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Criminal Practice - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 100 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Regina v Selvey [1970] AC 304; (1968) 52 Cr App R 443
1970
HL
Viscount Dilhorne
Criminal Practice
A defendant was not to be asked about any previous convictions, unless he had "lost his shield" and incurred liability to such cross-examination by putting his own character in issue, either by putting questions or giving evidence with a view to establish his good character or if he attacked the character of the prosecution witnesses.
Viscount Dilhorne set out the following propositions: "(a) The words of the statute must be given their ordinary natural meaning;
(b) The section permits cross-examination of the accused as to the character, both when imputations on the character of the prosecutor and his witnesses are cast to show their unreliability as witnesses independently of the evidence given by them and also when the casting of imputations is necessary to enable the accused to establish his defence;
(c) In rape cases the accused can allege consent without placing himself in peril of cross-examination;
(d) If what is said amounts in reality to no more than a denial of the charge, expressed, it may be, in emphatic language, it should not be regarded as coming within the section."
Criminal Evidence Act 1898 1(f)(ii)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Seward [1970] RTR 102
1970

Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic, Criminal Practice
The section required as a precondition to a request for a breath specimen that an accident had occurred. The defendant complained that this was an issue of fact, but had been decided by the deputy chairman and not the jury. Held: The appeal succeeded. Lord Widgery CJ: "The issue whether there was an accident or not is not a matter which gives rise to a discretion of the court, it is a vital question going to guilt on this charge, because if the prosecution decide to base their proceedings upon the allegation that an accident occurred, they have to prove it as one of the essential factors in the case. Accordingly the deputy chairman, in our judgment, was wholly wrong in taking this issue away from the jury and determining it himself as he did."
Road Safety Act 1967 2(2)
1 Citers


 
Secretary of State for Defence v Warn [1970] AC 394
1970
HL

Armed Forces, Criminal Practice
A courts martial prosecution begun without the necessary prior consent, the proceedings were a nullity.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Culbertson (1970) 54 Cr App R 310
1970
CCA

Criminal Practice
The court disapproved of a jury being told that disbelieving a police officer would ruin his career.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Newsome [1970] 2 QB 711
1970
CACD
Widgery LJ
Criminal Practice
The court was dealing with the question of a guideline judgment on sentence. There was good reason to adopt a flexible approach. The discretion to depart from a previous precedent was not to be exercised lightly and we endorse that restrictive and cautious approach. The court sat with five judges for the purpose.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Turner; CACD 1970 - [1970] 2 QB 321; [1970] 2 All ER 281; [1970] 54 Cr App R 352
 
California v Green (1970) 399 US 149
1970


Criminal Practice
(US Supreme Court) There was no violation of the Sixth Amendment when the defendant was convicted of supplying marijuana on the basis of pre-trial statements of a witness who gave evidence at the trial and who was subject to full and effective cross-examination.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Sweet-Escott [1971] 55 Cr App R 316
1971

Lawton LJ
Criminal Practice
It is the duty of the trial judge to prevent cross examination about a subject which can only go to the credit of a witness if the truth of the matter suggested would not, in his opinion, affect the credibility of the witness concerned. Lawton J said that the test to be applied was whether or not the matter which it was sought to put to the witness would affect his likely standing with the tribunal of fact: "What, then, is the principle upon which the judge should draw the line? It seems to me that it is this. Since the purpose of cross-examination as to credit is to show that the witness ought not to be believed on oath, the matters about which he is questioned must relate to his likely standing after cross-examination with the tribunal which is trying him or listening to his evidence." and "the conduct or character of a witness cannot, in my view, be used to attack his credit unless that conduct or character is of such a nature as to tend logically and rationally to weaken confidence in his veracity or in his trustworthiness as a witness of truth."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Beresford (1971) 56 Cr App R 143
1971
CACD
Sachs LJ
Criminal Practice
When asked whether the appellate courts in England and Wales should entertain additional evidence under the section, which required the court to be satisfied that there was a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it: "The court has in general to be satisfied that the evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained for use at the trial."
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 23((2)(b)
1 Citers


 
Keeble v United States (1971) 412 US 205
1971

Brennan J
Criminal Practice
(US Supreme Court) Brennan J said: "Moreover, it is no answer to petitioner's demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense to argue that a defendant may be better off without such an instruction. True, if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser offense instruction - in this context or any other - precisely because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction. In the case before us, for example, an intent to commit serious bodily injury is a necessary element of the crime with which petitioner was charged, but not of the crime of simple assault. Since the nature of petitioner's intent was very much in dispute at trial, the jury could rationally have convicted him of simple assault if that option had been presented. But the jury was presented with only two options: convicting the defendant of assault with intent to commit great bodily injury, or acquitting him outright. We cannot say that the availability of a third option - convicting the defendant of simple assault - could not have resulted in a different verdict."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Sweet Escott [1971] 55 Cr App R 316
1971
QBD
Lawton J
Criminal Practice
There are limits as to what may be put to a witness by way of cross-examination as to credit. Lawton J said: "What, then, is the principle upon which the judge should draw the line? It seems to me that it is this. Since the purpose of cross-examination as to credit is to show that the witness ought not to be believed on oath, the matters about which he is questioned must relate to his likely standing after cross-examination with the tribunal which is trying him or listening to his evidence."
1 Citers



 
 S v Recorder of Manchester and Others; HL 1971 - [1971] AC 481
 
The Queen v Ireland [1971-72] 126 CLR 321
1971

Barwick CJ
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
(High Court of Australia) Barwick CJ considered the circumstance where, in a criminal trial, a judge was asked to exclude evidence for unfairness: "Whenever such unlawfulness or unfairness appears, the judge has a discretion to reject the evidence. He must consider its exercise. In the exercise of it, the competing public requirements must be considered and weighed against each other. On the one hand there is the public need to bring to conviction those who commit criminal offences. On the other hand there is the public interest in the protection of the individual from unlawful and unfair treatment. Convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may be obtained at too high a price. Hence the judicial discretion."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Richardson [1971] CAR 244
1971
CACD

