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Torts - Other - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 85 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Manchester Corporation v Farnworth [1930] AC 171
1930
HL
Viscount Dunedin, Viscount Sumner
Land, Torts - Other
The House was asked as to the result in law when a nuisance is the inevitable result of carrying out the functions authorised by Parliament. Held: Viscount Dunedin said: "When Parliament has authorized a certain thing to be made or done in a certain place, there can be no action for nuisance caused by the making or doing of that thing if the nuisance is the inevitable result of the making or doing so authorized. The onus of proving that the result is inevitable is on those who wish to escape liability for nuisance, but the criterion of inevitability is not what is theoretically possible but what is possible according to the state of scientific knowledge at the time, having also in view a certain common sense appreciation, which cannot be rigidly defined, of practical feasibility in view of situation and of expense."
Viscount Sumner said: "the first question is "What did the Legislature authorize?" The sections can be read as directing the use of such a plant as was originally erected or even as relieving the Corporation from liability for nuisance on proof that all due care has been used. The case becomes one of quite a simple proof. I think the condition of freedom from liability is proof of due care but not that any particular plant or user can be implied from the general terms employed. The appellants are right in saying that the Manchester Corporation Act, 1914, is not a "special Act" within s. 1 of the Electric Lighting Clauses Act of 1899, but in effect varies or excepts the operation of the scheduled clauses of that Act. What is required of them is to use all due and reasonable means and precautions to avoid a nuisance. The burden of proving that they have done so is on them."
Manchester Corporation Act, 1914
1 Citers


 
Excelsior Wire Rope Co Ltd v Callan [1930] AC 404 HL(E)
1930
HL

Land, Torts - Other
The House dismissed an appeal by an occupier of land against a finding that he was liable for an injury occasioned to a child trespassing on his land.
1 Citers


 
Lynn v Bamber [1930] 2 KB 72
1930

Talbot J
Torts - Other, Contract
A cause of action in contract arises when the contract is breached. Talbot J said: "There is no question that the three learned judges who decided that case stated in emphatic and unambiguous language that contributory negligence is a good defence to an action of this class; but it is said that the expression of opinion can be disregarded in this court because it is not necessary for the purpose of deciding that case that that opinion should be expressed. I do not agree, any more than the other members of this court, that that expression of opinion was in fact unnecessary, and it appears to me that it is not legitimate to say that it should be disregarded . . If a judge thinks it desirable to give his opinion on some point which is not necessary for the decision of the case, that of course has not the binding weight of the decision of the case and the reasons for decision. It seems to me, however, to be an abuse of language to describe as obiter dicta the deliberate pronouncements in Dew's Case, which were all made expressly as reasons for the decision to which the court there came, and even if I did not assent to them, I should certainly regard these pronouncements as authoritative."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Betts v Receiver of Metropolitan Police District and Carter Paterson and Co Ltd; 1932 - [1932] 2 KB 595

