The case concerned whether, under the Act, an incorporeal right of fishing, demised as part of a lease of an hotel, was part of the ‘premises’ for the purpose of the Act.
Held: The standard conveyancing meaning of the word ‘premises’ has long been established as meaning the subject matter of the habendum of the lease. In strict conveyancing language the word ‘premises’ is used as meaning the subject-matter of the habendum in a lease. ‘Premises’ in the vital part of the statute had its strict legal meaning of the subject matter of the habendum of a lease, which would include incorporeal rights. In certain sections ‘premises’ was used in ‘a colloquial sense . . as meaning merely the physical buildings and land which are included in the lease.’
There was no reason to suppose that the expression ‘any premises held under a lease’ in section 17 of the 1927 Act did not include ‘not merely the actual buildings in which trade is carried on, but also the land surrounding them, the easements granted as appurtenant to them, and any other incorporeal hereditaments which may form part of the premises in the strict legal sense of the term which are the subject matter of the habendum.’ Any other construction would defeat the plain purpose of the Act, which was to provide in the circumstances defined in the Act the tenant should have the right to continue to carry on his trade or business in the premises in the legal sense in which he was carrying them on under the lease for which he seeks that renewal.
Judges:
Viscount Hailsham
Citations:
[1930] AC 544
Statutes:
Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 17
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Spring House (Freehold) Ltd v Mount Cook Land Ltd CA 12-Dec-2001
A lease provided against the tenant leaving his goods outside the premises, and the landlords objected to motor vehicles being parked there.
Held: The words had to be interpreted in the light of the intentions of the parties at the time. Motor . .
Cited – Regina v Yuthiwattana CACD 1984
The defendant appealed against his convictions under the 1977 Act.
Held: Under section 1(2) the deprivation of occupation for one day was insufficient. To constitute an offence, the deprivation had to take the character of an eviction. . .
Cited – Pointon York Group Plc v Poulton CA 13-Jul-2006
The lease included a right to use seven designated parking spaces. The parties disputed whether parking space could be occupied in such a way as to be given protection under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954.
Held: A parking space is an . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Landlord and Tenant
Updated: 16 June 2022; Ref: scu.184142