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Martin v Watson: HL 14 Jul 1995

References: Times 14-Jul-1995, Gazette 06-Sep-1995, Independent 19-Jul-1995, [1996] AC 74, [1995] 3 WLR 318, [1995] 3 All ER 559
Coram: Lord Keith of Kinkel
Ratio The plaintiff had been falsely reported to the police by the defendant, a neighbour, for indecent exposure whilst standing on a ladder in his garden. He had been arrested and charged, but at a hearing before the Magistrates’ Court, the Crown Prosecution Service offered no evidence, and the charge was dismissed. He appealed against the decision that he could not claim in malicious prosecution.
Held: The appeal succeeded, though there was no English authority on the topic. Since the facts relating to the alleged offence were solely within the complainant’s knowledge, and that as a practical matter the police officer who laid the information could not have exercised any independent discretion, the complainant could be sued for malicious prosecution, and upheld an award of damages against her. The complainant had ‘in substance procured the prosecution’. The police officer to whom the complaint was made had no way of testing the truthfulness of the accusation.
The tort of malicious prosecution can be committed by a informer knowingly and maliciously laying a false complaint to the police. The actions taken by the police are insufficient intervention to interfere with that liability. To ground a claim for malicious prosecution a plaintiff must prove (1) that the law was set in motion against him on a criminal charge; (2) that the prosecution was determined in his favour; (3) that it was without reasonable and proper cause, and (4) that it was malicious.
Ratio Lord Keith said: ‘It is common ground that the ingredients of the tort of malicious prosecution are correctly stated in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts ‘In action of malicious prosecution the plaintiff must show first that he was prosecuted by the defendant, that is to say, that the law was set in motion against him on a criminal charge; secondly, that the prosecution was determined in his favour; and thirdly, that it was without reasonable and probable cause; fourthly, that it was malicious.” and ‘The essential feature of malicious prosecution is an abuse of the process of the Court. If that has occurred it is immaterial that the abuse has involved giving evidence in a court of law.’
and ‘Where an individual falsely and maliciously gives a police officer information indicating that some person is guilty of a criminal offence and states that he is willing to give evidence in court of the matters in question, it is properly to be inferred that he desires and intends that the person he names should be prosecuted. Where the circumstances are such that the facts relating to the alleged offence can be within the knowledge only of the complainant, as was the position here, then it becomes virtually impossible for the police officer to exercise any independent discretion or judgment, and if a prosecution is instituted by the police officer the proper view of the matter is that the prosecution has been procured by the complainant.’
Ratio Lord Keith also said: ‘Analogies were sought to be drawn with the immunity afforded in respect of evidence given in a court of law, which extends also to statements made to solicitors engaged in preparation for pending proceedings: Watson v M’Ewan . . No such analogy is, however, helpful. The essential feature of malicious prosecution is an abuse of the process of the court. If that has occurred it is immaterial that the abuse has involved giving evidence in a court of law. That was held in Roy v Prior [1971] A.C. 470 in relation to an action for malicious arrest . .
Similar considerations apply to statements made to the police under circumstances where the maker falls to be regarded as having in substance procured the prosecution. There is no way of testing the truthfulness of such statements before the prosecution is brought. To deny any remedy to a person whose liberty has been interfered with as a result of unfounded and malicious accusations in such circumstances would constitute a serious denial of justice.’
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Last Update: 05-May-16
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