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Torts - Other - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 44 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Hussein v Choung Fook Kam [1970] AC 942
1970
HL
Lord Devlin
Police, Torts - Other
When making an arrest, the standard of proof required of the officer is suspicion and no more. It falls well short of prima facie proof. Suspicion should not be elided with guilt, or even prima facie proof of guilt. It "is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: I suspect but I cannot prove."
1 Citers



 
 Roy v Prior; HL 1970 - [1971] AC 470; [1970] 2 All ER 729
 
Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 KB 191; [1969] EWCA Civ 1; [1969] 3 All ER 863; [1969] 3 WLR 29
1970
CA
Widgery LJ, Harman LJ, Sachs LJ
Negligence, Torts - Other
The defendant had instructed independent contractors to remove a large tree in his garden. When they did so, the plaintiff was injured when the car he was in was fouled in a wire brought down by the tree. The defendant householder appealed against a finding of liability saying that he should not be held responsible for the acts of a competent independent contractor. Held: The activity of removing the tree was not an extra-hazardous activity so as to make the defendant liable. Extra-hazardous activities for which a land owner might responsible even though the activities were carried out by an independent contractor, were those "activities which are dangerous even if carried out with caution by those skilled in the activity". And "There are indeed certain categories of cases in which an occupier is under such a primary duty to others that he in effect warrants the safety of his property against those who are injured by what happens upon it, or alternatively is personally responsible for having any work on it done in a competent manner even if he selected a competent independent contractor."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Wheatley v Lodge; 1971 - [1971] 1 WLR 29; [1971] 1 All ER 173

 
 Southwark London Borough Council v Williams; CA 1971 - [1971] 1Ch 734; [1971] 2 All ER 175; [1971] 2 WLR 467
 
Regina v Governor of Richmond Remand Centre, Ex Parte Asghar [1971] 1 WLR 129
1971
QBD
Lord Parker LCJ
Immigration, Torts - Other
The Secretary of State had detained two persons who were awaiting removal with the object that they should testify in a pending criminal trial. Lord Parker J rejected the suggestion that the detention could be justified as reasonable in these circumstances, stating: "it does seem to me that while a reasonable time is contemplated between the giving of the directions and the final removal, that is a reasonable time necessary to effect the physical removal".
He considered the length of time for which the plaintiff had been detained after release from prison but pending deportation saying: "even if . . valid directions were given, the question remains whether, persuant to paragraph 4(1), the applicants continued thereafter, that is after the directions, to be held pending removal in pursuance of such directions. It quite clearly contemplates, of course, that there will be some interval of time between the giving of the directions and their implementation, and for that period of time there is authority to detain. But when one turns to the facts of this case, the reality of the position is that the applicants were being detained pending the trial at the Central Criminal Court at which they were required to give evidence. Accordingly on that second ground I think that detention was not justified.
Mr Slynn has argued very forcibly that of course the period contemplated that may elapse between the giving of the directions and the actual removal must be a reasonable period. He says here that in all the circumstances it was reasonable for the Secretary of State to require the detention of these two men pending the completion of the trial at the Central Criminal Court.
Much as I wish I could accede to that argument, it does seem to me that while a reasonable time is contemplated between the giving of the directions and the final removal, that is a reasonable time necessary to effect the physical removal, the truth of the matter is that the Home Office naturally desires to do nothing which will interfere with the trial. One sympathises with this object, but of course it can be achieved, by giving these applicants conditional permits. There are obvious practical reasons why this course is not adopted, because as experience has shown, nothing may ever be seen of the applicants again."
1 Citers


 
Distiller's Co (Biochemicals) Ltd v Thompson [1971] AC 458; [1971] UKPC 3; [1971] 1 All ER 694; [1971] 2 WLR 441
19 Jan 1971
PC
Lord Pearson, Lord Reid, Lord Morris, Lord Upjohn, Lord Donovan
Torts - Other, Jurisdiction, Commonwealth
(Australia) There had been a negligent failure in New South Wales to warn a pregnant woman of the dangers of taking the drug thalidimide. Held: When looking at jurisdiction to hear a complaint of a tort, the court should look to where in substance the tort was committed. Lord Pearson said: "It is not the right approach to say that, because there was no complete tort until the damage occurred, therefore the cause of action arose wherever the damage happened to occur. The right approach is, when the tort is complete, to look back over the series of events constituting it and ask the question: where in substance did this cause of action arise?"
and it was "manifestly just and reasonable that a defendant should have to answer for his wrongdoing in the country where he did the wrong".
New South Wales Common Law Procedure Act 1899 18(4)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Warren v Warren [1972] Qd R 386
1972