Criminal Practice
Statements and proofs of one witness should not be disclosed to any other witness.
1 Citers


 
Pemble v The Queen (1971) 124 CLR 107
1971

Barwick CJ
Criminal Practice
(High Court of Australia) Barwick CJ: "Whatever course counsel may see fit to take, no doubt bona fide but for tactical reasons in what he considers the best interest of his client, the trial judge must be astute to secure for the accused a fair trial according to law. This involves, in my opinion, an adequate direction both as to the law and the possible use of the relevant facts upon any matter upon which the jury could in the circumstances of the case upon the material before them find or base a verdict in whole or in part . .
Here, counsel for the defence did not merely not rely on the matters now sought to be raised; he abandoned them and expressly confined the defence to the matters he did raise. However, in my opinion, this course did not relieve the trial judge of the duty to put to the jury with adequate assistance any matters on which the jury, upon the evidence, could find for the accused."
1 Citers


 
Ludlow v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1971] AC 29
1971
HL
Lord Pearson
Criminal Practice
Two offences can constitute a series of offences, but there has to be some nexus between the offences. Lord Pearson said: "In my opinion, however, it is important to notice that there has to be a series of offences of a similar character. For this purpose there has to be some nexus between the offences. Counsel criticised the wording of passages in judgments appearing to say that there cannot be similarity of character without a nexus. But I think this criticism, if it has any validity, applies only to the wording, and not to the substance, because when regard is had to the requirement of a series of similar offences it is right to look for a nexus. Nexus is a feature of similarity which in all the circumstances of the case enables the offences to be described as a series." The nexus requisite to establish a "series of offences of . . [a] similar character" may be satisfied by the cross-admissibility of evidence"
As to the need if any for separate trials under the 1915 Act, Lord Pearson said: "The judge has no duty to direct separate trials under section 5(3) unless in his opinion there is some special feature of the case which would make a joint trial of the several counts prejudicial or embarrassing to the accused and separate trials are required in the interests of justice. In some cases the offences charged may be too numerous and complicated . . or too difficult to disentangle . . so that a joint trial of all the counts is likely to cause confusion and the defence may be embarrassed or prejudiced. In other cases objection may be taken to the inclusion of a count on the ground that it is of a scandalous nature and likely to arouse in the minds of the jury hostile feelings against the accused . . "
Indictments Act 1915 5(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Pink (1971) 55 Cr App R 16
1971
CACD

Criminal Practice
It is not an inevitable consequence of prosecuting counsel having improperly and inappropriately made a final speech in relation to an unrepresented defendant, that the conviction would be quashed: "In the view of this court, no reasonable jury, unaided by a second address on behalf of the prosecution but with the benefit of a full and fair summing-up such as they had in this case, could have failed to bring in a verdict of guilty. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Jones (No 1); 1971 - (1971) 55 Cr App R 321
 
Regina v Barron [1973] 1 WLR 115; [1972] 2 All ER 1192
1971

Caulfield J
Criminal Practice, Legal Professions
The judge at trial had refused to set aside a subpoena to produce documents which had been served on behalf of the accused in a criminal trial. Held: Caulfield J said: "I think the correct principle is this, and I think it must be restricted to these particular facts in a criminal trial, and the principle I am going to enunciate is not supported by any authority that has been cited to me, and I am just working on what I conceive to be the rules of natural justice. If there are documents in the possession or control of a solicitor which, on production, help to further the defence of an accused man, then in my judgment no privilege attaches. I cannot conceive that our law would permit a solicitor or other person to screen from a jury information which, if disclosed to the jury, would perhaps enable a man either to establish his innocence or to resist an allegation made by the Crown."
1 Citers


 
Anderson v The Queen [1971] UKPC 25; [1971] 3 WLR 718; [1971] 3 All ER 76; [1972] AC 100
13 Jul 1971
PC

Criminal Practice
(Jamaica) Juries are not free, on the other hand, uncritically to reject unchallenged expert evidence on a matter calling for scientific expertise.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Anderson v The Queen [1972] AC 100
1972

Lord Guest
Criminal Practice
The Board considered the application of the proviso in criminal appeals: "The test which an appeal court is to apply to the proviso was recently referred to by Viscount Dilhorne in Chung Kum Moey v Public Prosecutor for Singapore [1967] 2 AC 173, 185 quoting the classic passage by Lord Sankey in Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462, 482-483, whether 'if the jury had been properly directed they would inevitably have come to the same conclusion'. Viscount Dilhorne also referred to Stirland v Director of Public Prosecutions [1944] AC 315, 321, where Lord Simon said that the provision assumed 'a situation where a reasonable jury, after being properly directed would, on the evidence properly admissible, without doubt convict.'"

 
Jemmison v Priddle [1972] 56 Cr App R 229
1972

Lord Widgery CJ
Criminal Practice
"it is legitimate to charge on a single information one activity even though the activity may involve more than one act".
1 Citers


 
Regina v Prager (1972) 56 Cr App R 151; [1972] 1 WLR 260; [1972] 1 All ER 1114
1972
CACD
Edmund Davies LJ
Criminal Practice
The judge’s discretion to exclude a statement on the ground that its admission would be unfair is a matter of degree, but the first and principal decision is whether the prosecution has proved that it was made voluntarily. The court discussed what would be 'oppressive' in questioning by the police, and adopted part of a speech given by Lord MacDermotte: "questioning which by its nature, duration or other circumstances (including the fact of custody) excites hopes (such as the hope of release) or fears, or so affects the mind of the subject that his will crumbles and he speaks when otherwise he would have stayed silent." and "what may be oppressive to one or someone inexperience in the ways of the world may turn out not to be oppressive when one finds that accused person is of tough character and an experienced man of the world."
Edmund Davies LJ said: "As we have already indicated, the criticism directed in the present case against the police is that their interrogation constituted 'oppression'. This word appeared for the first time in the Judges' Rules of 1964, and it closely followed the observation of the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Parker) in Callis v. Gunn (1963) 48 Cr. App. R. 36 at page 40 condemning confessions 'obtained in an oppressive manner'."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Andrews-Weatherfoil Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 118; [1972] 1 ALL ER 65
1972
CACD
Eveleigh J
Criminal Practice, Company
For so long as it is possible for persons concerned in a single offence to be tried separately, it is inevitable that the verdicts returned by the two juries will on occasion appear to be inconsistent with one another. Eveleigh J: "It is necessary to establish whether the natural person or persons in question have the status and authority which in law makes their acts in the matter under consideration the acts of the company so that the natural person is to be treated as the company itself."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Johal and Ram; 1972 - (1972) 56 Cr App R 348; [1973] QB 475
 
