swarb.co.uk - law index

Torts - Other - From: 2000 To: 2000

This page lists 58 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

Originally, the tort required the breach to be the result of wilful, deliberate and direct conduct which the defendant knew or hoped would result in a violation of the plaintiff's contractual rights. See for example, Lumley v Gye (1853), 118 E.R. 749, 2 El. & B1.216 (Q.B); and Quinn v Leathem, [1901] A.C.495 (H.L.(I.)).

However, courts soon recognized that intent can also be inferred when the consequences of the conduct were a necessary or reasonable foreseeable result, because "people are presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of their acts": South Wales Miners' Federation v Glamorgan Coal Company, [1905]A.C.239 (H.L.(E.)) at 244. In Posluns v Toronto Stock Exchange and Gardiner (1965), 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210 (Ont. H.C) at 267; affirmed (1966), 53 D.L.R (2d) 193 (C.A.); affirmed [1968] S.C.R. 330, 67 D.L.R. (2d) 165, the court held that liability would attach if the defendant's conduct resulted in the breach of a contract "of which it was or ought to have been aware". The intention to bring about a breach of contract need not be the primary object; it is sufficient if the interference is necessarily incidental to attaining the defendant's primary objective: Fraser v Board of Trustees of Central United Church (1983), 38 O.R. (2d) 97 (H.C.J.) at 103' and Bank of Nova Scotia v Gaudreau (1985), 48 O.R. (2d) 478 (H.C.J.). [41] Intention can also be established when the defendant was reckless or wilfully blind to a breach. The defendant need not have actually known the precise terms of the contract or that his object only could be accomplished through breach of the contract. "If – turning a blind eye – he went about it regardless of whether it would involve a breach, he will be treated just as if he had knowingly procured it": J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 8th Ed. (Sydney: law Book Co., 1992) at 694.

Turning a blind eye may include situations in which the defendant failed to seek advice or employ the means available to obtain the necessary knowledge. For example, in Royal Bank of Canada v Wilton (1995), 165 A.R. 261, D.L.R. (4th) 266 (C.A.), the defendant was uncertain about the enforceability of a contract, had the "means of knowledge" to determine if a legitimate contract existed, but made no efforts to seek advice. This court found the defendant liable because he deliberately chose not to acquire the information, but proceeded on the basis that the contract was unenforceable. Similarly, when there are competing legal interpretations and the defendant adopts an interpretation which will interfere with the plaintiff's rights, the defendant "must at least show that he was advised and honestly believed that he was legally entitled to take that course": Swiss Bank v Lloyds Bank, [1979] Ch.548 at 580 (CH.D.); reversed on other grounds [1982] A.C. 584 (C.A.); affirmed [1982] A.C. 604 (H.L.(E)).
If the defendant acted under a bona fide belief that contractual rights would not be infringed, liability will not be found even though the belief turned out to be mistaken. But for a mistaken belief to be bona fide, rather than the result of recklessness or wilful blindness, some basis for the belief must exist, and some reasonable effort must have been made by the defendant to learn the truth. In British Industrial Plastics Ltd. v Ferguson, [1940] 1 All E.R. 479 (H.L.(E.)), the defendants who had made the effort to seek advice were not found liable even though their belief was described as "illogical". In Z-Mark International Inc. v Leng Novak Inc. (1996), 12 O.T.C. 33 (Gen. Div.), appeal dismissed (1999), 122 O.A.C. 341, a defendant made inquiries and obtained assurances and a warranty. The court found that the defendant had no reason to doubt the assurance or the warranty and therefore the defendant was not knowingly or recklessly indifferent to a breach of contract.

In some cases a distinction is drawn between direct interference, for which the breach must be foreseeable or reasonable consequence of the conduct, and indirect interference, for which the breach must be necessary or substantially certain consequence. See, for example, L.N. Klar, Tort Law, 2nd ed. (Scarborough: Carswell, 1996) at 498 and 507; Fleming, supra, at 694; D.C. Thomson & Co. Ltd. V Deakin ,[1952] Ch. 646 (C.A.); Bank of Nova Scotia, supra; Garry v Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd., [1988] 1 W.W.R. 289, 45 D.L.R. (4d) 22 (Sask. C.A.); and Atcheson, supra.

