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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Commonwealth - From: 1990 To: 1990

This page lists 55 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.

 
Holmes v Holmes (1990) FLC 92-181
1990

Cohen J
Family, Commonwealth
(Australia) Cohen J considered the distribution of assets (in particular a lottery win) on divorce, saying: "Yet, ignoring any contribution to the price of the winning ticket, this part of the winnings was brought into the pool of family assets by the wife, and no contribution to it was made by the husband" Rather than regarding the win automatically as though there was no contribution by either party, concluded that a windfall must be looked at in all of the circumstances; in particular to have regard to the effort made by a party to achieve the windfall, as well as the timing of the windfall.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Stingel; HCA 1990 - (1990) 171 CLR 312
 
De Garis v Nevill Jeffress Pidler Pty Ltd (1990) 18 IPR 292
1990

Beaumont J
Commonwealth, Intellectual Property
(High Court of Australia) The court considered the defence of criticism and review to a charge of coyright infringement. Held: The court should start with a dictionary definition.
1 Citers


 
India Cement Ltd v State of Tamil Nadu (1990) 1 SCC 12
1990


Commonwealth
(Supreme Court of India) The court found that it had jurisdiction to make rulings of retrospective effect only. Non-retroactive effect may be given to a ruling which decides an issue for the first time.
1 Citers


 
Rangarajan v Jagjivan Ram [1990] LRC (Const) 412
1990

J Shetty
Constitutional, Commonwealth
Democracy is a government by the people via open discussion. The democratic form of government itself demands of its citizens an active and intelligent participation in the affairs of the community. The public discussion with people’s participation is a basic feature and a rational price of democracy which distinguishes it from all other forms of government.
1 Citers


 
Thompson Newspapers Ltd v Director of Investigation and Research (1990) 54 CCC 417
1990

Justice La Forest
Commonwealth, Litigation Practice
(Supreme Court of Canada) The court considered a claim to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination. Held: Whereas a compelled statement is evidence that would not have existed independently of the exercise of the powers of compulsion, evidence which exists independently of the compelled statements could have been found by other means and its quality does not depend on its past connection with the compelled statement. Accordingly evidence of the latter type is in no sense "testimonial" and PSI ought not to attach to it.
Justice La Forest: "there is an important difference between the type of prejudice that will be suffered in the two cases. It is only when the testimony itself has to be relied on that the accused can be said to have been forced to actually create self-incriminatory evidence in his or her own trial. The compelled testimony is evidence that simply would not have existed independently of the exercise of the power to compel it; it is in this sense evidence which could have been obtained only from the accused.
By contrast, evidence derived from compelled testimony is, by definition, evidence that existed independently of the compelled testimony. This follows logically from the fact that it was evidence which was found, identified or understood as a result of the 'clues' provided by the compelled testimony. Although such evidence may have gone undetected or unappreciated in the absence of the compelled clues, going undetected or unappreciated is not the same thing as non-existence. The mere fact that the derivative evidence existed independently of the compelled testimony means that it could have been found by some other means, however low the probability of such discovery may have been . . . the difference between evidence which the accused has been forced to create (the compelled testimony), and the independently existing evidence he or she has been forced to assist in locating, identifying or explaining (evidence derived from compelled testimony), will be readily discernible. I believe its significance will be equally apparent.
The fact that derivative evidence exists independently of the compelled testimony means, as I have explained, that it could also have been discovered independently of any reliance on the compelled testimony. It also means that its quality as evidence does not depend on its past connection with the compelled testimony. Its relevance to the issues with which the subsequent trial is concerned, as well as the weight it is accorded by the trier of fact, are matters that can be determined independently of any consideration of its connection with the testimony of the accused.. . . What prejudice can an accused be said to suffer from being forced to confront evidence 'derived' from his or her compelled testimony, if that accused would have had to confront it even if the power to compel testimony had not been used against him or her? I do not think it can be said that the use of such evidence would be equivalent to forcing the accused to speak against himself or herself; once the derivative evidence is found or identified, its relevance and probative weight speak for themselves. The fact that such evidence was found through the evidence of the accused in no way strengthens the bearing that it, taken by itself, can have upon the questions before the trier of fact." and
"In my view, derivative evidence that could not have been found or appreciated except as a result of the compelled testimony under the Act should in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion be excluded since its admission would violate the principles of fundamental justice. As will be evident from what I have stated earlier, I do not think such exclusion should take place if the evidence would otherwise have been found and its relevance understood. There is nothing unfair in admitting relevant evidence of this kind ...""
. . . In our judgment, the answer to the question posed by the Attorney General is "No". We say that for a number of reasons. First, there is no doubt, and indeed it is not disputed before this court, that the privilege against self-incrimination is not absolute and in English law Parliament has, for a variety of reasons, in a whole range of different statutory contexts, made inroads upon that privilege.
So far as the English courts are concerned, there is, as it seems to us, no doubt that the documents to which we have referred would be regarded as admissible as a matter of law, subject of course to the trial judge's discretion to exclude under section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
The question which next arises is whether, in deference to the Strasbourg jurisprudence, this court should give a different answer to that which the English courts and the will of Parliament otherwise suggest. It seems to us that the distinction made in paragraphs 68 and 69 of the European Court of Human Rights's judgment in Saunders's case 23 EHRR 313, between statements made and other material independent of the making of a statement, is not only one to which we should have regard, but is one which, as it seems to us, is jurisprudentially sound. We say this for the reasons advanced in the judgment of La Forest J in the Thomson Newspapers case 67 DLR (4th) 161 which, via reference to the South African constitutional court's decision in Ferreira v Levin 1996 (1) SA 984, was before the European Court in Saunders's case. In our judgment, there is nothing in any of the speeches in Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 which contradicts this conclusion. The Privy Council were seeking to limit the scope of the privilege against self-incriminating statements and pre-existing documents revealed by compelled statements were outwith their consideration."
1 Citers


