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Vicarious Liability - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 22 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Mitchell And His Wife, v Chrassweller and Another; 27-Jan-1853 - [1853] EngR 174; (1853) 13 CB 237; (1853) 138 ER 1189
 
Bartonshill Coal Co v Reid (1858) 3 Macqu 265
1858
HL
Lord Cranworth
Vicarious Liability
A workman had been killed through the overturning of the miners' cage, the engineman having failed to stop the ascending cage at the platform and having allowed it to be sent with great force up against the scaffolding. An allegation was made that there had been no safe system of working. Held: After dealing with the maxim 'respondeat superior', Lord Cranworth said: "But do the same principles apply to the case of a workman injured by the want of care of a fellow-workman engaged together in the same work? I think not. When the workman contracts to do work of any particular sort, he knows, or ought to know, to what risks he is exposing himself; he knows, if such be the nature of the risk, that want of care on the part of a fellow-workman may be injurious or fatal to him, and that against such want of care his employer cannot by possibility protect him. If such want of care should occur, and evil is the result, he cannot say that he does not know whether the master or the servant was to blame. He knows that the blame was wholly that of the servant. He cannot say the master need not have engaged in the work at all, for he was party to its being undertaken." The law on this point should be the same in Scotland as in England.
1 Citers


 
Bartonshill Coal Company v Jane McGuire, Widow (1858) 3 Macq 300; [1858] UKHL 3 - Macqueen - 300
17 Jun 1858
HL
Lord Chelmsford LC, Lord Brougham
Vicarious Liability
Master's Liability to the Public for Injury done by a Servant. - Per the Lord Chancellor: A master is liable for any injury or damage done to the public through the negligence or unskilfulness of servants acting in the master's employ. The reason is, that every act done by the servant in the course of his duty is regarded as done by his master's orders, and consequently is the same as if it were the master's own act, according to the maxim, Qui facit per alium facit per se - Subject - Master's Exemption from Liability to one Servant for Injury done to him by a Fellow-Servant. - When the injury caused by the negligence or unskilfulness of a servant is sustained, not by the public, but by another servant acting in the same employment under the same master, the master is not liable, unless there be proof of general incompetency on the part of the servant causing the injury, or of insufficiency or defectiveness in the machinery furnished by the master;
Per Lord Brougham: The two servants (the injurer and the injured) must be in the same common employment, and engaged in the same common work under that common employment;
Lord Chelmsford LC It is necessary to ascertain whether the servants are fellow-labourers in the same common work; because, although a servant may be taken to have engaged to encounter all risks which are incident to the service which he undertakes, he cannot be expected to anticipate those which may happen to him on occasions foreign to his employment; p. 307.
[ Bailii ]
 
Ashworth v Stanwix (1860) 3 E & E 701
1860
QBD

Vicarious Liability, Company
Innocent partners are vicariously liable for the torts of their co-partner.
1 Citers


 
Pickard v Smith [1861] EngR 71; (1861) 10 CB NS 470; (1861) 142 ER 535
1861

Williams J
Vicarious Liability, Negligence
Refreshment rooms and a coal-cellar at a railway station were let by the company to one S, the opening for putting coals into the cellar being on the arrival platform. A train coming in whilst the servants of a cod-merchant mere shooting coals into the cellar for S., the plaintiff, a passenger, whilst passing (as the jury found) in the usual way out of the station, without any fault of his own, fell into the cellar opening, which the coal-merchant's servants had negligently left insufficiently guarded. Held: S, the occupier of the refreshment-rooms and cellar, was responsible for this negligence. And semble, per Williams, J, that the railway company also would be liable, but not the coal-merchant.
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Limpus v The London General Omnibus Company; 1861 - [1861] EngR 53; (1861) 2 F & F 640; (1861) 175 ER 1221
 
Goff v The Great Northern Railway Company [1861] EngR 316; (1861) 3 El & El 672; (1861) 121 ER 594
13 Feb 1861


Torts - Other, Vicarious Liability
A railway Company though it be a corporation, is liable in an action for false imprisonment, if that imprisonment be committed by its authority.
[ Commonlii ]

 
 Limpus v London General Omnibus Company; CExC 23-Jun-1862 - (1862) 1 H&C 526; [1862] EngR 839; (1862) 1 H & C 526; (1862) 158 ER 993
 