Matthews J
Commonwealth, Jurisdiction, Torts - Other
(Australia) The plaintiff was injured in a car accident while on a visit to New South Wales, where she had no right of action in tort against her husband. She began her action in Queensland, where she was ordinarily resident and domiciled where such a right of action did exist. Held: The defendant's application to set aside the writ was dismissed. There was a degree of flexibility in the rule which admitted of exception where clear and satisfactory grounds were shown why it should be departed from and that, on the facts of that case, it was right to apply the law of the forum even if the acts were not actionable by the law of the locus delicti.
1 Citers


 
S v McC; W v W [1972] AC 24
1972
HL
Lord Hodson, Lord MacDermott, Lord Reid
Children, Torts - Other, Health Professions
The distinction between the court's 'custodial' and 'protective' jurisdictions was recognised. The case concerned the ordering of blood tests with a view to determining the paternity of a child involved in divorce proceedings. This was not a matter of upbringing in which the child's interests (which might well be prejudiced by a finding that he was illegitimate) were paramount. (Lord MacDermott) "The duty of the High Court as respects the welfare and affairs of infants falls into two broad categories. There is, first of all, the duty to protect the infant, particularly when engaged or involved in litigation. This duty is of a general nature and derives from the Court of Chancery and to some extent also, I believe, from the common law courts which were merged along with the Court of Chancery in the High Court of Justice by the Judicature Act 1873. It recognises that the infant, as one not sui juris may stand in need of aid. He must not be allowed to suffer because of his incapacity. But the aim is to ensure that he gets his rights rather than to place him above the law and make his rights superior to those of others. The Official Solicitor, however, relied on something more than the protective jurisdiction. He relied upon what is commonly referred to as the 'custodial jurisdiction' - the second of the broad categories which I have mentioned already. This is an aspect of the prerogative and paternal jurisdiction of the former Court of Chancery. It is derived mainly from the administrative functions of the Court of Chancery in which that court had to make a choice between conflicting claims as to the custody and upbringing of the infant or the management of his affairs, or to determine the course to be taken in such matters even when not in actual dispute." (Lord Hodson) "In custody cases the child's welfare is the governing consideration when all the relevant facts, claims and the wishes of the parents are taken into account. I am not persuaded that the position is the same where a paternity issue has to be tried. True that, as in all cases where infants are concerned, the court will see that the infant is protected. . . . The court in ordering a blood test in the case of an infant has, of course, a discretion and may make or refuse an order for a test in the exercise of its discretion, but the interests of persons other than the child are involved in ordinary litigation. The infant needs protection but that is no justification for making his rights superior to those of others."
(Reid) "But even if one accepts the view that in ordering, directing or permitting a blood test the court should not go further than a reasonable parent would go, surely a reasonable parent would have some regard to the general public interest and would not refuse a blood test unless he thought that would clearly be against the interests of the child." (Sir Thomas Bingham MR) ‘I would for my part accept without reservation that the decision of a devoted and responsible parent should be treated with respect. It should certainly not be disregarded or lightly set aside. But the role of the court is to exercise an independent and objective judgment. If that judgment is in accord with that of the devoted and responsible parent, well and good. If it is not, then it is the duty of the court, after giving due weight to the view of the devoted and responsible parent, to give effect to its own judgment. That is what it is there for. Its judgment may of course be wrong. So may that of the parent. But once the jurisdiction of the court is invoked its clear duty is to reach and express the best judgment it can.’
1 Citers


 
Moore v News of the World [1972] 1 QB 441
1972
CA
Stephenson LJ, Lord Denning MR
Litigation Practice, Torts - Other
An article was published which the plaintiff said left readers with the false apprehension that she had written it. She claimed under the statutory tort of false attribution. Held: The judge was correct to direct the jury to make up their minds what the impression was to the reader. Confirming that a judge need not deal in detail with facts which were admitted by both parties when directing the jury in a defamation trial, “There were left out of the summing up, as out of every summing up which deserves the name, some of the things which one party, and probably both parties, would have liked put in; but there was no omission which could have led to a misunderstanding or injustice.”
Lord Denning MR set out section 5 of the 1952 Act and said: "That is a very complicated section, but it means that a Defendant is not to fail simply because he cannot prove every single thing in the libel to be true. If he proves the greater part of it to be true, theneven though there is a smaller part not proved, nevertheless the Defendant will win as long as the part not proved does not do the Plaintiff much more harm."
Copyright Act 1956 843 - Defamation Act 1952 5
1 Citers


