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Taylor and Others v Director of The Serious Fraud Office and Others: HL 22 Jan 1998

Taylor_SFOHL1998
References: Times 04-Nov-1998, [1998] UKHL 39, [1999] 2 AC 177, [1998] 4 All ER 801, [1998] 3 WLR 1040
Links: House of Lords, Bailii
Coram: Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Lord Goff of Chieveley, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Hutton
Ratio: The defendant had requested the Isle of Man authorities to investigate the part if any taken by the plaintiff in a major fraud. No charges were brought against the plaintiff, but the documents showing suspicion came to be disclosed in the later trial of others. The plaintiff sought damages in defamation.
Held: The documents which had been prepared for a criminal investigation, and which were disclosed as part of prosecution case, but not relied on in that prosecution, may only be used by defence for the purposes of that trial. They cannot be used to form the basis of an action for defamation. The documents were disclosed under an obligation imposed on the prosecution. The absolute immunity rule ‘is designed to encourage freedom of speech and communication in judicial proceedings by relieving persons who take part in the judicial process from the fear of being sued for something they say.’ The immunity extended also to statements made out of court which could fairly be said to be part of the process of investigating crime. The court referred in this connection to investigators and the prosecuting officials with whom they are required to communicate.
Lord Hope (with whom Lord Hutton agreed) observed: ‘I do not think that it is possible to overstate the importance, in the public interest, of ensuring that material which is disclosed in criminal proceedings is not used for collateral purposes’.
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘I find it impossible to identify any rational principle which would confine the immunity for out of court statements to persons who are subsequently called as witnesses. The policy of the immunity is to enable people to speak freely without fear of being sued, whether successfully or not. If this object is to be achieved, the person in question must know at the time he speaks whether or not the immunity will attach. If it depends upon the contingencies of whether he will be called as a witness, the value of the immunity is destroyed. At the time of the investigation it is often unclear whether any crime has been committed at all. Persons assisting the police with their inquiries may not be able to give any admissible evidence; for example, their information may be hearsay, but none the less valuable for the purposes of the investigation. But the proper administration of justice requires that such people should have the same inducement to speak freely as those whose information subsequently forms the basis of evidence at a trial.
When one turns to the position of investigators, it seems to me that the same degree of necessity applies. It would be an incoherent rule which gave a potential witness immunity in respect of the statements which he made to an investigator but offered no similar immunity to the investigator if he passed that information to a colleague engaged in the investigation or put it to another potential witness. In my view it is necessary for the administration of justice that investigators should be able to exchange information, theories and hypotheses among themselves and to put them to other persons assisting in the inquiry without fear of being sued if such statements are disclosed in the course of the proceedings.’
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Last Update: 07 August 2018
Ref: 135006

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