(Courts-Martial Appeals Court) The defendant had faced road traffic offence charges, but the court had discharged the case using the Forest of Dean case. The prosecutor sought to appeal but failed to give the undertaking with regard to taking no further action if the appeal did not succeed as required under the Order.
Held: The prosecution’s right of appeal under Article 4 is, just as is its civilian equivalent under s 58 Criminal Justice Act 2003, an interlocutory appeal. The assertion to the contrary made on behalf of the defendant in the course of argument was wrong. The scheme for these appeals is that the proceedings in the court below stand adjourned pending the hearing of the appeal: see Article 4(10), the mirror of s 58(10), under which the ruling is to have no effect pending the outcome of the appeal.
Hughes LJ said: ‘we are unable to see how these statutory provisions can be read as meaning anything other than that there is no right of appeal unless the undertaking is given to the court of trial at the time of the announcement of the intention to appeal. The Order, with s 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, represents a major departure from the former law. The Crown is given a right of appeal in relation to trial on indictment for the first time. Moreover, it is given a right of interlocutory appeal. The new right is given on strict terms. It may be that the new right could have been as effectively controlled if the statute and order had provided that whether or not an undertaking in the terms of article 4(8) was given in open court, any appeal was to be on terms that if leave were refused, or the appeal abandoned, or it failed in due course, acquittal should follow. Or it may be that alternative form of control would not be so effective. What is clear is that alternative form of control is not what has been enacted. The words ‘may not . . unless, at or before that time’ must be given their effect. They require the giving of the undertaking in open court at the time of invocation of the right of appeal and they say that the prosecution ‘may not’ inform the court it intends to appeal, unless this is done. The object is clearly to require the Crown to commit itself from the outset. Nor can we see any proper basis of construction under which what is in section 58(8) . . can be read differently according to whether the ruling under challenge is ipso facto fatal to the prosecution or one in relation to which the Crown chooses to give the acquittal agreement. There would, moreover, be considerable scope for argument about which category some rulings fall into. On these grounds alone, we are unable to see that we have any jurisdiction to hear the appeal against either ruling.
Prosecutors who wish to launch appeals against rulings must give the article . . section 58(8) undertaking in open court at the time of invoking the right of appeal. We are not asked to consider whether it must be given in any particular form, and have not done so; it may well be that it can be given in shorthand or by reference to the statute; given, however, it must be, and that must happen at or before the time of invoking the right of appeal.’
The Elrington principle is a rule against sequential trials. It is in no sense breached if two charges arising out of the same facts are put before the same court on the same occasion.
Hughes LJ explained the requirement for the acquittal undertaking: ‘ . . we are unable to see how these statutory provisions can be read as meaning anything other than that there is no right of appeal unless the undertaking is given to the court of trial at the time of the announcement of the intention to appeal. The Order, with section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, represents a major departure from the former law. The Crown is given a right of appeal in relation to trial on indictment for the first time. Moreover, it is given a right of interlocutory appeal. The new right is given on strict terms . . The words ‘may not unless, at or before that time’ must be given their effect. They require the giving of the undertaking in open court at the time of invocation of the right of appeal and they say that the prosecution ‘may not’ inform the court it intends to appeal, unless this is done. . .
As we have made clear, Art. 4 of the Order is in terms materially identical to s.58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Prosecutors who wish to launch appeals against rulings must give the Art.4(8)/s.58(8) undertaking in open court at the time of invoking the right of appeal. We are not asked to consider whether it must be given in any particular form, and have not done so; it may well be that it can be given in shorthand or by reference to the statute; given, however, it must be, and that must happen at or before the time of invoking the right of appeal.’
Hughes LJ, Treacy J, Sir Peter Cresswell
[2008] EWCA Crim 1034, [2008] 2 Cr App R 37, [2008] RTR 25, [2008] 1 WLR 2881, [2009] 1 All ER 1103
Bailii
Courts-Martial (Prosecution Appeals) Order 2000 (SI 2006/1786) 4(8), Criminal Justice Act 2003 58(8), Air Force Act 1955 36(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Explained – Regina v Forest of Dean Justices ex parte Farley CACD 1990
The prosecutor had charged the defendant first with drink driving so as to take advantage of the provision placing upon the defendant the burden of proving that he had taken drink after the traffic accident and before testing. It iintended then to . .
Cited – Regina v Hartnett CACD 2003
The defendant had pleaded guilty in the magistrates’ court to an excess alcohol offence. He was then committed to the Crown Court for trial on an associated charge of dangerous driving on the same occasion. He pleaded guilty to that also. He . .
Cited – Regina v R CACD 29-Feb-2008
The court considered the application of section 58 to prosecution appeals and the use of the ‘acquittal agreement’. . .
Explained – Regina v Elrington 9-Nov-1861
The appellant’s co-accused had been summarily tried and acquitted of common assault. The accused was subsequently indicted on the same facts for assault causing grievous bodily harm and assault causing actual bodily harm. The accused demurred.
Cited – Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions HL 1964
Plea of Autrefois Acquit is Narrow in Scope
The defendant had been tried for and acquitted of murder. The prosecution then sought to have him tried for robbery out of the same alleged facts. The House considered his plea of autrefois convict.
Held: The majority identified a narrow . .
Cited – Clarke, Regina v; Regina v McDaid HL 6-Feb-2008
An indictment had not been signed despite a clear statutory provision that it should be. The defects were claimed to have been cured by amendment before sentence.
Held: The convictions failed. Sections 1(1) and 2(1) of the 1933 Act which . .
Cited by:
Cited – NT, Regina v CACD 31-Mar-2010
The prosecutor appealed against a stay of the prosecution as an abuse. The prosecution had failed give the undertaking necessary on lodging the appeal to the court against whose ruling it wanted to appeal, that it agreed that the defendant should be . .
Cited – PY, Regina v CACD 22-Jan-2019
Police ‘lawful use’ of dog must be police work
The prosecutor wished to appeal from the acquittal of a police officer, whose police dog, while being exercised, attacked a runner causing injury. The judge had accepted the defence, since the dog required exercise, the officer was using the dog for . .
Cited – Wangige, Regina v CACD 14-Oct-2020
Second Prosecution on Same Facts was An Abuse
The defendant appealed his conviction of causing death by dangerous driving. He appealed from the refusal of the judge to give a stay the prosecution as an abuse He had been previously prosecuted for a lesser offence on the same facts.
Held: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Practice, Armed Forces
Updated: 08 January 2022; Ref: scu.267714
