Rex v Kritz: 1949

The House discussed the extent of the direction required to be given to a jury as to the standard of proof required: ‘The only other point which has been seriously argued is that because the learned Common Sergeant told the jury that they must be reasonably satisfied, and did not use the words ‘satisfied beyond reasonable doubt’, he was not stating sufficiently the onus of proof. It would be a great misfortune, in criminal cases especially, if the accuracy or inaccuracy of a summing up were to depend upon whether or not the Judge or the Chairman had used a particular formula of words. It is not the particular formula of words that matters; it is the effect of the summing up. If the jury are charged whether in one set of words or in another and are made to understand that they have to be satisfied and must not return a verdict against a defendant unless they feel sure, and that the onus is all the time on the prosecution and not on the defence, then whether the learned Judge uses one form of language or whether he uses another is neither here nor there. In our opinion, there was a perfectly fair and a perfectly proper summing up by the learned Common Sergeant in this case. We do not think that any jury could have been left in any doubt as to what was their duty. Juries, in my humble opinion, are not such fools as they are very often thought to be. They know when they have been a short time in the jury box that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the case and that they have to be fully and thoroughly satisfied, and they very seldom want guidance on that point. It is right that they should have it. It is right that they should be reminded that the onus is on the prosecution all the way through the case. It is right that they should be reminded in a criminal case that they must be fully satisfied of the guilt of the accused person and should not find a verdict against him unless they feel sure. That is the direction which I myself constantly give to juries when I am at assizes or at the Old Bailey. When once a judge begins to use the words reasonable doubt and tries to explain what is a reasonable doubt and what is not, he is much more likely to confuse them than if he tells them in plain language: ‘It is the duty of prosecution to satisfy you of the mans guilt’. I am not saying that the learned Common Sergeant used that formula of words, nor am I saying that it is to be preferred before all others, but what I do say is, and I am sure I can say it with the full assent of my brethren, that it is not the actual formula used that matters, but the effect of the summing up, and if the effect of the summing up is to convey to the jury what is their duty, that is enough.’

Lord Goddard
(1949) 33 Cr AppR 169, [1950] 1 KB 82
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedRegina v Derek William Bentley (Deceased) CACD 30-Jul-1998
The defendant had been convicted of murder in 1952, and hung. A court hearing an appeal after many years must apply laws from different eras to different aspects. The law of the offence (of murder) to be applied was that at the time of the offence. . .
CitedRegina v Hepworth and Fearnley 1955
Lord Goddard discussed again the direction to the jury as to the standard of proof: ‘I think it is very unfortunate to talk to juries about reasonable doubt, because the explanations given of what is and what is not a reasonable doubt are so very . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Criminal Practice

Updated: 17 November 2021; Ref: scu.192062