 
Ludlow and Others v Burgess (1972) 75 Cr App R 227
1972

Parker LCJ
Crime, Police, Torts - Other
A police officer has no more right to lay hands on someone than any other member of the community. The person so restrained is entitled to use reasonable force to free himself.
1 Citers


 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Goldblatt [1972] Ch 498
1972


Taxes Management, Insolvency, Torts - Other
In a winding up case, the Commissioners can if necessary proceed against a receiver for misfeasance.
1 Citers



 
 Gillespie Bros and Co Ltd v Roy Bowles Transport Ltd; CA 1973 - [1973] QB 400; [1973] 1 Lloyds Rep 10
 
Tampion v Anderson [1973] VR 715
1973


Commonwealth, Torts - Other
(Full Court of Victoria)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104; [1973] UKPC 2; [1973] UKPC 27
5 Dec 1973
PC
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Cross and Lord Simon of Glaisdale
Torts - Other, Contract
(New South Wales) The appellant had executed a deed on behalf of a company to sell shares to the respondent in the context of a long running boardroom battle. He said that the deed had been obtained by duress and was voidable. The respondent was said to have threatened the appellant with death. Held: The House considered the elements necessary to establish a defence of duress to a claim in tort.
Lord Cross said: "The scope of common law duress was very limited and at a comparatively early date equity began to grant relief in cases where the disposition in question had been procured by the exercise of pressure which the Chancellor considered to be illegitimate - although it did not amount to common law duress. " and "there is an obvious analogy between setting aside a disposition for duress or undue influence and setting it aside for fraud."
By way of analogy, he considered the treatment of contributing causes in fraud cases: "If it were established that Barton did not allow the representation to affect his judgment then he could not make it a ground for relief. . . If on the other hand Barton relied on the misrepresentation Armstrong could not have defeated his claim to relief by showing that there were other more weighty causes which contributed to his decision . . for in this field the court does not allow an examination into the relative importance of contributing causes . . "
Lord Wilberforce (dissenting) said: "The basis of the plaintiff's claim is, thus, that though there was apparent consent there was no true consent to the agreement; that the agreement was not voluntary. This involves consideration of what the law regards as voluntary, or its opposite; for in life, including the life of commerce and finance, many acts are done under pressure, sometimes overwhelming pressure, so that one can say that the actor had no choice but to act. Absence of choice in this sense does not negate consent in law: for this the pressure must be one of a kind which the law does not regard as legitimate. Thus, out of the various means by which consent may be obtained—advice, persuasion, influence, inducement, representation, commercial pressure—the law has come to select some which it will not accept as a reason for voluntary action: fraud, abuse of relation of confidence, undue influence, duress or coercion."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]

 
 Southern Portland Cement Ltd v Cooper; PC 1974 - [1974] AC 623; [1974] 2 WLR 152; [1974] 1 All ER 87
 
Worcestershire County Council v Newman [1974] 2 All ER 867
1974
QBD
Cairns LJ
Land, Torts - Other
A complaint had been made to the magistrates that the authority had failed in its duty to repair pathways. The paths were crossed by fencing, by barbed wire, and vegetation had grown.
1 Citers


