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Criminal Practice - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 62 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
Moorov v HM Advocate 1930 JC 68; [1930] ScotHC HCJAC - 1
1930


Criminal Practice
Corroboration evidence.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Proprietary Articles Trade Association v Attorney-General for Canada [1931] AC 310; 100 LJPC 84
1931
PC
Lord Atkin
Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
The Board was asked how to identify whether an allegation amounted to a criminal one. Lord Atkin said: "It appears to their Lordships to be of little value to seek to confine crimes to a category of acts which by their very nature belong to the domain of 'criminal jurisprudence'; for the domain of criminal jurisprudence can only be ascertained by examining what acts at any particular period are declared by the state to be crimes, and the only common nature they will be found to possess is that they are prohibited by the state and that those who commit them are punished." and "It certainly is not confined to what was criminal by the law of England or of any Province in 1867. The power must extend to legislation to make new crimes. Criminal law connotes only the quality of such acts or omissions as are prohibited under appropriate penal provisions by authority of the State. The criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by intuition; nor can it be discovered by reference to any standard but one: is the act prohibited with penal consequences?"
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Rex v Naylor; 1932 - [1933] 1 KB 685; (1932) 23 Cr App R 177
 
Rex v Thomas [1933] 2 KB 489
1933
CCA
Lord Atkin
Criminal Practice
The court refused to receive evidence that two Welsh-speaking jurors at Merioneth Quarter Sessions did not have sufficient knowledge of English to enable them to follow the proceedings.
1 Citers


 
Muir v HM Advocate 1933 JC 46
1933

Lord Sands
Criminal Practice
The jury in a murder trial had not been directed on the possible verdict of culpable homicide on the ground of diminished responsibility. Held: The defendant's appeal was allowed. Lord Sands said: "A brutal crime had been committed, and a measure of mental weakness might have been regarded from quite a different angle if the jury were aware that its affirmance did not involve complete acquittal."
1 Citers


 
Ras Behari Lal v King-Emperor (1933) 50 TLR 1; (1933) 60 IA 354
1933
PC
Lord Atkin
Criminal Practice
It was alleged that a juror had been unable to understand sufficient English to follow the trial. Held: The rule against enquiring into the events in the jury room has an exception where there are external events which may have affected them. The conviction must be set aside on the ground that the effect of the jury's inability to understand the language was to deny the accused persons an essential part of the protection afforded to them by law, and that the result of the trial was a miscarriage of justice.
Lord Atkin said: "The question whether a juror is competent for physical or other reasons to understand the proceedings is not a question which invades the privacy of the discussions in the jury box or in the retiring room. It does not seek to inquire into the reasons for a verdict." and "Finality is a good thing; but justice is a better."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Rex v Hare; 1934 - [1934] 1 KB 354

 
 Rex v Gee; CCA 1936 - [1936] 2 KB 442

 
 HM Advocate v McGuigan; HCJ 1936 - 1936 JC 16

 
 Seneviratne v Rex; PC 1936 - [1936] 3 All ER 36

 
 Bruce v H M Advocate; HCJ 1936 - 1936 JC 93
 
Rex v Jack Fielding [1938] 26 Cr App R 211
1938

du Parcq J
Criminal Practice
The defendant appealed alleging a misdirection of the jury by the judge. Held: du Parcq J said: "it is most unsatisfactory that grounds of appeal should be drawn with such vagueness as we find in the present case . . It has been said many times in this Court that particulars must be given in the grounds of appeal. If misdirection is complained of, it must be stated whether the alleged misdirection is one of law or fact and its nature must also be stated. If omission is complained of, it must be stated what is alleged to have been omitted. It is not only placing an unnecessary burden on the Court to ask it to search through the summing up and the transcript of evidence to find out what there may be to be complained of, but it is also unfair to the prosecution, who are entitled to know what case they have to meet. We hope that it will not again be necessary to point out a similar inadequacy in grounds of appeal."
1 Citers



 
 Milne and Others v Commissioner of Police for City of London; HL 1940 - [1940] AC 1

 
 Mancini v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 1942 - [1942] AC 1; [1941] 3 All ER 272
 
