swarb.co.uk - law index
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Vicarious Liability - From: 1900 To: 1929
This page lists 15 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Beard v London General Omnibus Company [1900] 2 QB 53; [1900-3] All ER Rep 112; [1900] LJQB 895; [1900] 83 LT 362; [1900] 48 WR 658; [1900] 16 TLR 499
1900
CA
Negligence, Vicarious Liability
One of the defendant's conductors, in order to save time, drove the bus quickly around some side streets, negligently injuring the plaintiff, who now sought damages against the bus company. Held: The plaintiff had failed to provide any evidence that the conductor had been authorised to drive the bus, and therefore failed to establish that they had any resonsibility in negligence for his acts. The action failed.
Hamlyn v John Houston and Co [1903] 1 KB 81
1903
CA
Collins MR
Information, Vicarious Liability
One side of the defendant's business as grain merchants was to obtain, by lawful means, information about its competitors' activities. Houston, a partner in the firm, obtained confidential information on the plaintiff Hamlyn's business by bribing one of Hamlyn's employees. Held: The firm was liable for the loss suffered by Hamlyn. If it was within the scope of Houston's authority to obtain the information by legitimate means, then for the purpose of vicarious liability it was within the scope of his authority to obtain it by illegitimate means and the firm was liable accordingly. This was on the broad 'risk' principle: the principal having selected the agent, and being the person who will have the benefit of his efforts if successful, it is not unjust he should bear the risk of the agent 'exceeding his authority in matters incidental to the doing of the acts the performance of which has been delegated to him'.
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Sanderson v Collins [1904] 1 KB 628
1904
CA
Collins MR
Vicarious Liability
The defendant's coachman had taken out for his own purposes a dog-cart which belonged to the plaintiff and had been lent to the defendant. Held: The defendant was not vicariously liable for the coachman's actions: "If the servant in doing any act breaks the connection of service between himself and his master, the act done under those circumstances is not that of the master".
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The Citizens Life Assurance Company Limited v Brown [1904] UKPC 20; [1904] AC 423
6 May 1904
PC
Lord Lindley
Commonwealth, Company, Vicarious Liability
(New South Wales) A malicious libel was alleged. The life assurance company was vicariously liable in respect of a libel contained in a circular sent out by a person who was employed by the company under a written agreement as its "superintendent of agencies". By the terms of the agreement that person was to devote his whole time to furthering the company's business and was to be paid a salary weekly as well as a commission on policies procured by him. Held: He was a servant of the company for whose actions the company was liable. Once companies are recognised by the law as legal persons, they are liable to have the mental states of agents and employees such as dishonesty or malice attributed to them for the purpose of establishing civil liability.
Lord Lindley said: "If it is once granted that corporations are for civil purposes to be regarded as persons, ie as principals acting by agents and servants, it is difficult to see why the ordinary doctrines of agency and of master and servant are not to be applied to corporations as well as to ordinary individuals."
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[ Bailii ]
Stanbury v Exeter Corporation [1905] 2 KB 838
1905
Lord Alverstone CJ
Vicarious Liability
An action was brought against the corporation for the negligence of an inspector who, acting under the 1894 Act seized and detained sheep suspected of sheep-scab. Held: The corporation was not liable. The inspector was performing a function imposed directly upon him by statute; it was a function that was, for him, and not the corporation, to perform.
Diseases of Animals Act 1894
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Cheshire v Bailey [1905] 1 KB 237
1905
CA
Vicarious Liability
A silversmith hired a coach and coachman from the defendants in order to show his wares to customers around London. But the coachman entered into a conspiracy with others to steal the silver. Held The Court dismissed the claim for damages against the defendant who grounded himself on the basis that the coachman's activities had constituted a crime which is clearly outside the scope of his employment. The judgment said: "It is a crime committed by a person who in committing it severed his connection with his master, and became a stranger; and, as the circumstances under which it was committed are known, it raises no presumption of negligence in the defendant."
