Links: Home | swarblaw - law discussions

swarb.co.uk - law index


These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Crime - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 217 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.

 
McWhirter v Platten [1970] 1 QB 508
1970
QBD

Elections, Crime
An order was made for the inspection of uncounted ballot papers before the institution of a prosecution under the Act, on the ground that the offenders, and the nature of offences could not be ascertained until the ballot papers had been inspected.
Representation of the People Act 1983
1 Citers


 
Regina v Laverty (1970) 54 Cr App R 495
1970
CACD
Lord Parker CJ
Crime
Lord Parker CJ said at that the Court should be reluctant to extend the principle in Sullivan further than was necessary. The Crown must always prove its case and one element which will always be required to be proved in these cases is the effect of the dishonest representation upon the mind of the person to whom it is made.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Donnelly v Jackman [1970] CLY 2218; [1970] NZLR 980; [1970] 1 WLR 562
1970

Turner J
Police, Crime, Commonwealth
Turner J considered the law of attempt: "He who sets out to commit a crime may in the event fall short of the complete commission of that crime for any one of a number of reasons. First, he may, of course, simply change his mind before committing any act sufficiently overt to amount to an attempt. Second, he may change his mind, but too late to deny that he had got so far as an attempt. Third, he may be prevented by some outside agency from doing some act necessary to complete commission of the crime—as when a police officer interrupts him while he is endeavouring to force the window open, but before he has broken into the premises. Fourth, he may suffer no such outside interference, but may fail to complete the commission of the crime through ineptitude, inefficiency or insufficient means. The jemmy which he has brought with him may not be strong enough to force the window open. Fifth, he may find that what he is proposing to do is after all impossible—not because of insufficiency of means, but because it is for some reason physically not possible, whatever means be adopted. He who walks into a room intending to steal, say, a specific diamond ring, and finds that the ring is no longer there, but has been removed by the owner to the bank, is thus prevented from committing the crime which he intended, and which, but for the supervening physical impossibility imposed by events he would have committed. Sixth, he may without interruption efficiently do every act which he set out to do, but may be saved from criminal liability by the fact that what he has done, contrary to his own belief at the time, does not after all amount in law to a crime."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Curbishley (1970) 55 Cr AppR 310 CA
1970


Crime

1 Citers


 
James v The Queen (1970) 55 Cr App Rep 299
1970
PC

Crime, Commonwealth

1 Citers



 
 Saddleworth Urban District Council v Aggregate and Sand Ltd; 1970 - (1970) 69 LGR 103

 
 Regina v Freeman; CACD 1970 - [1970] 1 WLR 728
 
Jayasena v The Queen [1970] AC 618
1970
PC
Lord Devlin
Crime
Lord Devlin said: "Their Lordships do not understand what is meant by the phrase 'evidential burden of proof'. They understand, of course, that in trial by jury a party may be required to adduce some evidence in support of his case, whether on the general issue or on a particular issue, before that issue is left to the jury. How much evidence has to be adduced depends upon the nature of the requirement. It may be such evidence as, if believed and left uncontradicted and unexplained, could be accepted by the jury as proof. It is doubtless permissible to describe the requirement as a burden, and it may be convenient to call it an evidential burden. But it is confusing to call it a burden of proof. Further, it is misleading to call it a burden of proof, whether described as legal or evidential or by any other adjective, when it can be discharged by the production of evidence that falls short of proof. The essence of the appellant's case is that he has not got to provide any sort of proof that he was acting in private defence. So it is a misnomer to call whatever it is that he has to provide a burden of proof . ."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Donnelly [1970] NZLR 980
1970


Commonwealth, Crime
(New Zealand)
1 Citers


 
Butler v Board of Trade [1970] 3 All ER 593; [1970] 3 WLR 822; [1971] Ch 680
1970
ChD
Goff J
Company, Crime
Goff J discussed the criterion for admissibility of evidence:"If one rejects the bare relevance test, as I have done, then what has to be shown prima facie is not merely that there is a bona fide and reasonably tenable charge of crime or fraud but a prima facie case that the communications in question were made in preparation for or in furtherance or as part of it."
Companies Act 1948 332(3)
1 Citers


 
Sopp v Long [1970] 1 QB 525
1970


Licensing, Crime
A short measure was sold by the local manageress and the non-resident licensee was prosecuted for contravening section 24(1). Held: It was agreed that only the licensee could sell through his servant the barmaid. On his behalf it was contended, unsuccessfully, that he could not have caused a short measure to be delivered unless he knew of or had authorised that act.
Weights and Measures Act 1963 24(1)
1 Citers


 
Treacy v Director of Public Prosecutions (1970) 55 Cr App R 113; [1971] AC 537; [1971] 1 All ER 110
1970
HL
Lord Diplock
Crime
Blackmail was alleged under section 21 of the 1968 Act, the letter making the unwarranted demand with menaces having been posted from England to an intended victim in Germany. Held: The appeal was dismissed. To allow an English court to have jurisdiction where elements of the offence occurred abroad, the last act constituting the actus reus had to be committed within the UK. "[W]e are willing to assume . . that the last constituent element does determine the place where the offence is committed. Where then is the offence of making a demand completed? . . The demand is not made when the threatening letter is written, because it may never be sent. But once the letter is posted, the demand is completed, and the offence of blackmail is committed." and "each sovereign State should refrain from punishing persons for their conduct within the territory of another sovereign State, where the conduct has had no harmful consequences within the territory which imposes the punishment." and "There is no rule of comity to prevent Parliament from prohibiting under pain of punishment persons who are present in the United Kingdom, and so owe local obedience of our law, from doing physical acts in England, notwithstanding that the consequences of those acts take effect outside the United Kingdom. Indeed, where the prohibited acts are of a kind calculated to cause harm to private individuals it would savour of chauvinism rather than comity to treat them as excusable merely on the ground that the victim was not in the United Kingdom itself but in some other state."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regona v Sperotto and Salvietti [1970] 1 NSWR 502
1970

Herron CJ
Commonwealth, Crime
(Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales) The court considered the mental element in the crime of rape: "In all crimes at common law a guilty intention is a necessary element and with the crime of rape this intention is to have carnal knowledge of the woman without her consent. In order to convict the accused of the crime of rape and, subject to what is hereinafter said, to establish this intention on his part the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that when the accused had intercourse with the woman either (i) he was aware that she had not consented, or (ii) he realized that she might not be consenting and was determined to have intercourse with her whether she was consenting or not. The intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime ". And
"Although the fact of the act of intercourse may be admitted by the accused or proved beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury, the accused may negative any intention on his part to have intercourse with the woman regardless of her consent if he holds an honest belief on reasonable grounds in the existence of circumstances which, if true, would make his act of intercourse with the woman an innocent one (Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, per Lord Reid). This involves these three concepts, firstly, that he in fact held the belief that the woman was consenting to the act of intercourse, secondly, that he was mistaken in that belief and, thirdly, that he can point objectively to circumstances which provided him with reasonable grounds for his mistake.
It then becomes necesary for the Crown as part of the ultimate onus which rests upon it to negative the existence of such belief, and this beyond reasonable doubt. This the Crown may do by reference to all the material adduced at the trial which tends to show that the belief asserted by the accused was not genuinely held by him or that the grounds upon which he relies for the foundation of his belief are, when examined in the light of all the circumstances, not a reasonable basis for the mistake which he claims to have made."
1 Citers



 
 Gray v Barr; ChD 1970 - [1970] 2 QB 626

 
 Regina v Lawrence (Alan); CACD 1970 - [1970] 3 All ER 933; [1970] 3 WLR 1103; [1971] 1 QB 373
 
Public Prosecutor v Yuvaraj [1970] AC 913; [1970] 2 WLR 226
1970
PC
Diplock L
Crime, Commonwealth
Diplock L said: "Corruption in the public service is a grave social event which is difficult to detect, for those who take part in it will be at pains to cover their tracks." and "In criminal proceedings, by an exception to the general rule founded upon considerations of public policy. If the consequence of a finding that a particular fact is proved will be the conviction of the defendant the degree of probability must be so high as to exclude any reasonable doubt that that fact exists. Generally speaking, no onus lies upon a defendant in criminal proceedings to prove or disprove any fact: it is sufficient for his acquittal if any of the facts which, if they existed, would constitute the offence with which he is charged, are "not proved." But exceptionally, as in the present case, an enactment creating an offence expressly provides that if other facts are proved, a particular fact, the existence of which is a necessary factual ingredient of the offence, shall be presumed or deemed to exist." . . "unless the contrary is proved." In such a case the consequence of finding that that particular fact is "disproved" will be an acquittal, whereas the absence of such a finding will have the consequence of a conviction."
1 Citers



 
 Havering London Borough Council v Stevenson; 1970 - [1970] 1WLR 1375
 
Regina v Phipps (1970) 54 Cr App R 300
1970
CACD

Crime
Where a person has been given permission by the owner of a motor vehicle to take and use it for a particular purpose, but on completion of that purpose fails to return it and thereafter uses it without any reasonable belief that the owner would consent to the use, he is to be regarded as having taken the vehicle without the owner's consent or other lawful authority.
Theft Act 1968 12
1 Citers


 
Regina v Bonner and Others [1970] EWCA Crim 1; [1970] 1 WLR 838; [1970] 2 All ER 97; 54 Cr App Rep 257; 134 JP 429
24 Feb 1970
CACD
Edmund Davis, Karminski LJJ, Jawton J
Crime
The appellants challenged their convictions for theft, saying that as partners in a firm they could not be convicted of theft of partnership property. Held: The appeals were allowed for the unsatisfactory and unsafe nature of the convictions on the particular evidence. However, the 1861 Act having not been repealed, and that: "the object of the Theft Act was to get rid of the subtleties and, indeed, in many cases the absurd anomalies of the pre-existing law. The view of this Court is that in relation to partnership property the provisions in the Theft Act have the following result: provided there is the basic ingredients of dishonesty, provided there be no question of there being a claim of right made in good faith, provided there be an intent permanently to deprive, one partner can commit theft of partnership property just as much as one person can commit the theft of the property of another to whom he is a complete stranger."
Theft Act 1968 1 - Larceny Act 1861
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Muldoon v Herron [1970] ScotHC HCJ - 1
25 Mar 1970
HCJ

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Palmer v The Queen [1971] 1 All ER 1077; (1971) 55 Cr App R 223 (PC); [1971] AC 814; [1970] UKPC 31; [1971] 2 WLR 831; (1971) 55 Cr App R 223
23 Nov 1970
PC
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Donovan, Lord Avonside
Crime
It is a defence in criminal law to a charge of assault if the defendant had an honest belief that he was going to be attacked and reacted with proportionate force: "If there has been an attack so that defence is reasonably necessary, it should be recognised that a person defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of necessary defensive action. If a jury is of the opinion that in a moment of unexpected anguish the person attacked did only what he honestly and reasonably thought was necessary, that should be regarded as most potent evidence that only reasonably defensive action was taken."
Jamaica - The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder, arguing self defenec. Held: After setting out the elements of the defence of self-defence, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said: "if the prosecution have shown that what was done was not done in self-defence then that issue is eliminated from the case. If the jury consider that the accused acted in self-defence or if the jury are in doubt as to this then they will acquit. The defence of self-defence either succeeds so as to result in an acquittal or it is disproved in which case as a defence it is rejected."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Edgar Mahinda Fernando v The Queen and v Lionel Mendis Karunaratne v The Queen [1970] UKPC 32
1 Dec 1970
PC

Commonwealth, Crime
(Ceylon)
[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Schildkamp; HL 1971 - [1971] AC 1
 
Naish v Gore [1971] 3 All ER 737
1971
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ
Crime, Consumer
The justices had come to the conclusion that reasonable precautions had been taken by the shopkeeper, and therefore that the defence in section 24 was made out. Held: Lord Widgery CJ said: "Accordingly, it seems to me that the proper disposal of this case is to observe that the justices with some evidence of reasonable precautions and due diligence before them were satisfied that that was sufficient to satisfy the terms of sec. 24. In the end, if the justices properly directed themselves as to the law and appreciated the onus that rests on the respondent, the question of whether the precautions taken were all reasonable precautions is a matter for them and, on the facts of this case, I am not disposed to say that they reached other than the conclusion which was open to them."
Lord Widgery contrasted the case before him with cases where no precautions had been taken, for example to test whether a watch said to be waterproof was in fact water resistant or whether the odometer had been altered in a case where there was no examination of the motorcar whatever. He observed that the trader had taken a certain amount of trouble to satisfy himself and said: "I for my part find it quite impossible to lay down as any general proposition in these cases that a motor dealer selling a secondhand car must wait for the log book and must check with the previous owner. To do so may be a very wise and proper precaution in appropriate cases, but I am not disposed to rule as a general principle that that must be so."
Trade Descriptions Act 1968 1(1)(b) 824
1 Citers


 
Regina v Roberts [1971] 56 Cr App R 95 CA
1971

Stephenson LJ
Crime
The complainant travelled in the appellant's car. As he was driving, he had assaulted her in the car but not so as to cause her actual bodily harm. However, as his assault continued, she opened the car door and jumped out. This caused her to sustain actual bodily harm. He appealed his conviction. Held: The appeal failed. The proper test was not whether the defendant in fact foresaw the conduct of the victim which resulted in the actual bodily harm, but whether that conduct could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing: "The test is: Was it the natural result of what the alleged assailant said and did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing."
Offences Against The Person Act 1861 47
1 Citers