Rex v Leckey (1943) 29 Cr App R 128; [1944] K B 80
1943
CCA

Criminal Practice
A conviction was set aside where the judge had invited the jury to take account of the defendant's failure to give evidence.
1 Citers


 
Armand v Home Secretary [1943] AC 147
1943


Criminal Practice, Judicial Review

1 Citers


 
Adel Muhammed el Dabbah v Attorney General for Palestine [1944] AC 156
1944
PC
Lord Thankerton
Criminal Practice
The Board looked at the discretion which lay with a prosecutor as to whether to call witnesses. Held: The discretion, in the first instance at any rate, rested with the prosecution: "And the court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion, unless, perhaps, it can be shown that the prosecutor has been influenced by some oblique motive."
1 Citers


 
Ex parte Blyth [1944] KB 532
1944


Criminal Practice
The High Court did not have jurisdiction to grant bail post conviction
1 Citers


 
Stirland v Director of Public Prosecutions [1944] AC 315; (1945) 30 Crim App R 40
1944
HL
Viscount Simon LC
Criminal Practice, Scotland
The House considered what was the appropriate test for allowing a conviction to stand despite the finding of an irregularity in the trial. Held: The House must be satisfied that there was "a situation a reasonable jury, after being properly directed, would, on the evidence properly admissible, without doubt convict." Assuming the wrong direction on law or the irregularity had not occurred and the trial had been free from legal error, would the only reasonable and proper verdict have been one of guilty?
Viscount Simon LC: 'the provision that the Court of Criminal Appeal may dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred in convicting the accused assumes a situation where a reasonable jury, after being properly directed, would on the evidence, properly admissible, without doubt convict.' It is a high and exacting test and we have come to be of the view, that it has not been passed in the present case." Where the verdict is criticised on the ground that the jury were permitted to consider inadmissible evidence, the question is whether no reasonable jury, after a proper summing up, could have failed to convict the appellant on the rest of the evidence to which no objection could be taken on the ground of its inadmissibility.
The word "charged" means "charged in court", not merely suspected or accused without subsequent prosecution.
1 Citers


 
Rex v Canny (1945) 30 Cr App R 143
1945

Humphreys J
Criminal Practice
Discussing the need for a judge not to sum up too strongly against a defendant: "in England a man is entitled to a fair trial by jury on any offence which is indictable. It does not matter how absurd the defence is, or how unlikely it is that any sensible person would pay the least attention to it. A prisoner is entitled to make his defence to the jury, and it is for the jury and not for the Judge to decide on its weight. The Judge has no power to stop a defence and say: 'This is an absurd defence and I will not let you put it before the jury'. When we find that the learned Judge, owing entirely to the initial mistake, has really prevented the jury from trying the prisoner fairly and squarely on the evidence by repeating over and over again: 'This is an absurd defence, there is no foundation for this allegation against his wife, and the truth is, as you will find in a minute, that the prisoner did assault his wife', that is not a trial at all according to our methods and understanding. It is a mistrial. We find it quite impossible to say, if this incident had not happened and if the jury had been properly directed, what they would have done, and we cannot speculate. What we do know is that the law of this country is that a prisoner is entitled to take his chance of finding a stupid jury and is entitled to put his defence before the jury with a view to persuading them to acquit him."
1 Citers