Regina v Lillis (1972) 56 Cr App R 573; [1972] 2 QB 236
1972
CACD
Lawton LJ
Criminal Practice
The court considered the intent of section 6(3) of the 1967 Act. Lawton LJ said: "Before the passing of the 1967 Act, the law (on alternative verdicts) was partly to be found in the common law and partly in a number of statutes. At common law on an indictment charging felony the accused could be convicted of a less aggravated felony of which the ingredients were included in the felony charged and similarly as regards misdemeanours: but except under statute a conviction for a misdemeanour was not allowed on a charge of felony. The object of the section was to provide a general rule continuing and combining the rules of common law and the provisions of most of the statutes which enabled alternative verdicts to be returned in specific cases or types of cases."
The test to be applied is this: "This can be shown by striking out of the indictment all the averments which had not been proved ?the ‘red pencil test’."
Criminal Law Act 1967 6(3)
1 Citers


 
Phelan v Back [1972] 1 All ER 901
1972


Criminal Practice

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Williams v Somerfield [1972] 2 QB 512
1972

Lord Widgery CJ
Criminal Practice
The court emphasised that a search warrant is a potentially serious invasion of the liberty of the subject, and a gross invasion of privacy. Lord Widgery also drew the distinction between authorising the obtaining of material as permitted by statute, and "a fishing expedition in the hope of finding some material upon which the charge can be hung".
Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1879
1 Citers


 
Regina v Le Caer (1972) 56 Cr App R 727
1972
CACD
Lord Widgery CJ
Criminal Practice
The judge's notes had gone missing before the appeal. Held: Applying Ellkiott, the simple fact that there is no shorthand note is not a ground for saying that the conviction is unsafe or unsatisfactory. For the appellant to claim that he must show something to suggest that there was an irregularity at the trial or a misdirection in the summing-up. Unless there is something to suggest that an error of that kind took place, the absence of a shorthand note simpliciter cannot cause the court to say that the verdict of the jury was unsafe or unsatisfactory.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Jones (Robert) No 2 [1972] 1 WLR 887; [1972] 56 CAR 413
1972


Criminal Practice, Legal Professions
The court was entitled to proceed to hear the case in the absence of the defendant where he had absconded. I was counsel's prerogative not the judge's, to decide whether he could continue to represent the defendant.
1 Citers


 
X v United Kingdom Unreported, 23 March 1972; 5076/71
23 Mar 1972
ECHR

Human Rights, Criminal Practice
(Commission) The applicant said that having been pressured into pleading guilty: "The Commission examined this complaint under Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which guarantees the right to a fair trial, and also under Article 6(2) (Art. 6-2) of the Convention, which provides that "Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law".
The Commission notes that, under English criminal procedure, if a person pleads guilty there is no trial in the usual sense; if the judge is satisfied that the accused understands the effect of his plea his confession is recorded, and the subsequent proceedings are concerned only with the question of sentence.
The Commission, having examined this practice in the context of English criminal procedures and also the other systems among those States Parties to the Convention where a similar practice is found, is satisfied that the practice as such is not inconsistent with the requirements of Article 6(1) and (2) (Art. 6-1, 6-2) of the Convention. In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission has had regard to the rules under which the practice operates and in particular to the safeguards which are provided to avoid the possibility of abuse."
European Convention on Human Rights 6
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Long; CACD 1973 - [1973] 57 Cr App R 871 C4
 
Regina v Ellis (1973) 57 Cr App R 571
1973

Edmund Davies LJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant's counsel rather than the defendant personally had made his plea of guilty. Held: The error amounted to a mistrial. The defendant's conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered.
Edmund Davies LJ said: "before a criminal trial by judge and jury can be properly launched there must generally be an arraignment of the accused of the offence charged and he must personally answer to it, and . . this cannot be done through counsel or any other person on his behalf . .
. . great mischief could ensure if a legal representative was generally regarded as entitled to plead on an accused's behalf. It would open the door to dispute as to whether, for example, counsel had correctly understood and acted upon the instructions which the accused had given him, and if a dispute of that kind arose, the consequential embarrassment and difficulty could be difficult in the extreme.
We think that the only safe and proper course accordingly is to say . . that (apart from a few very special cases) it is an invariable requirement that the initial arraignment must be conducted between the Clerk of the Court and the accused person himself or herself directly . . "
1 Citers


 
Parsons v Barnes [1973] CLR 537
1973

Lord Widgery CJ
Consumer, Criminal Practice
In the context of trading standards legislation: "No general proposition could be laid down that one partner was necessarily responsible for the acts of his co-partner under the legislation."