 
Mellenger v New Brunswick Development Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 604
1971
CA
Lord Denning MR, Salmon LJ, Phillimore LJ
Crime, International
An entity which is constituted in such a way that its purpose is to assist, promote and advance the industrial development, prosperity and economic welfare of the area in which it operates, can be seen as effectively carrying out government policy in the way that a government department does and therefore to assume the position of an organ of government. The New Brunswick Development Corporation was an arm or the alter ego of the Government of New Brunswick which was a sovereign state and so it was entitled to immunity from suits in the courts of this country. A state within a federal state may in certain circumstances partake of the sovereignty of the state as a whole and obtain State Immunity. Against the background of the 1872 Act, the mere fact that New Brunswick did not have control over international relations did not mean that for that reason alone that it could not be entitled to state immunity.
Lord Denning MR: "It was suggested by Mr Kempster that the Province of New Brunswick does not qualify as a sovereign state so as to invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity. But the authorities show decisively the contrary. The British North America Act 1867 gave Canada a federal constitution. Under it the powers of government were divided between the dominion government and the provincial governments. Some of those powers were vested in the dominion government. The rest remained with the provincial governments. Each provincial government, within its own sphere, retained its independence and autonomy directly under the Crown. The Crown is sovereign in New Brunswick for provincial powers, just as it is sovereign in Canada for dominion powers: see Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v Receiver-General of New Brunswick [1892] A.C. 437. It follows that the province of New Brunswick is a sovereign state in its own right, and entitled, if it so wishes, to claim sovereign immunity".
Salmon LJ: "There can be no doubt I think, that the Federal Government of New Brunswick is sovereign within its own sphere of influence. That appears from the Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v Receiver General New Brunswick [1892] AC437 and also from Hodge v The Queen (1883) 9 App Cas 132). "
British North America Act 1867
1 Citers



 
 Regina v McInnes; CACD 1971 - [1971] 1 WLR 1600
 
Cooper and Others v Shield [1971] 2 All ER 917
1971


Crime

Public Order Act 1936 5
1 Citers


 
Devlin v Armstrong [1971] LR NI 13
1971
CANI
Lord MacDermott LCJ
Crime
The defendant faced a charge of riot. He said that he had held an honest and reasonable belief that the police were about to behave unlawfully. Held: The Court assumed that the accused did honestly and reasonably so believe, but held that for a number of reasons it constituted no defence in the circumstances: it was not questioned that in other circumstances it might be the correct criterion.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Fennell [1971] 1 QB 428
1971
CACD
Lord Widgery CJ
Crime, Police
A father was accused of assaulting a police constable in order to release his son from custody. He pleaded self defence, saying that he had believed the arrest unlawful. Held: The defence failed. A defendant seeking to justify an assault, pleading self-defence by reference to his belief must show that the belief was not only honest but also reasonable.
Lord Widgery CJ considered the nature of self defence: "It was accepted in the court below that if the arrest had been, in fact, unlawful the appellant would have been justified in using reasonable force to secure the release of his son. This proposition has not been argued before us and we will assume, without deciding it, that it is correct. Mr. Bain referred us to a number of authorities concerned with the use of force in self-defence and pointed out that a sufficient justification was there established if the accused genuinely believed on reasonable grounds that a relative or friend was in imminent danger of injury, even though that belief was based on an honest mistake of fact: R v Chisam (1963) 47 Cr A R 130. Mr. Bain then contended that by a parity of reasoning a father who used force to effect the release of his son from custody was justified in so doing if he honestly believed on reasonable grounds that (contrary to the fact) the arrest was unlawful.
We do not accept that submission. The law jealously scrutinises all claims to justify the use of force and will not readily recognise new ones. Where a person honestly and reasonably believes that he or his child is in imminent danger of injury it would be unjust if he were deprived of the right to use reasonable force by way of defence merely because he had made some genuine mistake of fact. On the other hand, if the child is in police custody and not in immediate danger of injury, there is no urgency of the kind which requires an immediate decision, and a father who forcibly releases a child does so at his peril. If in fact the arrest proves to be lawful, the father's use of force cannot be justified."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Southwark London Borough Council v Williams; CA 1971 - [1971] 1Ch 734; [1971] 2 All ER 175; [1971] 2 WLR 467
 
Regina v Souter (1971) 55 Cr App R 403
1971
CACD

Crime
The word "permitting" connotes knowledge of that which is said to be permitted.
Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 5(b) 8(d)
1 Citers



 
 Gray v Barr; CA 1971 - [1971] 2 QB 554
 
Regina v Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202; [1971] EWCA Crim 2; [1971] 2 All ER 244; [1971] 2 WLR 1047; (1971) 56 Cr App Rep 1; (1971) 135 JP 403
17 Mar 1971
CACD
Lord Parker CJ, Widgery LJ, Cooke J
Crime
Two teenage girls committed perjury by failing to identify the defendant. When prosecuted they pleaded duress, on the basis that they had been warned by a group, including a man with a reputation for violence, that if they identified the defendant in court the group would get the girls and cut them up. They resolved to tell lies, and were strengthened in their resolve when they arrived at court and saw the author of the threat in the public gallery. The trial judge ruled that the threats were not sufficiently present and immediate to support the defence of duress. Held: The Court is willing to entertain the possibility of a defence of duress even in an extreme case if it is arguable that "the will of the accused has been overborne by threats of death or serious personal injury so that the commission of the alleged defence was no longer [his] voluntary act" Although the threats could not be executed in the courtroom they could be carried out in the streets of Salford that same night.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass; HL 31-Mar-1971 - [1971] CLY 10538; [1972] AC 153; [1971] 2 WLR 1166; [1971] 2 All ER 127; [1971] UKHL 1
 
Regina v Dodd Unreported, 10 June 1971
10 Jun 1971
CACD
Fenton Atkinson LJ, Stephenson LJ and Lawton J
Crime
Medical evidence available at the time of the trial of the defendant for murder had been against diminished responsibility but there was said to be fresh evidence in favour of it now available for the appeal. Held: “In the view of this Court, cases must be rare indeed when the defence have chosen to run at the trial as their only defence the defence of accident or provocation, or a combination of the two, and when that defence has failed can consult and call a psychiatrist, or a psychiatrist seeing the appellant for the first time many months after the event, with a view to getting a retrial to run a defence of diminished responsibility. It may well be that if subsequent evidence of diminished responsibility was really overwhelming, the Court might well fell moved to substitute a verdict of manslaughter, or to order a new trial.”
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 23 - Homicide Act 1957 2
1 Citers


 
Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1972] AC 626; [1971] 3 WLR 225; [1971] 2 All ER 1253; [1971] UKHL 2
30 Jun 1971
HL
Viscount Dilhorne
Crime
The defendant, a taxi driver, had without objection on the part of an Italian student asked for a fare of £6 for a journey for which the correct lawful fare was 10s 6d. The taxi driver was convicted of theft. On appeal the main contention was that the student had consented to pay the fare. But it was clear that the appellant had not told the student what the lawful fare was. Held: Section 1(1) of the 1968 Act is not to be read as if it contained such words as "without having the consent of the owner". A theft is complete upon proof of the statutory elements: (i) a dishonest (ii) appropriation (iii) of property belonging to another (iv) with the intention of permanently depriving the owner of it. "That there was appropriation in this case is clear. Section 3(1) states that any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation. Here there was clearly such an assumption. That an appropriation was dishonest may be proved in a number of ways. In this case it was not contended that the appellant had not acted dishonestly." Where consent is in issue, it is relevant, not to appropriation, but to dishonesty. Consent in the context of the law of theft means true consent with full knowledge of the relevant facts. belief that the passenger gave informed consent (i.e. knowing that he was paying in excess of the fare) "is relevant to the issue of dishonesty, not to the question whether or not there has been an appropriation." Sections 1(1) and 15(1) of the Act are not mutually exclusive. If the facts proved justify a conviction under section 15(1), there can lawfully be a conviction under section 1(1) on the same facts.
Theft Act 1968 1
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Collis-Smith [1971] EWCA Crim 1; [1971] Crim LR 716
30 Sep 1971
CACD
Megaw LJ, Cusack, Croom-Johnson JJ
Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction on a charge of: "obtaining property by deception contrary to Section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 for that you on the 24th February 1971, in the County of Warwick dishonestly obtained from William Arthur Snell 6 gallons of petrol with the intention of permanently depriving William Arthur Snell of the said petrol, by deception, namely false oral representation that you, Andrew David Collis-Smith, was authorised to draw petrol for your private motor car on the account of your employer, James Paper Sacks Limited." The petrol had been put in the car before he was asked how it would be paid for. Held: The appeal was allowed: "he Court takes the view that as the evidence emerged in this case - leaving aside altogether the question of ownership, which might involve difficult points under the Sale of Goods Act -possession and control must certainly have been obtained at the time the petrol was put in the tank. If that be the case, neither possession nor control took place after the moment of the deception - the deception came later; and for that reason, the obtaining was obtained before the deception was made. It is perfectly true that if this charge had been laid - even under this Section - in a different form, something to the effect that there was an implied representation made that the petrol would be paid for by the buyer, or an implied representation that it would be paid for at all, and the putting of the petrol in the tank followed that, the situation might be quite different; and it is therefore desirable to emphasise that the Court is only deciding this case on the charge as it was drafted in this case, and on the evidence as it emerged in this case."
Theft Act 1968 15(1)
[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Roberts [1971] EWCA Crim 4; (1972) 56 Cr App R 95; (1971) 115 SJ 809
21 Oct 1971
CACD
Stephenson LJ, Thompson, Bridge JJ
Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for assault, complaining of the judge's direction which did not require them to conclude that the defendant's acts had caused the injury suffered. Held: The appeal failed: " the Judge was right to tell the jury that it was their duty to convict if they accepted the evidence of the girl, and there was no misdirection involved in his telling them just that."
[ Bailii ]
 
Ritchie v Petrie [1971] ScotHC HCJ - 1
4 Nov 1971
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Clarke [1972] 1 All ER 219; (1971) 56 Cr App Rep 225; (1971) 136 JP 184; [1971] EWCA Crim 5
7 Dec 1971
CACD
Lord Widgery LCJ, Sachs LJ, Ackner J
Crime
The defendant appealed against her conviction for theft (shop-lifting). She had placed goods in the wire basket whilst in the supermarket, but transferred some of them to her own bag before approaching the checkout. She denied the intent to steal, citing a medical condition and stressful circumstances. She brought medical experts to support her case, but the judge pressed them as to their evidence, and eventually suggested that he would direct the jury that this was in effect a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and directed them as to the McNaughton rules. The defendant was advised to plead guilty. Held: The appeal succeeded. The judge had mis-stated the law. The medical evidence was to the effect that it was absurd to call anyone in Mrs. Clarke's condition insane.
[ Bailii ]

 
 In re Giles Deceased; 1972 - [1972] Ch 554
 
Buswell, Regina v [1972] 1 WLR 64
1972
CACD
Phillimore LJ
Crime
The defendant was accused of possession of drugs. The drugs in question had been medically prescribed by the defendant's doctor. After he had taken them home he genuinely thought that they had been accidentally destroyed by his mother when washing his jeans. Thereafter he discovered them still in his bedroom drawer where later still they were found by the police. Held: The appeal was allowed. The possession once lawful, remained lawful. Phillimore LJ said: 'If you have got it in your custody and you put it in some safe place and then forget that you have got it, and discover a year or two later, when you happen to look into that particular receptacle that it is still there, it seems to this court idle to suggest that during those two years it has not been in your possession. It has been there under your hand and control. There is no limbo into which the article can go if recollection dims.'
1 Citers



 
 X v United Kingdom; ECHR 1972 - (1972) 42 CD 135; 5877/72
 
Regina v Banks [1972] 1 WLR 346
1972


Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Durante (1972) 56 Cr App R 708
1972
CACD
Edmund Davies LJ
Crime
Logical inconsistency is generally an essential prerequisite for success of an appeal against conviction on the ground of inconsistency of verdicts.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Deakin [1972] 3 All ER 803
1972
CACD

Crime
On a charge of handling stolen goods (on the facts), the averment of ownership was not a material averment.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Hussain; 1972 - [1972] Cr App R 143

 
 Regina v Ardalan; CACD 1972 - [1972] 1 WLR 463
 
Ludlow and Others v Burgess (1972) 75 Cr App R 227
1972

Parker LCJ
Crime, Police, Torts - Other
A police officer has no more right to lay hands on someone than any other member of the community. The person so restrained is entitled to use reasonable force to free himself.
1 Citers


 
Selby v Director of Public Prosecutions [1972] AC 515
1972
HL

Crime
The House, by a majority, discounted the significance of the requirement in the statute for an act "with intent to defraud". The word 'uttering' involved inherently a fraudulent intent.
Coinage Offences Act 1936 5(6)
1 Citers


 
Dibble v Ingleton [1972] 1 QB 480
1972

Bridge J
Police, Crime
A motorist was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and was required to provide a specimen of breath. He claimed that he had consumed alcohol only a few minutes earlier and the constable had to wait until 20 minutes had elapsed before administering a breath test. Meanwhile the appellant consumed more alcohol supplied to him by a passengers so making it impossible for the constable to perform his duty under the Road Safety Act. The question for the court was whether the drinking of alcohol, with the intention of making it impossible to ascertain from a specimen taken subsequently if the level of alcohol in his body when he was stopped exceeded this prescribed limit, could amount to wilful obstruction of the officer in the execution of his duty. Held: Obstruction may consist in persisting in conduct of a positive nature which is, taken by itself, entirely lawful.
Bridge J said: "For my part I would draw a clear distinction between a refusal to act, on the one hand, and the doing of some positive act on the other. In a case, as in Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 Q.B. 414, where the obstruction alleged consists of a refusal by the defendant to do the act which the police constable has asked him to do - to give information, it might be, or to give assistance to the police constable - one can see readily the soundness of the principle, if I may say so with respect, applied in Rice v Connolly, that such a refusal to act cannot amount to a wilful obstruction under section 51 unless the law imposes upon the person concerned some obligation in the circumstances to act in the manner requested by the police officer.
On the other hand, I can see no basis in principle or in any authority which has been cited for saying that where the obstruction consists of a positive act, it must be unlawful independently of its operation as an obstruction of a police constable under section 51. If the act relied upon as an obstruction had to be shown to be an offence independently of its effect as an obstruction, it is difficult to see what use there would be in the provisions of section 51 of the Police Act 1964."
Police Act 1964 51(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Evans v Hughes [1972] 3 All ER 412
1972
QBD

Crime
The Court considered that for a defendant to justify his possession of a metal bar on a public highway he had to show that there was an imminent particular threat affecting the particular circumstances in which the weapon was carried.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Baxter [1972] 1 QB
1972