 
Manjang v Drammeh [1990] 61 PandCR 194
1990
PC
Lord Oliver
Commonwealth, Land
The owner of a strip of land alongside the River Gambia and which was "regularly and without inconvenience" accessed by his customers from the river failed in a contention that his land was "landlocked" so as to give him a way of necessity over adjoining land to the public highway. Held: Lord Oliver explained the principle underlying the grant of a right of way of necessity by implication: "It seems hardly necessary to state the essentials for the implication of such an easement. There has to be found, first, a common owner of a legal estate in two plots of land. It has, secondly, to be established that access between one of those plots and the public highway can be obtained only over the other plot. Thirdly, there has to be found a disposition of one of the plots without any specific grant or reservation of a right of access. Given these conditions, it may be possible as a matter of construction of the relevant grant (see Nickerson v Barraclough) to imply the reservation of an easement of necessity."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Wright and Advertiser Newspapers Limited v Lewis (1990) 53 SASR 416; [1990] Aust Torts Reports 81-026
1990

King CJ
Commonwealth, Constitutional, Defamation
(Supreme Court of South Australia) L, a member of the South Australia House of Assembly, alleged in the House that W had obtained an advantage from his close association with a former Government. W wrote to the newspaper, which published it, accusing L of abusing parliamentary privilege and of cheap political opportunism. L said the letter was libelous. W pleaded justification, qualified privilege and fair comment. L's integrity in making statements in the House was determinative of the action: the letter was plainly defamatory and unless the defendants could challenge the truthfulness of what the plaintiff had said in Parliament, they had no defence. Held. King CJ set out the result of allowing the action without such evidence: "It must be observed at the outset that if the view argued for by counsel for the Attorney-General and the plaintiff is correct, the result is remarkable. A Member of Parliament could sue for defamation in respect of criticism of his statements or conduct in the Parliament. The defendant would be precluded, however, from alleging and proving that what was said by way of criticism was true. This would amount to a gross distortion of the law of defamation in its application to such a situation. Defamation in law is by definition an untrue imputation against the reputation of another. . . If the defendant were precluded from proving the truth of what is alleged, the Member of Parliament would be enabled to recover damages, if no other defence applied, for an imputation which was perfectly true. Moreover the defence of fair comment would often be unavailable, as in the present case, because it would not be permissible to prove the factual foundation for the expression of opinion. The defence of qualified privilege might be seriously inhibited because the defendant would be prevented from answering an allegation of express malice by proving the facts as known to him. If this is the true legal position, it is difficult to envisage how a court could apply the law of defamation in a rational way to an action by a Member of Parliament in respect of an imputation relating to his statements or conduct in the House, or could try such an action fairly or adjudicate upon it justly.
If on the other hand such an action is not justiciable, other difficulties and injustices arise.
. . A Member of Parliament would be deprived of the ordinary right of a citizen to obtain damages for defamation in such circumstances notwithstanding , the privilege being that of the Parliament not of the member, that he might be quite willing to have all the ordinary defences put forward and adjudicated upon by the court."
The Court held limited parliamentary privilege does to exclude challenges to the truth or bona fides of statements made in Parliament where the maker of the statements himself initiates the proceedings. Such a limitation on normal parliamentary privilege would not inhibit the member from exercising his freedom of speech "because he would be aware that his actions and motives could not be examined in court unless he instituted the proceedings which rendered such examination necessary".
1 Citers


