The appellant acted for some time as agent to an insurance company at his own offices. After some correspondence as to a change of terms upon which the parties could not agree, the company’s secretary sent to persons who insured through the appellant a circular stating that the agency of the appellant at his offices had ‘been closed by the directors.’ The appellant having brought an action for libel against the company the judge ruled that the statement was capable of a defamatory meaning but that the occasion was privileged. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, that the statement was a libel, that it was untrue, and that the defendants had exceeded the privilege, but did not find actual malice.
Held: that judgment must be for the company, on the grounds that the statement was not capable of a defamatory meaning, that it was true, that the occasion was privileged, that the finding of the jury as to excess of privilege was insufficient, and that there was no evidence of malice for the jury.
Held: The decision of the Court of Appeal ([1895] 2 Q. B. 156) affirmed.
Citations:
[1896] UKLawRpAC 58, (1897) AC 68
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Stocker v Stocker SC 3-Apr-2019
The parties had been married and divorced. Mrs S told M S’s new partner on Facebook that he had tried to strangle her and made other allegations. Mrs S now appealed from a finding that she had defamed him. Lord Kerr restated the approach to meaning . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Defamation
Updated: 30 January 2022; Ref: scu.671686