 
 In re Simms; CA 1934 - [1934] 1 Ch 1

 
 Liddle v Yorkshire (North Riding) County Council; 1934 - [1934] 2 KB 101

 
 Thomas v Sawkins; KBD 1935 - [1935] 2 KB 249; 30 Cox CC 265 KB

 
 Commonwealth Life Assurance Society Limited v Brain; 1935 - [1935] 53 CLR 343

 
 Davis v Lisle; CA 1936 - [1936] 2 KB 434; [1936] 2 All ER 213

 
 Nicholas v Ely Beet Sugar Factory Ltd; CA 1936 - [1936] 1 Ch 346

 
 Duncan v Jones; KBD 1936 - [1936] 1 KB 218
 
Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797; [1937] 3 All ER 157
1937
HL
Lord Atkin, Lord Wright
Torts - Other, Contract
The House confirmed a declaration granted as to validity of a rule of association notwithstanding the absence of any dispute. The House considered the nature of the threat required to establish a defence of duress.
Lord Wright observed that the word 'menaces' is to be liberally construed and is not limited to threats of violence, but includes threats of any action detrimental, or unpleasant, to the person addressed. It may also include a warning that in certain events such action is intended.
Lord Atkin said: "The ordinary blackmailer normally threatens to do what he has a perfect right to do - namely, communicate some compromising conduct to a person whose knowledge is likely to affect the person threatened. Often indeed he has not only the right but also the duty to make the disclosure, as of a felony, to the competent authorities. What he has to justify is not the threat, but the demand of money. The gravamen of the charge is the demand without reasonable or probable cause: and I cannot think that the mere fact that the threat is to do something a person is entitled to do either causes the threat not to be a 'menace' within the Act or in itself provides a reasonable or probable cause for the demand."
and "It appears to me that if a man may lawfully, in the furtherance of business interests, do acts which will seriously injure another in his business he may also lawfully, if he is still acting in furtherance of his business interests, offer that other to accept a sum of money as an alternative to doing the injurious acts. He must no doubt be acting not for the mere purpose of putting money in his pocket, but for some legitimate purpose other than the mere acquisition of money."
In this case "If the Council bona fide exercised this power with the bona fide intention only of carrying out this trade policy, in my opinion they would not be demanding the payment without reasonable and probable cause." but "It is plain that these rules and any similar rules of any other association in any other trade are capable of being abused: and if so nothing in this decision will prevent offenders from being subjected to criminal law. But if the rules were genuinely enforced I am satisfied that there would not be as in my opinion in Denyer's case [1926] 2 KB 258 there was not, any evidence of an absence of reasonable or probable cause."
Larceny Act 1916 29(1)
1 Citers


 
J and E Hall Ltd v Barclay [1937] 3 All ER 620
1937


Torts - Other, Damages
The company had erected and tested two experimental davits for the appellant. They were then taken down and left unused for many years. The parties disputed the account. The company claimed also for damages for detinue or conversion of the davits which had eventually sold as scrap. The judge had awarded the scrap value of the equipment as sold. Held: The company should have been awarded the values of the equipment sold, at the price of similar articles in the market. In this case there was no such second hand market, and the meausre was the cost of buying alternatives.
1 Citers



 
 Skilton v Epsom and Ewell Urban District Council; CA 1937 - [1937] 1 KB 112

 
 Herniman v Smith; HL 1938 - [1938] AC 305

 
 Millington v Fox; 23-Jan-1938 - (1838) 40 ER 956; [1838] EngR 377; (1838) 3 My & Cr 338
 
Caxton Publishing v Sutherland Publishing [1939] AC 178; [1938] 4 All ER 389; 108 LJCh 5
1939
HL
Lord Porter
Damages, Torts - Other
The normal measure of damages in conversion is the market value of the goods converted at the date of conversion.
Mere possession is not a conversion. Some act interfering with the true ownrs right must be shown.
1 Citers



 
 British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson; HL 1939 - [1940] 1 All ER 479
 
United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] 4 All ER 20; [1941] AC 1
1940
HL
Lord Romer, Lord Atkin
Torts - Other, Damages
A person whose goods were wrongfully converted by another had a choice of two remedies against the wrongdoer. He could recover damages, in respect of the loss he had sustained by the conversion, or he could recover the proceeds of the conversion obtained by the defendant. It is necessary to distinguish election between remedies from election between rights. The House could hear "ghosts clanking their mediaeval chains."
1 Citers


 
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch Unreported 1940
1940
SCS
Lord Justice Clerk Aitchison, Lord Jamieson
Scotland, Torts - Other
Lord Justice Clerk Aitchison said: "When the end of a combination is not a crime or a tort in the accepted sense, and the means are not in the accepted sense criminal or tortious - cases which give rise to no difficulty - the question always is - What is the real purpose of the combination? If it is to injure, without reference to anyone's lawful gain, or the enjoyment of one's rights, or the furtherance of one's legitimate interests, then what is done may become a wrongful act and be actionable. If, on the other hand, the real purpose of the combination is to further the lawful interests of the parties to it- these not necessarily being identical interests - no wrong is committed even when the means, employed not being in themselves illegal, are calculated, and even intended, to injure the persons against whom they are directed."
dissentiente Lord Mackay
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282
1940

Dixon J
Commonwealth, Torts - Other
High Court of Australia
1 Citers

[ Austlli ]
 
Shaw Savill and Albion Company Ltd v The Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344; [1940] HCA 40
1940

