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Re The Bahia and San Francisco Railway Co Ltd v Trittin and others: CA 1868

Miss Trittin left her share certificates with a broker. A forged transfer together with the certificates, was lodged with and with registered by the company. The new certificates certified that the named person as registered holder. He then sold them to innocent purchasers who in turn lodged transfers and certificates and obtained certificates in their own names. The company had become obliged to restore Miss Trittin’s name to the register but refused to recognise the innocent purchasers as shareholders. A special case was stated for the opinion of the Court between the innocent purchasers as claimants and the company for the purpose of determining the amount of damages (if any) which the company was liable to pay them respectively.
Held: The claimant succeeded.
Lord Cockburn CJ: ‘This power of granting certificates is to give the shareholders the opportunity of more easily dealing with their shares in the market, and to afford facilities to them of selling their shares by at once showing a marketable title, and the effect of this facility is to make the shares of greater value. The power of giving certificates is, therefore, for the benefit of the company in general; and it is a declaration by the company to all the world that the person in whose name the certificate is made out, and to whom it is given, is a shareholder in the company, and it is given by the company with the intention that it shall be so used by the person to whom it is given, and acted upon in the sale and transfer of shares. It is stated in this case that the claimants acted bona fide, and did all that is required of purchasers of shares; they paid the value of the shares in money on having a transfer of the shares executed to them, and on the production of the certificates which were handed to them. It turned out that the transferors had in fact no shares, and that the company ought not to have registered them as shareholders or given them certificates, the transfer to them being a forgery. That brings the case within the principle of the decision in Pickard -v- Sears [6 AD and E 469] as explained by the case of Freeman -v- Cooke [2 Ex 654] that if you make a representation with the intention that it shall be acted upon by another, and he does so, you are estopped from denying the truth of what you represent to be the fact.’
Blackburn J referred to the Companies Act and said:- ‘The statute further provides that the company may give certificates specifying the shares held by the member; and the object of this provision is expressly stated to be that this certificate should be prima facie evidence of the title of the person named to the shares specified; and the company, therefore, by granting the certificate, do make a statement that they have transferred the shares specified to the person to whom it is given, and that he is the holder of the shares. If they have been deceived and the statement is not perfectly true, they may not be guilty of negligence, but the company and no-one else have power to enquire into the matter; and it was the intention of the legislature that these certificates should be documents on which buyers might safely act,’ and ‘ . . . it is quite clear that a statement of a fact was made by the company, on which the company, at the very least, knew that persons wanting to purchase shares might act.’
Lush J referred to the certificate given by the company to the fraudsters:- ‘And the claimants having acted on this statement by the company, there arises an estoppel as against the company, prohibiting them from denying that what it states is true. And the question then is, what does the certificate mean? Does it mean merely, that [the fraudsters’ names] are on the register, and the company have done their best to ascertain that they are entitled to the shares, but cannot say whether they are so entitled? Or does it amount to a statement that the company take upon themselves the responsibility of asserting that they are the registered shareholders entitled to the specific shares? I think the certificate must amount to the latter assertion. It is the company who are to keep and look after the register, and they are the only persons who have control over it, and they can refuse to register a person until he shews that he is legally entitled. Having, therefore, put the names of [the fraudsters] upon the register, and granted them a certificate, the company are estopped after that statement has been acted upon and cannot deny that those persons were the legal holders of the particular shares which have been transferred to the claimants. The claimants, therefore, are entitled to recover from the company the value of the shares at the time when they were deprived of them.’

Judges:

Lord Cockburn CJ, Blackburn J, Lush J, Mellor J

Citations:

(1868) LR 3 QB 584

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedThe Balkis Consolidated Co Ltd v Tomkinson and Others HL 1893
Tomkinson, a stockbroker, bought shares was registered by the company and received share certificates, and then sold them. The company found that the vendor to him had previously sold the shares to someone else who had been duly registered. The . .
CitedCadbury Schweppes Plc and Another v Halifax Share Dealing Ltd and Another ChD 23-May-2006
Fraudsters had successfully contrived to sell shares of others, by re-registering the shares to new addresses and requesting new certificates. The question was which of the company, the company registrars and the stockbrokers should bear the loss. . .
CitedCadbury Schweppes Plc and Another v Halifax Share Dealing Ltd and Another ChD 23-May-2006
Fraudsters had successfully contrived to sell shares of others, by re-registering the shares to new addresses and requesting new certificates. The question was which of the company, the company registrars and the stockbrokers should bear the loss. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Company, Estoppel

Updated: 30 May 2022; Ref: scu.242171

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