 
Esso Petroleum v Kingswood Motors (Addlestone) Ltd and Others [1974] QB 142
1974

Bridge J
Torts - Other
The defendant entered into a five year solus tie agreement with the plaintiff which required the defendant before completing any sale or transfer of the garage or its business to notify Esso and procure such person to enter into a direct agreement with Esso in the same terms as the agreement between Esso and the defendant. During the continuation of the tie, another company acquired the shares in the defendant and procured it to transfer the garage to its own subsidiary without notice to Esso or procuring its subsidiary to enter into a direct agreement with Esso. Esso instituted proceedings against Impact and its subsidiary and sought a mandatory injunction requiring the subsidiary to retransfer the garage to Kingswood. Held: The claim succeeded. If Esso had known the facts before the transfer had been completed it could have got injunctions restraining completion unless and until the transferee entered into the direct agreement with Esso which the tie required. He recorded the argument that it was now too late for the court to do anything about it. He rejected this submission. "There could be no clearer case than the present of an interference, namely, by Impact Holdings and Impact Motor as soon as they had control and were in a position to interfere, which procured not merely a prevention or hindrance to Kingswood in the performance of their obligations, but procured a direct breach by Kingswood of their contractual obligations. The interference was plainly deliberate and plainly direct." and "I am not asked to enforce an equitable doctrine which makes some party not privy to a contract nevertheless liable in certain circumstances to perform that contract. I am asked to enforce the personal liability incurred by a tortfeasor to undo the consequences of his tort which could have been restrained before it was committed. In a proper case, I ask myself: what reason can there be in principle why the tortfeasor should not be ordered to undo that which he has done?"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Australian Steel and Mining Corpn Pty Ltd v Corben [1974] 2 NSWLR 202
1974

Hutley JA
Torts - Other
Complaint was made that a statement (as to the identity of a purchaser to whom Mr Corben, who had decided to sell, was to give an option to purchase) was a "but for" cause of the agreement. Mr Corben would not have persevered with the deal if he had not known the identity of the purchaser. Held: The trial Judge or jury have to answer the question - did the misrepresentation cause the representee to enter into the contract, it being understood that the representation "was one among the factors which induced the contract''. That issue is one of fact.
1 Citers


 
Eccles v Bourque (1974) 50 DLR (3d) 753
11 Oct 1974

Laskin CJ and Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz and de Grandpre JJ
Torts - Other, Police
Canlii (Supreme Court of Canada) An action was brought by the appellant against the respondents, three constables on the Vancouver Police Force, for damages for trespass alleged to have been committed when the police officers entered the appellant’s apartment to apprehend one C, for whom there were three outstanding warrants. The officers were in plain clothes but were armed. They gave notice of presence by knocking on the door of the apartment and after it was opened notice of identity was given. An officer then told the appellant the reason for the entry. C was not found in the apartment. The appellant was successful at trial, but, on appeal, the Court of Appeal by a majority reversed. Leave to appeal to this Court was granted by the Court of Appeal. Held. The appeal should be dismissed.
Canlii Per Laskin C.J. and Judson, Spence and Dickson JJ.: The submission that a person who is by s. 450 of the Criminal Code authorized to make an arrest is, by s. 25, authorized by law to commit a trespass with or without force in the accomplishment of that arrest, provided he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, was not accepted. Section 25 merely affords justification to a person for doing what he is required or authorized by law to do in the administration or enforcement of the law, if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, and for using necessary force for that purpose. The question was whether the respondents were required or authorized by law to commit a trespass, not whether they were required or authorized to make an arrest. If they were authorized by law to commit a trespass, the authority for it must be found in the common law for there is nothing in the Criminal Code.
Unlike civil process, in the execution of criminal process the test is whether there are reasonable and probable grounds for acting. If the police officer has reasonable and probable cause to believe that the person named in the warrant for arrest is in the home of a stranger he has the right, after proper demand, to enter the home forcibly, to search and to arrest. In the present case the police officers had reasonable and probable grounds for believing that C was in the appellant’s apartment.
Except in exigent circumstances, the police officers must make an announcement prior to entry. In the ordinary case, before forcing entry, they should give (i) notice of presence by knocking or ringing the doorbell, (ii) notice of authority, by identifying themselves as law enforcement officers and (iii) notice of purpose, by stating a lawful reason for entry. On the facts of this case, proper notice was given.
1 Citers

[ Canlii ]
 