Dixon J
Armed Forces, Torts - Other, Commonwealth, Armed Forces
(High Court of Australia) The plaintiff owned a ship "The Coptic" which was in a collision with His Majesties Australian Ship "Adelaide". The plaintiff alleged that the collision resulted from the negligence of the defendant's officers, saying the Adelaide was sailing too fast, that it failed to keep a proper lookout for the Coptic and that it was not navigated in a proper and seaman like manner. The defence was that, at the relevant time; the Adelaide was part of the naval forces of Australia and was engaged in active naval operations against the enemy. The Court accepted that in principle such a defence was open to the state:"It could hardly be maintained that during an actual engagement with the enemy or a pursuit of any of his ships the navigating officer of a King's ship of war was under a common-law duty of care to avoid harm to such non-combatant ships as might appear in the theatre of operations. It cannot be enough to say that the conflict or pursuit is a circumstance affecting the reasonableness of the officer's conduct as a discharge of the duty of care, though the duty itself persists. To adopt such a view would mean that whether the combat be by sea, land or air our men go into action accompanied by the law of civil negligence, warning them to be mindful of the person and property of civilians. It would mean that the Courts could be called upon to day whether the soldier on the field of battle or the sailor fighting on his ship might reasonably have been more careful to avoid causing civil loss or damage. No one can imagine a court undertaking the trial of such an issue, either during or after a war. To concede that any civil liability can rest upon a member of the armed forces for supposedly negligent acts or omissions in the course of an actual engagement with the enemy is opposed alike to reason and to policy. But the principle cannot be limited to the presence of the enemy or to occasions when contact with the enemy has been established. Warfare perhaps never did admit of such a distinction, but now it would be quite absurd. The development of the speed of ships and the range of guns were enough to show it to be an impracticable refinement, but it has been put out of question by the bomber, the submarine and the floating mine. The principle must extend to all active operations against the enemy. It must cover attack and resistance, advance and retreat, pursuit and avoidance, reconnaissance and engagement. But the real distinction does exist between active operations against the enemy and other activities of the combatant services in time of war."
1 Citers


 
Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130; [1940] HCA 41
12 Dec 1940

Rich ACJ, Starke, McTiernan and Williams JJ
Commonwealth, Torts - Other
High Court of Australia - The claim sought to sidestep the rule giving immuity to witnesses before a court by alleging a conspiracy to give false evidence. Held: Starke J said: "But it does not matter whether the action is framed as an action for defamation or as an action analogous to an action for malicious prosecution or for deceit or, as in this instance, for combining or conspiring together for the purpose of injuring another: the rule of law is that no action lies against witnesses in respect of evidence prepared . . given, adduced or procured by them in the course of legal proceedings. The law protects witnesses and others, not for their benefit, but for a higher interest, namely, the advancement of public justice."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Saville Perfumery Ltd v June Perfect Ltd (1941) 58 RPC 147
1941
CA
Lord Greene MR
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
Lord Greene MR said: "It does not necessarily follow that a trader who uses an infringing mark upon goods is also guilty of passing-off. The reason is that in the matter of infringement, as I have already pointed out, once a mark is used as indicating origin, no amount of added matter intended to show the true origin of the goods can affect the question. In the case of passing-off, on the other hand, the defendant may escape liability if he can show that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff. Such proof may be very difficult, but theoretically at any rate the result may be as I have stated."
1 Citers



 
 Liversidge v Sir John Anderson; HL 3-Nov-1941 - [1942] AC 206; [1941] UKHL 1; [1941] 3 All ER 338

 
 Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Company Limited v Veitch; HL 15-Dec-1941 - [1942] AC 435; [1941] UKHL 2; 1942 SC HL 1
 
Dumbell v Roberts [1944] 1 All ER 326
1944
CA
Scott LJ
Police, Torts - Other
The court discussed the nature of reasonable grounds for suspicion for an arrest. The threshold for the existence of reasonable grounds for suspicion is low, and the requirement is limited. Scott LJ said: "The protection of the public is safeguarded by the requirement, alike of the common law and, so far as I know, of all statutes, that the constable shall before arresting satisfy himself that there do in fact exist reasonable grounds for suspicion of guilt. That requirement is very limited. The police are not called upon before acting to have anything like a prima facie case for conviction."
1 Citers


