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Defamation - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 47 cases, and was prepared on 27 May 2018.

 
Vizetelly v Mudie's Select Library [1900] 2 QB 170
1900

Romer LJ
Defamation
The court was asked about the liability in defamation of a circulating library who provided books to subscribers, in this case about the book on Stanley's search for Emir Pasha in Africa.
1 Citers


 
Malcolm v Moore (1901) 4 F 23
1901


Defamation

1 Citers


 
Dauncey v Holloway [1901] 2 KB 441
1901
CA
AL Smith MR
Defamation
The court was asked whether a slander conveyed an imputation on the plaintiff in his business as a solicitor and was therefore actionable in the absence of proof of special damage. Held: AL Smith MR said: "The words do not, in my opinion, reasonably convey any imputation of impropriety or misconduct on the part of the plaintiff in relation to or in connection with his profession or business, or of unfitness to carry on his business in a proper and satisfactory manner. To my mind the two expressions – that the plaintiff has gone for thousands or has lost thousands – mean very much the same thing, namely, that the plaintiff has lost a considerable sum of money. It would not be reasonable to say that they [the words complained of] impute to him any want of capacity to carry on the business or profession of a solicitor."
1 Citers



 
 McQuire v Western Morning News Co Ltd; CA 1903 - [1903] 2 KB 100
 
Joynt v Cycle Trade Publishing Co [1904] 2KB 292
1904

Kennedy J
Defamation
Kennedy J: "To sum it up, no doubt very imperfectly, it represents to my mind this - that the comment must be such that a fair mind would use under the circumstances, and it must not misstate facts, because a comment cannot be fair which is built upon facts which are not truly stated, and further, it must not convey imputations of an evil sort, except so far as the facts truly stated warrant the imputation".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
AB v CD [1904] ScotCS CSIH_6; (1904) 7 F 22; (1904) 12 SLT 395
1 Nov 1904
SCS
Lord Young
Scotland, Defamation
Lord Young said: "everyone giving evidence in a Court of justice, being admissible as a witness, and answering the questions which are properly put to him, which those allowed by the Court are presumed to be, is privileged, and that it is in the interests of justice, and the public for whom justice is administered, that he should not give his answers under any apprehension of being liable to an action of damages should his evidence be defamatory of anyone, whether a party to the action or not. The ground upon which that rule of law is founded your Lordship has explained, and it is indeed obvious. It is in the interests of the public that the truth should be ascertained in a Court of justice, and that witnesses should give their evidence without any such apprehension or fear."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Watson v M'Ewan [1905] AC 480; [1905] UKHL 1; (1905) 13 SLT 340; (1905) 7 F (HL) 109
1905
HL
Earl of Halsbury LC, James, Robertson LL
Litigation Practice, Defamation, Scotland
A claim was brought against a medical witness in respect of statements made in preparation of a witness statement and similar statements subsequently made in court. The appellant was a doctor of medicine who had been retained by the respondent in respect of proposed proceedings against her husband for separation and aliment. He was later instructed by the husband in the same proceedings. In preparing his witness statement he included some very damaging allegations based on matters that he had learned when acting for the wife, which included allegations of taking morphine and planning to procure an abortion. He subsequently gave oral evidence of these matters in the court proceedings. The wife brought an action against him for breach of confidence and for slander, relying on both what was said to the husband's lawyers and what was said in court. Held: The appellant was immune. In respect of the indemnity given to witnesses, the phrase 'in office' can only refer to giving evidence. The only qualification to this is a prosecution for perjury or, possibly, an attempt to pervert the course of justice.
The public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice must also and as a necessary consequence extend to the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove. The privilege surrounding evidence actually given in a Court of Justice necessarily involves the same privilege in the case of making a statement to a solicitor and other persons who are engaged in the conduct of proceedings in Courts of Justice when what is intended to be stated in the court is narrated to them.
Earl of Halsbury LC said: "The broad proposition I entertain no doubt about, and it seems to me to be the only question that properly arises here; as to the immunity of a witness for evidence given in a court of justice, it is too late to argue that as if it were doubtful. By complete authority, including the authority of this House, it has been decided that the privilege of a witness, the immunity from responsibility in an action when evidence has been given by him in a court of justice, is too well established now to be shaken. Practically I may say that in my view it is absolutely unarguable - it is settled law and cannot be doubted. The remedy against a witness who has given evidence which is false and injurious to another is to indict him for perjury; but for very obvious reasons, the conduct of legal procedure by courts of justice, with the necessity of compelling witnesses to attend, involves as one of the necessities of the administration of justice the immunity of witnesses from actions brought against them in respect of evidence they have given. So far the matter, I think, is too plain for argument."
He continued: "It appears to me that the privilege which surrounds the evidence actually given in a Court of justice necessarily involves the same privilege in the case of making a statement to a solicitor and other persons who are engaged in the conduct of proceedings in Courts of justice when what is intended to be stated in a Court of justice is narrated to them - that is, to the solicitor or writer to the Signet. If it were otherwise, I think what one of the learned counsel has with great cogency pointed out would apply - that from time to time in these various efforts which have been made to make actual witnesses responsible in the shape of an action against them for the evidence they have given, the difficulty in the way of those who were bringing the action would have been removed at once by saying, 'I do not bring the action against you for what you said in the witness-box, but I bring the action against you for what you told the solicitor you were about to say in the witness-box.' If that could be done the object for which the privilege exists is gone, because then no witness could be called; no one would know whether what he was going to say was relevant to the question in debate between the parties. A witness would only have to say, 'I shall not tell you anything; I may have an action brought against me tomorrow if I do; therefore I shall not give you any information at all.' It is very obvious that the public policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice must as a necessary consequence involve that which is a step towards and is part of the administration of justice - namely, the preliminary examination of witnesses to find out what they can prove. It may be that to some extent it seems to impose a hardship, but after all the hardship is not to be compared with that which would arise if it were impossible to administer justice, because people would be afraid to give their testimony."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Watson v M'Ewan [1905] AC 480
1905