Oppenheimer v Cattermole (Inspector of Taxes) [1976] AC 249; [1975] UKHL TC_50_159; [1975] TR 13
5 Feb 1975
HL
Lord Cross of Chelsea
International, Torts - Other
HL Income tax, Schedule D - Foreign possessions - Double taxation relief - German government pension fo r past services - Paid to British subject o f German origin - Whether German nationality deemed to be retained - Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Federal Republic o f Germany) Order 1955 (S.I. 1955 No. 1203), Sch., arts. 11(3), IX(1) and XXI(3); Double Taxation Relief (Taxes on Income) (Federal Republic o f Germany) Order 1967 (S.1. 1967 No. 25), Sch., arts. 11(3), IX(2) and XXIII(3).
The 1941 decree of the National Socialist Government of Germany deprived Jewish emigres of their German nationality and, consequentially, lead to the confiscation of their property. Held: A racially discriminatory and confiscatory law of this sort was so grave an infringement of human rights and of "clearly established rules of international law" that the courts of this country ought to refuse to recognise it as a law at all.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Pountney v Griffiths; Regina v Bracknell Justices, Ex parte Griffiths; HL 1976 - [1976] AC 314
 
Hubbard v Pitt [1976] 1 QB 142
1976
CA
Lord Denning MR, Stamp and Orr L.JJ
Torts - Other
Protesters handed out leaflets and carried posters outside the plaintiff's estate agency. He claimed in trespass over the public footpath outside his premises. The defendants appealed the grant of an interlocutory injunction to prevent their demonstrations. Held: The injunction was upheld. The question of rights to use the highway was irrelevant; the court was concerned only with the private law rights of the plaintiff in relation to an alleged private nuisance.
Denning MR, dissenting, said "The public have a right of passage over a highway: but the soil may belong to someone else. The owner of the soil may sue if a person abuses the right of passage so as to use it for some other and unreasonable purpose. Such as where a racing tout walked up and down to note the trials of the race horses: see Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 Q.B.752. But those cases do not give Prebble & Co. A cause of action here: because Prebble & Co. do not own the pavement. It is a highway. The surface is vested in the local authority and they have not complained. Nor could they, since no wrong has been done to them or their interest."
The courts "should not interfere by interlocutory injunction with the right to demonstrate and to protest any more than they interfere with the right of free speech; provided that everything is done peaceably and in good order." and "the right to demonstrate and the right to protest on matters of public concern . . are rights which it is in the public interest that individuals should possess" and that "history is full of warnings against suppression of these rights".
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Ward v Tesco Stores Ltd; CA 1976 - [1976] 1 WLR 810; [1976] 1 All ER 219
 
In re D (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1976] Fam 185
1976


Torts - Other, Health Professions

1 Citers


 
Esso Petroleum Company Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801; [1976] EWCA Civ 4; [1976] 2 All ER 5
6 Feb 1976
CA
Lord Denning MR, Ormrod, Shaw LJJ
Torts - Other, Damages, Negligence, Contract
Statements had been made by employees of Esso in the course of pre-contractual negotiations with Mr Mardon, the prospective tenant of a petrol station. The statements related to the potential throughput of the station. Mr Mardon was persuaded by the statements to enter into the tenancy; but he suffered serious loss when the actual throughput proved to be much lower than had been predicted. Mr Marden did his best but he lost his capital and incurred a large bank overdraft as a result of his trading losses. Held: Mr. Mardon was entitled to recover damages from Esso, on the basis of either breach of warranty or (on this point affirming the decision of the judge below) negligent misrepresentation. A contractor is not free to carry on with a disastrous contract and then seek to recover any losses on the basis of fraud. A special relationship, giving rise to a duty of care, may arise between the parties negotiating a contract if information is given in connection with the contract.
Lord Denning MR held: "A professional man may give advice under a contract for reward; or without a contract, in pursuance of a voluntary assumption of responsibility, gratuitously without reward. In either case he is under one and the same duty to use reasonable care: see Cassidy v. Ministry of Health [1951] 2 K.B. 343, 359-360. In the one case it is by reason of a term implied by law. In the other, it is by reason of a duty imposed by law. For a breach of that duty he is liable in damages: and those damages should be, and are, the same, whether he is sued in contract or in tort." and: "He is only to be compensated for having been induced to enter into a contract which turned out to be disastrous for him. Whether it be called breach of warranty or negligent misrepresentation, its effect was not to warrant the throughput but only to induce him to enter the contract. So the damages in either case are to be measured by the loss he suffered. Just as in Doyle v Olby he can say: 'I would not have entered into this contract at all but for your representation. Owing to it, I have lost all the capital I put into it. I also incurred a large overdraft. I have spent four years of my life in wasted endeavour without reward: and it will take sometime to re-establish myself.' For all such loss he is entitled to recover damages."
Ormrod and Shaw LJJ agreed that Mr. Mardon was entitled to recover damages either for breach of warranty or for negligent misrepresentation.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Murphy v Culhane; CA 10-Jun-1976 - [1976] EWCA Civ 3; [1977] QB 94