 
Rex v Bryant and Dickson (1946) 31 Cr App R 146
1946
CCA
Diplock LJ, Lord Goddard
Criminal Practice
A fraud occurred in respect of the repairing of ambulances in a garage operated by a company in which the defendant Dickson was the major shareholder and where the defendant Bryant worked. An employee of the company at the garage would make an estimate of the work which had to be done, and where that differed from the work specified in the note the sanction of a supervising mechanic named Campbell was required. He either consciously or unconsciously, facilitated the frauds which were perpetrated. The prosecution had taken a statement from Campbell but they did not furnish a copy of the statement to the defence and they did not call Campbell as a witness at the trial. On the appeal it was argued that: ". . . the prosecution, having taken a statement from Campbell and having decided not to call him as a witness, were under a duty to furnish the defence with a copy of the statement, in order to enable the defendant to decide whether they should call him." Held: The proposition that it is the duty of the prosecution to place before the court all the evidence known to him, whether or not it is probative of the guilt of the accused person, was erroneous. The principle of open justice did not extend that far. "A prosecutor is under no such duty. His duty is to prosecute, not to defend. If he happens to have information from a credible witness which is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, or, although not inconsistent with his guilt, is helpful to the accused, the prosecutor should make such witness available to the defence."
Lord Goddard: "It is said that it was the duty of the prosecution to have supplied the defence with a statement which Campbell had admittedly made to the prosecution. The prosecution, for reasons which one can well understand, did not call Campbell. Is there a duty in such circumstances on the prosecution to supply a copy of the statement which they have taken to the defence? In the opinion of the Court there is no such duty, nor has there ever been. In the first place, if they had supplied a copy of the statement of Campbell, that would not have enabled the defence to put the statement in. The statement which Campbell made could have become evidence only if he had been called as a witness. But it is said that it was the duty of the prosecution to put that statement at the disposal of the defence. In the opinion of the Court, the duty of the prosecution in such a case is to make available to the defence a witness whom the prosecution know can, if he is called, give material evidence. That they did in this case, because when a letter was sent by the defence to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the reply of the Director of Public Prosecutions showed quite clearly that the prosecution did not intend to call him, but he added: 'There is no objection to your taking a statement from Campbell if you wish to do so'. That was said well before the trial. It was said after the close of the police court proceedings, when the defence knew that Campbell was not being called by the prosecution, and therefore could quite well themselves have gone to Campbell and taken a statement from him. Campbell was at the Court. Who brought him to the Court I do not know, nor is it material to inquire, but the defence could have called him if they had liked. No doubt Mr. Scott Henderson would not have been so unwise as to call him without having a statement from him, but if the defence did not choose to take a statement and find out what he was prepared to say, that is not a matter with which the prosecution are concerned. In the opinion of the Court it is quite wrong to say that it was the duty of the prosecution in these circumstances, having made Campbell available to the defence as a witness if they wished to call him, to go further and produce the statement which he had made."
1 Citers



 
 Kwaku Mensah v The King; PC 1946 - [1946] AC 83; [1945] UKPC 51; (1946) 2 CR 113; [1946] 2 WWR 455
 
Bracegirdle v Oxley and Cobley [1947] KB 349
1947

Humphreys J, Lord Goddard CJ
Criminal Practice, Magistrates
The facts proved or admitted pointed inescapably to the conclusion that the drivers had driven dangerously. But the justices, in defiance of Divisional Court authority, concluded that the driving was not dangerous. Held: Humphreys J said: "I only desire to say that for a very great number of years, whenever justices have found facts from which only one conclusion can be drawn by reasonable persons honestly applying their minds to the question, and have refused to draw that only conclusion, this court has invariably upset the decision of the justices in the appropriate manner."
Lord Goddard CJ: "It is said that this court is bound by the findings of fact set out in the cases by the magistrates. It is true that this court does not sit as a general court of appeal against magistrates' decisions in the same way as quarter sessions. In this court we only sit to review the magistrates' decisions on points of law, being bound by the facts which they have found, provided always that there is evidence on which they could come to the conclusions of fact at which they have arrived. Mr Parker, who has intervened in this case as amicus curiae to enable the court to have the benefit of a full argument on each side, concedes that if magistrates come to a decision to which no reasonable bench of magistrates, applying their minds to proper considerations and giving themselves proper directions, could come, then this court can interfere, because the position is exactly the same as if the magistrates had come to a decision of fact without evidence to support it. Sometimes it has been said of the verdict of a jury given in those circumstances, that it is perverse, and I should have no hesitation in applying that term to the decisions of magistrates which are arrived at without evidence to support them."
1 Citers


 
Rex v Neal [1949] 2 KB 590
1949
CCA

Criminal Practice
"If some irregularity comes to the knowledge of Counsel before the verdict is returned, he should bring it to the attention of the court at the earliest possible moment so that the presiding judge may consider whether or not to discharge the jury without giving a verdict. Points of the sort ought not to be held in reserve with a view to taking them before this court when it may be, as here, too late to remedy the mistake."
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Hopkins-Husson; 1949 - (1949) 34 Cr App R 47