Murphy v Caralli (1864) 3 H & C 462
1864


Vicarious Liability

1 Citers


 
Regina v Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702
1866

Mellor J, Blackburn J
Crime, Vicarious Liability
The court was asked whether the owner of a slate quarry was answerable for a public nuisance caused by his workmen without his knowledge and contrary to his general orders. Held: Mellor J: "It is quite true that this in point of form is a proceeding of a criminal nature, but in substance I think it is in the nature of a civil proceeding, and I can see no reason why a different rule should prevail with regard to such an act as is charged in this indictment between proceedings which are civil and proceedings which are criminal. I think there may be nuisances of such a character that the rule I am applying here, would not be applicable to them, but here it is perfectly clear that the only reason for proceeding criminally is that the nuisance, instead of being merely a nuisance affecting an individual, or one or two individuals, affects the public at large, and no private individual, without receiving some special injury, could have maintained an action. Then if the contention of those who say the direction is wrong is to prevail, the public would have great difficulty in getting redress. The object of this indictment is to prevent the recurrence of the nuisance. The prosecutor cannot proceed by action, but must proceed by indictment, and if this were strictly a criminal proceeding the prosecution would be met with the objection that there was no mens rea: that the indictment charged the defendant with a criminal offence, when in reality there was no proof that the defendant knew of the act, or that he himself gave orders to his servants to do the particular act he is charged with; still at the same time it is perfectly clear that the defendant finds the capital, and carries on the business which causes the nuisance, and it is carried on for his benefit; although from age or infirmity the defendant is unable to go to the premises, the business is carried on for him by his sons, or at all events by his agents. Under these circumstances the defendant must necessarily give to his servants or agents all the authority that is incident to the carrying on of the business. It is not because he had at some time or other given directions that it should be carried on so as not to allow the refuse from the works to fall into the river, and desired his servants to provide some other place for depositing it, that when it has fallen into the river, and has become prejudicial to the public, he can say he is not liable on an indictment for a nuisance caused by the acts of his servants. It appears to me that all it was necessary to prove is, that the nuisance was caused in the carrying on of the works of the quarry."

Blackburn J: "All that it is necessary to say is this, that where a person maintains works by his capital, and employs servants, and so carries on the works as in fact to cause a nuisance to a private right, for which an action would lie, if the same nuisance inflicts an injury upon a public right the remedy for which would be by indictment, the evidence which would maintain the action would also support the indictment. That is all that it was necessary to decide and all that is decided."
1 Citers



 
 Barwick v English Joint Stock Bank; 1867 - (1867) LR 2 Ex 259
 
St Aubyn v Smart (1868) LR 3 Ch App 646
1868


Vicarious Liability, Legal Professions

1 Citers


 
McGowan and Co v Dyer (1873) LR 8 QB 141
1873

Blackburn J
Vicarious Liability
Story on Agency states the general rule that the principal is liable to third persons in a civil suit "for the frauds, deceits, concealments, misrepresentations, torts, negligences, and other malfeasances or misfeasances, and omissions of duty of his agent in the course of his employment, although the principal did not authorise, or justify, or participate in, or indeed know of such misconduct, or even if he forbade the acts, or disapproved of them. But although the principal is thus liable for the torts and negligences of his agent, yet we are to understand the doctrine with its just limitations, that the tort or negligence occurs in the course of the agency. For the principal is not liable for the torts or negligences of his agent in any matters beyond the scope of the agency, unless he has expressly authorised them to be done, or he has subsequently adopted them for his own use and benefit.
1 Citers



 
 Rourke v White Moss Colliery Co Ltd; 1876 - [1876] 2 CPD 205

 
 Yewens v Noakes; CA 1880 - (1880) 6 QBD 530
 
Hughes v Percival (1883) 8 App Cas 443; [1881-85] All ER 44; (1883) 8 AC 443
1883

Lord Blackburn
Agency, Vicarious Liability, Negligence
The parties were neighbouring householders with a party wall. A builder working in the defendant's house negligently cut into the party wall, causing the partial collapse of both the defendant's house and the Plaintiff's house next-door. Held: Lord Blackburn said: "The first point to be considered is what was the relation in which the defendant stood to the plaintiff. It was admitted that they were owners of adjoining houses between which was a party-wall the property of both. The defendant pulled down his house and had it rebuilt on a plan which involved in it the tying together of the new building and the party-wall which was between the plaintiff's house and the defendant's, so that if one fell the other would be damaged. The defendant had a right so to utilize the party-wall, for it was his property as well as the plaintiff's; a stranger would not have had such a right. But I think the law cast upon the defendant, when exercising this right, a duty towards the plaintiff. I do not think that duty went so far as to require him absolutely to provide that no damage should come to the plaintiff's wall from the use he thus made of it, but I think that the duty went as far as to require him to see that reasonable skill and care were exercised in those operations which involved a use of the party-wall, exposing it to this risk. If such a duty was cast upon the defendant he could not get rid of responsibility by delegating the performance of it to a third person. He was at liberty to employ such a third person to fulfil the duty which the law cast on himself, and, if they so agreed together, to take an indemnity to himself in case mischief came from that person not fulfilling the duty which the law cast upon the defendant; but the defendant still remained subject to that duty, and liable for the consequences if it was not fulfilled. This is the law I think clearly laid down in Pickard v Smith 10 CB (NS) 470, and finally in (1881) Dalton v Angus 6 App Cas 740. But in all the cases on the subject there was a duty cast by law on the party who was held liable."
1 Citers