 
 Smelter Corporation v O'Driscoll; 1977 - [1977] IR 307

 
 Spicer v Holt; HL 1977 - [1977] AC 987

 
 Cremdean Properties Ltd v Nash; CA 1977 - (1977) 244 EG 547
 
International Factors v Rodriguez [1979] 1 QB 351; [1978] 3 WLR 877
1978
CA
Sir David Cairns and Bridge LJ, Buckley LJ
Jurisdiction, Torts - Other
(Majority) Cheques were made payable to a company which had entered into a factoring agreement with the plaintiffs. The cheques were sent to the company in settlement of debts owed to the company but which had been assigned to the plaintiffs. The defendant, a Director of the company, paid the cheques into the company's bank account. Held: A mere contractual right to possession of cheques was insufficient to found an action in conversion, but the plaintiffs had more than a mere contractual right to possession, because they had equitable rights in the cheques.
Buckley LJ (minority) said that a contractual right to demand immediate delivery was a sufficient right to possession to give a status to sue in conversion.
Sir David Cairns said: "so a contractual right is not sufficient.
In my view, however, there was here something more than a contractual right. Clause 11(e) of the [Factoring] agreement provided both that the company was to hold any debt paid direct to the company in trust for the plaintiffs and immediately after receipt of a cheque, in the case of payment by cheque, to hand over that cheque to the plaintiffs. Taking together the trust which was thereby set up and the obligation immediately on receipt to hand over the cheque to the plaintiffs, I am satisfied that the plaintiffs had here a sufficient proprietary right to sue in conversion".
Bridge LJ said: "It is manifest on the terms of clause 11(e) of the agreement that the intention of the parties was that the cheque itself, if payment was by cheque, should be handed on, endorsed if necessary to the plaintiffs, and that confers upon the plaintiffs, as it seems to me an immediate right to possession if any such cheque quite sufficient to support a cause of action in conversion against anyone who wrongfully deals with the cheque in any other matter.
I think that there is a contractual right here for the plaintiffs to demand immediate delivery of the cheque to them, and that that is a sufficient right to possession to give them a status to sue in conversion".
1 Citers


 
Mahesan v Malaysia Government Officers Co-operative Housing Society [1979] AC 374; [1978] 2 All ER 405
1978
PC

Torts - Other, Agency, Damages
The appellant, the director and employee of a housing society was bribed by a real estate agent, one Manickam, and the appellant then caused the society to buy land at an overvalue. The agent was sued for money had and received (for the amount of the bribe paid in breach of the agent’s fiduciary duty) as well as in tort (for the loss suffered by the society for the overvalued land because of the agent’s fraud). Held: The profit made by an intermediate purchaser, due to the fraud of the agent, was awarded as compensation on the basis that the principal had lost the opportunity to purchase at the lower price. Bribery and corruption are torts. A defrauded principal has alternative remedies against both the briber and the agent for money had and received where he can recover the amount of the bribe, or for damages for fraud where he can recover the amount of any actual loss sustained by entering into the transaction in respect of which the bribe was given. The plaintiffs need not elect between these alternatives before the time has come for judgment to be entered in their favour in one or other of those causes of action.
1 Citers


 
Greig v Insole [1978] 1 WLR 302; [1978] 3 All ER 449
1978

Slade J
Torts - Other, Contract
The court was asked whether the Test and County Cricket Board had by passing resolutions, induced cricketers with contracts with World Series Cricket Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, to break those contracts. The TCCB had acted in good faith and under a mistake as to the legal position. They believed that their resolutions would only induce cricketers who could lawfully terminate their contracts to do so. Held: People are presumed to intend the reasonable consequences of their actions. Good faith as such is no defence if knowledge and intention are proved. The court applied an objective test to ascertain whether there was an intention to induce the cricketers to break their contracts and held that mistake and error as to the legal position were irrelevant. It identified 5 conditions to be established for the tort of wrongful interference with contractual relations, namely: "(1) either (a) direct interference or (b) indirect interference (if coupled with unlawful means); (2) knowledge of the contract; (3) intention to interfere with it; (4) damage which is more than nominal; (5) so far as necessary, the rebuttal of any defence based on justification for the interference."
1 Citers


