secretary can inform himself where the courts can not. "First, the Court must consider, as was said by Sachs LJ in Caird's case, whether the accused's continued presence in the United Kingdom is to its detriment. This country has no use for criminals of other nationalities, particularly if they have committed serious crimes or have long criminal records. That is self-evident. The more serious the crime and the longer the record the more obvious it is that there should be an order recommending deportation . . Secondly, the Courts are not concerned with the political systems which operate in other countries . . The next matter to which we invite attention by way of guidelines is that the effect that an order recommending deportation will have upon others who are not before the Court and who are innocent persons."
Immigration Act 1971 6(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Ong Ah Chuan v The Public Prosecutor; PC 1980 - [1981] AC 648; [1980] 3 WLR 855; [1981] Crim LR 245
 
Regina v Duporte (1980) 11 Cr App R (S) 116
1980
CACD

Criminal Sentencing
A sentencer should not ordinarily intervene to upset the course of a probation order, unless there is reason to do so.
1 Citers


 
Practice Direction (Crime: Sentence: Loss of Time) [1980] 1 WLR 270
1980


Criminal Sentencing
Appellants were reminded of the courts powers to make a loss of time order in the case of inappropriate appeals against sentence.
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 29
1 Citers


 
The Queen v Johns (TS) (1980) 143 CLR 108; [1980] HCA 3
7 Feb 1980

Mason, Murphy and Wilson JJ
Commonwealth, Crime, Criminal Sentencing
High Court of Australia - Criminal Law (N.S.W.) - Accessory before the fact - Liability - Possible consequences of venture planned with principal in first degree - Sentence of accessory - Whether judge may impose sentence of less duration than life - Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.), ss. 19, 346, 442 (1).
The appellant had been convicted of murder and assault with intent to rob. His role was to drive the principal offender, W, to a rendezvous with a third man, D. The appellant was to wait while the other two men robbed a known receiver of stolen jewellery. Afterwards the appellant was to take possession of the proceeds and hide them in return for a share. The appellant knew that W was carrying a pistol, and W told him that he would not stand for any nonsense if he met any obstacle during the robbery. In the event the victim resisted and W shot him dead.
The judge had directed the jury that the appellant and D would be guilty if the act constituting the offence committed was within the contemplation of the parties as an act done in the course of the venture on which they had embarked. It was argued on the appellant's behalf that while this was an appropriate direction in the case of D, who was present and therefore a principal in the second degree, it was a misdirection in the case of the appellant, who was an accessory before the fact. It was submitted that in his case it was necessary for the jury to conclude that it was a likely or probable consequence of the way in which the crime was to be committed that the gun would be discharged so as to kill the deceased. Held: The High Court unanimously rejected the argument that any distinction was to be drawn between the liability of a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact. There was no reason as a matter of legal principle why such a distinction should be drawn. They also said: "The narrow test of criminality proposed by the applicant is plainly unacceptable for the reason that it stakes everything on the probability or improbability of the act, admittedly contemplated, occurring. Suppose a plan made by A, the principal offender, and B, the accessory before the fact, to rob premises, according to which A is to carry out the robbery. It is agreed that A is to carry a revolver and use it to overcome resistance in the unlikely event that the premises are attended, previous surveillance having established that the premises are invariably unattended at the time when the robbery is to be carried out. As it happens, a security officer is in attendance when A enters the premises and is shot by A. It would make nonsense to say that B is not guilty merely because it was an unlikely or improbable contingency that the premises would be attended at the time of the robbery, when we know that B assented to the shooting in the event that occurred.
In the present case there was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the applicant gave his assent to a criminal enterprise which involved the use, that is the discharge, of a loaded gun, in the event that [the victim] resisted or sought to summon assistance. We need not recapitulate the evidence to which we have already referred. The jury could therefore conclude that the common purpose involved resorting to violence of this kind, should the occasion arise, and that the violence contemplated amounted to grievous bodily harm or homicide."
[ Austlii ]

 
 Regina v Macleod; CACD 1981 - (1981) 3 Cr App R (S) 247

 
 Regina v Sinfield; CACD 1981 - [1981] 3 CAR (s) 258

 
 Regina v Dodd; CACD 1981 - (1981) 74 Crim App R (s) 50
 
Regina v Sykes (1982) Cr App R (S) 173
1982
CACD

Criminal Sentencing

1 Citers


 
Regina v Kraus (1982) 4 Crim App R (S) 113
1982
CACD

Criminal Sentencing, Immigration

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Aramah [1982] 4 Cr App R (S) 407
1982
CACD

