Jurors, after retirement refused to deliver a verdict claiming personal reasons. The were summoned to court to answer charges of contempt of court. Explaining the contempt proceedings that the jurors faced, the trial judge said: ‘[I]n so far as those two jurors are concerned . . I want them to come before this court for the direct contempt that they have shown to this court and show cause why they ought not to be fined substantial amounts of money . . That is . . show cause why you should not be fined for the deliberate contempt you have shown to this court in wasting so much of court time and leading us into this situation.’ The judge subsequently found both jurors guilty of contempt, concluding: ‘[A]ll I have to decide is having heard what the defendants have had to say and having taken account of what the jury did say to the court through their notes, I have no hesitation in saying that both defendants are guilty of a contempt of court because both of them in their own way have intentionally disrupted this entire trial by their refusal. Therefore, I hold them in contempt.’
Held: The appeals succeeded. The court pointed to a sequence of errors in the trial judge’s approach. On the test for contempt, the court explained: ‘[C]ontumacious refusal to reach a verdict because of reluctance to judge another person, may, in an appropriate case, establish the actus reus of contempt, though it may be difficult or impossible to prove. The mens rea, namely an intention to impede or create a real risk of prejudicing the administration of justice, must also be proved . . This can be established by foreseeability of consequence. But the judge in the present case does not appear to have given any consideration to this, save to say ‘both of them in their own way have intentionally disrupted the entire trial by their refusal’. In the light of Barclay’s evidence that she did not want to disrupt the court’s process or be disrespectful towards the court, and Schot’s evidence that she wanted, or had tried, to reach a verdict, this is a difficult conclusion to sustain in the absence of any finding by the judge that he rejected that evidence . .’
Judges:
Rose LJ VP, Forbes, Keene JJ
Citations:
Times 14-May-1997, [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 303, [1997] EWCA Crim 3424, [1997] 2 Cr App Rep 383
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Attorney General v Fraill and Another CACD 16-Jun-2011
Juror’s use of Facebook was contempt
The court considered whether a juror had committed contempt of court. She had communicated with a defendant via Facebook, despite explicit warnings not to use the internet.
Held: Both juror and defendant in the trial had committed contempt of . .
Cited – Dallas v The United Kingdom ECHR 11-Nov-2013
The applicant challenged her conviction for contempt of court in that whilst a juror, she researched the case before her on the internet, discovering that the defendant had faced an earlier allegation broadly similar. She now said that the . .
Cited – HM Solicitor General v Cox and Another QBD 27-May-2016
Applications for committal of the defendants for having taken photographs of court proceedings when their friend was being sentenced for murder and publishing them on Facebook. The SG urged that the offences had aggravating features taking the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Crime, Contempt of Court
Updated: 11 October 2022; Ref: scu.518580