 
Willis v British Car Auctions [1978] 1 WLR 438
1978
CA
Denning LJ
Torts - Other, Agency
A car on hire purchase was sold and delivered by auctioneers on the instructions of the hirer. The main issue was whether the auctioneers' liability was affected by the fact that the car had been sold under their provisional bid procedure. Held: The auctioneers were liable. It is well established that if an auctioneer sells goods by knocking down with his hammer at an auction and thereafter delivers them to the purchaser - then although he is only an agent - then if the vendor has no title to the goods, both the auctioneer and the purchaser are liable in conversion to the true owner, no matter how innocent the auctioneer may have been in handling the goods or the purchaser in acquiring them.
1 Cites


 
Ex parte Island Records [1978] Ch 122; [1978] 3 All ER 795
1978
CA
Lord Denning MR
Torts - Other
An injunction is available to any person who can show that a private right or interest has been interfered with by a criminal act.
1 Citers


 
Gipps v Gipps [1978] FLC 90-523; [1978] 1 NSWLR 454; 9 ACLR 706; 3 ACLC 424
1978

Hutley, Glass and Samuels JJA
Torts - Other
(Court of Appeal of New South Wales) In order to defeat a claim in misrepresentation, it is necessary for the false belief to be "wholly dissipated" for knowledge to defeat misrepresentation. Huttley JA said: "Any other rule would be an affront to commonsense. It would mean that, if a person dealing with a rogue has made to him a representation which he knows to be false, but believes to be false to a particular extent, he has no right of action, after making the contract in reliance upon the representation as adjusted by the representee, even though he later learns that the misrepresentation was greater than he suspected.
. . The only way in which the decision of the trial judge on this issue can be effectively attacked would be to show that the respondent understood completely the extent of her husband's misrepresentations; or, possibly, that the difference between what she understood and the extent of his misrepresentations was so minute that his Honour should have decided that it was irrelevant."
Hutley JA said: "[t]o state that a person is induced by a statement is to affirm a causal relation which is a question of fact, not of law"
1 Citers


 
Warnink (Erven) Besloten Vennootschap v J Townend and Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] 2 All ER 927; [1979] 3 WLR 68; [1979] AC 731; (1980) RPC 31
1979
HL
Lord Diplock, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
The House formulated the modern principle which governs the tortious liability compendiously described as passing off. The right protected by the tort is the "property in the business or goodwill likely to be injured by the misrepresentation."
Lord Diplock set out five characteristics required in a passing off action: "My Lords, Spalding v Gamage and the later cases make it possible to identify five characteristics which must be present in order to create a valid cause of action for passing off: (1) a misrepresentation (2) made by a trader in the course of trade (3) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied by him, (4) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence) and (5) which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will probably do so."
Lord Fraser formulated the action of passing off as it applied to goods: "It is essential for the Plaintiff in a passing off action to show at least the following facts:
(1) That his business consists of, or includes, selling in England a class of goods to which the particular trade name applies;
(2) That the class of goods is clearly defined, and that in the minds of the public, or a section of the public, in England, the trade name distinguishes that class from other similar goods;
(3) That because of the reputation of the goods, there is a goodwill attached to the name;
(4) That he, the Plaintiff, as a member of the class of those who sell the goods, is the owner of goodwill in England which is of substantial value;
(5) That he has suffered, or is really likely to suffer, substantial damage to his property in the goodwill by reason of the Defendant selling goods which are falsely described by the trade name to which the goodwill is attached."
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Mitchell v Ealing London Borough Council (1979) QB 1
1979


Torts - Other
The council stored the plaintiff's goods after they had evicted her. The court was asked whether the council was liable in conversion.