 
 Rex v Kritz; 1949 - (1949) 33 Cr AppR 169; [1950] 1 KB 82

 
 Rex v Pople; Rex v Smith; 1950 - [1951] 1 KB 53; (1950) 34 Cr App R 168
 
Sambasivam v Director of Public Prosecutions, Federation of Malaya [1950] AC 458
1950
PC
Lord Dermott
Criminal Practice
(Malaya) The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court after a lawful trial is not restricted to the fact that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. It is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication: "The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. The maxim "Res judicata pro veritate accipitur" is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings."
1 Citers



 
 Rex v Green; 1950 - [1950] 34 Cr App R 38

 
 Flockhart v Robinson; 1950 - [1950] 2 KB 498
 
Sambasivam v The Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaysia (Malaya) [1950] UKPC 7; [1950] AC 458; (1950) 66 TLR (Pt 2) 254
30 Mar 1950
PC
Lord MacDermott
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
Malaya - The appellant challenged his conviction for carrying a firearm and ammunition. He had been tried under simplified emergency procedures and sentenced to death. The prosecution had adduced evidence of possession on the same occasion of unlawful possession by him of .38 ammunition in respect of which he had been acquitted at a previous trial and of which acquittal the assessors in the subsequent trial were not informed. Held:His appeal succeeded. The prosecution was not entitled to challenge the validity of the acquittal in that way and that the appellant was entitled to rely on it in so far as it might be relevant to his defence.
Lord MacDermott said: “The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication.”
[ Bailii ]

 
 Rex v Murray; 1951 - [1951] 1 KB 391
 
Rex v Heyes [1951] 1 KB 29
1951
KBD

Criminal Practice
For so long as a defendant remains in the charge of the jury he or she can only be acquitted or convicted by the verdict of the jury.
1 Citers



 
 Gallacher v HM Advocate; HCJ 1951 - 1951 JC 38
 
Rex v Summers (1952) 36 Cr App R 14; [1952] WN 185
1952
HL
Lord Goddard
Criminal Practice
The House considered the direction on the standard of proof. Lord Goddard said: "It is far better, instead of using the words 'reasonable doubt' and then trying to explain what is a reasonable doubt, to direct a jury: 'You must not convict unless you are satisfied by the evidence that the offence has been committed'. The jury should be told that it is not for the prisoner to prove his innocence, but for the prosecution to prove his guilt. If a jury is told that it is their duty to regard the evidence and see that it satisfies them so that they can feel sure when they return a verdict of Guilty, that is much better than using the expression 'reasonable doubt' and I hope in future that that will be done. I never use the expression when summing up. I always tell a jury that, before they convict, they must feel sure and must be satisfied that the prosecution have established the guilt of the prisoner."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Miller [1952] 36 Cr App R 169
1952

Devlin J
Criminal Practice, Criminal Evidence
The fact that a defendant has previous convictions is not normally relevant: "The fundamental principle, equally applicable to any question that is asked by the defence as to any question that is asked by the prosecution, is that it is not normally relevant to inquire into a prisoner's previous character, and, particularly, to ask questions which tend to show that he has previously committed some criminal offence. It is not relevant because the fact that he has committed an offence on one occasion does not in any way show that he is likely to commit an offence on any subsequent occasion. Accordingly, such questions are, in general, inadmissible, not primarily for the reason that they are prejudicial, but because they are irrelevant."
As to the possibility of separate trials for conspirators: "The cases must be rare in which fellow conspirators can properly in the interests of justice be granted a separate trial." There is a considerable risk with separate trials in such circumstances and on such a charge that the jurors would each hear a very different account of events from the defendants they were trying with a distinct possibility of a miscarriage of justice.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Bates [1952] 2 All ER 842
1952

Donovan J
Criminal Practice
If a statute is ambiguous, the court may look at the long title to discover the purpose of the Act: "In many cases the long title may supply the key to the meaning. The principle, as I understand it, is that where something is doubtful or ambiguous the long title may be looked to to resolve the doubt or ambiguity, but, in the absence of doubt or ambiguity, the passage under construction must be taken to mean what it says, so that if its meaning be clear, that meaning is not to be narrowed or restricted by reference to the long title."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Middlesex Quarter Sessions, ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions; QBD 1952 - [1952] 2 QB 758
 