 
Walter v Alltools (1944) 61 TLR 39
1944

Lawrence LJ
Damages, Torts - Other
The court considered damages to be awarded for false imprisonment: "… any evidence which tends to aggravate or mitigate the damage to a man's reputation which flows naturally from his imprisonment must be admissible up to the moment when damages are assessed. A false imprisonment does not merely affect a man's liberty, it also affects his reputation. The damage continues until it is caused to cease by an avowal that the imprisonment was false."
1 Citers



 
 Bents Brewery and Co Ltd v Hogan; 1945 - [1945] 2 All ER 570
 
Bowmakers Ltd v Barnet Instruments Ltd [1945] KB 65
1945
CA
du Parq LJ
Equity, Contract, Torts - Other
An action was brought for the wrongful conversion of machine tools delivered under hire purchase agreements which contravened wartime statutory orders. The plaintiff established its legal title to the goods at issue without relying upon the illegal contract pursuant to which it had hired the goods to the defendant. A party to an illegality can recover by virtue of a legal or equitable property interest if, but only if, he can establish his title without relying on his own illegality. The court stated the general rule that a man's right to possession of an article will be enforced notwithstanding the fact that the article came into his possession by reason of an illegal contract. "a man’s right to possess his own chattels will as a general rule be enforced against one who, without any claim of right, . . has converted them to his own use, even though it may appear from the pleadings, or in the course of the trial, that the chattels in question came into the defendant’s possession by reason of an illegal contract between himself and the plaintiff, provided that the plaintiff does not seek, and is not forced, either to found his claim on the illegal contract or to plead its illegality in order to support his claim." and "It must not be supposed that the general rule which we have stated is subject to no exception. Indeed there is one obvious exception, namely that class of cases in which goods claimed are of such a kind that it is unlawful to deal in them at all, as for example, obscene books. No doubt there are others, but it is unnecessary, and would we think be unwise, to seek to name them all or to forecast the decisions which would be given in a variety of circumstances which may hereafter arise".
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Roberts v J and F Stone Lighting and Radio Ltd; 1945 - (1945) 172 LT 240
 
Adams v Naylor [1946] 2 All ER 241; [1946] AC 543
1946
HL
Lord Simonds
Litigation Practice, Torts - Other
The House disapproved of the practice of appointing a nominee defendant in tort actions against whom damages could be awarded as opposed to a party with crown immunity. The House refused to entertain a claim against a nominated army officer arising from injuries which children had sustained in a derelict minefield.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Morris v Kanssen [1946] AC 459; [1946] 1 All ER 586
1946
HL
Lord Simonds
Torts - Other, Company
The House considered the effect of provisions relating to the acts of directors in the 1929 Act. Lord Simonds said: "There is, as it appears to me, a vital distinction between (a) an appointment in which there is a defect or, in other words, a defective appointment, and (b) no appointment at all. In the first case it is implied that some act is done which purports to be an appointment but is by reason of some defect inadequate for the purpose; in the second case there is not a defect, there is no act at all. The section does not say that the acts of a person acting as director shall be valid notwithstanding that it is afterwards discovered that he was not appointed a director. Even if it did, it might well be contended that at least a purported appointment was postulated. But it does not do so, and it would, I think, be doing violence to plain language to construe the section as covering a case in which there has been no genuine attempt to appoint at all. These observations apply equally where the term of office of a director has expired, but he nevertheless continues to act as a director, and where the office has been from the outset usurped without the colour of authority."
Companies Act 1929 143
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Rosenthal v Alderton and Sons Limited [1946] KB 374
1946
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Torts - Other, Damages
The court was asked as to how it should value goods which had disappeared, and where the plaintiff sought damages for their wrongful detention, either as at the date of the detention or as at the date of the judgment. Held: Damages for detinue were to be based on the value of the item at the time of the judgment. Lord Evershed MR said in the course of answering: 'it is further to be noted that the action of detinue was essentially a proprietary action implying property in the plaintiff in the goods claimed', and then a reference is made to Viner's Abridgement vol 8 p23 and Holdsworth, History of English Law vol 7, pp 438 and 439. ' It was, and still is, of the essence of an action of detinue that the plaintiff maintains and asserts his property in the goods claimed.
I think that the rights of the plaintiff as regards these goods were not such as entitled him to bring an action in detinue against the defendant, in whose possession they were, as agent, as the time, of the person in whom the property in the goods was then vested'.
1 Citers