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Radley v London Council (1909) 109 LT 162
1909
Vicarious Liability
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Padbury v Holliday and Greenwood Ltd; 1912 - [1912] 28 TLR 492
Lloyd v Grace, Smith and Co; HL 1912 - [1912] AC 716; [1912] UKHL 1
Plumb v Cobden Flour Mills Co Ltd [1914] AC 62
1914
HL
Lord Dunedin
Vicarious Liability, Health and Safety
In looking at restrictions by an employer to limit his vicarious liability, the court must distinguish between prohibitions which limit the sphere of employment and those which only deal with conduct within the sphere of employment:" "there are prohibitions which limit the sphere of employment, and prohibitions which only deal with conduct within the sphere of employment".
Workmen's Compensation Act 1906
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Bugge v Brown (1919) 26 CLR 110
1919
Isaacs J
Vicarious Liability
When an employee acts 'so as to be in effect a stranger in relation to his employer with respect to the act he has committed', his employer does not have vicarious liability for his acts.
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Percy v Corporation of Glasgow; HL 1922 - [1922] 2 AC 299
The Koursk [1924] P 140
1924
CA
Scrutton LJ
Vicarious Liability, Torts - Other
The navigators of two ships had committed two separate torts or one tort in which they were both tortfeasors. Held: Three situations were identified where A might be jointly liable with B for B's tortious act. Where A was master and B servant; where A was principal and B agent; and where the two were concerned in a joint act done in pursuance of a common purpose: "Certain classes of persons seem clearly to be "joint tortfeasors": The agent who commits a tort within the scope of his employment for his principal, and the principal; the servant who commits a tort in the course of his employment, and his master; two persons who agree on common action, in the course of, and to further which, one of them commits a tort. These seem clearly joint tortfeasors; there is one tort committed by one of them on behalf of, or in concert with another." and "I am of the opinion that the definition in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 7th ed., p59, is much nearer the correct view : "Persons are said to be joint tortfeasors when their respective shares in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a common design" . . "but mere similarity of design on the part of independent actors, causing independent damage, is not enough; there must be concerted action to a common end."
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Central Motors (Glasgow) Ltd v Cessnock Garage and Motor Co; 1925 - 1925 SC 796
Poland v Parr (John) and Sons [1927] 1 KB 236; [1926] All ER 177
1926
CA
Scrutton, Atkin LJJ
Vicarious Liability
A carter, who had handed over his wagon and was going home to his dinner, struck a boy whom he suspected, wrongly but on reasonable grounds, of stealing his master's property. Held: The master was responsible. A servant has implied authority, at least in an emergency, to protect his master's property.
To fix a master with liability for an unauthorised mode of performing an authorised act, the act must be sufficiently connected with the authorised act as to be a mode of doing it.
Scrutton LJ said: "Maybe his action was mistaken and maybe the force he used was excessive; he might have pushed the boy instead of striking him. But that was merely acting in excess of what was necessary in doing an act which he was authorized to do. The excess was not sufficient to take the act out of the class of authorized acts."
Atkin LJ said: "I am of the same opinion. With great respect to the learned judge I think his judgment goes wrong where he says 'The blot, the failure in this case is that he [Hall] was not then in fact acting in the course of his employment . . nor was he in fact doing an act incidental to it.' The learned judge took the view that the servant was not doing an authorized act, because he was not doing an act of the class which was expressly authorized, and therefore his act could not be authorized. Bank of New South Wales v. Owston shows that to be an erroneous view. The learned judge has not given enough weight to the consideration that a servant may be impliedly authorized in an emergency to do an act different in kind from the class of acts which he is expressly authorized or employed to do. Any servant is as a general rule authorized to do acts which are for the protection of his master's property. I say 'authorized,' for though there are acts which he is bound to do, and for which therefore his master is responsible, it does not follow that the servant must be bound to do an act in order to make his master responsible for it."
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