Crime
The charge was attempting to obtain property by deception by posting letters from Northern Ireland to pools promoters in England. The demand had arrived in England and had been intended to do damage there. Held: "The attempt to obtain the money by deception in the shape of a letter can be likened to the demand by letter which was under consideration in the House of Lords [in Treacy]: and it appears that all their Lordships were disposed to hold that had it been a case of a demand dispatched abroad which had arrived in England, there would have been jurisdiction here to try the offence-indeed three of their Lordships specifically so stated"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Knuller (Publishing, Printing and Promotions) Ltd; Knuller etc v Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] AC 435; [1972] 2 All ER 898; 56 Cr App R 633
1972
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Simon of Glaisdale
Crime, Constitutional
The defendants were charged after pasting up in telephone booths advertisements for homosexual services. They published a magazine with similar advertisements. The House was asked to confirm the existence of an offence of outraging public decency. Held: There now exists no power in the courts to create new criminal offences. A new criminal offence could only be created by Act of Parliament. The House considered its ability to depart from its own previous decisions.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale set out the matters which should be included in the directions to the jury where a defendant faced charges of outraging public decency: "It should be emphasised that 'outrage', like 'corrupt,' is a very strong word. 'Outraging public decency' goes considerably beyond offending the susceptibilities of, or even shocking, reasonable people. Moreover the offence is, in my view, concerned with recognised minimum standards of decency, which are likely to vary from time to time." It is sufficient for liability that, on an objective assessment, the conduct complained of should cause public offence. Aa jury should be directed that, "outraging public decency goes considerably beyond offending the susceptibilities of or even shocking reasonable people."
Lord Reid said: "It was decided by this House in Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions [1962] AC 220 that conspiracy to corrupt public morals is a crime known to the law of England. So if the appellants are to succeed on this count, either this House must reverse that decision or there must be sufficient grounds for distinguishing this case. The appellants' main argument is that we should reconsider that decision; alternatively they submit that it can and should be distinguished.
I dissented in Shaw's case. On reconsideration I still think that the decision was wrong and I see no reason to alter anything which I said in my speech. But it does not follow that I should now support a motion to reconsider the decision. I have said more than once in recent cases that our change of practice in no longer regarding previous decisions of this House as absolutely binding does not mean that whenever we think that a previous decision was wrong we should reverse it. In the general interest of certainty in the law we must be sure that there is some very good reason before we so act . . . I think that however wrong or anomalous the decision may be it must stand and apply to cases reasonably analogous unless or until it is altered by Parliament." and "if the appellants are to succeed on this count, either this House must reverse that decision or there must be sufficient grounds for distinguishing this case. The appellants' main argument is that we should reconsider that decision; alternatively they submit that it can and should be distinguished. I dissented in Shaw's case. On reconsideration I still think that the decision was wrong and I see no reason to alter anything which I said in my speech. But it does not follow that I should now support a motion to reconsider the decision. I have said more than once in recent cases that our change of practice in no longer regarding previous decisions of this House as absolutely binding does not mean that whenever we think that a previous decision was wrong we should reverse it. In the general interest of certainty in the law we must be sure that there is some very good reason before we so act . . I think that however wrong or anomalous the decision may be it must stand and apply to cases reasonably analogous unless or until it is altered by Parliament." and
'there is a material difference between merely exempting certain conduct from criminal penalties and making it lawful in the full sense.'
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Whyte; HL 1972 - [1972] AC 849
 
Dymond v Pearce [1972] 1 All ER 1142; [1972] EWCA Civ 7; [1972] 2 WLR 633; [1972] 1 QB 496; [1972] RTR 169
13 Jan 1972
CA
Sachs LJ, Edmund Davies LJ, Stephenson LJ
Crime, Road Traffic, Nuisance
A motorcyclist crashed into the rear of a lorry stationary on the carriageway. The plaintff said that the parking of the lorry was a nuisance, and that if it had not been so parked, there would have been no accident. Held: The appeal failed. The accident was due wholly to the negligence of the motorcyclist. 'sine qua non is not an all-sufficient basis for establishing liability.' In criminal law at least nuisance must be actual as opposed to potential.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Alphacell Ltd v Woodward; HL 3-May-1972 - [1972] All ER 475; [1972] AC 824; [1972] UKHL 4
 
Regina v Collins [1972] EWCA Crim 1; [1972] 2 All ER 1105; [1973] 3 WLR 243; 56 Cr App Rep 554; 136 JP 605; [1973] QB 100
5 May 1972
CACD
Edmund Davies and Stephenson L.JJ. and Boreham J.
Crime
The defendant was accused of burglary. He had followed a woman from a public house, entered her bedroom via a ladder and had sex with her. She thought he was her boyfriend. He denied entry as a trespasser with intent to rape, saying she had invited him in as he was about to enter the window. Held: He entered as a trespasser if he entered knowing or being reckless as to whether he was entering unlawfully. The jury had to conclude that he had already made a substantial entry into the house before he had been mistakenly invited in. The direction had not been in adequate terms, and the conviction was overturned. The common law doctrine of trespass ab initio has no application to burglary under the Theft Act 1968.
Theft Act 1968 9(1)(a)
[ lip ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Gilks; CACD 27-Jun-1972 - [1972] 1 WLR 1341; 136 JP 777; [1972] 3 All ER 280; [1972] EWCA Crim 2; (1972) 6 Cr App Rep 734
 
Edwards v Regina [1972] UKPC 1
27 Jun 1972
PC

Crime
(Hong Kong)
[ Bailii ]
 
Edwards Alias Murray v The Queen [1972] UKPC 14; [1972] 3 WLR 893; [1973] 1 All ER 15; (1973) 57 Cr App R 157; [1972] Crim LR 782; [1973] AC 648
27 Jun 1972
PC

Crime
(Hong Kong) Appeal from conviction for murder. Held: Manslaughter conviction substituted.
[ Bailii ]
 
Wan Ping Nam v German Federal Republic Minister of Justice [1972] ScotHC HCJ - 1
13 Jul 1972
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Brutus v Cozens; HL 19-Jul-1972 - [1973] AC 854; [1972] UKHL 6; HL/PO/JU/4/3/1219

 
 Regina v Salisbury; 9-Oct-1972 - [1976] VR 452; [1976] VicRp 45
 
Taylor v Mucklow [1973] Crim LR 750
1973
QBD

Crime
The court upheld a decision of magistrates who considered that a building owner was deploying an unreasonable use of force in equipping himself with a loaded airgun against a builder who was demolishing a new extension because his bills were unpaid.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Feely; CACD 1973 - (1973) 57 Cr App R 512; [1973] QB 530

 
 Regina v Taylor; HL 1973 - [1973] AC 964

 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Doot; HL 1973 - [1973] 1 All ER 940; [1973] AC 807

 
 Regina v McEvilly and Lee; CACD 1973 - [1974] Crim LR 239; (1973) 60 Cr App R 150

 
 Davies v Flackett; 1973 - [1973] RTR 8
 
Regina v Hodgson (1973) 57 Cr App R 502
1973
CACD

Crime
An alternative verdict of indecent assault is available on a charge of rape.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Greenfield; CACD 1973 - (1973) 57 Cr App R 849; [1973] 1 WLR 1151
 
Regina v Reid [1973] QB 299
1973


Crime
A husband could be guilty of the common law offence of kidnapping his wife.


 
 Regina v Bogacki; CACD 1973 - [1973] 1 QB 832

 
 Regina v Murray; CACD 1973 - 75 Crim App R 58

 
 Regina v Lennox-Wright; 1973 - (1973) CLR 529
 
Regina v Panayiotou and Another [1973] 1 WLR 1032
1973
CACD

Crime
Interfering with potential witnesses, so as to prevent or dissuade them from testifying are acts which amount to perverting the course of Justice.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Houghton v Smith [1973] 2 WLR 944
1973
CACD
Lord Widgery CJ
Crime
The defendant appealed his conviction for attempting to handle stolen goods, saying that that the time of his act, the goods were no longer stolen, having been taken into lawful custody by the police. Held: The appeal failed. Lord Widgery CJ discussed the legal implications of inchoate, but uncompleted, sequences of actions in cases which might or might not amount to criminal attempts, identifying two classes of case: "The type of case where the accused has embarked on a course of conduct which, if completed, will result in an offence but for some reason breaks off that course of conduct and never completes the action required to amount to the offence." This would include "pickpocket who puts his hand in a man's pocket only to find it empty; the burglar who is disturbed by the police when he is in the process of trying to break open the window; the safebreaker who finds when he gets to the safe, it is too difficulty for him and he cannot open it.
In general a charge of attempt can properly be laid in that type of case".
It was otherwise, he thought, in the second class of case which he described as follows: "Where the accused has meticulously and in detail followed every step of his intended course believing throughout that he was committing a criminal offence and when in the end it is found he has not committed a criminal offence because in law that which he planned and carried out does not amount to a criminal offence at all." In such a case a criminal attempt had not been committed.
1 Citers


 
Arthur Francis v The Chief of Police [1973] UKPC 4; [1974] Crim LR 50; [1973] 2 WLR 505; [1973] AC 761; [1973] 2 All ER 251
5 Feb 1973
PC

Commonwealth, Crime, Constitutional
(St. Christopher and Nevis and Anguilla) The appellant had spoken at a public meeting using a microphone without first obtaining the required license. The meeting itself ha already been approved. He complained that his arrest under the law had been unconstitutional. The magistrate referred for the determination of the High Court the question whether section 5 of the Public Meetings and Processions Act 1969 offended against section 10 of the Constitution. The High Court held that section 5 of the Act did not infringe the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by section 10 of the Constitution and their decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Held: , Dismissing the appeal, the control of loudspeakers at public meetings by section 5 of the Act of 1969 was not contrary to section 10 of the Constitution, for public order required that the public, who did not wish to hear the speaker, be protected from any excessive noise. Per curiam. A wrongful refusal of permission to use a loudspeaker at a public meeting (for instance if the refusal is inspired by political partiality) would be an unjustified and therefore unconstitutional interference with freedom of communication.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Quick; CACD 18-Apr-1973 - [1973] QB 910; [1973] EWCA Crim 1; (1973) 137 JP 763; [1973] 3 All ER 347; (1973) 57 Cr App Rep 722; [1973] 3 WLR 26
 
Aitchison v Reith and Anderson (Dingwall and Tain) Ltd [1973] ScotHC HCJ - 1
13 Jul 1973
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Ray; HL 25-Jul-1973 - [1973] UKHL 3; [1974] AC 370

 
 Haughton v Smith, On Appeal From Regina v Smith (Roger); HL 21-Nov-1973 - [1974] 2 WLR 1; [1973] 3 All ER 1109 HL(E); [1975] AC 476; [1973] UKHL 4

 
 Broome v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 20-Dec-1973 - [1973] UKHL 5; [1974] I All ER 314; [1974] 2 WLR 58; [1974] ICR 84; [1974] AC 587

 
 Rees v Munday; QBD 1974 - [1974] 1 WLR 1284
 
Smedleys Limited v Breed [1974] AC 839
1974
HL
Viscount Dilhorne
Consumer, Crime
The defendant company had sold a can of peas. A caterpillar was found in it. Held: Despite having shown that they had taken all reasonable care, the defendant was guilty of selling food not to the standard required. The defence under the Act was available only if the incident was unavoidable, but that would require every person in the production line to have done everything humanly possible. Notwithstanding non-negligent quality control, there was strict liability at criminal law where a caterpillar identical in colour, size, density and weight to the peas in a tin survived the process in one out of three million tins.
Viscount Dilhorne said: “In 1951 the question was raised whether it was not a basic principle of the rule of law that the operation of the law is automatic where an offence is known or suspected. The then Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, said: ‘It has never been the rule in this country - I hope it never will be - that criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution.’ He pointed out that the Attorney-General and the Director of Public Prosecutions only intervene to direct a prosecution when they consider it in the public interest to do so and he cited a statement made by Lord Simon in 1925 when he said: 'there is no greater nonsense talked about the Attorney-General’s duty than the suggestion that in all cases the Attorney-General ought to decide to prosecute merely because he thinks there is what the lawyers call a case. It is not true and no one who has held the office of Attorney-General supposes it is.' Sir Hartley Shawcross’s statement was indorsed, I think, by more than one of his successors.”
Food and Drugs Act 1955
1 Citers


 
Regina v O'Brien [1974] 3 All ER 663
1974
Crwn
Park J
Crime
(Crown Court, Bristol) A decree nisi effectively terminated a marriage and revoked the wife's implied consent to marital intercourse, so that subsequent intercourse by the husband without her consent constituted rape.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Wall [1974] 59 Crim App R 58; [1974] 1 WLR 930
1974


Crime
The charge was fraudulent evasion of the restriction on importation of dangerous drugs. For that offence to be committed, the drugs in question must necessarily arrive in this country. Held: If sending a letter from abroad to England containing false pretences constituted an offence punishable here, so must taking part in the dispatch of drugs to England with a view to evading a restriction on their import.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Walker [1974] 1 WLR 1090
1974
PC
Lord Salmon
Crime

1 Citers


 
McNight v Davies [1974] RTR 4
1974

Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic, Crime
The court considered whether a driver had teken a vehicle without the owners consent, and having had that consent for one purpose, continued to use the car beyond that purpose: "[n]ot every brief, unauthorised diversion from his proper route by an employed driver in the course of his working day [would] necessarily involve a 'taking' of the vehicle for his own use". The test was whether "he appropriate[d] it to his own use in a manner which repudiates the rights of the true owner, and shows that he has assumed control of the vehicle for his own purposes".
Theft Act 1968 12
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Mealey and Sheridan [1974] 60 Cr App R 59; [1975] Crim LR 154
1974
CACD

Crime, Criminal Practice
A claim of entrapment into an offence is not a defence in Engish law. The court adopted a definition contained in the report of the Royal Commission on Police Powers in 1928 in which an "agent provocateur" was taken to mean "a person who entices another to commit an express breach of the law which he would not otherwise have committed and then proceeds or informs against him in respect of such offence".
An application for leave to appeal is not itself an appeal under section 5(1) of the 1968 Act.
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 5(1)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Griffiths (1974) 60 Cr App R 14
1974
CACD
James LJ
Crime
It was perfectly correct to direct a jury that, in common sense and in law, they may find that the defendant knew or believed goods to have been stolen because he deliberately closed his eyes to the circumstances.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Wilson [1974] 58 Cr App R 304
1974
CACD

Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Sloan (1974) 19 CCC (2d) 190
1974


