The primary victim suffered an accident in the supermarket car park when a crash barrier which had been poorly maintained came through her windscreen. Her mental state deteriorated and, some months later, she committed suicide by hanging herself. The secondary victim was her husband, who found her hanging body and suffered psychiatric injury. The Court was asked what constituted the shocking event. If it was the original accident, the claim would fail (since the secondary victim never witnessed that); if it was the suicide, the claim could succeed.
Held: The claim was bound to fail.
Even with the benefit of hindsight his injury was not reasonably foreseeable. He cannot bring himself within the category of people who suffer shock as a result of seeing or hearing a tragic event or its immediate aftermath. This is because in my judgement the relevant event for the purposes of this case is the incident with the barrier.
. . . I agree with [counsel for the respondent] that one cannot simply ignore the incident in which injury was actually and negligently caused to the primary victim. Mrs White’s cause of action based on the respondent’s negligence arose at that time. Had Mr White come across the accident and his wife’s car and suffered shock as a result, he would no doubt have had a claim. But he did not. It took a second event six months later for that to happen. This was not a combination of circumstances making up one event or even one series of events of a seamless nature. Nor was there an inexorable progression. The shocking event in this case was a completely distinct event, a second event separated in time and space from the accident. . .
It follows from what I have said that I do not accept that the decision in Walters extends the law in the way that [counsel for the Claimant] might wish. In Walters it is clear from the judgement that the event with which the court was concerned was the fit suffered by the baby and its aftermath. The defendant’s negligence caused the fit, which caused the brain damage, which in turn led to the death. Thus the event or series of events began with the fit, ‘the negligent infliction of damage’ and continued ‘through to the conclusion of its immediate aftermath’. That is why there was, as the court found an inexorable progression from fit to death, which occurred in the mother’s sight and hearing. It was in that context that the court found the claimant succeeded in bringing herself within the class of people with a legitimate claim in law.
As I have indicated, I am not persuaded that Mr White can do the same. He could not have sued for his own personal injury had his wife’s health simply deteriorated after the accident. A distraught parent cannot sue for the progressive assaults upon him or her caused by the despair of looking after a brain-damaged child. Sadly, not all those who suffer can be compensated in damages. It is difficult to see therefore why the law should be extended to cover Mr White’s reaction to his wife’s death simply because six months after the accident it was for him an undoubtedly shocking event.’
Judges:
Hallett J
Citations:
[2005] EWHC 871 (QB)
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Paul and Another v The Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust QBD 4-Jun-2020
Nervous shock – liability to third parties
The claimants witnessed the death of their father from a heart attack. They said that the defendant’s negligent treatment allowed the attack to take place. Difficult point of law about the circumstances in which a defendant who owes a duty of care . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Personal Injury
Updated: 01 December 2022; Ref: scu.651246