 
Cakebread v Hopping Bros Ltd [1947] KB 641
1947
CA
Cohen LJ
Torts - Other
Cohen LJ discussed the doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, saying: "The maxim ex turpi causa is based on public policy, and it seems to me plain on the facts of this case that public policy, far from requiring that this action shall be dismissed, requires that it shall be entertained and decided on its merits."
1 Citers


 
Mohammed Amin v Jogendra Kumar Bannerjee [1947] AC322
1947
PC
Sir John Beaumont
Commonwealth, Torts - Other
The Board considered an action for malicious prosecution. Sir John Beaumont said: "The foundation of the action lies in abuse of the process of the court by wrongfully setting the law in motion, and it is designed to discourage the perversion of the machinery of justice for an improper purpose. The plaintiff must prove that the proceedings instituted against him were malicious, without reasonable and probable cause, that they terminated in his favour (if that be possible), and that he has suffered damage. As long ago as 1698 it was held by Holt CJ in Savile v Roberts that damages might be claimed in an action under three heads, (1) damage to the person, (2) damage to property, and (3) damage to reputation, and that rule has prevailed ever since. That the word "prosecution" in the title of the action is not used in the technical sense which it bears in criminal law is shown by the fact that the action lies for the malicious prosecution of certain classes of civil proceedings, for instance, falsely and maliciously presenting a petition in bankruptcy or a petition to wind up a company ( Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre ). The reason why the action does not lie for falsely and maliciously prosecuting an ordinary civil action is, as explained by Bowen LJ in the last mentioned case, that such a case does not necessarily and naturally involve damage to the party sued. A civil action which is false will be dismissed at the hearing. The defendant's reputation will be cleared of any imputations made against him, and he will be indemnified against his expenses by the award of costs against his opponent. ... but a criminal charge involving scandal to reputation or the possible loss of life or liberty to the party charged does necessarily and naturally involve damage, and in such a case damage to reputation will be presumed."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Christie v Leachinsky; HL 25-Mar-1947 - [1947] AC 573; [1947] UKHL 2; [1947]1 All ER 567; [1947] 63 TLR 231; (1947) 111 JP 224
 
Askey v Golden Wine Co Ltd [1948] 2 All ER 35
1948

Denning J
Torts - Other
Denning J said: "It is, I think, a principle of our law that the punishment inflicted by a criminal court is personal to the offender, and that the civil courts will not entertain an action by the offender to recover an indemnity against the consequences of that punishment."
1 Citers



 
 Cresswell v Sirl; CA 1948 - [1948] 1 KB 241
 
M'Elroy v M'Allister [1948] ScotCS CSIH_4; 1949 SC 110; 1949 SLT 139
4 Nov 1948
SCS

Scotland, Torts - Other, International
The court rejected the renvoi doctrine in tort. An act done in a foreign country was actionable in Scotland only if it was, if done in Scotland, a tort, and was also actionable according to the law of the place in which it was done.
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Industries and General Mortgage Co Ltd v Lewis; 1949 - [1949] 2 All ER 573

 
 Beaman v ARTS Ltd; CA 1949 - [1949] 1 KB 550; [1949] 1 All ER 465; 65 TLR 389; 93 Sol Jo 236

 
 Curtis v Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co; CA 1951 - [1951] 1 KB 805