Crime
(Canada) A man cannot be 'armed with his own finger'.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Kovacs [1974] 1 WLR 370
1974
CACD
Lawton LJ, Michael Davis J
Crime
The defendant appealed against her conviction for deception. A retailer had been deceived by her use of a bank card. Held: The appeal failed. In offering a cheque supported by the card, she was to be taken to be making a represention to the shopkeeper that she was authorised by the bank to draw the cheque and use the card.
Lawton LJ said: 'S16(1) does not provide either expressly or by implication that the person deceived must suffer any loss arising from the deception. What does have to be proved is that the accused by deception obtained for himself or another a pecuniary advantage. What there must be is a causal connection between the deception used and the pecuniary advantage obtained'.
Theft Act 1968 16(1)

 
Regina v Hyam [1974] 2 All ER 41 HL(E); [1974] 2 WLR 607; [1975] AC 55
1974
HL

Crime
The defendant had burnt down the house of her rival in love, thereby killing her children. The judge directed the jury to convict the defendant of murder if she knew that it was highly probable that her act would cause death or serious bodily harm. The jury convicted her of murder. Held: The House considered what state of mind, apart from the case where a defendant acts with the purpose of killing or causing serious injury, may be sufficient to constitute the necessary intention for murder. The House differed in their reasons for upholding the conviction. One adopted the "highly probable" test; another thought a test of probability was sufficient; and a third thought it was sufficient if the defendant realised there was "a serious risk."
1 Citers


 
Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85
1974
PC
Morris L
Crime, Evidence, Commonwealth
(Victoria) A young girl was sadistically murdered. The two accused, were present and the crime was committed by one or the other, or both. Each brought evidence of the unlikelihood that he could have committed the murder. L emphasised his good character and said that because of fear of K he had been unable to prevent the murder. K said that he had been under the influence of drugs and had been powerless to prevent L from killing the girl. Despite L's objection, K was allowed to call a psychologist as to their respective personalities and, on that evidence, to invite the jury to conclude that it was less probable that K was the killer. They were both convicted. L unsuccessfully appealed to the Supreme Court of Victoria on the ground, inter alia, that the psychologist's evidence ought not to have been admitted. Held: Only in exceptionl circumstances can expert evidence be admissible as to the likelihood of the defendant's veracity. The evidence of the psychologist was relevant in support of K's case to show that his version of the facts was more probable than that put forward by the appellant. Accordingly the Privy Council dismissed the appeal. Evidence is relevant 'if it tended to show that the version of the facts put forward by one co-accused was more probable than that put forward by the other'. The Board approved a statement as to the law: "It is … established by the highest authorities that in criminal cases the Crown is precluded from leading evidence that does no more than show that the accused has a disposition or propensity or is the sort of person likely to commit the crime charged; .. it is, we think, one thing to say that such evidence is excluded when tendered by the Crown in proof of guilt, but quite another to say that it is excluded when tendered by the accused in disproof of his own guilt. We see no reason of policy or fairness which justifies or requires the exclusion of evidence relevant to prove the innocence of an accused person."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Duru [1974] 1 WLR 2
1974
CACD
Megaw LJ
Crime
The defendants were accused of involvement in mortgage frauds perpetrated on a local authority. The advances were made by cheque, and the defendants were charged with obtaining the cheques by deception. The principal question for consideration was whether there was an intention on the part of the defendants to deprive the council of the property. Held: There was such an intention. Megaw LJ: "So far as the cheque itself is concerned, true it is a piece of paper. But it is a piece of paper which changes its character completely once it is paid, because then it receives a rubber stamp on it stating that it has been paid and it ceases to be a thing in action, or at any rate it ceases to be, in its substance, the same thing as it was before: that is, an instrument on which payment falls to be made. It was the intention of the defendants, dishonestly and by deception, not only that the cheques should be made out and handed over, but also that they should be presented and paid, thereby depriving the council of the cheques in their substance as things in action."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Smith (John) [1974] 1 All ER 376
1974


Crime
The question of the "good faith" of a doctor sanctioning an abortion is a question for the jury
Abortion Act 1968

 
Regina v Ingle [1974] 3 All ER 811
1974
CACD

Crime
The court has a power at common law to defer part of its sentencing process.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Ellames 60 Cr App R 7; [1974] 1 WLR 1391
1974
CACD
Browne J
Crime
The defendant had been charged under s 8(1) and s 25(1) of the 1968 Act with robbery and going equipped for stealing. A robbery had been committed and the accused were later found in possession of articles fit for use in a robbery. Held: Browne J said: "In our view, to establish an offence under Section 25 (1) the prosecution must prove that the Defendant was in possession of the article, and intended the article to be used in the course of or in connection with some future burglary, theft or cheat. But it is not necessary to prove that he intended it to be used in the course of or in connection with any specific burglary, theft or cheat; it is enough to prove a general intention to use it for some burglary, theft or cheat; we think that this view is supported by the use of the word "any" in Section 25 (1). Nor, in our view, is it necessary to provide that the defendant intended to use it himself; it will be enough to prove that he had it with him with the intention that it should be used by someone else."
Theft Act 1968 25(1)

 
Regina v Tirado [1974] 59 Cr App R 80
1974


Crime

1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Brooks; PC 1974 - [1974] AC 862

 
 Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions; HL 21-Mar-1974 - [1974] UKHL 2; [1975] AC 55
 
Regina v Woodman [1974] EWCA Crim 1
26 Apr 1974
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Waddington v Miah [1974] UKHL 6; 138 JP 497; 59 Cr App Rep 149; [1974] 2 All ER 377; [1974] 1 WLR 683
1 May 1974
HL

Immigration, Crime
HL Immigration - Statute controlling immigration - Retrospective operation - Penal provisions - Illegal entry - Possession of false passport - Whether statute creating offences in respect of acts performed before it came into force - Immigration Act 1971, ss 24(1)(a), 26(1)(d).
Immigration Act 1971
[ Bailii ]
 
Scott v Metropolitan Police Commissioner; Regina v Scott [1975] AC 819; [1974] UKHL 4
20 Nov 1974
HL
Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Reid, Lord Diplock, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Kilbrandon
Intellectual Property, Crime
The defendant had been accused of conspiracy to produce pirate copies of films obtained by purchasing copies from cinema owners without the knowledge or consent of the copyright owners. Held: To establish a conspiracy to defraud, it was not necessary to prove a deceit by the defendant of the person who would end up being defrauded. A conspiracy to defraud is an agreement between two or more people dishonestly to deprive a person of something which is his or to which he would be entitled, or to injure a proprietary right.
Viscount Dilhorne observed with approval that: "In East's Pleas of the Crown vol. II the author stated that in his view the common law offence of cheating consisted in: "the fraudulent obtaining of the property of another by any deceitful or illegal practice or token (short of felony) [which affects or may affect the public.] . . "
Viscount Dilhorne referred to the ancient common law offence of cheating, citing East's Pleas of the Crown (1803) vol II, pp 816ff for that author's opinion that that offence consisted in: "the fraudulent obtaining [of] the property of another by any deceitful and illegal practice or token (short of felony) which affects or may affect the public. It is not, however, every species of fraud or dishonesty in transactions between individuals which is the subject matter of a criminal charge at common law; . . it must be such as affects the public . . calculated to defraud numbers, to deceive the people in general."
Copyright Act 1956 21(1)(a)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Director of Public Prosecution v Withers [1975] AC 842
20 Nov 1974
HL
Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Reid, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Kilbrandon
Crime
The House was asked to consider whether there existed the crime of a conspiracy to commit a public mischief. Held: There was no such crime, since it was so undefined as to be unfair to any defendant. Although at common law no clear distinction was originally drawn between conspiracies to "cheat" and conspiracies to "defraud ", these terms being frequently used in combination, by the early years of the nineteenth century "conspiracy to defraud" had become a distinct species of criminal agreement independent of the old common law substantive offence of "cheating". The abolition of this substantive common law offence by section 31(l)(a) of the Theft Act, 1968, except as regards offences relating to the public revenue, thus leaves surviving and intact the common law offence of conspiracy to defraud.
Where the intended victim of a "conspiracy to defraud" is a private individual the purpose of the conspirators must be to cause the victim economic loss by depriving him of some property or right, corporeal or incorporeal, to which he is or would or might become entitled. The intended means by which the purpose is to be achieved must be dishonest. They need not involve fraudulent misrepresentation such as is needed to constitute the civil tort of deceit. Dishonesty of any kind is enough.
Where the intended victim of a "conspiracy to defraud" is a person performing public duties as distinct from a private individual it is sufficient if the purpose is to cause him to act contrary to his public duty, and the intended means of achieving this purpose are dishonest. The purpose need not involve causing economic loss to anyone.
Viscount Dilhorne said: "The preferment of charges alleging public mischief appears to have become far more frequent in recent years. Why this is, I do not know. It may be that it is due to a feeling that the conduct of the accused has been so heinous that it ought to be dealt with as criminal and that the best way of bringing it within the criminal sphere is to allege public mischief and trust that the courts will fill the gap, if gap there be, in the law. But if gap there be, it must be left to the legislature to fill.
I hope that in future such a vague expression as "public mischief" will not be included in criminal charges. It introduces a wide measure of uncertainty and should not be a vehicle for the enlargement of the criminal law or a device to secure its extension to cover acts not previously thought to be criminal." Judges have no power to create new offences."
Lord Simon of Glaisdale said: "To be punishable as conduct tending to pervert the course of justice, the conduct must be such as can be properly and seriously so described. 'Pervert' is a strong word (cf. 'corrupt' and 'outrage' as explained in Knuller (1973) AC 435)."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Hetherington [1975] NI 164
1975
CANI
Lowry LCJ
Crime
Lowry LCJ discussed the rule against the admission of evidence obtained under mistreatment and said: "It is not for the defence to prove but for the prosecution to disprove beyond reasonable doubt in relation to each accused that he was not subject even to any degrading treatment in order to induce him to make a statement on which the Crown rely . . the decision under section 6(2) must be based solely on how the statement is proved to have been obtained and not on whether it was true."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Venna [1975] 3 All ER 788; [1976] 1 QB 421; [1975] 3 WLR 737
1975
CACD
James LJ
Crime
An assault is an act by which the defendant intentionally or recklessly causes the complainant to apprehend immediate, or to sustain, unlawful personal violence. The jury ought to be directed that the defendant cannot be guilty of an assault unless the prosecution proves that he acted with the mental element necessary to constitute his action on assault, that is that the defendant intentionally or recklessly applied force to the person of another.
1 Citers


 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Curran; Regina v Curran [1975] 2 All ER 1045
1975
CACD

Crime
The defendant was sat drunk in his car. He had his keys, but they were not in the ignition. He was breathalysed. He later refused to provide a specimen of his urine to be analysed. He was acquited of being drunk in charge, but convicted of failing to provide the specimen. He appealed saying the convictions were inconsistent. Held: He was so drunk that he was in fact unlikely to drive.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Skipp; CACD 1975 - [1975] Crim L R 114

 
 Regina v Greenstein; Regina v Green; CACD 1975 - [1976] 1 All ER 1; [1975] 1 WLR 1353
 
Regina v Reid (1976) 62 Cr App R 109
1975
CACD
Lawton, Geoffrey Lane LJJ and Robert Goff J
Crime
Three men, alleged by the Crown to be supporters of the IRA, armed with weapons, went to the house of an army officer at night. When he opened the door one of them shot him. Two were convicted of murder; the third, Reid, was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter. All three were also convicted of joint possession of a revolver, knife and imitation gun. His defence had been that he was not part of the joint venture but had gone along with them in order to see whether the other two were really IRA terrorists, which he did not believe they were. The judge had given the jury a direction on manslaughter based upon Church. Held: The appeal failed.
Lawton LJ said: "In Anderson and Morris . . a distinction was drawn between a mere unforeseen consequence of an unlawful act and an "overwhelmingly supervening event which is of such a character that it will relegate into history matters which would otherwise be looked upon as causative factors"; see the judgment of Lord Parker CJ at . . 120. Was O'Conaill's deliberate firing of the revolver "a mere unforeseen consequence" of the unlawful possession of offensive weapons? We adjudge it was. When two or more men go out together in joint possession of offensive weapons such as revolvers and knives and the circumstances are such as to justify an inference that the very least they intend to do with them is to use them to cause fear in another, there is, in our judgment, always a likelihood that, in the excitement and tensions of the occasion, one of them will use the weapon in some way which will cause death or serious injury. If such injury was not intended by the others, they must be acquitted of murder; but having started out on an enterprise which envisaged some degree of violence, albeit nothing more than causing fright, they will be guilty of manslaughter."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Madden (1975) 61 Cr App R 254; [1975] 1 WLR 1379
1975
CACD
James LJ
Crime
The court considered an appeal against a conviction for causing a public nuisance by the making of bomb hoax telephone call to a steel works. The message was received by a telephonist, who informed the engineer and also the police. The police informed the chief security officer of the works, who caused eight security men to carry out a search. This lasted for just over an hour before the telephone call was found to be a hoax. Held: The offence continued to be a valid charge. "It is, in our view, still an offence known to the law of this country to commit a public nuisance. A person who makes a bogus telephone call falsely giving information as to the presence of explosives may … be shown to have committed an offence of public nuisance." However the this particular conviction was quashed. The directions had invited the jury to consider "In this particular case the conviction must be quashed on two grounds. First, the directions which the recorder was persuaded by the Crown to give to the jury were not right in that those directions invited the jury to consider the potential danger to the public rather than the actual danger and the potential risk to the comfort of the public as distinct from the actual comfort of the public. Secondly, on the evidence which I have recited, it was not possible for a jury, properly directed, to have arrived at the conclusion that a considerable number of persons were affected by the action of the appellant. It is quite clear that, for a public nuisance to be proved, it must be proved by the Crown that the public, which means a considerable number of persons or a section of the public, was affected, as distinct from individual persons."
1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Majewski [1975] 3 WLR 401; (1976) 62 Cr App R 5
1975
CACD
Lawton LJ
Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for assault saying that he was so intoxicated on drink and drugs at the time that he did not have mens rea. Held: The appeal failed. The court certified a question for the House of Lords namely: "Whether a defendant may properly be convicted of assault notwithstanding that, by reason of his self-induced intoxication, he did not intend to do the act alleged to constitute the assault".
Lawton LJ said: "The facts are commonplace—indeed so commonplace that their very nature reveals how serious from a social and public standpoint the consequences would be if men could behave as the [appellant] did and then claim that they were not guilty of any offence."
Criminal Justice Act 1967 8
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Edwards; 1975 - [1975] 1 QB 27
 