 
 McGreevy v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 1973 - [1973] 1 WLR 276; [1973] 57 Cr App R 424

 
 Regina v Radley; CACD 1973 - (1973) 58 Cr App R 394; [1974] Crim LR 312

 
 Regina v Merriman; CACD 1973 - [1973] AC 584

 
 Regina v Deacon; CACD 1973 - (1973) 57 Cr App R 688
 
Regina v Prime (1973) 57 Cr App R 632
1973
CACD
Widgery LCJ
Criminal Practice
Widgery LCJ said: "It is important in all criminal cases that the judge should on the first occasion when the jury separate warn them not to talk about the case to anybody who is not one of their number."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hulusi and Purvis (1973) 58 Cr App R 378
1973
CACD
Lawton LJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant appealed against his conviction, complaining of the judge's repeated hostile interventions. Lawton LJ said: "Time and time again the judge intervened, got an answer and then asked questions on that answer. The impression he must have given was that he was cross-examining on the evidence in-chief as it was being given. It really was most unfortunate." Held: The conviction was quashed. The defendant and his witnesses had "effectively prevented the defendant or a witness for the defence from telling his story in his own way."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Falconer-Atlee; CACD 1973 - (1973) 58 Cr App R 348

 
 Regina v Massaro; QBD 1973 - [1973] QB 433

 
 Regina v Greenfield; CACD 1973 - (1973) 57 Cr App R 849; [1973] 1 WLR 1151
 
Regina v Cross (Patrick) [1973] 1 QB 937
1973
CACD
Lord Widgery CJ
Criminal Practice
The court had allowed an appeal against sentence; but later the same day the defendant was brought back because the court thought that he had not been frank in answering questions about another offence. Held: The court set aside its original judgment and directed a rehearing, at which it was held that there was indeed power to alter the original decision.
Lord Widgery CJ explained the limits of the rule: "It is well recognised that a court of record has power to alter a judgment or order which it has made within certain limits. The limits set in general appear to be that the power to alter the judgment ceases when the judgment is, in the words of the civil courts, drawn up. In other words, the general principle seems to be that once the judgment has been finally recorded, then the inherent power to vary it is lost. We are satisfied from the arguments before us, and indeed from our own experience, that that rule has been extensively applied in the criminal courts in the past . . We think that the same principles ought to apply to this court, and so we have investigated, partly with the assistance of counsel and partly by making our own inquiries within the internal organisation of the court, to determine the appropriate equivalent moment at which proceedings in this court reach that degree of finality when no further change in the decision of the court is possible . . When a judgment of this court is given, the registrar is required by the rules to notify the decision to a variety of people. By rule 15 of the Criminal Appeal Rules 1968 it is provided as follows:
'(1) The registrar shall, as soon as practicable, serve notice of any determination by the court or by any judge of the court under section 31 of the Act on any appeal or application by an appellant on - (a) the appellant; (b) the Secretary of State; (c) any person having custody of the appellant; (d) in the case of an appellant detained under the Mental Health Act 1959 the responsible authority. (2) The registrar shall, as soon as practicable, serve notice on the proper officer of the court of trial of the order of the court disposing of an appeal or application for leave to appeal.
It is to be observed that the formality required of the registrar under that rule is in no sense the making of a record. What the registrar is required to do, and does do, when he performs his duties under rule 15, is to give notice to interested parties of what the order of the court has been.
Accordingly, it does not seem to us that it would be right or appropriate to pick upon the moment when these notices are issued as being the moment when the record is made up, because they are, as I have endeavoured to describe, in no sense a record. However, by order of the Lord Chancellor following the creation of the Crown Court, there is published a Crown Court Manual which contains specific provision as to what is to be done by the court of trial on receipt of notification from the registrar under rule 15. What the Crown Court Manual requires is that the officer of the court of trial on receiving notice of the determination of this court from the registrar, shall record the determination so transmitted to him.
There is, therefore, for the first and really the only time the making of a formal record of the determination of this court, and we think that the proper interpretation of the position, so far as the matter presently under review is concerned, is that the court of trial is the court that maintains a formal record of proceedings in this court, and it is enabled to maintain such records by the registrar performing the duty cast upon him under rule 15. Consequently when the question arises, as it arises in this case, of the court's power to make a change in any decision or order which it has pronounced, the vital question is whether that decision or order has been recorded by the proper officer at the court of trial pursuant to the directions to which I have just referred"
Criminal Appeal Rules 1968 15
1 Citers


 
Regina v Radley (1973) 58 Cr App R 396
1973

Lord Widgery CJ
Criminal Practice
Lord Widgery CJ "one ought to give a fairly liberal meaning to the language of section 5"
Indictments Act 1915 5
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Bentham and Others [1973] QB 357
1973


Criminal Practice
Whether possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life was a continuing offence: 'The mischief at which the Section is aimed must be that of a person possessing a firearm ready for use, if and when the occasion arises, in a manner which endangers life.'
1 Citers


 
Regina v Poulson and Pottinger [1974] Crim LR 141
1974
CACD
Waller J
Criminal Practice, Media
The trial judge said that he did not see how the press could report the evidence in the case without running the risk of being in contempt of other criminal proceedings which had already begun against Poulson and other defendants in respect of similar offences.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Pilcher [1974] 60 Crim App R 1
1974

Lawton LJ
Criminal Practice
The prosecutor had closed his case, and the defendant had presented some evidence. It became clear that the prosecutor had failed to present evidence on one element, and the defendant appealed his conviction after the prosecutor had been allowed to re-open his case to present that evidence. Held: It was too wide a statement to say that the only material consideration was whether the interests of justice would be best served by allowing the witness to be called. The court had always to bear in mind the principle that the prosecution case should be brought to an end before the defence was called on to meet that case. "Almost any additional relevant evidence will be of value to a jury, and if the only question one had to ask oneself was: was justice more likely to be done if the jury heard this evidence, the result may well be almost any fact arising late in a trial would be let in by an ever-widening door. It is clear that that is not the practice in our courts. The rule that the prosecution must finish their case once and for all before the defence starts is a very important and salutary one." However: "On these very special facts, it seems to us that the exercise of the Judge's discretion did not step outside the narrow limits of the discretion which a judge can exercise in allowing the prosecution to call further evidence. There was no prejudice to the appellant in this case. If there had been even a possibility of prejudice to the appellant, the court would have taken the view that the judge's exercise of discretion was wrong."
1 Citers