 
 Armstrong v Strain; QBD 1951 - (1951) 1 TLR 856

 
 Neath Rural District Council v Williams; QBD 1951 - [1951] 1 KB 115
 
Tims v John Lewis and Co Ltd [1951] 2 KB 459
1951
CA
Lord Goddard CJ
Torts - Other
The plaintiff said that the defendant's allegation against him leading to a prosecution which failed was malicious. Held: Lord Goddard CJ said: "It is quite easy to imagine a case in which a person was thoroughly justified in bringing proceedings, and then in the course of the case something comes to light which shows the prosecution to be in fact groundless. Then if the prosecutor insists on continuing the prosecution without at any rate informing the court of the facts which he has since discovered, he will, I think, possibly have no reasonable or probable cause for continuing the prosecution and at any rate will be guilty of malice."
Lord Goddard considered the decision in Christie v Leachinsky and said of it: "I do not think that the decision of the House of Lords means that if an officer is arresting a deaf person, he has to possess himself of an ear-trumpet, or something of that sort, or shout at the top of his voice. He must do what a reasonable person would do in the circumstances. As I said during the course of the argument, if a police officer who is not able to speak French has to arrest a Frenchman who does not speak English, he can only tell him in English for what he is arresting him, and take him to the police station until some officer who does speak the language or some interpreter comes to explain the charge on which he has been arrested to the person arrested. In stating the charge or on suspicion of what crime a person is arrested, the person arresting without warrant has only to act reasonably."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Conway v George Wimpey and Co Ltd [1951] 2 KB 266
1951
CA
Asquith LJ
Torts - Other, Vicarious Liability
A number of contractors were employed in work at the Heathrow Airport. The defendant company had instituted a bus service for their own employees and the driver was prohibited by the defendant company from giving lifts to anyone other than their own employees. Held: The claim failed. The act of the driver in giving a lift to the plaintiff was outside the scope of his employment. It was not merely a wrongful mode of performing an act of the class which the driver was employed to perform, but was the performance of an act which he was not employed to perform.
Asquith LJ said: "I should hold that taking men not employed by the defendants on to the vehicle was not merely a wrongful mode of performing the act of the class this driver was employed to perform, but was the performance of an act of a class 'which he was not employed to perform at all."
1 Citers



 
 British Motor Trade Association v Gray; 1951 - 1951 SLT 247; 1951 SC 586
 
D C Thomson and Co Ltd v Deakin [1952] Ch 646
1952
CA
Jenkins LJ, Lord Evershed MR
Torts - Other, Contract
The defendant Trades Union was alleged to have indirectly prevented a supplier from performing its contract to supply paper to the plaintiffs by inducing its members to withdraw their services from the supplier. Held: It is a tort at common law knowingly to have contractual dealings which are inconsistent with a prior contract. It is also a tort for a third party directly to do an act, with knowledge of the contract, which, if done by one of the parties to the contract, would have been a breach of contract. Lord Evershed MR considered the tort of directly inducing a breach of contract, saying that it was conceded that the defendant must have acted with the intention of doing damage to the person damaged and that he must have succeeded in his efforts. So far as indirectly procuring a breach of contract was concerned, the same intention had to be proved, but the tort would only be committed if the acts indirectly inducing the breach of contract involved wrongful conduct.
Jenkins LJ said: "First . . . there may…be an actionable interference with contractual rights where other means of interference than persuasion or procurement or inducement, in the sense of influence of one kind or another brought to bear on the mind of the contract breaker to cause him to break his contract, are used by the interferer; but, secondly, that (apart from conspiracy to injure, which, as I have said, is not in question so far as this motion is concerned) acts of a third party lawful in themselves do not constitute an actionable interference with contractual rights merely because they bring about a breach of contract, even if they were done with the object and intention of bringing about such breach."
Lord Evershed MR: "It was suggested in the course of argument by Sir Frank Soskice and by Mr. Lindner, that the tort must still be properly confined to such direct intervention, that is, to cases where the intervener or persuader uses by personal intervention persuasion on the mind of one of the parties to the contract so as to procure that party to break it. I am unable to agree that any such limitation is logical, rational or part of our law. In such cases where the intervener (if I may call him such) does so directly act upon the mind of a party to the contract as to cause him to break it, the result is, for practical purposes, as though in substance he, the intervener, is breaking the contract, although he in not a party to it…At any rate, it is clear that, when there is such a direct intervention by the intervener, the intervention itself is thereby considered wrongful. I cannot think that the result is any different if the intervener, instead of so acting upon the mind of the contracting party himself, by some other act, tortious in itself, prevents the contracting party from performing the bargain. A simple case is where the intervener, for example, physically detains the contracting party so that the contracting party is rendered unable by the detention to perform the contract."
1 Citers


