swarb.co.uk - law index
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Undue Influence - From: 1980 To: 1984
This page lists 2 cases, and was prepared on 21 May 2019.
ÂIsrael Discount Bank of New York v Hadjipateras [1984] 1 WLR 137; [1983] 3 All ER 129; [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep 490
1983
CA
Contract, Undue Influence
An application was made to enforce a judgment in England. The respondent alleged that he had signed a guarantee under the undue influence of his father. Held: The Court reversed the decision of the first instance judge. The substance of the decision is that the respondent had deliberately refrained from raising a defence in New York and was therefore not entitled to take the point in the English courts. However, in general, "The fact that an agreement was obtained by undue influence, duress or coercion was a reason for an English court to treat a foreign judgment based on that agreement as being invalid or to refuse to enforce the foreign judgment as being contrary to English public policy."
1 Citers
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Tommey v Tommey [1983] Fam 15; [1983] 4 FLR 159
1983
FD
Balcombe J
Family, Undue Influence
W asked the court to set aside a consent financial relief order. She was to transfer her half of the home to H, in return for £8,000 paid by H in settlement of her financial provision. She said that in the negotiations leading up to the agreement H had exercised undue influence over her. Held: As a matter of law, undue influence was not a good ground to set aside a consent order. She also said that because H had filed no affidavit, the judge had made the order without full knowledge. Balcombe J said: "Nor is there substance in another ground, viz. ignorance of relevant facts on the part of the judge. A judge who is asked to make a consent order cannot be compelled to do so: he is no mere rubber stamp. If he thinks there are matters about which he needs to be more fully informed before he makes the order, he is entitled to make such inquiries and require such evidence to be put before him as he considers necessary. But, per contra, he is under no obligation to make inquiries or require evidence. He is entitled to assume that parties of full age and capacity know what is in their own best interests, more especially when they are represented before him by counsel or solicitors. The fact that he was not told facts which, had he known them, might have affected his decision to make a consent order, cannot of itself be a ground for impeaching the order. Accordingly, the wife is not entitled on this ground to have the order of 18 February 1975 set aside."
1 Citers
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