Evans v Sant [1975] QB 626
1975
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ, Bridge and Shaw JJ
Health and Safety, Crime
In the course of laying a water-main, a test-head was attached between the pipe and a pump to test the water pressure, but it was insecurely fitted and, as pressure built up, it blew off, causing the death of a workman who ran into the path of a passing car. Held: On a case stated by magistrates after conviction, the defendant's appeal was allowed. The guiding light in the court's approach was that: "in deciding whether the place of work was made safe, it is the place qua place that we look at, and not the place qua operation carried on upon the place." Lord Widgery CJ continued to say: "That does not mean of course that in deciding whether the place is made safe one has total disregard for the activities which go on in the place itself. The safety of the place depends not simply on the construction of the floor or the solidity of the walls, but it also depends in some degree upon the nature of the operations carried on therein. In so far as there is permanent equipment in the place, then its safety can in my judgment reflect on the safety of the place. In so far as there are activities carried on in the place which are constant, regular and recurring, I can well see that they may have their impact on the question of whether the place has been made safe." and "Where, as in the present case, you start with a place safe in every degree, and the only thing which renders it unsafe is the fact that equipment brought upon it for a particular operation, and being used for a particular operation on a particular day, produces an element of danger, it seems to me that that is not enough to justify the allegation, certainly in criminal proceedings, that the place itself has not been made safe."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Sheehan and Moore [1975] 60 CAR 308; [1975] 1 WLR 739
1975
CACD

Crime
The court approved a direction of law to the jury who had been asked to conclude that the voluntary consumption of alcohol by the defendant should lead to the conclusion that he was too drunk to form the intention required for proof of the crime alleged against him, is that "a drunken intent is still an intent."
1 Citers



 
 Behrendt v Burridge; QBD 1975 - [9750 63 Cr App R 202

 
 Regina v Blaue; CACD 1975 - [1975] 1 WLR 1411; [1975] 3 All ER 446

 
 Regina v Becerra and Cooper; CACD 1975 - (1975) 62 Cr App R 212; [1975] EWCA Crim 6

 
 Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch; HL 1975 - [1975] AC 653; [1975] 1 All ER 913; [1975] UKHL 5

 
 Fenton, Regina v; 1975 - [1975] 61 Cr App R 261
 
Regina v Arrowsmith [1975] QB 678
1975


Crime
The defendant was charged with endeavouring to seduce a member of Her Majesty's forces from his duty or allegiance to Her Majesty. Held: A soldier owes allegiance to the Crown, whether he has taken the oath of allegiance or not.
Incitement to Disaffection Act 1934
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Smart v H.M. Advocate [1975] ScotHC HCJ - 1
24 Jan 1975
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Attorney General's Reference No 1 of 1975 [1975] EWCA Crim 1
25 Apr 1975
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Morgan; HL 30-Apr-1975 - [1976] AC 182; [1975] 1 All ER 8; [1975] UKHL 3

 
 Regina v Cogan and Another; CACD 9-Jun-1975 - [1975] EWCA Crim 2; [1975] 3 WLR 316,; [1975] 2 All ER 1059; (1975) 61 Cr App Rep 217; (1975) 139 JP 608; [1976] QB 217
 
R v Blaue [1975] EWCA Crim 3
16 Jul 1975
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Venna [1975] EWCA Crim 4
31 Jul 1975
CACD

Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Cato and others [1976] 1 WLR 110; [1975] EWCA Crim 5; 140 JP 169; [1976] 1 All ER 260; 62 Cr App Rep 41
15 Oct 1975
CACD

Crime
The defendant had injected the deceased with heroin. He appealed his conviction for manslaughter. Held: Proof of manslaughter requires proof that the unlawful act substantially contributed to the death of the victim.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Hinds and other v The Queen; Director of Public Prosecutions v Jackson, attorney General of Jamaica (Intervenor); PC 1-Dec-1975 - [1976] 1 All ER 1976; [1976] 2 WLR 366; (1975) 119 SJ 864; [1976] Crim LR 124; [1977] AC 195
 
Anderson v Laverock [1975] ScotHC HCJ - 2
18 Dec 1975
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Secretary of State for Trade v Markus; HL 1976 - [1976] AC 35
 
Regina v Steele (1976) 65 Cr App R 22
1976
CACD

Crime
The parties to the marriage were living apart, and the wife had taken the husband to court for domestic violence, and the court had accepted his undertaking not further to molest her. He later had intercourse with her and appealed against his conviction for rape. Held: The proceedings had been enough to revoke any consent implied by the wife by virtue of the marriage and the conviction stood.
1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Majewski; HL 1976 - [1977] AC 443; [1976] 2 All ER 1542; [1976] UKHL 2
 
Regina v Ben Nien Tao (1976) 63 Crim App R 163
1976
CACD
Roskill LJ
Crime
Tao was an undergraduate at Cambridge who had occupied a room in a college hostel. He appealed a conviction for being an occupier of premises used for the smoking of cannabis. Held: His conviction was upheld. Roskill LJ: "On those facts it seems to us that the correct legal analysis of the appellant's right of occupation of that room in the King's College Hostel was this: he had an exclusive contractual licence from the college to use that room. He was entitled to retain the use of that room to live in, to sleep in, to eat in and to work in: he paid the college for the use of that room. It was, in "our view, clearly a licence which gave him not merely a right to use but a sufficient exclusivity of possession, so that he can fairly be said to be 'the occupier' of that room for the purpose of section 8. He does not have to be a tenant or to have an estate in land before he can be 'the occupier' within that section. It is in every case a question of fact and degree, whether someone can fairly be said to be 'the occupier' for the purpose of that section." and "One asks what is the mischief against which this section is aimed. If one asks that question, it seems to this Court plain that the object is to punish those persons who are able to exclude from their premises potential offenders who wish to smoke cannabis in those premises but do not do so, "by making such persons themselves guilty of an offence if they knowingly permit or suffer any of the forbidden activities, those persons being either 'the occupier' or 'concerned in the management' of those premises. This suggests that Parliament was intending not that a legalistic meaning should be given to the phrase 'the occupier' but a common sense interpretation, that is to say 'the occupier' was to be regarded as someone who, on the facts of the particular case, could fairly be said to be 'in occupation' of the premises in question, so as to have the requisite degree of control over those premises to exclude from them those who might otherwise intend to carry on those forbidden activities I have already indicated. That is the way in which this Court would approach a question of construction, apart from authority."
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Invicta Plastics Limited v Clare; QBD 1976 - [1976] RTR 251; [1976] Crim LR 131
 
Regina v Whitfield (1976) 63 Crim App R 39
1976
CACD
Lord Widgery CJ
Crime
The court declined to apply the proviso to allow conviction of the defendant where the judge had given a msidirection, saying that to do so would be to determine the issue otherwise than by verdict of the jury.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Thomas and Thomson; 1976 - (1976) 63 Cr App R 65

 
 Regina v Coughlan and Young; CACD 1976 - [1976] 63 Cr App R 33
 
Regina v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981
1976


Crime
Proof of unlawful act manslaughter requires a criminal offence.

 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Curran; Regina v Curran [1976] 1 All ER 162
1976
HL

Crime, Road Traffic
The defendant had been found drunk at the wheel of his car. His keys were not in the ignition. He was convicted of being drunk in charge of the car, but appealed his conviction for failing to provide a specimen of urine. He appealed saying the verdicts were not consistent with each other. Held: The statute was confusing. The Act was a consolidating Act, and the House considered its ability to look to earlier versions to help in interpreting the statute: "[where] the actual words are clear and unambiguous in their meaning it is not permissible to have recourse to the corresponding provisions in the earlier Act repealed by the consolidation Act and to treat any difference in their wording as capable of casting doubt on what is clear and unambiguous language in the consolidation Act itself." and "... in the instant case, ... the actual words are clear and unambiguous in their meaning it is not permissible to have recourse to the corresponding provisions in the earlier Act repealed by the consolidation Act and to treat any difference in their wording as capable of casting doubt on what is clear and unambiguous language in the consolidation Act itself"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Timmis [1976] Crim LR 129
1976
CACD

Crime
The offence of escape from lawful custody is not limited to those who escape from prison, or remand centres, or similar institutions following an order of the sentencing court, or for that matter following a remand in custody, but that it does extend to those who do so after they have been arrested by the police.
1 Citers


 
Attorney-General for Northern Ireland's Reference [1976] 2 All ER 937
1976


Northern Ireland, Crime


 
Regina v Mogford (1976) 63 Crim App R 168
1976

Nield J
Crime
(Glamorgan Assizes) The two daughters of parents who owned, but were away from, a house in South Wales had invited some friends in to smoke cannabis. Held: The daughters could not in those circumstances properly be charged as occupiers of their parents' home.
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 89d)
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Kellett; CACD 1976 - [1976] 1 QB 372

 
 Logdon v Director of Public Prosecutions; QBD 1976 - [1976] Crim LR 121
 
Regina v Lang [1976] 62 CAR 50
1976
CACD

Crime
The defendant was accused of rape. The jury sought guidance from the judge on the question of whether the complainant's alcohol consumption may have vitiated her consent to sexual intercourse. Held: "there is no special rule applicable to drink and rape. If the issue be, as here, did the woman consent? the critical question is not how she came to take the drink, but whether she understood her situation and was capable of making up her mind. In Howard [1965] 50 CAR 56 the Court of Criminal Appeal had to consider the case of a girl under 16. Lord Parker CJ said: "in the case of a girl under 16 the prosecution…must prove either that she physically resisted, or, if she did not, that her understanding and knowledge was such that she was not in a position to decide whether to consent or resist ". In our view these words are of general application when ever there is present some factor, be it permanent or transient, suggesting the absence of such understanding or knowledge. None of this was explained to the jury. Their attention was focussed by the judge upon how she came to take drink, not upon the state of her understanding and her capacity to exercise judgment in the circumstances."
1 Citers


 
Edwards v Ddin [1976] 1 WLR 942
1976


Crime
The defendant had obtained petrol from the station, and whilst washing his hands decided not to pay. Held: He could not be convicted of theft. By the time he acquired the dishonest intent the property in the petrol had already been transferred to him because of the admixture with the existing petrol in the tank.


 
 Regina v Belfon; 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 741

 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Newbury and Jones; HL 12-May-1976 - [1976] CLY 496; [1977] AC 500; [1976] UKHL 3
 
Palazzo v Copeland [1976] ScotHC HCJ - 1
14 Jul 1976
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Abbott v The Queen [1976] CLY 513; [1977] AC 755; [1976] 3 All ER 140; [1976] UKPC 19
20 Jul 1976
PC
Lord Hailsham, Lord Kilbrandon, Lord Salmon, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies
Crime
The appellant was charged as a principal in the first degree, and the issue was whether the defence of duress was available. The Board considered the availability of duress as a defence to a criminal charge. Held: The defence was not open to the defendant (Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmund-Davies dissenting). The Court was bound to "loyally" accept the decision in Lynch, but that it was not an authority which required extension of the doctrine of duress to such a case. Having regard to the doubts expressed in the speeches of the majority as to the applicability of their reasoning to persons who actually carry out killings, combined with the dissenting speeches, it was considered that a majority of the House in Lynch had to be seen as being of the opinion that it should not be extended.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Bow; CACD 24-Nov-1976 - [1976] EWCA Crim 1; (1977) 64 Cr App R 54; [1977] RTR 6
 
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v Charles [1977] AC 177
1977
HL
Lord Diplock
Crime
The House was asked as to the dishonest use of a cheque card. The appellant defendant was charged and convicted on two counts of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception, contrary to section 16 of the 1968 Act. The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) upheld those convictions. Held: Where a drawer of a cheque which is accepted in return for goods, services or cash, uses a cheque card he represents to the payee that he has the actual authority of the bank to enter on its behalf into the contract expressed on the card that it would honour the cheque on presentation for payment.
Lord Diplock said: "When a cheque card is brought into the transaction, it still remains the fact that all the payee is concerned with is that the cheque should be honoured by the bank. I do not think that the fact that a cheque card is used necessarily displaces the representation to be implied from the act of drawing the cheque which has just been mentioned. It is, however, likely to displace that representation at any rate as the main inducement to the payee to take the cheque, since the use of the cheque card in connection with the transaction gives to the payee a direct contractual right against the bank itself to payment on presentment, provided that the use of the card by the drawer to bind the bank to pay the cheque was within the actual or ostensible authority conferred upon him by the bank.
By exhibiting to the payee a cheque card containing the undertaking by the bank to honour cheques drawn in compliance with the conditions endorsed on the back, and drawing the cheque accordingly, the drawer represents to the payee that he has actual authority from the bank to make a contract with the payee on the bank's behalf that it will honour the cheque on presentment for payment.
It was submitted on behalf of the accused that there is no need to imply a representation that the drawer's authority to bind the bank was actual and not merely ostensible, since ostensible authority alone would suffice to create a contract with the payee that was binding on the bank; and the drawer's possession of the cheque card and the cheque book with the bank's consent would be enough to constitute his ostensible authority. So, the submission goes, the only representation needed to give business efficacy to the transaction would be true. This argument stands the doctrine of ostensible authority on its head. What creates ostensible authority in a person who purports to enter into a contract as agent for a principal is a representation made to the other party that he has the actual authority of the principal for whom he claims to be acting to enter into the contract on that person's behalf. If (1) the other party has believed the representation and on the faith of that belief has acted upon it and (2) the person represented to be his principal has so conducted himself towards that other party as to be estopped from denying the truth of the representation, then, and only then, is he bound by the contract purportedly made on his behalf. The whole foundation of liability under the doctrine of ostensible authority is a representation, believed by the person to whom it is made, that the person claiming to contract as agent for a principal has the actual authority of the principal to enter into the contract on his behalf."
Theft Act 1968 16
1 Citers


 
Jeffrey v Black [1977] 3 WLR 895
1977
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ
Crime
The prosecutor appealed by way of case stated from magistrates who had exercised their discretion to exclude evidence of possession of drugs that had been obtained by an illegal search of the accused's room by the police. Held: The magistrates had exercised their discretion wrongly in the particular case; but Lord Widgery C.J., while stressing that the occasions on which the discretion ought to be exercised in favour of excluding admissible evidence would be exceptional, nevertheless referred to it as applying to "all the evidence tendered by the prosecution" and described its ambit in the widest terms: "If the case is such that not only have the police officers entered without authority but they have been guilty of trickery, or they have misled someone, or they have been oppressive, or they have been unfair, or in other respects they have behaved in a manner which is morally reprehensible, then it is open to the justices to apply their discretion and decline to allow the particular evidence to be let in as part of the trial".
1 Citers


 
Regina v Turnbull (Launcelot) (1977) 65 Cr App R 242
1977
CACD

Crime

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex parte Clowes; 1977 - [1977] 1 WLR 1353
 
Regina v Parker (Daryl) [1977] 1 WLR 600
1977
CACD
Scarman and Geoffrey Lane LJJ and Kenneth Jones J
Crime
In a temper the defendant broke a telephone by smashing the handset violently down on to the telephone unit. Held: Applying but modifying Briggs, the defendant had been fully aware of all the circumstances and, if "he did not know, as he said he did not, that there was some risk of damage, he was, in effect, deliberately closing his mind to the obvious - the obvious being that damage in these circumstances was inevitable." Briggs was modified thus: "A man is reckless in the sense required when he carried [sic] out a deliberate act knowing or closing his mind to the obvious fact that there is some risk of damage resulting from that act but nevertheless continuing in the performance of that act."
Criminal Damage Act 1971 1(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Miller [1977] 1 WLR 1129
1977
CACD

Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Williamson (1977) 67 Cr App R 35
1977
CACD

Crime
Geoffrey Lane LJ said: "As has been pointed out in numerous cases, that [ie section 1(4) of the Act] provides three categories of weapons. The first category is the weapon which is made for causing injury to the person. The second type of weapon is one not made for the purpose but adapted for it, such as, as counsel pointed out in this case, a potato with a razor blade inserted into it. The third type of weapon is one neither made nor adapted but is one which is intended by the person having it with him for the purpose of causing personal injury to someone. That sort of thing could be any object that one can think of." and "It is for the jury to decide these matters."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Speck [1977] 2 All ER 859
1977
CACD

Crime
The court considered that the offence of inciting a child to commit an indecent act can be committed simply by inactivity in not preventing the child from committing the indecent act, thereby encouraging it.