[45] As this case involves direct interference, this distinction does not arise. Pocklington, as the director of Gainers, executed the documents to complete the transfer of the 350151 shares to his own company. The transfer caused Gainers to breach s. 12.03(1) of the Master Agreement, which prohibited dispositions of assets without Alberta's consent. Therefore, if the breach was a reasonable or foreseeable consequence of that transfer, or alternatively, if Pocklington completed the transfer recklessly, was wilfully blind to its consequences, or was indifferent as to whether or not it caused a breach, the necessary intent element for the tort will be met."
1 Citers

[ Canlii ]
 
Margaret Ribee v Michael Norrie Times, 22 November 2000; [2000] EWCA Civ 275; [2001] L & TR 23
22 Nov 2000
CA

Torts - Other, Land, Personal Injury
An owner of a property let to tenants was liable to a neighbour injured after a fire in the property, where the fire arose in circumstances which the owner had power, through the making of rules to prevent. The damage arose from a tenant smoking in a communal area. The test was whether the owner had the right to debar such behaviour. Since he did, he must be treated as the occupier of the land for this purpose and was therefore liable to the neighbour.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Hilda Amoo-Gottfried v Legal Aid Board (No 1 Regional Committee) [2000] EWCA Civ 301
1 Dec 2000
CA
Otton LJ, Mantell LJ, Hale LJ
Torts - Other
The claimant appealed an order dismissing her claim for misfeasance in public office by the defendant, for the way in which they had mishandled her membership of duty solicitor rota schemes. Held: The court discussed the requirements for establishing the tort of misfeasance in public office. The tort was Here reckless indifference (if subjective) to the consequences to the claimant had to be shown. Here: "Whether or not the committee were entitled to do as they did, they were doing so in order to further the main purpose of the legislation. They were not doing so arbitrarily, out of prejudice, or favouritism, or any of the other improper motives which might have been alleged in this case." and "The point . . is not what was or was not in fact lawful at the time, but whether the committee had an honest belief that it was lawful to do as it did." The claim failed.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Bank of Ireland Home Mortgages Ltd v Bell and Another [2000] EWCA Civ 426
4 Dec 2000
CA
Beldam LJ, Otton J, Judge LG
Personal Injury, Torts - Other

[ Bailii ]
 
Abrahams v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis Gazette, 01 February 2001; Times, 21 December 2000; [2001] 1 WLR 1257; [2000] EWCA Civ 3043; [2000] Po LR 374
8 Dec 2000
CA
Mantell LJ, Kay LJ
Torts - Other, Criminal Practice, Police
The claimant had been arrested for swearing at a police officer. After her arrest, the claimant made admissions to secure a caution, rather than risk prosecution. She later sought to begin a civil action for damages against the police in the course of which she the denied the matters which she had earlier admitted. Held: The claimant's appeal against a strike out of her claim succeeded. The admissions had been secured by an apparent breach of duty by the officer, and she was not be estopped from bringing the claim. The formal caution is not so closely analogous to a conviction that the claimant should be barred from beginning civil proceedings because of it. An attack on the caution did not involve attacking any decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.
Lord Justice Mantell said: 'the caution was not brought about by any decision of a court of justice, so did not fall foul of the rule in Saif Ali. An attack on it did not involve attacking a decision of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction.'
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Sinclair v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire and British Telecommunications Plc; CA 12-Dec-2000 - [2000] EWCA Civ 319
 
Kieth Platt v Colin Platt and Another [2000] EWCA Civ 322
13 Dec 2000
CA
The Vice-Chancellor Lord Justice Chadwick And Lord Justice Latham
Company, Damages, Torts - Other
The applicant appealed an order setting aside transfers to him of shares in a family company, found to have been made after misrepresentation and a breach of fiduciary duty. Three companies owned by the family had fallen into difficulties, and the shares were transferred for nominal consideration, on the basis of representations made as to the liabilities of the company, and as to their later return. Later the company prospered, and they sought the return of their shares. Held: The appeal was as to matters of fact. The judgment did not set out clearly the facts found on the issues now tested, but there was evidence upon which his findings could properly be based. There had been misrepresentation by the defendant. The measure of damages for a tortious misrepresentation is the sum necessary to put the claimant in the position he would have been in, if the misrepresentation had not been made. The judge should not have assessed damages on a partial realisation basis without discounting the assets for the value of the directors service contracts, which would have been costs in the realisation of the assets.
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Macquarie Generation v Peabody Resources Ltd; 14-Dec-2000 - [2000] NSWCA 361; [2001] Aust Contract Reports 90-121
 
Yukong Line Limited (S K Shipping Limited) v Rendsburg Investments Corporation; Ladidi Investment Corporation of Liberia; etc [2000] EWCA Civ 358
21 Dec 2000
CA

Torts - Other

[ Bailii ]

 
 Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Sheik; CA 22-Dec-2000 - Times, 22 December 2000; Gazette, 08 February 2001