Criminal Sentencing
In relation to major cases of importation of Class A drugs, the starting point for consignments exceeding 5 kilos assessed by reference to 100% purity rather than total weight, is a sentence of 14 years and upwards following conviction. In a passage dealing with sentences for the importation and supply of cannabis the court said: "Class "B" Drugs, particularly Cannabis:
We select this from amongst the class "B" drugs as being the drug most likely to be exercising the minds of the courts.
Importation of cannabis: Importation of very small amounts for personal use can be dealt with as if it were simple possession, with which we will deal later. Otherwise importation of amounts up to about 20 kilogrammes of herbal cannabis, or the equivalent in cannabis resin or cannabis oil, will, save in the most exceptional cases, attract sentences of between 18 months and three years, with the lowest ranges reserved for pleas of guilty in cases where there has been small profit to the offender. The good character of the courier (as he usually is) is of less importance than the good character of the defendant in other cases. The reason for this is, it is well known that the large scale operator looks for couriers of good character and for people of a sort which is likely to exercise the sympathy of the court if they are detected and arrested. Consequently one will frequently find students and sick and elderly people are used as couriers for two reasons: first of all they are vulnerable to suggestion and vulnerable to the offer of quick profit, and secondly, it is felt that the courts may be moved to misplaced sympathy in their case. There are few, if any, occasions when anything other than an immediate custodial sentence is proper in this type of importation.
Medium quantities over 20 kilogrammes will attract sentences of three to six years' imprisonment, depending upon the amount involved, and all the other circumstances of the case.
Large scale or wholesale importation of massive quantities will justify sentences in the region of 10 years' imprisonment for those playing other than a subordinate role.
Supply of cannabis: Here again the supply of massive quantities will justify sentences in the region of 10 years for those playing anything more than a subordinate role. Otherwise the bracket should be between one to four years' imprisonment, depending upon the scale of the operation."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R (S) 83
1982


Criminal Sentencing

1 Citers


 
Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 443; [1982] ECHR 3
24 Jun 1982
ECHR
Wiarda P
Human Rights, Criminal Sentencing
The applicant was sentenced to two years' imprisonment for theft. He had a previous convictions and was thought to have a persistent tendency to crime, and was placed at the government's disposal for 10 years on that ground. This was subject to appeal, and was classified not as a security measure but as a penalty which formed an inseparable whole together with the principal penalty. Held: "The most significant feature of detention ordered in connection with placing at the Government's disposal is, as has already been pointed out, the relative indetermination of its duration. Depending on the case and the relevant administrative decisions, it may vary from nothing to ten years. No minimum duration is fixed by the law or the court; the detention may continue for a maximum period of 10 years, without the court which ordered the measure exercising the least control over it. In fact, the administration is responsible for adjusting the penalty to the circumstances of the individual." The sentence gave the Minister initial authority to detain for an indeterminate period varying according to the treatment required by the offender and the demands of the protection of society. This system was fundamentally different from that of the conditional release of prisoners "sentenced by a court to a period of imprisonment imposed by the court as being appropriate to the case".
European Convention on Human Rights 5.4
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Hart; CACD 1983 - (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 25

 
 Regina v Fawcett; CACD 1983 - (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 158

 
 Regina v Chambers; CACD 1983 - [1983] CAR (S) 190

 
 Regina v Savage; 1983 - (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 216
 
Regina v Wilkinson (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 105
1983
CACD
Lord Lane CJ
Criminal Sentencing
A discretionary life sentence should be reserved for the most exceptional circumstances, and for the most part for offenders who were incapable of being dealt with under the Mental Health Act 1959, "yet who are in a mental state which makes them dangerous to the life or limb of members of the public" and in respect of whom "It is sometimes impossible to say when that danger will subside".
Mental Health Act 1959
1 Citers


 
Regina v Spence and Thomas (1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 413
1983
CACD

Criminal Sentencing
The court gave guidelines in sentencing for kidnapping, and particularly as to the role to be played by the views of the victim. Held: Such offences differ very widely, ranging from, at the top of the scale carefully planned abductions where the victim is used as a hostage or where ransom money is demanded. For such offences the usual minimum will be 8 years' imprisonment or thereabouts. Where there are further aggravating elements, such as the use of violence, or firearms or the detention of the victim over a long period of time, then the sentence will rapidly climb.
On the other hand, some offences will only barely be classed as kidnapping. These typically arise within a family context, and the starting point may be eighteen months and sometimes rather less.