 
Regina v Briggs (Note) [1977] 1 WLR 605
1977
CACD
James LJ, Kenneth Jones and Pain JJ
Crime
The defendant caused damage to a car. The appeal turned on the trial judge's direction on the meaning of "reckless". Held: The conviction was set aside. The judge had not adequately explained that the test to be applied was that of the defendant's state of mind. "A man is reckless in the sense required when he carries out a deliberate act knowing that there is some risk of damage resulting from that act but nevertheless continues in the performance of that act."
Criminal Damage Act 1971 1
1 Citers


 
Regina v Ashton-Rickhardt (1977) 65 Cr App R 67
1977
CACD

Crime

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 28(2)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Rowell [1977] 65 CAR 174
1977
CACD

Crime
Giving a false story to the police in relation to a criminal offence resulting in the arrest of another can constitute the offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Ameer and Lucas [1977] Crim L R 104
1977
CCC
Judge Gilles
Crime
The court exercised its discretion to refuse to allow the prosecution to call any evidence to prove the commission of the offence by the accused where it had been shown that there had been an agent provocateur.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Stone and Dobinson [1977] 2 All ER 341; [1977] 2 WLR 169; [1977] 1 QB 354
1977
CACD
Geoffrey Lane LJ
Crime
The male defendant, Stone, and his mentally disabled son lived in Stone's house with the female defendant, Dobinson. Stone's sister came to live as a lodger. She neglected herself to such an extent that she became helplessly infirm. Fanny refused to supply the name of her GP because she thought she might be 'put away' if she did. She refused to leave her bed. Although they knew that the sister was in poor condition Stone and Dobinson failed to obtain help. In particular, they did not say anything to the social worker who visited the son. Dobinson attempted with a neighbour to wash the sister. The neighbour suggested she should contact social services and the landlord of their local pub which they visited every day advised calling a doctor. Nothing was done and three weeks later the sister died from the effects of immobilisation, infected bed sores and malnutrition. The prosecution case was that the defendants had undertaken a duty of care towards a person who could not care for herself. The defendants appealed on the ground that the deterioration in her condition was not something for which they could be responsible. Held: The Court of Appeal disagreed. The appeal failed.
Geoffrey Lane LJ said: "This was not a situation analogous to the drowning stranger. They did make efforts to care . . The jury were entitled to find that the duty had been assumed. They were entitled to conclude that once Fanny became helplessly infirm, as she had by July 19, the appellants were, in the circumstances, obliged to summon help or else care for Fanny themselves."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Fitzpatrick [1977] NI 20
1977
CANI
Lowry LCJ
Northern Ireland, Crime
The court considered the defence of duress: "A person may become associated with a sinister group of men with criminal objectives and coercive methods of ensuring that their lawless enterprises are carried out and thereby voluntarily expose himself to illegal compulsion, whether or not the group is or becomes a proscribed organisation . . if a person voluntarily exposes and submits himself, as the appellant did, to illegal compulsion, he cannot rely on the duress to which he has voluntarily exposed himself as an excuse either in respect of the crimes he commits against his will or in respect of his continued but unwilling association with those capable of exercising upon him the duress which he calls in aid."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Neale [1977] 65 Cr App R 304
1977
CACD
Scarman LJ
Crime, Criminal Evidence
Neale and Burr were jointly charged with arson and manslaughter. N wanted to adduce evidence, either by cross-examining prosecution witnesses or leading evidence himself, that B had admitted that he had started fires himself on four other occasions. Held: The evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. "The view that he took was that this was evidence of propensity or disposition only, and contained nothing which bore upon the defence which was that the applicant was elsewhere and did not therefore do it. We have come to the conclusion that the learned judge was right and that it really is, in the circumstances of this case, a non sequitur to deduce from the existence of a propensity in Burr to raise fires that Neale was not there or participating when this fire, which did the damage and caused the death, was raised. Mr Hillman really revealed or exposed the logical fallacy in his argument, when in the course of a succinct and extremely well developed submission he submitted that evidence of Burr's propensity to commit wanton and unaided arson was needed in order to support the defence that the applicant Neale was not there at the time the fire was raised. In our judgment this is a non sequitur." and "There is a clear general principle, that, in general, evidence of propensity to commit a crime is not evidence that the man with that propensity committed the crime on the particular occasion, but of course in the present case the logical gap is greater. Hence the relevance of the evidence has to be borne in mind by reference to the defence, which was, 'I was not there.'"A judge has no discretionary power at the request of one accused to exclude relevant evidence tending to support the defence of another accused."
1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55; [1977] 2 All ER 909; (1977) 65 Cr App R 192
1977
HL
Lord Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Diplock
Crime
The defendant had been charged with attempting to obtain property by deception by fabricating his death by drowning in the sea off Miami in Florida. The final act alleged to constitute the offence occurred outside the jurisdiction of the English courts. Held: The charge was justiciable in England. The defendant appealed conviction on counts of attempted obtaining by deception on the ground, among others, of judicial misdirection in the following words: "There is an attempt by the accused within the legal meaning of that word 'attempt' if you are satisfied that the matters I have stated to you are proved."
Lord Diplock (minority) equated the judge's power to direct a conviction with his power to direct an acquittal, regarding the contrary view as cynical and inconsistent with the proviso in section 2(1). Whether an activity forms part of an employer's undertaking to make him liable under the Act is a question of fact to be left to the jury. As to jurisdiction where elements of the offence were committed abroad: "I see no reason for doubting the correctness of the decision in Reg v. Harden [1963] 1 Q.B. 8 if it was in that case right to conclude that the cheques were obtained in Jersey. The court in that case held, in my view correctly, following Reg. v. Ellis [1989] 1 Q.B. 230, that the gist of the offence lay in the obtaining, and as that in their view had occurred outside the jurisdiction, the convictions were quashed. It was not suggested in that case that the making of the false pretences in England gave the English courts jurisdiction. I doubt, however, whether it was right to hold that the jurisdiction of the English courts in respect of criminal offences depended on the narrow ground that the Post Office was the agent of the maker of the false pretences to obtain on his behalf the fruits of his fraud. Neither he nor the company in Jersey are likely to have considered or contemplated that the Post Office was acting as agent for one or other of them. The Post Office was just the vehicle for the transmission of the false pretences and the fruits of the fraud.
I can find no authority for the proposition that the English courts have jurisdiction in a case where the false pretences were made in this country and the obtaining of goods or money in consequence thereof occurred outside the jurisdiction. That the law might have so provided and that Parliament might make that the law, I acknowledge but I do not think that it is the law now. "

Lord Salmon said: "The criticism of that passage was that the judge should have explained to the jury the legal meaning of an attempt and directed them that if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts proved established the attempt charged, then they should find the accused guilty, otherwise they should acquit him. I agree with that criticism. So did counsel for the Crown who conceded that there had been the technical misdirection of which counsel for the appellant had complained . . The learned judge conducted this trial lasting 70 days with outstanding ability and patience. The direction complained of came towards the end of a most fair, accurate and lucid summing up. It concerned a matter which was as plain as a pikestaff. No reasonable jury could have failed to find that the facts proved clearly established the attempt charged and convicted the appellant accordingly. It has never been suggested that when the appellant faked his death, he may not even have been giving his wife a thought and did what he did do solely to escape from being arrested and charged with the 13 other counts to which he had no defence and of which he was convicted . . Anyone in the judge's position might easily have made the slip which he did of not leaving the jury to decide whether the facts proved amounted to the attempt charged. However obvious it may be that they did and that the accused was guilty, technically, the judge should still have left it to the jury to decide whether or not the evidence established the attempt charged and to have found him guilty or not guilty accordingly. The technical slip on the part of the judge certainly made no difference to the result of the trial. There is no possibility that any reasonable jury could have had the slightest doubt that the facts proved did establish the attempt charged and accordingly would certainly have brought in a verdict of guilty. I am completely satisfied that no miscarriage of justice could have resulted from what technically was a misdirection and that therefore the proviso to section 2(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 should be applied.
With the greatest respect to my noble and learned friends, Lord Diplock and Viscount Dilhorne and the Court of Appeal, I am afraid that I cannot agree with their views on this aspect of the case. Whilst there is no doubt that if a judge is satisfied that there is no evidence before the jury which could justify them in convicting the accused and that it would be perverse for them to do so, it is the judge's duty to direct them to acquit. This rule, which has long been established, is to protect the accused against being wrongly convicted. But there is no converse rule - although there may be some who think that there should be. If the judge is satisfied that, on the evidence, the jury would not be justified in acquitting the accused and indeed that it would be perverse of them to do so, he has no power to pre-empt the jury's verdict by directing them to convict. The jury alone have the right to decide that the accused is guilty. In any appropriate case (and this was certainly such a case) the judge may sum up in such a way as to make it plain that he considers that the accused is guilty and should be convicted. I doubt however whether the most effective way of doing so would be for the judge to tell the jury that it would be perverse for them to acquit. Such a course might well be counter-productive."

Lord Edmund-Davies said: "Eveleigh J approached this part of his very onerous task as if he were interpreting a statute containing the word 'attempt' and regarded himself as entitled to direct the jury that, as a matter of pure law, the acts itemised (if proved) did constitute the 'actus reus'. But just as it was for the jury and not the judge to decide whether the necessary mens rea had been established, so also it was for them to decide whether the proved acts of the accused were such as to constitute an attempt to commit the full offence of obtaining by deception . . . the erroneous direction in the instant case [to be] but one example of a prevalent (though fortunately not universal) tendency in our courts in these days to withdraw from the jury issues which are solely theirs to determine."
Lord Keith of Kinkel "In the second place it was argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury in respect that he failed to leave it to them to decide whether in their view the appellant's acts were sufficiently proximate to constitute an attempt or were merely preparatory. The learned trial judge did indeed direct the jury that if they were satisfied that the appellant falsely staged his death by drowning, dishonestly intending that a claim should be made and the policy moneys obtained in due course, then in law there had been an attempt to commit the offence. I am of opinion that it should properly have been left to the jury to say whether what the appellant did amounted to an attempt, and indeed this was accepted by Mr Tudor Price for the [Crown]. It is the function of the presiding judge at a trial to direct the jury upon the relevant rules of law. This includes the duty, if the judge takes the view that the evidence led, if accepted, cannot in law amount to proof of the crime charged, of directing the jury that they must acquit. It is the function of the jury, on the other hand, not only to find the facts and to draw inferences from the facts, but in modern practice also to apply the law, as they are directed upon it, to the facts as they find them to be. I regard this division of function as being of fundamental importance, and I should regret very much any tendency on the part of presiding judges to direct juries that, if they find certain facts to have been established, they must necessarily convict. A lawyer may think that the result of applying the law correctly to a certain factual situation is perfectly clear, but nevertheless the evidence may give rise to nuances which he has not observed, but which are apparent to the collective mind of a lay jury. It may be suggested that a direction to convict would only be given in exceptional circumstances, but that involves the existence of a discretion to decide whether such circumstances exist, and with it the possibility that the discretion may be wrongly exercised. Thus the field for appeals against conviction would be widened. The wiser and sounder course, in my opinion, is to adhere to the principle that, in every case where a jury may be entitled to convict, the application of the law to the facts is a matter for the jury and not for the judge. I see no reason to doubt that the good sense and responsible outlook of juries will enable them to perform this task successfully." As to the principle that an offence is committed within the jurisdiction if the effects of the act operate within it: "This would be the situation if a bomb or a letter sent from abroad were found anywhere within the jurisdiction. Its presence at that spot would be an intended effect of the act of despatching it. In my opinion it is not the present law of England that an offence is committed if no effect of an act done abroad is felt there, even though it was the intention that it should be. Thus if a person on the Scottish bank of the Tweed, where it forms the border between Scotland and England, were to fire a rifle at someone on the English bank, with intent to kill him, and actually did so, he would be guilty of murder under English law. If he fired with similar intent but missed his intended victim, he would be guilty of attempted murder under English law, because the presence of the bullet in England would be an intended effect of his act. But if he pressed the trigger and his weapon misfired, he would be guilty of no offence under the law of England, provided at least that the intended victim was unaware of the attempt, since no effect would have been felt there."