Defamation

1 Citers



 
 Stretton v Stubbs Ltd; CA 28-Feb-1905 - Times, 28 February 1905

 
 Watson v Daily Record Ltd; CA 1907 - [1907] 1 KB 853
 
Plymouth Mutual Co-operative Soceiety and Industrial Society Ltd v Traders' Publishing Organisation [1908] 1 KB 403
1908

Vaughan Williams LJ
Defamation
Interrogatories in defamation proceedings will not be allowed to request from a newspaper the source of the journalist's information where there may be considerable public interest.
1 Citers



 
 Hunt v Star Newspaper Co Ltd; CA 1908 - [1908] 2 KB 309
 
Bottomley v Brougham [1908] 1 KB 584
1908

Channell J
Legal Professions, Insolvency, Defamation
The official receiver is acting in a judicial capacity in making his report and his further report and in conducting the examination under that further report. A judge is privileged from inquiry as to whether he is malicious. Channell J considered whether the OR in carrying out investigative functions came within the doctrine of absolute privilege. He held: "I think, in the first place, that the official receiver has a statutory duty to inquire in a judicial way into certain matters by the Act of 1890, and that in performing that duty he is acting in a judicial capacity. It is quite true that the report is made ex parte, but that makes no difference. A judge in hearing an ex parte application is still acting as a judge, and the absolute privilege applies quite as much as when he is hearing a case in which both parties appear. The fact that this was a preliminary inquiry equally does not prevent it being a judicial enquiry. An inquiry before a magistrate on a charge of murder, for instance, which he has certainly no power to deal with, and as to which he is only inquiring in a preliminary way whether there is a case for committing the accused person for trial, is clearly a judicial proceeding although it is preliminary to trial. It is strongly contended on the part of the plaintiff that there is mischief and danger in allowing absolute privilege in this case, because it is an ex parte statement, and the person against whom the charge is made has no opportunity of meeting it; it appears to me, however, that the answer to that is the very fact that it is preliminary, and that it does lead to further inquiry upon which that person does have that opportunity of explaining and giving his view of the matter, and that, it being obviously known by anybody who sees or reads the report of the official receiver that, qua report, it will lead to future proceedings in which the report may be entirely displaced, that really prevents any serious mischief arising from applying this doctrine to such a proceeding as this. I think, therefore, that this report may be considered to be absolutely privileged on the footing of its being the judgment of a judicial officer upon a matter entrusted to him for inquiry".
However Channell J went on to give an alternative ground for holding that the OR attracted absolute privilege which proceeded on the arguably opposite premise that the function which the OR was exercising was more analogous to that of a prosecutor than a judge: "But, even if that is not sound, there is the further ground that the report of the official receiver may be treated, not so much as the judgment in a judicial proceeding, but as the initial stage of proceedings in the winding-up Court, which clearly is a Court. It is the information upon which the proceedings take place and it is made by the official receiver under a statutory duty. It seems to me to come within the authority of the case of Lilley v Roney 61 L.J. (Q.B.) 727, and to be a much stronger case, because in that case complaint by a person who considered himself aggrieved by the conduct of a solicitor - a complaint which was the initiation of proceedings before the Law Society - was held to be privileged as being the commencement of proceedings of a legal character. I quite agree that there the privilege was rather the privilege of a litigant than the privilege of the judge; it was the privilege of a man who was starting proceedings. It is perhaps not quite accurate to say the official receiver is in any sense a litigant, but when he comes before the winding-up Court upon the examination no doubt he is, in one sense, a party to the proceedings; he is, as it were, appearing for the prosecution. It is much the same as when the Attorney-General appears upon an information filed by the Attorney-General; he is then a party to the proceedings possibly, not a litigant, and I should say certainly not acting as a judge, but I do not see that that much affects the matter here. In presenting this report the official receiver is informing the Court of alleged matters for inquiry, and so initiating a judicial enquiry; and it seems to me to be entirely analogous to what was held to be absolute privilege in Lilley v Roney, and to be a stronger case. It was done in the course of the performance of a duty imposed upon him in his position of officer of the Court. It is much like the report of an official referee, or someone of that sort, to whom matters are referred to report to the Court. I suppose no one would doubt that those reports were privileged."
1 Citers


