The defendant was a sexual psychopath who had strangled and mutilated a young woman resident of the YWCA. The case on his behalf was that he was unable to resist his impulse to gross and sadistic sexual violence. The judge’s directions had amounted to excluding from abnormality of mind an inability to control his urges.
Held: This was incorrect. When considering a defence of diminished responsibility, lies told by the defendant are not relevant.
Lord Parker CJ explained the meaning of ‘abnormality of mind’ as ‘wide enough to cover the mind’s activities all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters and the ability to form a rational judgment as to whether an act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment.’ Whether the defendant suffered from such an abnormality was a matter for the jury, but the jury was entitled to take into consideration all the evidence, ‘including acts or statements of the accused and his demeanour. They are not bound to accept the medical evidence if there is other material before them which, in their good judgment, conflicts with it and outweighs it.’ The key phrase ‘substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing’, ‘points to a consideration of the extent to which the accused’s mind is answerable for his physical acts which must include a consideration of the extent of his ability to exercise will power to control his physical acts’.
Whether the abnormality of mind was such as substantially impaired the mental responsibility of the accused for his acts in doing or being a party to the killing was ‘a question of degree and essentially one for the jury.’ and ‘Medical evidence is, of course, relevant, but the question involves a decision not merely as to whether there was some impairment of the mental responsibility of the accused for his acts but whether such impairment can properly be called ‘substantial’, a matter upon which juries may quite legitimately differ from doctors.
Furthermore, in a case where the abnormality of mind is one that affects the accused’s self – control the step between ‘he did not resist his impulse’ and ‘he could not resist his impulse’ is, as the evidence of this case shows, one which is incapable of scientific proof. A fortiori there is no scientific measurement of the degree of difficulty which an abnormal person finds in controlling his impulses. These problems which in the present state of medical knowledge are scientifically insoluble, the jury can only approach in a broad, common sense way’.
Lord Parker CJ
[1960] 44 Cr App R 246, [1960] 2 QB 396
Homicide Act 1957
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Andrews CACD 15-Oct-2003
The defendant sought leave to appeal her conviction for murder saying that a finding of manslaughter was appropriate for her diminished responsibility.
Held: There was insufficient evidence to establish that the judge’s directions on the . .
Cited – Regina v Khan CACD 27-Jul-2009
On his trial for murder the defendant produced unchallenged expert evidence that at the time of the offence, his mental responsibility for the killing was substantially impaired by his mental illness. He said that in these circumstances the charge . .
Cited – Stewart, Regina v CACD 26-Mar-2009
The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder, saying that the judge should have directed the jury as to the impact of alcohol dependency syndrome on his plea of diminished responsibility where there had been no discernible brain damage. . .
Cited – Golds, Regina v SC 30-Nov-2016
The defendant appealed against his conviction for murder, saying that he should have been only convicted of manslaughter, applying the new test for diminished responsibility as provided under the 1957 Act as amended, and particularly whether the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 10 October 2021; Ref: scu.240381 br>