 
Stafford v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 878; [1973] 3 All ER 762; [1973] 3 WLR 719; (1974) 58 Cr App R 256
1974
HL
Lord Kilbrandon, Viscount Dilhorne
Criminal Practice, Evidence
The House rejected the submission of counsel that the Court of Appeal had asked the wrong question by taking as the test the effect of the fresh evidence on their mind and not the effect that the evidence would have had on the mind of the jury. It would be anomalous for the court to say that the evidence raised no doubt whatever in their minds but might have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury. Lord Kilbrandon said that the test to be applied by each member of the appellate court is: "Have I a reasonable doubt, or perhaps even a lurking doubt, that this conviction may be unsafe or unsatisfactory?" Viscount Dilhorne: "While . . the Court of Appeal and this House may find it a convenient approach to consider what a jury might have done if they had heard the fresh evidence, the ultimate responsibility rests with them and them alone for deciding the question [whether or not the verdict is unsafe]."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Shannon [1974] CLY 546
1974


Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Regina v Daya Kalia (1974) 60 Cr App R 200
1974
CACD
Roskill LJ
Criminal Practice
One of the difficulties associated with granting of bail in the absence of any exceptional circumstances, is the trauma caused to the appellant being returned to prison if his appeal fails. Roskill LJ said: "This Court desires to say as plainly as possible that where (exceptionally) intending appellants or applicants are released on bail and delay follows in the hearing of the appeal, that delay cannot and must not be relied upon, whenever the appeal or application fails, as a reason for their not being sent back to prison to serve their sentence. That is usually made plain when bail is granted, and it must be clearly understood that that is so."
The judge has a duty to restrain cross-examination which is improper.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Robinson (1974) 60 Cr App R 108
1974
CACD

Criminal Practice
Verdicts of a jury must be delivered in open court
1 Citers


 
Regina v Mealey and Sheridan [1974] 60 Cr App R 59; [1975] Crim LR 154
1974
CACD

Crime, Criminal Practice
A claim of entrapment into an offence is not a defence in Engish law. The court adopted a definition contained in the report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers in 1928 in which an "agent provocateur" was taken to mean "a person who entices another to commit an express breach of the law which he would not otherwise have committed and then proceeds or informs against him in respect of such offence".
An application for leave to appeal is not itself an appeal under section 5(1) of the 1968 Act.
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 5(1)
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Foxford; CANI 1974 - [1974] NI 181

 
 Regina v Barker (Note); 1975 - (1975) 65 Cr App R 287

 
 Regina v Barry; 1975 - [1975] 1 WLR 1190

 
 Regina v Thompson; 1975 - [1975] 1 WLR 1425
 
Regina v McFadden (1975) 62 Cr Ap r 187
1975
CACD

Criminal Practice
Unfair limitation of cross examination of witness by judge.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Waterfield [1975] 1 WLR 711
1975
QBD
Lawton LJ
Criminal Practice
The defendant was convicted of importing pornographic films and magazines. One ground of appeal was that the proceedings were a nullity because the press and public had been excluded from the court room during the showing of the films. Held: The appeal failed. The principle of open justice does not extend to a right for members of the public in court, to inspect documents or other exhibits placed before the court.
Lawton LJ said: "When evidence is given orally, all in court hear what is said. When evidence is produced it may or may not be read out . . The members of the public in court have no right to claim to be allowed to look at the exhibits." and "As judges have differed as to how judicial discretion should be exercised in this class of case it may be helpful if we give some guidance . . It seems to us that, normally when a film is being shown to a jury and the judge, in the exercise of his discretion, decides that it should be done in a closed court room or in a cinema, he should allow representatives of the press to be present. No harm can be done by doing so: some good may result."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Vickers; CACD 1975 - (1975) 61 Cr App R 48; [1975] 2 ALL ER 945
 
Regina v Sheerin (1976) 64 Cr App R 68
1976
CACD

Criminal Practice
The court considered a procedural error in an indictment.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Medway (1976) 2 Cr App R 85
1976
CACD
Lawson J
Criminal Practice
The court had jurisdiction to give an applicant or appellant leave to withdraw a notice of abandonment of appeal or application for leave to appeal only where the notice of abandonment can be treated as a nullity.
Lawson J said: "The answer to the first question which we have to decide depends upon whether alongside the jurisdiction which undoubtedly, as all authorities show, exists to give leave to withdraw an abandonment where it is shown that circumstances are present which enable the Court to say that that abandonment should be treated as a nullity, there co-exists an inherent jurisdiction, in other special circumstances, enabling the Court to give such leave. We are satisfied and hold that there is no such jurisdiction. In our judgment the kernel of what has been described as the 'nullity test' is that the Court is satisfied that the abandonment was not the result of a deliberate and informed decision, in other words that the mind of the applicant did not go with his act of abandonment. In the nature of things it is impossible to foresee when and how such a state of affairs may come about; therefore it would be quite wrong to make a list, under such headings as mistake, fraud, wrong advice, misapprehension and such like, which purports to be exhaustive of the types of case where this jurisdiction can be exercised. Such headings can only be regarded as guidelines, the presence of which may justify its exercise."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Southampton Justices ex parte Green [1976] QB 11
1976
CA
Lord Denning MR
Criminal Practice
The court considered whether as the Court of Appeal, it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the Divisional Court's refusal to quash an order estreating a recognisance. Held: It did. Lord Denning MR said that "the matter is criminal" if "the matter is one the direct outcome of which may be trial of the applicant and his possible punishment for an alleged offence." The recognizance was simply a bond giving rise to a civil debt with a special enforcement procedure which was also civil.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Davis (George) [1976] 62 CAR 194
1976
CACD

Criminal Practice
After retirement, the jury requested, and was inadvertently supplied with a copy of a statement made by a witness to the police. The statement had been used by defence counsel for the purposes of cross-examination, but the document itself had not been exhibited. Held: The court questioned the absolute nature of the observation that a conviction would inevitably be quashed in circumstances where the jury had received evidence after retirement, not on the basis that the principle was in doubt, but as to whether every breach of it would result in the quashing of the conviction. The breach would be an irregularity, which depending on the circumstances might or might not result in the application of the proviso to the section. In this case the proviso was applied.
Although no additional evidence should be placed before the jury after their retirement, it is perfectly permissible for them to have a repeat of evidence which had already been given.
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 291)
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Coughlan and Young; CACD 1976 - [1976] 63 Cr App R 33