 
Mangena v Edward Lloyd Ltd (1908) 98 LT 64; (1908) 24 TLR 610
1908

Darling J
Defamation, Constitutional
The plaintiff claimed in defamation after the defendant had republished an extract from a paper laid before parliament. Held: The 'blue book' reflected material laid before both houses of parliament, and reproduction of it was protected under the 1840 Act.
As to whether the paper had been printed by malice, Darling J referred to an earlier case where a plea of justification had been placed on the record but the defendant at the trial had offered no evidence in support of it. Darling J added: "A plea of justification ought never to be put on the record unless the person believes in it and is prepared to support it with evidence".
Parliamentary Privileges Act 1840 3
1 Citers


 
Dakhyl v Labouchere [1908] 2 KB 325
1908
HL

Defamation
(Note) The plaintiff complained of a publication by the defendant that he was a "quack of the rankest species". Held: Lord Atkinson said that a personal attack could form part of a fair comment on facts stated provided that it was a reasonable inference from those facts.
1 Citers


 
Mangena v Wright [1909] 2 KB 958
1909


Defamation
Where the defamatory allegations are in fact untrue, the defence of fair comment is available only where the occasion was privileged.
1 Citers


 
Jones v E Hulton and Co [1909] 2 KB 444; 26 TLR 128; [1910] AC 20; [1908-10] All ER 29
1909
HL
Farwell CJ, Lord Loreburn LC
Defamation
The defendant newspaper published an article describing the attendance at a motor race at Dieppe. It described the antics, intending to refer to a fictitious person, of one Artemus Jones, and said of him that he was "with a woman who is not his wife, who must be, you know - the other thing!' It added: "Really, is it not surprising how certain of our fellow-countrymen behave when they come abroad? Who would suppose, by his goings on, that he was a churchwarden at Peckham?" The real Artemus Jones was not, of course, a churchwarden at Peckham or anywhere else. He was a barrister on the North Wales Circuit. Held: The claim succeeded. The test was not whether the defendant intended to refer to the plaintiff but whether the words published were understood by reasonable people who knew the plaintiff to refer to him. Defamation is a tort of strict liability and does not depend upon the intention of the publisher.
A witness may be called to testify that they understood, from reading the libel in the light of the facts and circumstances narrated and described, and their acquaintance with, and knowledge of, the claimant, that he was the person referred to.
The meaning of the words intended by the publisher or the absence of any intention to harm the plaintiff is irrelevant to the inquiry as to their meaning to a reader: "A person charged with libel cannot defend himself by showing that he intended in his own breast not to defame, or that he intended not to defame the plaintiff, if in fact he did both." The defendants remedy "is to abstain from defamatory words."
Lord Loreburn LC said: "A person charged with libel cannot defend himself by shewing that he intended in his own breast not to defame, or that he intended not to defame the plaintiff, if in fact he did both. He has none the less imputed something disgraceful and has none the less injured the plaintiff. A man in good faith may publish a libel believing it to be true, and it may be found by the jury that he acted in good faith believing it to be true, and reasonably believing it to be true, but that in fact the statement was false. Under those circumstances he has no defence to the action, however excellent his intention. If the intention of the writer be immaterial in considering whether the matter written is defamatory, I do not see why it need be relevant in considering whether it is defamatory of the plaintiff. The writing, according to the old form, must be malicious, and it must be of and concerning the plaintiff. Just as the defendant could not excuse himself from malice by proving that he wrote it in the most benevolent spirit, so he cannot shew that the libel was not of and concerning the plaintiff by proving that he never heard of the plaintiff."
1 Citers



