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Mitchell v Faber and Faber: CA 24 Mar 1994

As a matter of principle the question of bane and antidote should necessarily be left to the jury. Hirst LJ said: ‘So far as the antidote is concerned, it seems to me that only in the clearest of cases would it be proper for a judge to rule that the sting of words, which are ex hypothesi capable of defamatory meaning in themselves, is drawn by the surrounding context so that in the result those words cease to be capable of a defamatory meaning. In my judgment the general, though perhaps not universal rule should be that this is matter for the jury and not for the judge to decide.’

Judges:

Hirst LJ

Citations:

Unreported, 24 March 1994

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Defamation

Updated: 29 June 2022; Ref: scu.441574

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