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Attorney General v De Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd: HL 10 May 1920

A hotel had been requisitioned during the war for defence purposes. The owner claimed compensation. The AG argued that the liability to pay compensation had been displaced by statute giving the Crown the necessary powers.
Held: There is an established general principle, of high constitutional importance, that there is no common law power to take or confiscate property without compensation. The powers of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council are now governed by the Acts of 1833 and 1844 which must be recognised as superseding the royal prerogative. In the exercise of the War Prerogative the Crown’s power to requisition property had been limited by Defence Act 1842 so as to require compensation to be paid to the subject.
Lord Parmoor said: ‘The growth of constitutional liberties has largely consisted in the reduction of the discretionary power of the executive, and in the extension of Parliamentary protection in favour of the subject, under a series of statutory enactments. The result is that, whereas at one time the Royal Prerogative gave legal sanction to a large majority of the executive functions of the Government, it is now restricted within comparatively narrow limits. The Royal Prerogative has of necessity been gradually curtailed, as a settled rule of law has taken the place of an uncertain and arbitrary administrative discretion.’
. . And ‘The constitutional principle is that when the power of the Executive to interfere with the property or liberty of subjects has been placed under Parliamentary control, and directly regulated by statute, the Executive no longer derives its authority from the Royal Prerogative of the Crown but from Parliament, and that in exercising such authority the Executive is bound to observe the restrictions which Parliament has imposed in favour of the subject.’
Lord Dunedin discussed when the prerogative is overtaken by statute: ‘it is equally certain that if the whole ground of something which could be done by the prerogative is covered by the statute, it is the statute that rules. On this point I think the observation of the learned Master of the Rolls is unanswerable. He says: ‘What use would there be in imposing limitations, if the Crown could at its pleasure disregard them and fall back on prerogative?”
. . And ‘In as much as the Crown is a party to every Act of Parliament it is logical enough to consider that when the Act deals with something which before the Act could be effected by the prerogative, and specially empowers the Crown to do the same thing, but subject to conditions, the Crown assents to that, and by that Act, to the prerogative being curtailed.’

Lord Dunedin, Lord Parmoor, Lord Atkinson
[1920] AC 508, [1920] UKHL 1, [1920] All ER 80, (1920) 36 TLR 600, (1920) 122 LT 691, [1920] UKHL 757
Bailii, Bailii
Defence Act 1842
England and Wales
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Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Constitutional, Damages

Leading Case

Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.180896

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