 
Armstrong v Strain [1952] 1 KB 236
1952
CA
Devlin J
Torts - Other, Contract
(Upheld)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Everett v Ribbands [1952] 2 QB 198
1952


Torts - Other, Police
The court considered the tort of the malicious obtaining of a search warrant.
1 Citers



 
 John Lewis v Tims; HL 1952 - [1952] AC 676
 
Toteff v Antonas (1952) 87 CLR 647
1952

Dixon J
Commonwealth, Damages, Torts - Other
(High Court of Australia) Dixon J said: "In an action of deceit a plaintiff is entitled to recover as damages a sum representing the prejudice or disadvantage he has suffered in consequence of his altering his position under the inducement of the fraudulent misrepresentations made by the defendant. When what he has been induced to do is to make a purchase from the defendant and part with his money to him in payment of the price, then, if the transaction stands and is not disaffirmed or rescinded what is recoverable is 'the difference between the real value of the property, and the sum which the plaintiff was induced to give for it' per Abbott L.C.J. Pearson v. Wheeler. As Sir James Hannen P. in Peek v. Perry pointed out, the question is how much worse off is the plaintiff than if he had not entered into the transaction. If he had not done so he would have had the purchase money in his pocket. To ascertain his loss you must deduct from the amount he paid the real value of the thing he got. It may be objected that the point of the application of this doctrine lies in identifying 'the transaction' and that what Mayo J. has done is to identify it as the purchase of the goodwill and that only. But what is meant is the transaction into which the representation induced the plaintiff to enter. The measure of damages in an action of deceit consists in the loss or expenditure incurred by the plaintiff in consequence of the inducement on which he relied diminished by the corresponding advantage in money or moneys worth obtained by him on the other side: Potts v. Miller. You look to what he has been induced to part with as the initial step. He is entitled to say that but for the fraud he would never have parted with his money; per Coleridge L.C.J. Twycross v. Grant. But he cannot recover the entire price he has paid unless the thing prove wholly worthless. If the thing has any appreciable value the damages must be reduced pro tanto: per Cockburn L.C.J., Twycross v. Grant. It must not be forgotten that after all deceit is an action on the case for special damages incurred in consequence of the defendant's fraudulent inducement."
1 Citers

[ Austlii ]
 
Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Berisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246
1952


Damages, Torts - Other
The court assessed the amount of damages for the wrongful refusal to deliver up portable switchboards which the owner would not have used anyway. The measure was a sum equivalent to the price or hire that a reasonable person would pay for such use.
1 Citers


 
Horobin [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 460
1952

Barry J
Torts - Other
Barry J sought to define wilful misconduct through negligence as: "he took a risk which he knew he ought not to take."
1 Citers


 
Tempest v Snowden [1952] 1 KBD 130
1952


Police, Torts - Other
A custody officer is not required to be sure that the accused person is guilty before charging him, but rather whether he believes that a charge is warranted
1 Citers


 
Gray v New Augarita Porcupine Mines Limited [1952] UKPC 4
24 Mar 1952
PC

Commonwealth, Torts - Other, Damages
Ontario
[ Bailii ]
 
Barnard v National Dock Labour Board [1953] EWCA Civ 5; [1953] 2 QB 18; [1953] 1 All ER 1113; [1953] 2 WLR 995; [1953] 1 Lloyd's Rep 371
31 Mar 1953
CA
Singleton, Denning, Romer LJJ
Employment, Torts - Other
The appellant sought a declaration that the employer had imposed disciplinary measures improperly, in that they had been put in place by a port manager who possessed no relevant disciplinary powers. Held: The delegation by the London Dock Labour Board, a statutory body, of its disciplinary functions to a port manager, was unlawful. The manager's purported suspension of workers was therefore a nullity, and the Board was unable to ratify the decision.
Denning LJ said: "we are not asked to interfere with the decision of a statutory tribunal; we are asked to interfere with the position of a usurper . . These courts have always had a jurisdiction to deal with such a case . . the courts of equity have always had power to declare the orders of a usurper to be invalid and to set them aside. So at the present day we can do likewise."
[ Bailii ]
 