Regina v Kent Justices, Ex parte Machin [1952] 2 QB 366
1952

Lord Goddard CJ
Criminal Practice
The applicant had been charged before the justices with indictable offences. He consented to summary trial but it had not been explained to him that he might be committed to the Quarter Sessions for sentence. Held: The court allowed certiorari.
Lord Goddard CJ described the statutory provisions in question as "peremptory" because "for many centuries in English history an indictable offence could only be tried by a jury and the power of magistrates to try cases of theft and false pretences is purely the creation of statute". He concluded: "The convictions must be quashed because the justices took upon themselves, although with the consent of the prisoner, to try offences summarily without a strict compliance with the provisions of the Act, which alone allow an indictable offence to be tried summarily
In this case we hold that the convictions were bad and therefore the case could not be sent forward for sentence to quarter sessions, because the justices never had jurisdiction to try it because the provisions of the section had not strictly been complied with."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Smith v HM Advocate 1952 JC 66
1952
HCJ
Lord Justice Clerk Thomson
Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Downie v HM Advocate 1952 JC 37
1952
HCJ
Lord Justice General Cooper
Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Regina v Owen [1952] 36 CAR 16
1952
CCA
Lord Goddard CJ
Criminal Practice
The trial judge allowed a doctor who had already given evidence in the case, to be recalled to give evidence in answer to a question raised by the jury after its retirement. Held: The conviction was quashed: "… Once the summing up is concluded, no further evidence ought to be given. The jury can be instructed in reply to any question they may put on any matter on which evidence has been given, but no further evidence should be allowed."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Bass [1953] 1 QB 680; (1953) 17 Cr App R 51
1953
CCA
Lord Goddard CJ, Byrne and Parker JJ
Criminal Practice, Police
The court considered how to deal with the admission of a statement where the defendant contested its admissibility. Here the defendant said he had not been cautioned before the interview. Held: It was within the discretion of the judge to admit the interview "It is to be observed, as this court pointed out in Rex v Murray [1951] 1 KB 391, that while it is for the presiding judge to rule whether a statement is admissible, it is for the jury to determine the weight to be given to it if he admits it, and thus, when a statement has been admitted by the judge, he should direct the jury to apply to their consideration of it the principle as stated by Lord Sumner, and he should further tell them that if they are not satisfied that it was made voluntarily, they should give it no weight at all and disregard it."
Byrne J said: "This court has observed that police officers nearly always deny that they have collaborated in the making of notes, and we cannot help wondering why they are the only class of society who do not collaborate in such a matter. It seems to us that nothing could be more natural or proper when two persons have been present at an interview with a third person than that they should afterwards make sure that they have a correct version of what was said. Collaboration would appear to be a better explanation of almost identical notes than the possession of a superhuman memory."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Sanderson [1953] 37 CAR 32
1953
CCA
Lord Goddard CJ
Criminal Practice
It was permissible for the evidence for a witness for the defence (only) to be taken after the summing up had been completed, but before the jury had retired.
1 Citers


 
Regina v McNally [1954] 1 WLR 933; [1954] 2 All ER 372
1954
CCA
Lord Goddard LCJ
Criminal Practice
The appellant had indicated early in the magistrates’ court an intention to plead guilty, he could not possibly have misunderstood the nature of a straightforward charge of burglary and he had unequivocally admitted guilt when the indictment was put to him. He appealed against refusal of the trial judge to allow him to withdraw his plea. Held: The appeal failed. The court considered the applicable rules when a defendant wishes to withdraw a plea of guity. Lord Goddard, ruled that (i) up until sentence vacation of plea is a matter entirely within the discretion of the judge, but (ii) after sentence there is no power to permit it. One recent instance of a trial judge permitting a change of plea after sentence was wrong and ought not to be followed. A mistake or misunderstanding as to the nature of the charges against him would lead a trial court to allow a change of plea.
Lord Goddard LCJ said: "The question whether a plea may be withdrawn or not is entirely a matter for the trial judge. If the court came to the conclusion that there was a question of mistake or misunderstanding or that it would be desirable on any ground that the prisoner should be allowed to join issue, no doubt the court would allow him to do it. For example, it has been known for a prisoner charged with receiving stolen goods to acknowledge that he had received them, and to plead guilty adding "but I did not know that they were stolen". In such a case, the trial judge might well allow the prisoner to change his plea but it is entirely within the discretion of the judge."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Chairman, London County Quarter Sessions, ex parte Downes [1954] 1 QB 1
1954