 
 Clark v Norton; 1910 - [1910] VLR 494

 
 E Hulton and Co v Jones; HL 1910 - [1910] AC 20; [1908-1910] All ER Rep 29; 79 LJKB 198; [1909] 2 KB 444; [1908-10] All ER 29; [1910] AC 20

 
 Clarke v Norton; 1910 - [1910] VLR 494

 
 E Hulton and Co v Jones; HL 1910 - [1910] AC 20; [1908-1910] All ER Rep 29; 79 LJKB 198; [1909] 2 KB 444; [1908-10] All ER 29; [1910] AC 20

 
 Weldon v The Times Book Co Ltd; 1911 - (1911) 28 TLR 143

 
 Browne v Thomson and Co; 1912 - 1912 SC 359

 
 Russell v Stubbs Ltd; CA 1912 - [1913] 2 KB 200

 
 Rex v Blumenfeld, Ex parte Tupper; 1912 - (1912) 28 T L R 308

 
 Barham v Lord Huntingfield; CA 1913 - [1913] 2 KB 193

 
 Russell v Stubbs Limited; HL 1913 - 1913 SC (HL) 13

 
 O'Brien v Eason; 1913 - [1913] 47 Irish LT 266

 
 Adam v Fisher; 1914 - [1914] 39 TLR 288
 
Maisel v Financial Times Ltd (1) (1915) 84 LJKB 2145; (1915) 31 TLR 192; (1915) 112 LT 953
1915
HL

Defamation
The plaintiff company director complained of defamation in the report of his arrest on a charge of fraud. In his Statement of Claim, the plaintiff relied upon an imputation that he was an unfit person to be the director of any company. The newspaper sought to justify the imputation by relying on dishonest acts other than those referred to in the article. The plaintiff moved to strike out those particulars of the justification defence arguing that the defendant could not justify the defamation by matters not referred to in the article. Held: The defendant was entitled to justify that imputation by relying upon a number of other dishonest acts, quite independent of that for which he was said in the matter complained of to have been arrested. It is for the defendant to choose how he wishes to justify his imputation.
1 Citers


 
Maisel v Financial Times Ltd (2) [1915] 3 KB 336
2 Jan 1915
CA
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR, Pickfo
Defamation
Having failed to have the defence of justification struck out in his action for defamation, the plaintiff amended his imputations to include one asserting that “his character and reputation were such that he was likely to have misappropriated funds of companies with which he was connected”. The defendant filed an amended defence pleading justification and relied in its particulars on events which had taken place after the date of publication of the matter complained of. The plaintiff sought to strike out the particulars of post-publication facts. Held: He was unsuccessful.
Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said: "In a general allegation by way of justification of general character and general tendency, which are the only words I can think of at the moment as the meaning of the word ‘likely’, I do not see how you can exclude events which happen, I will not say years later, but within a reasonable time from the date of the publications. I instance a case which seems to me to be rather analogous; an allegation that the plaintiff was addicted to drink and would get drunk if he could. Could you exclude evidence that the day after publication of that libel he had been found suffering from delirium tremens? It seems to me you could not in answer to a general allegation of what the man was likely to have done if he could."
1 Cites



 
 Jones v Jones; HL 1916 - [1916] 2 AC 481; [1916] UKHL 2

 
 Jones v Baird; HL 1916 - [1916] SC(HL) 158

 
 London Association for Protection of Trade v Greenlands Ltd; HL 1916 - [1916] 1 AC 15
 