Lord Diplock discussed the 'terminating' thery of jurisdiction: "The basis of the jurisdiction under the terminatory theory is not that the accused has done some physical act in England, but that his physical acts, wherever they were done, have caused the obtaining of the property in England from the person to whom it belonged." If a judge is satisfied that there is no evidence which could justify the jury in convicting the defendant and that it would be perverse for them to do so, it is the judge's duty to direct them to acquit.
Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 - Criminal Appeal Act 1968 2(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Tao [1977] QB 141
1977


Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Dawson and James [1977] 64 Cr App R 170
1977
CACD
Lawson LJ
Crime
At Liverpool Pier Head a sailor on shore leave waiting for the ferry was surrounded by two men, one standing on either side of him, who nudged him on the shoulder, causing him to lose his balance. While trying to keep his balance, a third man got his hand into the sailor's pocket and took his wallet. It was contended before the trial court that that did not amount to the offence of robbery. The judge left the offence to the jury, who convicted him. In giving the judgment of the court, Held: Lawson LJ said: "The choice of the word 'force' is not without interest because under the Larceny Act 1916 the word 'violence' had been used, but Parliament deliberately on the advice of the Criminal Law Revision Committee changed that word 'force'. Whether there is any difference between 'violence' or 'force' is not relevant for the purposes of this case; but the word is 'force'. It is a word in ordinary use. It is a word which juries understand. The learned judge left it to the jury to say whether jostling a man in the way which the victim described to such an extent that he had difficulty in keeping his balance could be said to be the use of force. The learned judge, because of the argument put forward by Mr Locke, went out of his way to explain to the jury that force in these sort of circumstances must be substantial to justify a verdict.
Whether it was right for him to put that adjective before the word 'force' when Parliament had not done so we will not discuss for the purposes of this case. It was a matter for the jury. They were there to use their common sense and knowledge of the world. We cannot say that their decision as to whether force was used was wrong. They were entitled to the view that force was used."
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Whitehouse; CACD 18-Feb-1977 - [1977] EWCA Crim 2; [1977] 3 All ER 737; 142 JP 45; [1977] 2 WLR 925; (1977) 65 Cr App Rep 33; [1977] QB 868
 
Regina v Norbury (1978) CLR 435
1 Mar 1977

His Honour Judge Beezley
Crime
(Norwich Crown Court) Between July 1972 and November 1976, 494 women resident in Norfolk reported to the police a total of 605 obscene telephone calls from the defendant. The offence would normally be a summary offence with a maximum of £50.00 fine. He was indicted for causing a public nuisance, an indictable offence for which there was no maximum penalty. His counsel moved to quash the indictment. The judge rejected the argument: "It seems to me, dealing with the present indictment, that repetition, over a long period and on a number of occasions of telephone calls of an obscene nature, intending to cause offence and alarm and resulting in such offence and alarm to a large number of Her Majesty's subjects selected from a telephone directory, or merely by chance dialling, is the very kind of act, and, indeed the very kind of series of acts, which the public has an interest in condemning and has a right to vindicate."
Post Office Act 1969 78
1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Sanchez-Burke; PC 19-Apr-1977 - [1977] UKPC 6
 
Brennan v HM Advocate 1977 SLT 151; [1977] ScotHC HCJ - 1; 1977 JC 38,
12 May 1977
HCJ
Emslie LJG
Scotland, Crime
The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder after his special defence of insanity was rejected. The trial judge, in charging the jury withdrew the special defence from their consideration and directed them that the evidence of the appellant's state of intoxication did not entitle them to return a verdict of culpable homicide. In the result the outcome of the trial was conviction of the appellant of murder.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Pierre Bouchereau; ECJ 27-Oct-1977 - C-30/77; [1977] ECR 1999; R-30/77; [1977] EUECJ R-30/77; [1987] QB 732
 
Oxford v Moss [1978] 68 Cr App Rep 183; [1979] Crim LR 119
1978
QBD

Crime
The defendant, a student, was accused of theft after he obtained a draft of a paper for his forthcoming engineering exam. It was accepted that the paper itself had not been appropriated. The prosecutor appealed dismissal of the case, sayng that he was guilty of the theft of intangible property within section 4. Held: information is not property for the purposes of theft. The confidentiality which inhered in the paper was a right over property and not a right in property. It was not intangible property.
Theft Act 1968 4(1)

 
Boggeln v Williams [1978] 2 All ER 1061
1978


Crime
The defendant had reconnected his electricity meter after it had been disconnected by the supply company for non-payment of bills. Held: The defendant's beliefs as to his honesty were crucial to the decision whether he was honest or not.
Theft Act 1968

 
A (A juvenile) v The Queen [1978] Crim LR 689
1978


Crime
Spitting on a police officer's coat was held to be such a minor "damage" to the coat as not to be criminal damage within the meaning of the 1971 Act at all. Though spitting on a raincoat which was likely to be cleaned easily with a damp cloth did not amount to damage, the same act on a delicate garment, such as a wedding dress, might well have resulted in damage. A thing is damaged if it is rendered imperfect or inoperative.
Criminal Damage Act 1971 1
1 Citers


 
Regina v Wellard [1978] 1 WLR 921; [1978] 3 All ER 161
1978
CACD
Lawton LJ
Crime
The defendant had induced a girl to accompany him about 100 yards to his car and to get into the back of it, by pretending to be a police officer searching for drugs and saying that he would escort her to her home. Before he could drive away, her boy friend arrived with two other men and rescued her. At trial, Robert Goff J, had directed the jury that the prosecution had first to prove was that the defendant deprived the victim of her liberty, and then show that he had secreted his victim or carried her away. This second requirement did not need that the victim should be physically carried. "It would be quite enough if, because of his conduct, the defendant had the practical effect upon [her] that she felt compelled to submit to his instructions and, for example, to walk a short distance." The defendant took the point that the offence of kidnapping was not complete unless and until the defendant succeeded in taking the victim to the destination to which he wished to take her. Held: Lawton LJ said that the deprivation of liberty "has not been in dispute". What was in issue was the carrying away: "All that has to be proved is the false imprisonment, the deprivation of liberty coupled with a carrying away from the place where the victim wants to be. It may be that in some circumstances the movement would not be sufficient in the estimation of the jury to amount to a carrying away. Every case has to be considered on its own facts. In this case the victim was carried away by the appellant for no less than 100 yards and put into a motor car. In our judgment, there was ample evidence that the victim was carried away from the place where she wanted to be, namely by the side of her boyfriend on Stafford Common. There is nothing in the point of law which is raised in this appeal."
1 Citers


 
Oxford v Moss [1978] 68 Cr App R 183
1978


Crime


 
Regina v Edwards and Roberts [1978] 67 Crim App Rep 228
1978
CACD
Diplock LJ, Bridge LJ
Crime
The defendant appealed against a conviction for having a knife in a public place. He had been in his front garden. Held: Persons such as the postman or milkman who have an implied licence to enter the garden do so not as members of the public but rather as lawful visitors. The front garden of this particular property, a Victorian terraced house, was a public place. The garden was no more than a metre wide, and the appellant could sit on the windowsill of the front room and put his feet on the top of the garden wall. Having regard to the purpose of the legislation, a public place was not merely land to which the public was permitted access but might also include land adjacent to areas where the public had access, provided that the harm against which the section was designed to provide protection could still be inflicted from such a place, and here it was perfectly possible for the appellant standing in his own garden to use the knife against a passing pedestrian.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Berry [1978] 66 Cr App R 156
1978
CACD
Lord Lane CJ
Crime
Although a person was highly abnormal, it did not mean that he was incapable of doing those things set out in Pritchard as the requirements to be fit to be tried. Lord Lane CJ set aside a finding that the defendant was unfit to stand trial, saying: "It may very well be that the jury may come to the conclusion that a defendant is highly abnormal, but a high degree of abnormality does not mean that the man is incapable of following a trial or giving evidence or instructing counsel and so on."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Hunt; CACD 1978 - (1978) 66 Cr App R 105
 
Corbyn v Saunders [1978] 1 WLR 400
1978

Cummin-Bruce J, Woolf LJ
Crime, Transport
The defendant appealed a conviction for fare evasion, saying that it had been his intention to pay at the end of his journey. Held. The section references to "dishonestly" and the specific intention "to avoid payment" were not two separate elements in the mens rea of the offence. Woolf LJ said: "It is clear from the first clause of section 5(3)(a) that the traveller is not to travel on the railway without paying the fare for the intended journey before he begins that journey. The intention that has to be proved is intention to avoid that obligation, ie, payment of the proper fare before he begins his journey."
Regulation of Railways Act 1889 5(3)

 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Nock [1978] AC 979
1978


Crime
There can be no conspiracy to defraud at common law where the object of the contended conspiracy would be impossible to perform.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Mallett [1978] 1 WLR 820; (1978) 67 Cr App Rep 239
1978
CACD

Crime
The defendant car dealer had made out and used a hire-purchase agreement form which falsely stated that the hirer had been a company director for a named company for several years. Relying on the information, a finance company financed the transaction. He argued that though the document was required for an accounting purpose, the false statement about the hirer was not directly connected with the accounting purpose of the document. Held: The effect of section 17 of the 1968 Act is not to be whittled down. Knowledge of the purpose for which any record or document is made or required does not form any part of the mens rea of the offence. The section focuses on the existence of an account or record or document made or required for an accounting purpose, and these are essential ingredients of the offence.
The judge had directed the jury that "false in a material particular" meant false in an important respect; something which mattered. The Court of Appeal approved the direction.
Theft Act 1968 17
1 Citers


 
Regina v Bracewell (1978) 68 Cr App R 44
1978
CACD

Crime
When there is more than one defendant in a case, the test of the relevance of an accused's previous convictions before their admission into evidence, must be strictly applied 'for if irrelevant and therefore inadmissible evidence is admitted, the other accused is likely to be seriously prejudiced, and grave injustice may result'.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Hale (1978) 68 Cr App R 415
1978
CACD
Eveleigh LJ
Crime
The defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated burglary, saying that the force used had been only after the theft. Held: The events were one continuing act. The court should aks "whether force used after the theft was complete could be seen as immediately before or at the time. The court said it was a continuing act. Eveleigh LJ said: 'counsel submitted that the theft was completed when the jewellery box was first seized and any force thereafter could not have been 'immediately before or at the time of stealing' and certainly not 'in order to steal.' The essence of the submission was that the theft was completed as soon as the jewellery box was seized.''
and 'In the present case there can be little doubt that if the appellant had been interrupted after the seizure of the jewellery box the jury would have been entitled to find that the appellant and his accomplice were assuming the rights of an owner at the time when the jewellery box was seized. However, the act of appropriation does not suddenly cease. It is a continuous act and it is a matter for the jury to decide whether or not the act of appropriation has finished. Moreover, it is quite clear that the intention to deprive the owner permanently, which accompanied the assumption of the owner's rights was a continuing one at all material times. This Court therefore rejects the contention that the theft had ceased by the time the lady was tied up. As a matter of common-sense the appellant was in the course of committing the theft; he was stealing.'
Theft Act 1968 8


 
 Regina (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Camplin; HL 1978 - [1978] AC 705; [1978] 2 All ER 168; [1978] UKHL 2
 
Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Maxwell [1978] 1 WLR 1350; [1978] 3 All ER 1140; (1979) 68 Cr App R 128
1978
CCA
Lowry LCJ
Crime
The defendant was a member of a terrorist organisation, the Ulster Volunteer Force ("UVF"). Under UVF instructions he took part in what he knew was a planned military mission, by guiding a car containing three or four other men on a cross country journey to a country inn on a winter evening. He knew that they were intending to carry out some form of violent attack on the inn, whether by shooting, bombing or some incendiary device, and he intentionally acted in order to help them to carry out the mission. He did not know the precise form of attack that they were intending to carry out (which was in fact an explosion). He had been charged in the indictment as a principal when he was a secondary, as regards offences of doing an act with intent to cause an explosion and being in possession of a bomb. Held: The accused was properly convicted of the accessory offence.
It will be sufficient if the offence that was committed was one of a number of offences that the principal party was likely to commit.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Doughty [1986] Crim LR 625; [1986] 83 Cr App R 319
6 Apr 1978
CACD

Crime
The defendant appealed his conviction for murder. He had smothered his baby son with a cushion, trying to quieten his crying. He complained that the judge had not left to the jury his defence that he was subject to a loss of self control through the extreme tiredness of having to care for his wife and son. Held: The judge had been wrong to withhold the defence of provocation from the jury. A verdict of manslaughter was substituted.
Homicide Act 1957 3
1 Citers


 
Criminal proceedings against Michel Choquet C-16/78
28 Nov 1978
ECJ

European, Crime
Europa It is not in principle incompatible with community law for one member state to require a national of another member state, who is permanently established in its territory, to obtain a domestic driving licence for the purpose of driving motor vehicles, even if he is in possession of a driving licence issued by the authorities in his state of origin. However, such a requirement may be regarded as indirectly prejudicing the exercise of the right of freedom of movement, the right of freedom of establishment or the freedom to provide services guaranteed by articles 48, 52 and 59 of the treaty respectively, and consequently as being incompatible with the treaty, if it appears that the conditions imposed by national rules on the holder of a driving licence issued by another member state are not in due proportion to the requirements of road safety. Insistence on a driving test which clearly duplicates a test taken in another member state for the classes of vehicle which the person concerned wishes to drive, or linguistic difficulties arising out of the procedure laid down for the conduct of any checks, or the imposition of exorbitant charges for completing the requisite formalities could all be examples of this.

 
Kivlin v Milne 1979 SLT (Notes) 2
1979


Scotland, Crime
Intention to deprive permanently. The defender took a car without the owner's consent and left it in a place where it was not likely to be found. Held: The Sheriff had been entitled to infer that there had been an intention to deprive the owner permanently, and therefore that there was theft.