 
Diamond v Bank of London and Montreal Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 561; [1979] 1 QB 333
1979
CA
Lord Denning MR, Stephenson LJ, Shaw LJ
Torts - Other
Fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations were made by telephone and telex in Nassau to Mr Diamond in London. Donaldson J had held that the tort of fraudulent misrepresentation was committed in Nassau when the telexes were sent and from where the representor spoke on the telephone. The plaintiff appealed. Held: The appeal succeeded. The tort of deceit, when conducted over a telephone, takes place "where the message is received - wherever it is heard on the telephone".
Lord Denning MR said: "In the case of fraudulent misrepresentation it seems to me that the tort is committed at the place where the representation is received and acted upon; and not the place from where it was sent. Logically, it seems to me, the same applies to a negligent misrepresentation by telephone or by telex. It is committed where it is received and acted upon."
Stephenson LJ said: "But it is settled law that A's misrepresentation, however fraudulent and morally wrong, does not become tortious until B not merely receives it but acts upon it . . The damage may be suffered when and where B acts or begins to act upon the representation, but it may be suffered at a later time or at a different place. Although A's part of the tort is committed when and where he speaks or telexes or writes the misrepresentation, B's part is needed to complete the tort by acting upon the representation, and the tort is committed, in my judgment, when and where he does so act. "
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Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No 3) [1979] Ch 496
1979
FD
Oliver J
Family, Torts - Other
Oliver J said: "The common law has in relation to the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden been a trifle selective in its application of the biblical doctrine that "even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence"."
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B E Lavender v Witten Industrial Diamonds [1979] FSR 9
1979


Torts - Other, Company

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Meade v Haringey Borough Council [1979] ICR 494
1979


Torts - Other
The economic tort of interference with a pre-existing contractual or legal position can also protect statutory interests.
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Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227; [1978] 3 All ER 193; [1978] ICR 950; [1978] 3 WLR 116
1979
ChD
Sir Robert Megarry VC
Torts - Other, Contract, Intellectual Property
The managing director defendant had resigned before the end of the contractual term. There was an express covenant in his contract against using or disclosing the company's confidential information during or after his employment. It was submitted that this was a repudiation which brought the contract to an end and with it any obligation to observe the restrictive covenants. Held: Sir Robert Megarry VC considered the power of a court to prevent a wrongdoer from benefiting from his wrong: "Above all, I think the courts must be astute to prevent a wrongdoer from profiting too greatly from his wrong. If without just cause a servant who has contracted to serve for a term of years refuses to do so, it is easy to see that the court is powerless to make him do what he has contracted to do: neither by decreeing specific performance nor by granting an injunction can the court make the servant perform loyally what he is refusing to do, however wrongfully . . But why should the court's inability to make a servant work for his employer mean that as soon as the servant refuses to do so the court is forthwith disabled from restraining him from committing any breach, however flagrant, of his other obligations during the period of his contract? I would wholly reject the doctrine of automatic determination, whether in its wide form or in its narrowed version."
As to whether information was confidential, Sir Robert Megarry VC said: "If one turns from the authorities and looks at the matter as a question of principle, I think (and I say this very tentatively, because the principle has not been argued out) that four elements may be discerned which may be of some assistance in identifying confidential information or trade secrets which the court will protect. I speak of such information or secrets only in an industrial or trade setting. First, I think that the information must be information the release of which the owner believes would be injurious to him or of advantage to his rivals or others. Second, I think the owner must believe that the information is confidential or secret, i.e., that it is not already in the public domain. It may be that some or all of his rivals already have the information: but as long as the owner believes it to be confidential I think he is entitled to try and protect it. Third, I think that the owner's belief under the two previous heads must be reasonable. Fourth, I think that the information must be judged in the light of the usage and practices of the particular industry or trade concerned. It may be that information which does not satisfy all these requirements may be entitled to protection as confidential information or trade secrets: but I think that any information which does satisfy them must be of a type which is entitled to protection."
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Belegging-en Exploitatiemaatschappij Lavender BV v Witten Industrial Diamonds Ltd [1979] FSR 59
1979

Lord Justice Buckley
Torts - Other, Intellectual Property
The defendants sold diamond grit allegedly for the sole purpose of making grinding tools in which it was to be embedded in a resin bond as part of a grinding material patented by the plaintiffs. Held: The defendants could not be infringers unless they "sold the grits in circumstances which in some way made them participants in their subsequent embodiment in resin bonded grinding wheels, or that they induced someone so to embody them."
Lord Justice Buckley said: "The plaintiffs do not only assert infringement by the defendants. They also say that the defendants have procured, counselled and/or aided other persons to infringe. This may perhaps amount to an allegation of direct infringement by the defendants themselves, but I am inclined to think that it is a claim in respect of a distinct, suggested tort of procuring infringement by others (based upon the principle enunciated by Erle J in Lumley v Gye" and
"facilitating the doing of an act is obviously different from procuring the doing of an act."
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