 
Regina v Pilgrim [1983] 5 Cr App R (S) 140
1983
CACD

Criminal Sentencing

1 Citers


 
Regina v Folkestone and Hythe Justices, ex parte R (1983) 74 Cr App Rep 58
1983
CACD
Lane CJ
Criminal Sentencing
The court was prepared to consider sentences on the basis that the magistrates had misrecorded the basis of the defendant's committal to the Crown Court.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Keys [1986] 84 Cr App R 204
1984


Criminal Sentencing

1 Citers


 
Regina v Boswell [1984] 1 WLR 1047; [1984] 6 CAR 257
1984
CACD

Criminal Sentencing
The court gave guidelines for sentencing for the offence of causing death by reckless driving.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Charalambous [1984] 6 Cr App R S 389
1984
CACD

Criminal Sentencing
The defendant appealed agains the financial penaties imposed. Held: It was unjust that "a family should be fined".
1 Citers


 
Regina v Williams (1984) 6 Cr App R(S) 298
1984


Criminal Sentencing

1 Citers


 
Regina v Curtis [1984] 6 Cr App R S 250
1984
CACD

Criminal Sentencing
The defendant, a lorry driver had been fined £10,000 for fraudulent evasion of the payment of duty on tobacco. The sentencer had indicated that he had imposed the fine to see "if those who had put the appellant up to the offence" would pay. He had been a driver of heavy goods vehicles for about 17 years with an income of between £100 and £190 per week. Held: The Court accepted that he was in a very serious financial plight, and adjusted the penalty accordingly.
1 Citers


 
Regina v O'Neill [1984] 13 NIJB
1984
CANI
Gibson LJ
Northern Ireland, Criminal Sentencing
The court gave sentencing guidelines for offences of robbery. Gibson LJ said: "In circumstances such as obtain nowadays in Northern Ireland where firearms are frequently used to rob banks and post offices this Court would re-affirm that a sentence of 13 years or upwards should not now be considered outside the norm for a deterrent sentence for this type of offence. Indeed, it would be appropriate for a judge to regard a sentence within the range of 10 to 13 years as a starting point for consideration, which sentences may be increased if there is a high degree of planning and organisation, or if force is actually used, or if the accused has been involved in more than one such crime. Equally it would be appropriate to reduce the sentence if the degree of preparation or the efficiency of performance is low, or if the money and weapons have been recovered, or if the accused has shown contrition and pleaded guilty to the charge, or if there are other special features which ought to be treated as grounds for reduction of the penalty."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hough (1984) CAR (S) 406
1984
CACD
Lord Lane CJ
Criminal Sentencing
The court considered the purpose of section 2 of the 1961 Act. Lord Lane CJ observed: "It is clear . . that Parliament had in mind the potential scope for disaster and malpractice in circumstances where elderly, infirm and easily suggestible people are sometimes minded to wish themselves dead. It is a crime, whether you pigeon-hole it under attempted murder or assisting a suicide. In terms of gravity it can vary from the borders of cold-blooded murder down to the shadowy area of mercy killing or common humanity."
Suicide Act 1961 2(1)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Courtie [1984] 1 All ER 740 HL(E); [1984] 2 WLR 330; [1984] AC 463
1984
HL
Lord Diplock
Criminal Sentencing, Crime
The House considered how to frame an indictment in a case of buggery where the prescribed punishment differed depending on the particular factual ingredients. Held: Lord Diplock said: "Where it is provided by a statute that an accused person's liability to have inflicted upon him a maximum punishment which, if the prosecution are successful in establishing the existence in his case of a particular factual ingredient, is greater than the maximum punishment that could be inflicted on him if the existence of that particular factual ingredient were not established, it seems to me to be plain beyond argument that Parliament has thereby created two distinct offences, whether the statute by which they are created does so by using language which treats them as being different species of a single genus of offence, or by using language which treats them as separate offences unrelated to one another. . The statement of offence in the instant case may therefore just pass muster, provided that it is supplemented by adequate particulars of offence which give to Courtie reasonable information as to which of the particular species of offences falling within the genus buggery, was the offence with which he was charged."
1 Citers


 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.