 
Lim Boon Neov Arumugam Administrator of The Estate of Perumal Ramayee [1990] UKPC 1
22 Jan 1990
PC

Commonwealth
Singapore
[ Bailii ]
 
Hector v The Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda, The Commissioner of Police And, Samuel Barzey, Additional Magistrate District 'A' Co [1990] UKPC 3
22 Jan 1990
PC

Commonwealth
(Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court)
[ Bailii ]
 
Ebanks and Ebanks v Borden (As Joint Administratrix of The Estate of Henry London Ebanks - Deceased) Co [1990] UKPC 4
29 Jan 1990
PC

Commonwealth
Cayman Islands
[ Bailii ]

 
 Post Investments Pty Ltd v Wilson; 1-Feb-1990 - (1990) 26 NSWR 598
 
Fazal Mohammed V. The State Co (Trinidad and Tobago) [1990] UKPC 5
5 Feb 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Howe Yoon Chong v The Chief Assessor and The Comptroller of Property Tax Co [1990] UKPC 7
6 Feb 1990
PC

Commonwealth
Singapore
[ Bailii ]
 
Mok Wei Tak And, Mok Chiu Yee Man V. The Queen Co (Hong Kong) [1990] UKPC 8
6 Feb 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Bbmb Finance (Hong Kong) Ltd (Formally Known As Bumiputra Malaysia Finance Ltd) V. Eda Holdings Ltd (In Liquidation), Inland Realty Ltd (In Liquidation), Food Finance Ltd (In Liquidation) Co (Hong Kong) [1990] UKPC 6
6 Feb 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
France and Bryant v Kennedy Alphonse Simmonds Co [1990] UKPC 10
20 Feb 1990
PC

Commonwealth
St. Christopher and Nevis
[ Bailii ]

 
 Lee Ting Sang v Chung Chi-Keung; PC 8-Mar-1990 - [1990] ICR 409; [1990] 2 AC 374; [1990] UKPC 1; [1990] UKPC 9; [1990] IRLR 236
 
Markfaith Investment Ltd V. Chip Hua Flashlights Ltd Co (Hong Kong) [1990] UKPC 11
8 Mar 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Llewellyn Da Costa V. The Queen Co (Jamaica) [1990] UKPC 12
21 Mar 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Cunningham v Montreal Trust (Bermuda) Ltd And, The Bank of Butterfield Executor and Trustee Co Ltd Co [1990] UKPC 14
26 Mar 1990
PC

Commonwealth
(Bermuda)
[ Bailii ]
 
Samad Ramoly V. The Queen Co (Mauritius) [1990] UKPC 13
26 Mar 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Mason v Desnoes and Geddes Ltd [1990] 2 AC 729; [1990] UKPC 15
2 Apr 1990
PC

Commonwealth, Litigation Practice
(Jamaica) A section enabled the Court to set aside a judgment where a party had not appeared at the trial. Held: The reference to "the Court or a Judge" made it clear that the jurisdiction may be exercised by a judge in chambers and: "…the application to set aside a default judgment is not the invocation of an appellate jurisdiction but of a specific rule enabling the court to set aside its own orders in certain circumstances where the action has never been heard on the merits."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Lancelot St. Elmo Balbosa V. Ayoub Ali Co (Trinidad and Tobago) [1990] UKPC 16
2 Apr 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
The Minister of Housing and National Insurance And, The Attorney General of The Commonweal and Bahamas V. Frederick R.M. Smith Co (Bahamas) [1990] UKPC 17
5 Apr 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Chase Manhattan Asia Ltd V. The Official Receiver and Liquidator of First Bangkok City Finance Ltd Co (Hong Kong) [1990] UKPC 20
30 Apr 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Luvinia Baird (Legal Personal Representative of The Estate of Milton Baird) V. Dickson Baird Co (Trinidad and Tobago) [1990] UKPC 21
30 Apr 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Warshaw, Gillings and Adler v Drew Co [1990] UKPC 22
21 May 1990
PC