Lord Goddard CJ
Criminal Practice
The court considered a case where the judge had taken it on himself to stop a prosecution on the grounds that the defence was bound to succeed: "If this course were permissible, it would enable a court, the members of which disapproved of or disliked a statute, the breach of which formed the subject matter of the indictment, simply to quash it and decline to try it."
1 Citers


 
Boucher v The Queen (1954) 110 CCC 263; (1954) 110 Can CC 263
1954

Randall J
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
(Supreme Court of Canada) The prosecutor in a criminal case has a duty to act impartially with no notion of winning or losing.
Randall J said: "It cannot be over-emphasised that the purpose of a criminal prosecution is not to obtain a conviction; it is to lay before a jury what the Crown considers to be credible evidence relevant to what is alleged to be a crime. Counsel have a duty to see that all available legal proof of the facts is presented; it should be done firmly and pressed to its legitimate strength, but it must also be done fairly. The role of prosecutor excludes any notion of winning or losing; his function is a matter of public duty than which in civil life there can be none charged with greater personal responsibility. It is to be efficiently performed with an ingrained sense of the dignity, the seriousness and the justness of judicial proceedings."
1 Citers


 
Chalmers v HM Advocate 1954 JC 66
1954
HCJ
Lord Justice Clerk Thomson
Criminal Practice
Where a defendant failed to prevent a statement being admitted in evidence, and sought to be able to challenge it again before the jury, this was a situation where logic must yield, since the jury cannot be asked to accept as an item of evidence a statement made by an accused, while being prevented from considering the circumstances under which it was made. So the jury must be able to take account of those circumstances in deciding what weight and value to attach to the confession.
The law must reconcile two principles: (1) that no accused person is bound to incriminate himself, and (2) that what an accused person says is admissible evidence against him, provided he says it freely and voluntarily.
1 Citers


 
Joshua v The Queen [1955] AC 121; [1955] 1 All ER 22
1955
PC
Lord Oaksey
Criminal Practice
The Board of the Privy Council considered the possibility of a judge directing a jury to find guilt. Held: In a jury trial the judge has no fact finding role
Lord Oaksey said: "On the second question their Lordships are of opinion that it was for the judge to direct the jury as to the elements of the crime of effecting a public mischief (assuming that such a crime exists) and to direct them on the facts if he thought that there was evidence to go to the jury, and it was for the jury to find whether the appellant was guilty upon those facts. It was a misdirection to tell the jury as a matter of law that they must convict the appellant if they found that he had spoken the words alleged. To do so was, in their Lordships' opinion, to usurp the function of the jury . . It is a general principle of British law that on a trial by jury it is for the judge to direct the jury on the law and in so far as he thinks necessary on the facts, but the jury, whilst they must take the law from the judge, are the sole judges on the facts . ."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hepworth and Fearnley (1955) 39 Cr App R 152
1955

Lord Goddard
Criminal Practice
Lord Goddard discussed again the direction to the jury as to the standard of proof: "I think it is very unfortunate to talk to juries about reasonable doubt, because the explanations given of what is and what is not a reasonable doubt are so very often extraordinarily difficult to follow and it is very difficult to tell a jury what is a reasonable doubt. To tell a jury that it must not be a fanciful doubt is no real guidance. To tell them that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as would cause them to hesitate in their own affairs never seems to me to convey any particular standard; one member of the jury might say he would hesitate over something and another member might say that that same thing would not cause him to hesitate at all. I, therefore, suggested in that case that it would be better to use some other expression, by which I meant that it should be conveyed to the jury that they should convict only if they felt sure of the guilt of the accused. In some cases the word "satisfied" has been used. It is said that the jury in a civil case has to be satisfied and, therefore, one is laying down only the same standard of proof as in a civil case. I confess that I have had some difficulty in understanding how there is or there can be two standards; therefore, one would be on safe ground if one said in a criminal case to a jury: 'You must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt' and one could also say: 'You must be completely satisfied' or better still: 'You must feel sure of the prisoner's guilt'"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Murtagh and Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72
1955


