The majority decision of the House in Myers v DPP ‘established the principle, never since challenged, that it is for the legislature, not the judiciary, to create new exceptions to the hearsay rule.’ and ‘Hearsay evidence is not excluded because it has no logical probative value . . The rationale of excluding [hearsay] as inadmissible, rooted as it is in the system of trial by jury, is a recognition of the great difficulty, even more acute for a juror than for a trained judicial mind, of assessing what, if any, weight can properly be given to a statement by a person whom the jury have not seen or heard and which has not been subject to any test of reliability in cross-examination . . The danger against which this fundamental rule provides a safeguard is that untested hearsay evidence will be treated as having a probative force which it does not deserve.’
Lord Bridge of Harwich
 AC 41,  2 All ER 1095,  3 WLR 345, (1985) 81 Cr App R 266
England and Wales
Cited – Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 1965
Limits to Admission of Hearsay Evidence
It was not for the House to alter the admissibility of hearsay evidence on a case by case basis.
Lord Reid said: ‘I have never taken a narrow view of the functions of this House as an appellate tribunal. The common law must be developed to . .
Cited – Regina v Hayter HL 3-Feb-2005
The House considered the principle that the confession of a defendant is inadmissible in a joint criminal case against a co-defendant. In a trial for murder, one party was accused of requesting a middleman to arrange for the murder by a third party. . .
Cited – Cole and Another v Regina CACD 30-Jul-2007
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 October 2021; Ref: scu.222548