 
 Regina v Thompson; CACD 1976 - [1976] 64 Cr App R 96

 
 Regina v Lake; CACD 1976 - (1976) 64 Cr App R 172
 
Regina v Melville (1976) 62 Cr App Rep 100
1976
CACD

Criminal Practice
The defendant appealed his conviction for murder saying that evidence later obtained suggested that he was suffering diminished responsibility at the time of the offence. Held: The evidence was not admitted. It was not sufficiently strong to have supported the defence. The court quoted a previous judgment of Atkinson LJ: "It may well be that if subsequent evidence of diminished responsibility was really overwhelming, the Court might well feel moved to substitute a verdict of manslaughter, or to order a retrial."
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 23 - Homicide Act 1957 2
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Michael; QBD 1976 - [1976] QB 414
 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574
1976
PC
Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Criminal Practice
The Board was asked whether a statement by the defendant was shown to be voluntary. Held: A trial Judge faced by the problem should approach the task in a common sense way and should ask himself whether the prosecution had proved that the contested statement was voluntary in the sense that it was not obtained by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage excited or held out by a person in authority. It is not necessary, before a statement is held to be inadmissible because not shown to have been voluntary, that it should be thought or held that there was impropriety in the conduct of the person to whom the statement was made. What has to be considered is whether a statement is shown to have been voluntary rather than one brought about in one of the ways referred to.
The Committee described the courts abhorrence of the admission of evidence obtained by oppression: "By the judiciary, though it ought not to be extended, it must by no means be whittled down. It bears, it is true, all the marks of its origin at a time when the savage code of the eighteenth century was in full force. At that time almost every serious crime was punishable by death or transportation. The law enforcement officers formed no disciplined police force and were not subject to effective control by the central government, watch committees or an inspectorate. There was no legal aid. There was no system of appeal. To crown it all the accused was unable to give evidence on his own behalf and was therefore largely at the mercy of any evidence, either perjured or oppressively obtained, that might be brought against him. The judiciary were therefore compelled to devise artificial rules designed to protect him against dangers now avoided by other and more rational means. Nevertheless, the rule has survived into the twentieth century, not only unmodified but developed, and only Parliament can modify it now from the form in which it was given classical expression by Lord Sumner."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Cain; 1976 - [1976] QB 496

 
 Regina v Annesley; CACD 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 106
 
Regina v Tate [1977] RTR 17
1977
CACD
Lawton LJ
Road Traffic, Evidence, Criminal Practice
At the close of a prosecution case for driving with excess alcohol, the appellant stated that he would not give or call evidence. He then submitted that the jury should be directed to consider only the admissible evidence of the analyst called who stated in cross examination, that two of the experiments had been carried out by a colleague. The results of those experiments were, therefore, hearsay and inadmissible. The trial judge then permitted the second analyst to be called, and the appeal was dismissed. Held: "Since 1911 there have been a number of cases before this court and its predecessor in which the problem has had to be considered. It suffices, we think, to say without going through the cases in detail, that it is now clearly established that the trial judge has a discretion whether he will allow the prosecution to call any more evidence after they have closed their case. The exercise of discretion will not be interfered with by this court unless it has been exercised either wrongly in principle or perversely."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Manchester City Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte S Nelson [1977] 1 WLR 911
1977
CACD
Lord Widgery CJ
Criminal Practice
Challenge was made to the institution of fresh committal proceedings following the applicant's discharge at an earlier committal hearing when, the prosecution's application for an adjournment having been refused, no evidence was offered against him. The applicant contended that the prosecution's only right was to apply for a voluntary bill of indictment. Held: No question of autrefois acquit arises by reason of the earlier discharge. Any practice did not change that rule.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Keene [1977] 65 Cr App Rep 247
1977


Criminal Practice
"The jury must be told that they can rely on a false alibi as supporting an identification only if they are satisfied that the sole reason for the fabrication was to deceive them on the issue of identification."
1 Citers


 
Regina v McHugh (1977) 64 Cr App R 92
1977
CACD

Criminal Practice
The defendant was convicted of theft. It was suggested that he might have been guilty of obtaining by deception. The court considered it "a purely technical question whether at the end of the day the proper offence is one of theft or obtaining by deception" and concluded that even if the point was a good one there could have been no miscarriage of justice. It accordingly applied the proviso.
1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys; HL 1977 - [1977] AC 146
 
Regina v Tompkins (1977) 67 Cr App R 181
1977
CACD

Criminal Practice, Legal Professions

1 Citers


 
Regina v Wehner [1977] 1 WLR 1143
1977


Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Regina v Daniel [1977] 64 Cr App R 50
1977
CACD
Lawton LJ
Criminal Practice
The applicant renewed his application for leave to appeal, which had been refused by the single judge. He instructed solicitors who wrote to the court to advise that they intended to instruct Counsel on the renewed application. Due to an administrative error the renewed application was listed, heard and dismissed on 14 June 1976 without notice to the applicant's lawyers. The order was recorded by the Crown Court. When an application was made to re-hear the matter, the court decided on 14 September 1976 that it was bound by Cross to dismiss the application on the ground that it was functus officio. Held: Although the appeal was dismissed on the merits, the court considered in detail the question of jurisdiction. After referring to Majewski, Lawton LJ concluded that: "It follows, in our judgment, that [Cross] did not apply when what has happened is a nullity."
Lawton LJ then asked whether the court had jurisdiction in the circumstances of a case where the applicant had been deprived of his right to be represented by counsel. He answered the question: ""This court clearly has jurisdiction within the ambit of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 and the Rules of 1968 to see that no injustice is done to any defendant in the course of any application or appeal. If in any particular case, because of a failure of the court to follow the rules or the well established practice, there is a likelihood that injustice may have been done, then it seems to us right, despite the generality of what was said in R v. Cross that a case should be relisted for hearing. It is pertinent to point out that in R v. Cross the court had heard arguments by counsel on the merits before any question arose about rehearing the appeal, for such it was. The kind of problem which has arisen in this case was never considered.
It follows that this court acted per incuriam in adjudging, on September 14, 1976, that it had no jurisdiction to consider the defendant's application. The court had such jurisdiction.
Before leaving this subject the court would stress that save in cases in which what has happened is a nullity, the jurisdiction to relist depends on the likelihood of an injustice having been done. That is for the court itself to decide. There may not be a likelihood of injustice if, from the written grounds of appeal and any supporting documents, it is clear beyond argument that the application cannot succeed."
Criminal Appeal Act 1968
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Mitchell; CACD 1977 - (1977) 65 Cr App R 185
 