Commonwealth
(Jamaica)
[ Bailii ]
 
Kuwait Asia Bank E.C. V. National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd Co (New Zealand) [1990] UKPC 23
21 May 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Pradeep Heerraman V. The Queen Co (Mauritius) [1990] UKPC 25
23 May 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Kevin Francis Meates And, Rowe and Co (New Zealand) Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp Ltd And, The Attorney General for New Zealand Co (New Zealand) [1990] UKPC 27
5 Jun 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Wakely (1990) 93 ALR 79; (1990) 64 ALJR 321
7 Jun 1990

Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ
Commonwealth, Crime
(High Court of Australia) The defendants appealed against their convictions, saying that their cross examinations had been improperly restricted by the judge at trial. Held: The court considered the limit of permissible cross-examination.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Elders Pastoral Ltd v The Bank of New Zealand Co [1990] UKPC 29
18 Jun 1990
PC

Commonwealth
(New Zealand)
[ Bailii ]
 
Junious C. Morgan V. The Attorney General Co (Jamaica) [1990] UKPC 28
18 Jun 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Albyn Henry Stewart V. James Borthwick Welch Co (New Zealand) [1990] UKPC 30
2 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
John Patrick Hickey V. The General Medical Council Co (The Professional Committee of The General Medical Council) [1990] UKPC 32
5 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Bi-Flex Caribbean Ltd V. The Board of Inland Revenue Co (Trinidad and Tobago) [1990] UKPC 35
23 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue V. Databank Systems Ltd Co (New Zealand) [1990] UKPC 37
23 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Herbert Wellesley Eldemire v Arthur Wellesley Eldemire and Arthur Wellesley Eldemire v Herbert Wellesley Eldemire Co (Jamaica) [1990] UKPC 36
23 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Leslie John Holt v Juliet Elizabeth Holt Co [1990] UKPC 34
23 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth
(New Zealand)
[ Bailii ]
 
M.O. Nazir V. A.A. Bundhoo Co (Mauritius) [1990] UKPC 33
23 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Republic Resources Ltd V. Nzi Leasing Corp Ltd Co (New Zealand) [1990] UKPC 39
25 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Tricanipillay Canarapen v Jubilee Insurance Co Ltd Co [1990] UKPC 38
25 Jul 1990
PC

Commonwealth
(Mauritius)
[ Bailii ]
 
Motor and General Insurance Co Ltd V. Dorothy Cox And, Sandra Cox Co (Barbados) [1990] UKPC 40
2 Oct 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Abdool Cader Abdool Gaffoor V. The Queen Co (Mauritius) [1990] UKPC 41
2 Oct 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Cheung Ying-Lun V. Government of Australia And, Superintendent Lai Chi Kok Reception Centre (Hong Kong) [1990] UKPC 43
5 Oct 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue V. Hang Seng Bank Ltd Co (Hong Kong) [1990] UKPC 42
8 Oct 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Elders Pastoral Ltd v The Bank of New Zealand Co [1990] UKPC 45
22 Oct 1990
PC

Commonwealth
(New Zealand)
[ Bailii ]
 
Hadsphaltic International Ltd v Tower Corp Ltd And, Maples and Calder Co [1990] UKPC 46
29 Oct 1990
PC

Commonwealth
Channel Islands
[ Bailii ]
 
George Hugh Kevin Brown V. The General Dental Council Co (The Professional Committee of The General Dental Council) [1990] UKPC 47
30 Oct 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Alhaji Bora Manjang V. Kebba Drammeh Co (Gambia) [1990] UKPC 50
13 Nov 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Endell Thomas V. The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago Co (Trinidad and Tobago) [1990] UKPC 49
13 Nov 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Waylee Investment Ltd V. The Commissioner of Inland Revenue Co (Hong Kong) [1990] UKPC 48
13 Nov 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
Apple Fields Ltd And, Styx Mill Orchard Partnership No.6 v The New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board And, New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation Co (New Zealand) [1990] UKPC 51
3 Dec 1990
PC

Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
The Chase Manhattan Bank And, Robert Stewart Kirby v The Sanitary Laundry Co Ltd Co [1990] UKPC 52
17 Dec 1990
PC

Commonwealth
Barbados
[ Bailii ]
 
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