The court set out the procedure for the introduction of DNA evidence in criminal trials. In particular the court explained the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy’ when using statistical evidence. The significance of the DNA evidence will depend critically upon what else is known about the suspect. Provided there is no reason to doubt either the matching data or the statistical conclusion based upon it, the random occurrence ratio deduced from the DNA evidence, when combined with sufficient additional evidence to give it significance, is highly probative. ([1996] EWCA Crim 648 as to leave only).
Phillips LJ said: ‘The significance of the DNA evidence will depend critically upon what else is known about the suspect. If he has a convincing alibi at the other end of England at the time of the crime, it will appear highly improbable that he can have been responsible for the crime, despite his matching DNA profile. If, however, he was near the scene of the crime when it was committed, or has been identified as a suspect because of other evidence which suggests that he may have been responsible for the crime, the DNA evidence becomes very significant. The possibility that two of the only 26 men in the United Kingdom with the matching DNA should have been in the vicinity of the crime will seem almost incredible . . and a comparatively slight nexus between the defendant and the crime, independent of the DNA, is likely to suffice to present an overall picture to the jury that satisfies them of the defendant’s guilt.
The reality is that, provided there is no reason to doubt either the matching data or the statistical conclusion based upon it, the random occurrence ratio deduced from the DNA evidence, when combined with sufficient additional evidence to give it significance, is highly probative. As the art of analysis progresses, it is likely to become more so, and the stage may be reached when a match will be so comprehensive that it will be possible to construct a DNA profile that is unique and which proves the guilt of the defendant without any other evidence. So far as we are aware that stage has not yet been reached.’
The court recommended a direction: ‘Members of the jury, if you accept the scientific evidence called by the Crown, this indicates that there are probably only about four or five males in [the given area] from whom that semen stain could have come. The defendant is one of them. If that is the position, the decision you have to reach, on all the evidence, is whether you are sure that it was the defendant who left that stain or whether it is possible that it was one of that other small group of men who share the same DNA characteristics.’
Judges:
Lord Justice Phillips, Mr Justice Jowitt, And Mr Justice Keene
Citations:
Times 14-Aug-1996, [1996] EWCA Crim 648, [1996] EWCA Crim 728, [1997] 1 Cr App R 369, [1997] Crim LR 669, [1996] EWCA Crim 728, [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 369
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina v Adams CACD 26-Apr-1996
The defendant appealed against his conviction for rape. There had been a DNA match, but the defendant did not match the description given by the victim, and she had not picked him out. He argued that DNA evidence alone should not be used to convict, . .
Cited – Regina v Deen CACD 21-Dec-1993
The statistical basis of DNA evidence presented to the court was incorrect in principle. It suffered from the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’. The court described the nature of DNA evidence: ‘The process of DNA profiling starts with DNA being extracted from . .
Cited – Regina v Lucas (Ruth) CACD 1981
People sometimes tell lies for reasons other than a belief that they are necessary to conceal guilt.
Four conditions were identified which must be satisfied before a defendant’s lie could be seen as supporting the prosecution case:-
(1) . .
Cited – Regina v Makanjuola CACD 17-May-1995
Guidance was given on the directions to be given to the jury where a co-accused speaks for prosecution as a witness and in sexual assault cases. The full corroboration warning is not now needed; the Judge may use his own discretion, and may give a . .
Cited – Regina v Bailey CACD 1993
The court held that corroboration which goes to the heart of the dispute as to whether or not the complainant had consented to whatever the Defendant was doing, was enough to remove the danger of convicting on the evidence of the complainant alone: . .
Cited by:
Applied – Michael Pringle v The Queen PC 27-Jan-2003
PC (Jamaica) The court considered the way in which statistical conclusions drawn from DNA evidence had been presented to the jury. The judge had fallen into the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy.’ Also the court had relied . .
Cited – Regina v Clark CACD 2-Oct-2000
. .
Cited – Regina v Sally Clark CACD 11-Apr-2003
The defendant appealed against her conviction for the murder of her two infant children by, in the one case, smothering and, in the other, suffocation. Amongst the experts called at her trial by the Crown was Professor Sir Roy Meadow. The . .
Cited – Meadow v General Medical Council Admn 17-Feb-2006
The appellant challenged being struck off the medical register. He had given expert evidence in a criminal case which was found misleading and to have contributed to a wrongful conviction for murder.
Held: The evidence though mistaken was . .
Cited – Lashley, Regina v CACD 8-Feb-2000
The sole evidence against an appellant was DNA found on a cigarette left at the scene of the crime. It was accepted that there would be between seven and ten males in the United Kingdom to whom this profile related. There was no other evidence . .
Cited – Regina v Ogden CACD 28-Jun-2013
The defendant had been charged for burglary on the basis, solely, of DNA evidence found on a scarf. The scarf was accidentally destroyed before the trial, and the defence had been unable to have it examined. He now appealed saying that the use of . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Evidence, Crime
Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.148392