 
Donovan v Laing, Wharton and Down Construction Syndicate Ltd [1893] 1 QB 629
1893
CA
Bowen LJ, Lord Esher MR
Vicarious Liability
The plaintiff was injured by the negligence of a crane driver. The defendants had contracted to lend the crane with its driver to a firm who were loading a ship. Held: There are circumstances in which vicarious liability for the tortious act of a workman can be transferred from his employer to a third person who is using the employee's services under a contract, or other arrangement, with his employer. Although the crane driver remained the general employee of the defendants, they had parted with the power of controlling him with regard to the matter on which he was engaged and were not liable for his negligence while he was so employed.
Lord Esher MR said: "For some purposes, no doubt, the man was the servant of the defendants. Probably, if he had let the crane get out of order by his neglect, and in consequence anyone was injured thereby, the defendants might be liable; but the accident in this case did not happen from that cause, but from the manner of working the crane. The man was bound to work the crane according to the orders and under the entire and absolute control of Jones & Co." Bowen LJ said that the court only had to consider in whose employment the man was at the time the acts complained of were done, in the sense that by the employer is meant the person who has a right at the moment to control the doing of the act. The question was whether the defendants had parted with the power of controlling the operation on which the man was engaged.
1 Citers


 
Dyer v Munday; Morris v Martin [1895] 1 QB 742
1895
CA
Lord Esher MR
Crime, Vicarious Liability
The defendant, a hire purchase furniture dealer, sent his manager to recover back some furniture hired to X and upon which several instalments were unpaid. X had pledged the furniture to his landlord as security for his rent, and the landlord's wife sought to prevent the manager from removing the furniture. The manager assaulted her in the house. Held: The employer had placed his employee in a situation "where he may be expected on occasions to have to resort to personal violence". There is no rule of law that vicarious responsibility should cease to apply when the conduct for which liability is imposed is criminal rather than just tortious. "The liability of the master does not rest merely on the question of authority, because the authority given is generally to do the master´s business rightly; but the law says that if, in course of carrying out his employment, the servant commits an excess beyond the scope of his authority, the master is liable."
1 Citers


 
Meux v Great Eastern Railway Co [1895] 2 QB 387
1895


Negligence, Vicarious Liability
The plaintiff sought damages from the railway company for carelessly damaging his goods even though he did not himself have a contract with the company. Held: A duty was owed by the railway company towards the goods owner, applying cases which had held that a railway company owed a duty of care towards passengers injured by the carelessness of that company's employee even though the passenger had bought his ticket from another company. No distinction was drawn between an employee injuring the plaintiff and damaging or losing his property.
1 Citers


 
Mara v Browne [1896] 1 Ch 199
1896
HL
Lord Herschell, A L Smith LJ, Rigby LJ
Vicarious Liability, Legal Professions
In a marriage settlement, the first defendant, a solicitor, advised the persons who were acting as trustees, though not yet formally appointed as such. He suggested a series improper of investments for the trust funds. The money was to be lent on speculative building, and the margin was unsatisfactory. The money was lost. Lord Herschell considered that, if the claimants had charged him with negligence as a solicitor and brought the action in time, they might well have succeeded, in which case both he and his partner would have been liable. But any such action was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Accordingly the claimants alleged that HB had intermeddled with the trust and was liable as a trustee de son tort. They alleged that he had laid out the trust moneys at a time when there were no trustees, and therefore must be taken to have acted as a principal in the matter and not as a mere agent for the trustees. Such a claim was not statute-barred. Held: It is not within the scope of the implied authority of a partner in a firm of solicitors that he should act to make himself a constructive trustee, and thereby subject his partner to liability. "it is not within the scope of the implied authority of a partner in . . [a solicitor's] business that he should so act as to make himself a constructive trustee, and thereby subject his partner to the same liability".
1 Citers


 
Jones v Scullard [1898] 2 QB 565
1898

Lord Russell of Killowen CJ
Vicarious Liability
A borrowed driver was acting as the servant of the defendant owner of the carriage and horses so as to make the defendant liable for the driver's negligence.
1 Citers


 
Holliday v National Telephone Company [1899] 2 QB 392
1899
CA
A L Smith LJ
Negligence, Vicarious Liability
A passer-by on the highway was injured through the negligence of an independent contractor. Held: The employer was liable.
A L Smith LJ said: "The defence is that the defendants are not liable in respect of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, because it was occasioned by the negligence of an independent contractor for whom they are not responsible. In my opinion, since the decision of the House of Lords in Hughes v. Percival (1883) 8 App. Cas. 443, and that of the Privy Council in Black v. Christchurch Finance Co. [1894] A C 48, it is very difficult for a person who is engaged in the execution of dangerous works near a highway to avoid liability by saying that he has employed an independent contractor, because it is the duty of a person who is causing such works to be executed to see that they are properly carried out so as not to occasion any damage to persons passing by on the highway."
1 Citers


 
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