Langlands v John Leng and Company Limited 1916 SC (HL) 102
1916
HL
Viscount Haldane
Defamation
Complaint was made as to observations made by an architect and said to be defamatory. Held: These had referred to a criticism of the system under which the architect was employed and not to the architect individually.
Viscount Haldane said: "The question which we have to deal with we have to decide as Judges of law. It is whether it is possible, if the language used is read in its ordinary sense, to say that it is such as can reasonably and naturally support the innuendo . . The pursuer must . . when he puts forward his innuendo, put it forward either on the footing that the language taken by itself supports the innuendo, or that there is extrinsic evidence, extrinsic to the libel itself, which shows that that was the sense in which the words were intended to be construed."
1 Citers


 
Morgan v Wallis (1917) 33 Times 495
1917

Darling J
Defamation
(Year?) privilege as between solicitor and client is qualified only, and not absolute.
1 Citers



 
 Adam v Ward; HL 1917 - [1917] AC 309; [1917] AC 309; [1917] All ER 151; [1917] AC 309; [1916-17] All ER 157; 86 LJKB 849
 
Lyle-Samuel v Oldhams Ltd [1920] 1 KB 135; [1918-19] All ER Rep 779
1919

Bankes LJ, Scrutton LJ
Defamation
The rule that in defamation proceedings, a newspaper defendant should not be obliged in interrogatories to disclose the name of an informant is so well established as to be beyond argument. "All I say is that this is an action of libel against the publishers of a newspaper, that it is well established that in the case of newspapers there is an exception to the rule requiring a defendant to disclose the source of his information where he pleads either privilege or fair comment."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1919] 1 KB 520
1919
CA
Bankes LJ
Defamation, Intellectual Property
The exception to the obligation not to disclose confidential information is limited to the proposed or contemplated commission of a crime or a civil wrong.
1 Citers



 
 Myroft v Sleight; 1921 - (1921) 90 LJKB 883
 
Myerson v Smith's Weekly (1923) 24 SR (NSW) 20
1923

Ferguson J
Commonwealth, Defamation
(New South Wales) The court considered the distinction between fact and comment. Ferguson J said: "To say that a man's conduct was dishonourable is not comment, it is a statement of fact. To say that he did certain specific things and that his conduct was dishonourable is a statement of fact coupled with a comment. "
1 Citers



 
 Aga Khan v Times Publishing Co; CA 1924 - [1924] 1 KB 675

 
 Sutherland v Stopes; HL 1925 - [1925] AC 47

 
 Broome v Agar; CA 1928 - (1928) 44 TLR 339
 
More v Weaver [1928] EWCA Civ 1; [1928] 2 KB 520
11 Jul 1928
CA
Scrutton, Lawrence, Greer LJJ
Defamation, Legal Professions
The appellant brought the latest of several actions, this time alleging defamation in letters from the respondent to her own solicitors making certain statements about the appellant. Those letters had become public in the course of the earlier proceedings. The court was now asked whether such correspondence was subject to absolute privilege. Held: This is a case of absolute, not qualified, privilege, and there was no ground for leaving to the jury the question whether the statements complained of were relevant. Swift J. was right in the view he took, and the appeal must be dismissed.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Cassidy v Daily Mirror [1929] 2 KB 331
1929
CA
Russell LJ, Scrutton LJ
Defamation
Words which would not otherwise have been defamatory can become so because of circumstances. The intention of the defendant is irrelevant: "Liability for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamor; but on the fact of defamation."
Scrutton LJ said: "I agree with the view expressed arguendo by Sir Montague Smith in the case of Simmons v. Mitchell (1880) 6 App. Cas. 156, 158.: The Judge must decide if the words are reasonably capable of two meanings; if he so decide, the jury must determine which of the two meanings was intended; and by intended I understand that a man is liable for the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the words he used, whether he foresaw them or not."
1 Citers


 
Hoeppner v Dunkirk Printing 227 NYAD 130 (1929)
1929


International, Defamation
It was held to be defamatory to impute incompetence to a football coach: "While the articles complained of fail to charge the plaintiff with the commission of any crime, or to attack his moral character, the fair inference to be drawn from the language used is that the plaintiff is an inefficient coach, and has failed to properly instruct the team in modern play and in the technique of the game, so that they could successfully meet and compete with other teams in their class . . The law recognises one's right to live and that the majority of people are compelled to earn a living."
1 Citers


 
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