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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Utilities - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 5 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Geitling Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft and Others v ECSC High Authority C-13/60; [1962] EUECJ C-13/60
3 May 1961
ECJ

Utilities
ECJ 1. In view of the difference of wording between paragraphs (1) and (2) of article 65 of the ECSC treaty a basic distinction between the power to fix prices and the power to determine prices is permissible.
for the undertaking which exercises it, the power to fix prices represents an objective fact arising out of an easily ascertainable organizational structure.
On the other hand, the power to determine prices resides in the power, given to the undertaking entitled to exercise it, to establish prices at a level appreciably different from that at which they would have been established by the unaided effect of competition. Thus a power to determine prices can be said to exist only when it is established that the actual prices are, or may be, different from what they would have been in the absence of any power to fix prices.
2. It follows from the provisions of article 65 (2) and 66 (2) of the ecsc treaty that the treaty is not opposed to the continued existence or to the creation of large production or sales units, such as are characteristic of the coal and steel market, on condition that the resulting system of imperfect competition serves the objectives of the treaty and, in particular, that it safeguards within that market the measure of competition essential for the observance of the requirements of the second paragraph of article 2.
3. A cartel which has the ability to regulate the marketing of a substantial part of a given product within the common market exercises a power of control over marketing within the meaning of article 65 (2) (c) of the ecsc treaty.
4. By permitting the continued existence and creation of large production and sales units within the common market for coal and steel, the ecsc treaty grants those who take part in this market a measure of power to determine prices, which is, however, limited by provisions such as those of article 65 (2) (c) which are intended to safeguard a necessary minimum of competition.
5. A power to determine prices or to control marketing applies to a substantial part of certain products within the common market when the full extent of the effects which it produces is not of secondary or minor importance, but is such as to jeopardize, within the said market, the measure of competition intended by the treaty or the execution of the tasks which articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 assign to the community.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Central Electricity Generating Board v Halifax Corporation; HL 1963 - [1963] AC 785

 
 Haley v London Electricity Board; HL 28-Jul-1964 - [1964] 3 All ER 185; [1964] 3 WLR 479; [1965] AC 778; [1964] UKHL 3
 
Acciaieria Ferriera Di Roma (Feram) And Others v High Authority Of The ECSC C-25/64; [1965] EUECJ C-25/64
2 Jun 1965
ECJ

Utilities

[ Bailii ]
 
Societe anonyme metallurgique Hainaut-Sambre v High Authority of the ECSC (Judgment) C-4/65; [1965] EUECJ C-4/65
15 Dec 1965
ECJ

European, Utilities
Europa 1. Common financial arrangements - equalization - contributions - exemption - principles (ECSC treaty, article 53) 2. Common financial arrangements - equalization - ferrous scrap - exemption - own resources - concept (ECSC treaty, article 53) 1 Cf. Paragraph 1, summary in case 3/65 (1965) ECR 1065. The conditions for granting exemption from contributions under an equalization scheme must be interpreted strictly and must be consistent with the aims, the basic principles and requirements for the proper functioning of such a scheme, in particular the principle of the equal liability of all those affected to pay contributions shared in proportion to the amounts respectively consumed, and the requirement that the scheme be applied impartially to all those subject to it. No exemption from equalization contributions can be allowed which would tend to increase substantially differences in production costs, otherwise than by altering the level of output, and thereby bring about an appreciable disequilibrium in the competitive relationships between undertakings. 2. Cf. Paragraph 2, summary in case 3/65 (1965) ECR 1065. Any exemption from equalization contributions which depends not on the way in which an undertaking arranges its production but on the contractual relationships which it has with other undertakings is not compatible with the equalization scheme. Classification of scrap as 'own resources' is not necessarily dependent on the concept of ownership of the scrap, but is intended to apply in the main to scrap which is genuinely the product of an undertaking's own activity
[ Bailii ]
 
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