The Director of Public Prosecutions v Donald White [1977] 3 WLR 447; [1977] Crim LR 418; [1977] UKPC 8; [1978] AC 426; [1977] 3 All ER 1003
28 Apr 1977
PC
Diplock, Simon of Glaisdale, Salmon, Edmund-Davies, Russell of Killowen LL
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
(Jamaica) At his trial, the jury had first indicated that they were to give a majority verdict, but then returned a unanimous verdict. At the time, one hour had not passed and therefore a majority verdict was not available to them. The court had ordered a venire de novo. Held: In jurisdictions where appellate courts have power to order retrial "the concept of nullity of proceedings has been extended to situations beyond those covered by the ancient writ of venire de novo."
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Hennessey (Timothy) (1978) 68 Cr App R 419
1978
CACD
Lawton LJ
Criminal Practice
The court considered the obligations of the prosecution on disclosure. The courts must: "keep in mind that those who prepare and conduct prosecutions owe a duty to the courts to ensure that all relevant evidence of help to an accused is either led by them or made available to the defence. We have no reason to think that this duty is neglected; and if ever it should be, the appropriate disciplinary bodies can be expected to take action. The judges for their part will ensure that the Crown gets no advantage from neglect of duty on the part of the prosecution."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016
1978

Scarman LJ
Criminal Practice
Scarman LJ referred to the need for similar fact evidence to be "believed" and the need for the jury "to accept the evidence": "Positive probative value is what the law requires, if similar fact evidence is to be admissible. Such probative value is not provided by the mere repetition of similar facts; there has to be some feature or features in the evidence sought to be adduced which provides a link - an underlying link as it has been called in some of the cases. The existence of such a link is not to be inferred from mere similarity of facts which are themselves so commonplace that they can provide no sure ground for saying that they point to the commission by the accused of the offence under consideration"
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hennessy (Timothy) (1978) 68 Cr App R 419
1978

Lawton LJ
Criminal Practice
The court described the duty on a prosecutor to disclose evidence: "those who prepare and conduct prosecutions owe a duty to the courts to ensure that all relevant evidence of help to an accused is either led by them or made available to the defence." As to the correctness of the convicion for importing drugs: "It matters not for the purpose of conviction what the goods were as long as he knew that he was bringing into the United Kingdom goods which he should not have been bringing in".
1 Citers


 
Regina v Williams [1978] QB 373
1978

Shaw LJ
Criminal Practice
At his Crown Court trial, a misunderstanding led the clerk of the court to empanel a jury without first taking the defendant's not guilty plea. The defendant was convicted and now argued that the trial was a nullity because he had not pleaded. Held: The appeal failed. It was implicit in the proceedings that the defendant had waived his right to plead not guilty personally; accordingly, the defective arraignment had not invalidated the trial. distinguished between pleas of guilty and pleas of not guilty. As to guilty pleas, Shaw LJ, having cited Ellis, said: "There [i.e., in Ellis] the critical issue was whether a plea of guilty tendered by counsel and not by the accused himself could be regarded as an effective and binding plea. It is of course plain to see why it cannot and should not be so regarded. It is a plea which is self-incriminatory and self-incrimination cannot be vicariously accomplished. Any contrary view would be fraught with manifest dangers. Injustice rather than justice would be the likely products of a principle which permitted indirect delegated confessions of guilt.
No qualification of or deviation from the rule that a plea of guilty must come from him who acknowledges guilt is thus permissible. A departure from the rule in a criminal trial would therefore necessarily be a vitiating factor rendering the whole procedure void and ineffectual."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] AC 474
1978
HL
Lord Wilberforce
Criminal Practice
The defendant had married the complainant only two days before he was to face trial for assaulting her. The House considered whether she was compellable as a witness against him as his wife. Held: A spouse ought not to have been compelled to give evidence against her husband who was charged with wounding her with intent to do grievous bodily harm.
Lord Wilberforce said: "a wife is in principle not a competent witness on a criminal charge against her husband. This is because of the identity of interest between husband and wife and because to allow her to give evidence would give rise to discord and to perjury and would be, to ordinary people, repugnant. Limited exceptions have been engrafted on this rule, of which the most important, and that now relevant, relates to cases of personal violence by the husband against her. This required that, as she is normally the only witness and because otherwise a crime would go without sanction, she be permitted to give evidence against him. But does this permission in the interest of the wife, carry the matter any further, or do the general considerations, arising from the fact of marriage and her status as a wife, continue to apply so as to negative compulsion? . . My Lords, after careful consideration I have reached the conclusion . . that the wife should be held non-compellable."
1 Citers


 
Regina (Caherty) v Belfast Justices [1978] NI 94
1978


Northern Ireland, Criminal Practice
Section 7 of the 1945 Act provides that a person charged in Northern Ireland with the commission of indictable offence may be proceeded against in any county or place in which (a) he is apprehended; (b) he is in custody in relation to the offence; or (c) he appears to answer a summons lawfully issued charging the offence. In such circumstances the offence will be deemed to have been committed in the relevant county or place. Held: The section conferred the necessary jurisdiction to proceed.
Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1945 791)
1 Citers



