Mckendrick v The Financial Conduct Authority: CA 28 Mar 2019

Appeal from sentence for contempt of court – Defendant breaching terms of worldwide freezing order – Defendant committed to six-month prison sentence
‘In deciding what sentence to impose for a contempt of court, the judge has to weigh and assess a number of factors. This court is reluctant to interfere with decisions of that nature, and will generally only do so if the judge: (i) Made an error of principle; (ii) Took into account immaterial factors or failed to take into account material factors; or (iii) Reached a decision which was plainly wrong in that it was outside the range of decisions reasonably open to the judge. See Mersey Care NHS Trust v Ackroyd [2007] EWCA Civ 101 , at paras 35-36, Aldi Stores Ltd v WSP Group plc [2007] EWCA Civ 1260; [2008] 1 WLR 748, at para 16, Stuart v Goldberg Linde [2008] EWCA Civ 2; [2008] 1 WLR 823, at paras 76 and 81 and the very recent decision of this court in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Zafar [2019] EWCA 392 (Civ), at para 44.
It follows from that approach that there will be few cases in which a contemnor will be able successfully to challenge a sentence as being excessive. If however this court is satisfied that the sentence was ‘wrong’ on one of the above grounds, it will reverse the decision below and either remit the case to the judge for further consideration of sanction or substitute its own decision.
In Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Zafar, at para 58 this court considered the correct approach to sentencing for a contempt of court involving a false statement verified by a statement of truth. We consider that a similar approach should be adopted when-as in this case-a court is sentencing for contempt of court of the kind which involves one or more breaches of an order of the court. The court should first consider (as a criminal court would do) the culpability of the contemnor and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused by the breach of the order. In this regard, aggravating or mitigating factors which are likely to arise for consideration will often include some of those identified by Popplewell J in the Asia Islamic Trade Finance Fund case (see para 32 above). Having determined the seriousness of the case, the court must consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty. If it would, committal to prison cannot be justified, even if the contemnor’s means are so limited that the amount of the fine must be modest.
Breach of a court order is always serious, because it undermines the administration of justice. We therefore agree with the observations of Jackson LJ in the Solodchenko case (see para 31 above) as to the inherent seriousness of a breach of a court order, and as to the likelihood that nothing other than a prison sentence will suffice to punish such a serious contempt of court. The length of that sentence will, of course, depend on all the circumstances of the case, but again we agree with the observations of Jackson LJ as to the length of sentence which may often be appropriate. Mr Underwood was correct to submit that the decision as to the length of sentence appropriate in a particular case must take into account that the maximum sentence is committal to prison for two years. However, because the maximum term is comparatively short, we do not think that the maximum can be reserved for the very worst sort of contempt which can be imagined. Rather, there will be a comparatively broad range of conduct which can fairly be regarded as falling within the most serious category and as therefore justifying a sentence at or near the maximum.’

Hamblen, Holroyde LJJ
[2019] EWCA Civ 524, [2019] WLR(D) 192, [2019] 4 WLR 65
Bailii, WLRD
England and Wales

Contempt of Court, Criminal Sentencing

Updated: 11 December 2021; Ref: scu.635242