A police doctor’s statement in a contemporary medical report that her findings were consistent with the claimant’s allegation had not been included in the evidence before the CICB when it rejected her claim for compensation.
Held: The decision was quashed. What happened was held to be a breach of the rules of natural justice and constituted unfairness. Where a party had successfully applied inter partes for judicial review out of time, the court should not bring that question in again when making the final order. A party wishing to oppose the time extension should rather appeal against the leave given.
The court has a jurisdiction to quash for a misunderstanding or ignorance of an established and relevant fact.
Lord Slynn of Hadley set out the principles to be applied in cases relating to delay as:
‘(a) On an ex parte application leave to apply for judicial review out of time can be refused, deferred to the substantive hearing or given.
(b) Leave may be given if the court considers that good reason for extending the period has been shown. The good reason on an ex parte application is generally to be seen from the standpoint of the applicant.
(c) If leave is given then an application to set it aside may be made though this is not to be encouraged.
(d) If leave is given, then unless set aside, it does not fall to be reopened at the substantive hearing on the basis that there is no ground for extending time under Ord.53 r.4(1). At the substantive hearing there is no ‘application for leave to apply for judicial review’, leave having already been given.
(e) Nor is there a power to refuse ‘to grant . . leave’ at the substantive hearing on the basis of hardship or prejudice or detriment to good administration. The court has already granted leave; it is too late to ‘refuse’ unless the court sets aside the initial grant without a separate application having been made for that to be done. What the court can do under section 31(6) is to refuse to grant relief. (This was stated by his Lordship as his ‘provisional view’ on this matter as the point had not been argued).
(f) If the application is adjourned to the substantive hearing, the questions as to good reason for an extension of time and hardship, prejudice, detriment, justifying a refusal of leave may fall for determination’.
Lord Slynn of Hadley Lord Mackay of Clashfern Lord Nolan Lord Clyde Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough
Times 26-Mar-1999, Gazette 28-Apr-1999,  UKHL 21,  2 AC 330,  2 WLR 974,  QB 659
House of Lords, House of Lords, Bailii
Supreme Court Act 1981 31
England and Wales
Overruled – Ex parte Worth 1985
The giving of leave to bring a judicial review case did not equate to an extension of time to make the application. The judge’s task on the ex parte application was to do no more than to decide that there was an arguable case for judicial review and . .
Cited – Regina v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales, Ex parte Caswell HL 17-May-1990
The House sought to reconcile section 31 of the 1981 Act, with RSC Order 53 r4 as to the time within which judicial review proceedings must be brought.
Held: Whenever there was a failure to act promptly or within three months there was ‘undue . .
Cited – Regina v Greenwich London Borough Council, Ex Parte Patterson QBD 27-May-1993
A council should satisfy itself by making more enquiries about suggestions of domestic violence before transferring a claimant to another authority. The granting of leave to move for a judicial review does not preclude the respondent from objecting . .
Cited – E v Secretary of State for the Home Department etc CA 2-Feb-2004
The court was asked as to the extent of the power of the IAT and Court of Appeal to reconsider a decision which it later appeared was based upon an error of fact, and the extent to which new evidence to demonstrate such an error could be admitted. . .
Cited – Regina (Smeaton) v Secretary of State for Health and Others Admn 18-Apr-2002
The claimant challenged the Order as regards the prescription of the morning-after pill, asserting that the pill would cause miscarriages, and that therefore the use would be an offence under the 1861 Act.
Held: ‘SPUC’s case is that any . .
Cited – Regina (Holding and Barnes plc) v Secretary of State for Environment Transport and the Regions; Regina (Alconbury Developments Ltd and Others) v Same and Others HL 9-May-2001
Power to call in is administrative in nature
The powers of the Secretary of State to call in a planning application for his decision, and certain other planning powers, were essentially an administrative power, and not a judicial one, and therefore it was not a breach of the applicants’ rights . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Judicial Review, Natural Justice
Updated: 11 November 2021; Ref: scu.135140