 
 The Republic of Ireland v The United Kingdom; ECHR 18-Jan-1978 - 5310/71; Series A no 25, p 65; [1978] ECHR 1; (1978) 2 EHRR 25; [2018] ECHR 247
 
Kwan Ping Bong and Kong Ching v The Queen [1978] UKPC 28; [1979] 2 WLR 433; [1979] AC 609
16 Nov 1978
PC
Lord Diplock
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
(Hong Kong) In reaching its conclusions it is open to the court to draw inferences from primary facts which it finds established by evidence. A court may not, however, infer the existence of some fact which constitutes an essential element of the case unless the inference is compelling i.e. such that no reasonable man would fail to draw it.
Lord Diplock said: "The requirement of proof beyond all reasonable doubt does not prevent a jury from inferring, from the facts that have been the subject of direct evidence before them, the existence of some further fact, such as the knowledge or intent of the accused, which constitutes an essential element of the offence; but the inference must be compelling -- one (and the only one) that no reasonable man could fail to draw from the direct facts proved."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Wong Kam-Ming v The Queen [1978] UKPC 34; [1979] Crim LR 168; [1979] 1 All ER 939; [1979] 2 WLR 81; [1980] AC 247; (1979) 69 Cr App R 47
20 Dec 1978
PC
Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Hailsham
Criminal Practice
The voir dire system allows a defendant to give his evidence on the limited issues surrounding the circumstances under which his statement was made as to the admissibility of the confession, without infringing his right to elect not to give evidence in the trial of the general issue. The committee confirmed the rule excluding from admission evidence improperly obtained: "The basic control over admissibility of statement are found in the evidential rule that an admission must be voluntary i.e. not obtained through violence, fear or prejudice, oppression, threats and promises or other improper inducements. See decision of Lord Sumner in IBRAHIM v. R (1914-15) AER 874 at 877. It is to the evidence that the court must turn for an answer to the voluntariness of the confessions."
Lord Hailsham said: "I have stated elsewhere (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Ping Lin [1976] A.C. 574) that the rule, common to the law of Hong Kong and that of England, relating to the admissibility of extra-judicial confessions is in many ways unsatisfactory, but any civilised system of criminal jurisprudence must accord to the judiciary some means of excluding confessions or admissions obtained by improper methods. This is not only because of the potential unreliability of such statements, but also, and perhaps mainly, because in a civilised society it is vital that persons in custody or charged with offences should not be subjected to ill treatment or improper pressure in order to extract confessions. It is therefore of very great importance that the courts should continue to insist that before extra-judicial statements can be admitted in evidence the prosecution must be made to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained in a manner which should be reprobated and was therefore in the truest sense voluntary. For this reason it is necessary that the defendant should be able and feel free either by his own testimony or by other means to challenge the voluntary character of the tendered statement. If, as happened in the instant appeal, the prosecution were to be permitted to introduce into the trial the evidence of the defendant given in the course of the voir dire when the statement to which it relates has been excluded whether in order to supplement the evidence otherwise available as part of the prosecution case, or by way of cross-examination of the defendant, the important principles of public policy to which I have referred would certainly become eroded, possibly even to vanishing point."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v West London Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Klahn; QBD 1979 - [1979] 1 WLR 933

 
 Regina v Maynard and Other; CACD 1979 - (1979) 69 Cr App R 309
 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Menocal [1980] AC 598; [1979] 2 WLR 876
1979
HL
Lord Edmund Davies
Criminal Practice
The appellant had been convicted under the 1952 Act of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent importation of controlled drugs. She was sentenced to imprisonment on her plea. More than three months later, application was made to forfeit the money found on arrest. The court inferred that the whole of the money had been provided to her to assist in the importation, and a forfeiture order was made, expressed to be under section 27 of the Act of 1971 or, alternatively, under section 43 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973. She appealed the forfeiture saying it was made without jurisdiction since the time limit for variation under section 11(2) of the Courts Act 1971 had expired. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Held: By virtue of the definition of 'sentence' in section 57 of the Courts Act 1971 the word 'sentence' in section 11(2) of that Act included a forfeiture order made against the offender; section 11(2) laid down very clearly that any sentence or other order might be varied or rescinded by the Crown Court within 28 days, but that there was no power in the Crown Court to vary or rescind a sentence or any other order after the expiry of that period, and that accordingly, in the circumstances, the appeal must be allowed.
Customs and Excise Act 1952 304 - Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 3(1) - Courts Act 1971
1 Citers


 
Regina v Barrell and Wilson (1979) 69 Cr App R 620
1979
CACD

Criminal Practice
The court set out the test for whether charges could properly be rejoined after severance on the indictment.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Pearce; CACD 1979 - (1979) 69 Cr App R 365
 
Regina v Leyland Justices, Ex parte Hawthorn [1979] QB 283; [1979] 1 All ER 209
1979
QBD

Criminal Practice
A motorist successfully challenged his conviction for careless driving because of a failure by the prosecutor, in breach of a duty owed to the court and the defence, to disclose the existence of witnesses who could have given evidence favourable to the defence. Although no dishonesty was suggested, it was this suppressio veri which had the same effect as a suggestio falsi in distorting and vitiating the process leading to conviction, and it was, in my opinion, the analogy which Lord Widgery CJ drew between the case before him and the cases of fraud, collusion and perjury which had been relied on in counsel's argument, which identified the true principle on which the decision could be justified.
1 Citers



 
 Attorney-General v Leveller Magazine Ltd; HL 1-Feb-1979 - [1979] AC 440; [1978] 3 All ER 731; [1979] 2 WLR 247

 
 Regina v Sang; HL 25-Jul-1979 - [1980] AC 402; [1979] UKHL 3; [1979] 3 WLR 263; [1979] 2 All ER 1222; (1979) 69 Cr App R 282

 
 Schiesser v Switzerland; ECHR 4-Dec-1979 - (1979-80) 2 EHRR 417; [1979] ECHR 5; 7710/76
 
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