Criminal Practice

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Aladesuru v The Queen; PC 1956 - [1956] AC 49; 39 Cr App R 184
 
Ross v The Queen [1956] UKPC 43; [1957] 2 WLR 307; [1957] 1 All ER 451; [1957] AC 208
11 Dec 1956
PC
Viscount Simonds, Oaksey, Cohen, Keith of Avonholm LL
Commonwealth, Criminal Practice
Eastern Africa - The Board was asked whether the Court of Appeal of Eastern Africa had juridiction to order a new trial in a criminal case, and if so whether one had been properly ordered in this case. Held: The power falls to be exercised upon the setting aside of a jury verdict and the conviction recorded thereon.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Wilson; QBD 1957 - [1957] 41 CAR 226

 
 Critchell v Lambeth Borough Council; CA 1957 - [1957] 2 QB 535
 
Bullard v The Queen [1957] AC 635
1957
PC
Lord Tucker
Criminal Practice, Commonwealth
The question was whether there was evidence on which the jury could have found a verdict of manslaughter on grounds of provocation rather than the verdict of murder which had been returned. Held: There is naturally a tendency for an appellate court to substitute its view of the facts for a possible view which might have been entertained by a properly directed jury. However, it had "long been settled law that if on the evidence, whether of the prosecution or of the defence, there is any evidence of provocation fit to be left to a jury, and whether or not this issue has been specifically raised at the trial by counsel for the defence and whether or not the accused has said in terms that he was provoked, it is the duty of the judge, after a proper direction, to leave it open to the jury to return a verdict of manslaughter if they are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the killing was unprovoked." and "Every man on trial for murder has the right to have the issue of manslaughter left to the jury if there is any evidence upon which such a verdict can be given. To deprive him of this right must of necessity constitute a grave miscarriage of justice and it is idle to speculate what verdict the jury would have reached."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Dunbar [1958] 1 QB 1
1958


Criminal Practice
A conviction in a capital case may not stand in the absence of a proper direction on the standard of proof.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Wallwork; CCA 1958 - (1958) 42 Cr App Rep 153
 
Regina v Hnedish [1958] 26 WWR 685
1958

Hall CJ
Criminal Practice
(Canada) "Having regard to all the implications involved in accepting the full impact of the Hammond decision [1941] 3 All ER 318 which can, I think, be summarised by saying that regardless of how much physical or mental torture or abuse has been inflicted on an accused to coerce him into telling what is true, the confession is admitted because it is in fact true regardless of how it was obtained, I cannot believe that the Hammond decision does reflect the final judicial reasoning of the English courts… I do not see how under the guise of ‘credibility’ the court can transmute what is initially an inquiry as to the ‘admissibility’ of the confession into an inquisition of an accused. That would be repugnant to our accepted standards and principles of justice; it would invite and encourage brutality in the handling of persons suspected of having committed offences"
1 Citers


 
Wallace v H M Advocate 1959 JC 71
1959


Scotland, Criminal Practice
The running of the 110 day maximum period for detention after which a trial must have begun, was interrupted when the accused began to serve a sentence of imprisonment on another matter. He was no longer being detained because of the committal warrant.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325; [1959] 3 All ER 418; (1959) 43 Cr App R 220
1959

Lord Parker CJ
Criminal Practice
The Court summarised its position that "Even if the loss of memory had been a genuine loss of memory, that did not of itself render the appellant insane so that he could not be tried on the indictment." The tests set out in Pritchard "may be said to be firmly embodied in our law".
The onus lies on the defendant to demonstrate that he is unfit on the balance of probabilities.
Lord Parker CJ explained the meaning of "make a proper defence" and "comprehend" in the context in which Alderson B. was using them: "As to the word "comprehend", we do not think that this word goes further in meaning than the word "understand". In our judgment the direction . . is not intended to cover and does not cover a case where the prisoner can plead to the indictment and has the physical and mental capacity to know that he has the right of challenge and to understand the case as it proceeds."

 
Regina v Davis (1959) 43 Cr App R 215
1959
CCA

Criminal Practice
A judge is not entitled in any circumstances to suggest to a jury, when a man refuses to answer any questions after having been cautioned, that, if he were innocent, it is likely that he would have answered the questions.
1 Citers


 
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