 
Regina v Stephenson [1979] QB 695; [1979] EWCA Crim 1
1979
CACD
Geoffrey Lane LJ, Ackner and Watkins JJ
Crime
The defendant sought to sleep in a hollow in a haystack. He lit a fire, to keep warm, which set fire to the stack. He appealed against his conviction under the 1971 Act. He had a long history of schizophrenia and may not have had the same ability to foresee or appreciate risks as the mentally normal person. Held: The court considered the definition of recklessness in the Law Commission's Working Paper No 31, academic authority and the subjective approach to recklessness in Herrington. The 1971 Act intended to continue the legal meaning as described in Kenny and followed in Cunningham "What then must the prosecution prove in order to bring home the charge of arson in circumstances such as the present? They must prove that (1) the defendant deliberately committed some act which caused the damage to property alleged or part of such damage; (2) the defendant had no lawful excuse for causing the damage; these two requirements will in the ordinary case not be in issue; (3) the defendant either (a) intended to cause the damage to the property, or (b) was reckless as to whether the property was damaged or not. A man is reckless when he carries out the deliberate act appreciating that there is a risk that damage to property may result from his act. It is however not the taking of every risk which could properly be classed as reckless. The risk must be one which it is in all the circumstances unreasonable for him to take. Proof of the requisite knowledge in the mind of the defendant will in most cases present little difficulty. The fact that the risk of some damage would have been obvious to anyone in his right mind in the position of the defendant is not conclusive proof of the defendant's knowledge, but it may well be and in many cases doubtless will be a matter which will drive the jury to the conclusion that the defendant himself must have appreciated the risk."
Criminal Damage Act 1971 1(1) 1(3)
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Walkington; CACD 1979 - (1979) 68 Cr App R 427
 
Henn and Darby v Director of Public Prosecutions [1981] AC 850; [1980] 2 WLR 597
1979
HL
Lord Diplock
European, Crime
The House referred to the ECJ questions concerning the impact of Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome upon a prohibition against the importation of pornographic articles.
Lord Diplock said: "The European Court, in contrast to English courts, applies teleological rather than historical methods to the interpretation of the Treaties and other community legislation. It seeks to give effect to what it conceives to be the spirit rather than the letter of the Treaties; sometimes, indeed, to an English judge, it may seem to the exclusion of the letter. It views the communities as living and expanding organisms and the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaties as changing to match their growth."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Whitehouse v Lemon; Whitehouse v Gay News Ltd [1979] 1 QB 10
1979
CA
Roskill LJ
Crime, Media
The defendants, editors and publisher respectively of 'Gay News' had been accused of blasphemous libel. The magazine had a poem entitled 'The love that dare not Speak its Name'. it is not a necessary part of the offence that there should be an attack on the whole edifice of Christianity. It suffices that there are insults to or vilification of Christianity or the scriptures or sacred persons or objects. The Court discussed the development of the law of the offence tracing its history. Roskill LJ discussed the reasoning behind allowing prosecutions for blasphemous libel: "The state only became interested in the offence if the actions of the alleged offender affected the safety of the state."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Dytham; CACD 1979 - [1979] 1 QBD 722; (1979) 69 Crim App R 722
 
Regina v Hamid and Hamid [1979] 69 CAR 324
1979
CACD

Crime

1 Citers


 
Regina v Scott [1979] 68 Cr App R 164
1979


Crime

1 Citers


 
The Queen v O'Connor (1979-1980) 146 CLR 64
1979

Mason J
Commonwealth, Crime
Mason J cinsidered the defence of intoxication to a criminal charge and held that: "the view is taken that the act charged is voluntary notwithstanding that it might not be ordinarily considered so by reason of the condition of the perpetrator, because his condition proceeds from a voluntary choice made by him. These cases therefore constitute an exception to the general rule of criminal responsibility."
1 Citers


 
Regina v Kohn (1979) 69 Cr App Rep 395; [1979] Crim LR 675
1979
CACD

Crime
An overdraft facility was property which could be the subject of a charge of theft. In the context of the presentation of a cheque, improperly presented to a bank but which the bank pays, it was a theft of a chose in action by the person who presented such a cheque. The company's accounant appealed from his conviction, having used the lawful possession of the company's cheque book to write cheques for his own gain.
The Court confirmed that the for of charge was appropriate: "The sequence of events in this case can be brought down to a simple series of facts. The defendant starts with a cheque book in his possession. It is the cheque book of the company and he is plainly in lawful possession of that book with the cheques inside it. He apparently had the habit, as we have already indicated, at least occasionally of removing blank cheques from the book, tearing out the cheque, leaving the counterfoil in position, putting the cheque in his pocket and filling it in at a later stage. Still nothing wrong at all in that. He is still acting lawfully, although it may be somewhat unusual. He then makes up his mind to fill in the cheque with the amount, then the payees and the date and so on. The third party in whose favour the cheques were being made were ex hypothesi not entitled not entitled these sums. The appellant was therefore using the company's cheques and the company's bank account for his own purposes. Ms Goddard suggests that there was a gradual appropriation as the events moved on in this way.
The next stage is this. He says to himself, "I am now going to make the cheques payable to [another individual]. This action is unknown to [the principal of the company]. It is ex hypothesi once again contrary to the interests of the company. It is contrary to the will of the company and it is dishonest. This is dealing with a cheque not as agent of the company duly authorised, but is dealing with the cheque as if it was his own. That seems to us sufficient to amount to an appropriation under the Act."
Theft Act 1968
1 Citers


 
Whitehouse v Lemon; Whitehouse v Gay News Ltd [1979] 2 WLR 281; [1979] AC 617
21 Feb 1979
HL
Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Scarman
Defamation, Crime, Ecclesiastical
The appellants challenged their conviction for blasphemous libel. They had published a poem which described homosexual acts carried out on the body of Christ after his death. Held: For a conviction, it was necessary to show that the defendant had published the material, and that it was of the necessary character, namely that it vilified Christ in his life and crucifixion. It was not necessary to show that the defendant intended the blasphemy. A blasphemous libel is a publication of material calculated to shock or outrage the feelings of Christians. There is no need to show additionally a tendency to cause a breach of the peace.
Lord Scarman gave the rationale for the existence of an offence of blasphemy: "I do not subscribe to the view that the common law offence of blasphemous libel serves no useful purpose in the modern law. On the contrary, I think there is a case for legislation extending it to protect the religious beliefs and feelings of non-Christians. The offence belongs to a group of criminal offences designed to safeguard the internal tranquillity of the kingdom. In an increasingly plural society such as that of modern Britain it is necessary not only to respect the differing religious beliefs, feelings and practices of all but also to protect them from scurrility, vilification, ridicule and contempt . . I will not lend my voice to a view of the law relating to blasphemous libel which would render it a dead letter, or diminish its efficacy to protect religious feelings from outrage and insult"
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ lip ]
 
Gransaul and Ferreira v The Queen Unreported, 9th April 1979
9 Apr 1979
PC
Lord Salmon
Crime, Commonwealth
(Trinidad and Tobago) The two appellants had been said to have been engaged in a common enterprise to rob a van. The first appellant pointed a pistol at the driver and, according to his account, it went off by accident. Held: The appeals were rejected. Lord Salmon: "In the Court of Appeal, the first argument on behalf of the appellants was that the learned trial judge had erred in his summing up in that he had directed the jury that even if the first appellant, whilst engaged in a robbery which involved violence, had accidentally shot the driver, he would in law be guilty of murder. According to this argument, the learned judge ought to have directed the jury that if the shooting had been accidental, they should return a verdict of manslaughter. The Court of Appeal, rightly, in their Lordships' opinion, rejected that argument."
1 Citers


 
z 6538/74; (1979) 2 EHRR 245; [1979] ECHR 1
26 Apr 1979
ECHR
G Balladore Pallieri, President
Human Rights, Crime, Media
The court considered the meaning of the need for an offence to be 'in accordance with law.' Held: "In the Court's opinion, the following are two of the requirements that flow from the expression 'prescribed by law'. First, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. Those consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice."
and "Where there has been an interference with the Art. 10(1) right, it is not sufficient that its subject-matter fell within a particular category or was caught by a legal rule formulated in general or absolute terms; the Court has to be satisfied that the interference was necessary having regard to the facts and circumstances prevailing in the specific case before it".
Article 10(1) confers not only the right to "impart" information and ideas but also the right to "receive" them.
Article 10(2) specifically identifies "maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary" as a legitimate aim which may justify interference with freedom of expression. The phrase has a wide scope . .
The term 'judiciary' ('pouvoir judiciaire') comprises the machinery of justice or the judicial branch of government as well as the judges in their official capacity. The phrase 'authority of the judiciary' includes, in particular, the notion that the courts are, and are accepted by the public at large as being, the proper forum for the ascertainment of legal rights and obligations and the settlement of disputes relative thereto; further, that the public at large have respect for and confidence in the courts' capacity to fulfil that function."
and "The Court would reiterate its opinion that the phrase 'in accordance with the law' does not merely refer back to domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention. The phrase thus implies - and this follows from the object and purpose of Article 8 - that there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1. Especially, where a power of the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. Undoubtedly, as the Government rightly suggested, the requirements of the Convention, notably in regard to foreseeability, cannot be exactly the same in the special context of interception of communications for the purposes of police investigations as they are where the object of the relevant law is to place restrictions on the conduct of individuals. In particular, the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly. Nevertheless, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence."
European Convention on Human Rights 10
1 Citers

[ Worldlii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Lee Chow Meng alias Koh Loh Meng alias Lim Peng Hun v The Public Prosecutor; PC 10-May-1979 - [1979] UKPC 20; [1979] Crim LR 465; [1979] 1 WLR 1463
 
Boyne v Her Majesty's Advocate [1979] ScotHC HCJAC - 2
13 Jul 1979
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Sang; HL 25-Jul-1979 - [1980] AC 402; [1979] UKHL 3; [1979] 3 WLR 263; [1979] 2 All ER 1222; (1979) 69 Cr App R 282
 
Allan v Patterson [1979] ScotHC HCJ - 1
24 Oct 1979
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Criminal proceedings against Joseph Danis and others C-16/79
6 Nov 1979
ECJ

European, Agriculture, Crime
Agricultural price freeze.

 
Regina v Maurice Donald Henn and John Frederick Ernest Darby C-34/79
14 Dec 1979
ECJ

European, Crime, Commercial
Europa Article 30 of the EEC treaty applies also to prohibitions on imports inasmuch as they are the most extreme form of restriction. The expression used in article 30 must therefore be understood as being the equivalent of the expression ' ' prohibitions or restrictions on imports ' ' occurring in article 36. Hence a law of a member state prohibiting any importation of pornographic articles into that state constitutes a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of article 30 of the treaty. Under the first sentence of article 36 of the EEC treaty it is in principle for each member state to determine in accordance with its own scale of values and in the form selected by it the requirements of public morality in its territory. Each member state is entitled to impose prohibitions on imports justified on grounds of public morality for the whole of its territory, as defined in article 227 of the treaty, whatever the structure of its constitution may be and however the powers of legislating in regard to the subject in question may be distributed. The fact that certain differences exist between the laws enforced in the different constituent parts of a member state does not thereby prevent that state from applying a unitary concept in regard to prohibitions on imports imposed, on grounds of public morality, on trade with other member states. The first sentence of article 36 upon its true construction thus means that a member state may, in principle, lawfully impose prohibitions on the importation from any other member state of articles which are of an indecent or obscene character as understood by its domestic laws. Such prohibitions may lawfully be applied to the whole of its national territory even if, in regard to the field in question, variations exist between the laws in force in the different constituent parts of the member state concerned. The second sentence of article 36 of the EEC treaty is designed to prevent restrictions on trade based on the grounds mentioned in the first sentence of that article from being diverted from their proper purpose and used in such a way as either to create discrimination in respect of goods originating in other member states or indirectly to protect certain national products. If a prohibition on the importation of goods is justifiable on grounds of public morality and if it is imposed with that purpose the enforcement of that prohibition cannot, in the absence within the member state concerned of a lawful trade in the same goods, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade contrary to article 36 of the EEC treaty. In so far as a member state avails itself of the reservation relating to the protection of public morality provided for in article 36 of the EEC treaty, the provisions of article 234 of that treaty do not preclude that state from fulfilling the obligations arising from the Geneva convention, 1923, for the suppression of traffic in obscene publications and from the universal postal convention (renewed at Lausanne in 1974, which came into force on 1 January 1976).
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Maurice Donald Henn And John Frederick Ernest Darby. R-34/79; [1979] EUECJ R-34/79
14 Dec 1979
ECJ

European, Crime
Europa Article 30 of the EEC Treaty applies also to prohibitions on imports inasmuch as they are the most extreme form of restriction. The expression used in article 30 must therefore be understood as being the equivalent of the expression " prohibitions or restrictions on imports " occurring in article 36. Hence a law of a member state prohibiting any importation of pornographic articles into that state constitutes a quantitative restriction on imports within the meaning of article 30 of the Treaty.
Under the first sentence of article 36 of the eec treaty it is in principle for each member state to determine in accordance with its own scale of values and in the form selected by it the requirements of public morality in its territory.
Each member state is entitled to impose prohibitions on imports justified on grounds of public morality for the whole of its territory, as defined in article 227 of the treaty, whatever the structure of its constitution may be and however the powers of legislating in regard to the subject in question may be distributed. The fact that certain differences exist between the laws enforced in the different constituent parts of a member state does not thereby prevent that state from applying a unitary concept in regard to prohibitions on imports imposed, on grounds of public morality, on trade with other member states.
The first sentence of article 36 upon its true construction thus means that a member state may, in principle, lawfully impose prohibitions on the importation from any other member state of articles which are of an indecent or obscene character as understood by its domestic laws. Such prohibitions may lawfully be applied to the whole of its national territory even if, in regard to the field in question, variations exist between the laws in force in the different constituent parts of the member state concerned.
The second sentence of article 36 of the eec treaty is designed to prevent restrictions on trade based on the grounds mentioned in the first sentence of that article from being diverted from their proper purpose and used in such a way as either to create discrimination in respect of goods originating in other member states or indirectly to protect certain national products.
If a prohibition on the importation of goods is justifiable on grounds of public morality and if it is imposed with that purpose the enforcement of that prohibition cannot, in the absence within the member state concerned of a lawful trade in the same goods, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade contrary to article 36 of the EEC Treaty.
In so far as a member state avails itself of the reservation relating to the protection of public morality provided for in article 36 of the eec treaty, the provisions of article 234 of that treaty do not preclude that state from fulfilling the obligations arising from the geneva convention, 1923, for the suppression of traffic in obscene publications and from the universal postal convention (renewed at lausanne in 1974, which came into force on 1 January 1976).
[ Bailii ]
 
Copyright 2014 David Swarbrick, 10 Halifax Road, Brighouse, West Yorkshire HD6 2AG.