London County Council v Cattermoles (Garages) Ltd [1953] EWCA Civ 3; [1953] 1 WLR 997; [1953] 2 All ER 582
20 Apr 1953
CA
Sir Raymond Evershed MR, Birkett, Romer LJJ
Torts - Other, Vicarious Liability
An employer is vicariously liable for employees' torts committed in the course of employment, in spite of prohibitions dealing with conduct within its course. The defendants were held liable for the negligence of their servant whilst driving, even though the servant, a garage hand had no driving licence and had been expressly prohibited from driving.
[ Bailii ]
 
Solomons v R Gertzenstein Ltd [1954] 1 QB 565
1954
QBD
Lord Goddard
Negligence, Torts - Other
A fire which started with an electrical short circuit, went on to set fire to some wood and in due course to a stack of paper. Held: Section 86 of the 1774 Act applied to excuse the defendant. Lord Goddard said: "In my opinion it was a short circuit that set fire to the wood in the neighbourhood of the ventilator and that in turn set fire to the stack of paper. Pausing here, it does not appear that this paper ever burnt freely; no doubt it caused a lot of smoke, and I accept the evidence that there was some flame seen, but it was not that stack apparently that caused the sudden sheet of flame which caused the real damage here. The cause of that is obscure; the only explanation was that offered by the fire officers, that the heating of the paint and varnish caused an accumulation of gas which suddenly ignited and rushed upwards. However, I do not propose to deal further with this because I cannot hold that placing packing paper and cardboard cartons in this recess behind the balustrade was negligent. Business of the sort carried on by the first defendants necessitates having a stack of packing and wrapping material at hand. This material is not highly inflammable like loose tissue paper or shavings would be. It is common knowledge that it takes a good deal to get closely packed thick paper well alight, though it will smoulder. But in any case I cannot see how it can be negligent to store this paper in what was a convenient recess any more than it would be to store it in one of the rooms occupied by the first defendants. They had no reason to suppose that there was likely to be a short circuit which would fire the panelling in the immediate neighbourhood of the stack, which I may mention was never burnt through. On the evidence before me I am not prepared to find that the fire was caused by the negligence of any of the defendants, and I hold that it was accidental and need only refer on this matter to Collingwood v Home and Colonial Stores Ltd."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 86


 
 Briess v Woolley; HL 1954 - [1954] AC 333
 
Wimpey (George) Co Ltd v British Overseas Airways Corporation [1955] AC 169; [1954] 3 WLR 932; [1954] 3 All ER 661
1954
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Viscount Simonds, Lord Porter
Litigation Practice, Torts - Other, Damages, Limitation
A joint tortfeasor could escape liability in contribution proceedings if it had been unsuccessfully sued by the injured person in an action brought outside the relevant limitation period. Where a court has to decide between two competing cases, if the arguments are fairly evenly balanced that interpretation should be chosen which involves the least alteration of the existing law.
An employee of BOAC, had been injured in a collision between a vehicle owned by BOAC and another owned by Wimpey. He sued Wimpey, who now claimed a contribution against BOAC. The claimant later joined BOAC, but outside a special one year limitation period under the 1939 Act. The judge had found BOAC one third liable, but that they then escaped liability, the claim against them being time barred. At the Court of Appeal LLJ Denning and Singleton compared the situation with that of co-sureties, and that a six year period applied. Held: The decision and discussion was limited firmly to the point of statutory construction under section 6(1)(c) of the 1935 Act.
Viscount Simonds: "My Lords, at the hearing of the action and of the appeal two questions were raised, upon which there was no argument before your Lordships, the first as to the date upon which Wimpeys' right to contribution arose and the second as to the period of limitation in respect of a claim for contribution against a public authority under section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1939. I am content to assume that the right to contribution arose at any rate not earlier than the date when the existence and amount of Wimpeys' liability to Littlewood was ascertained by judgment and that the relevant period of limitation was six years." The concept of being "held liable" by a judgment for the purpose of setting time running in a claim for contribution involved the ascertainment of the quantum of the liability.
Lord Porter: "The quantum having been determined, the only question is: can the party against whom judgment has been given recover contribution from the other who was in part the cause of the injury?" and "Substantially, their view was that Wimpeys were under no liability until judgment was given against them, that their cause of action arose then and not until then, and accordingly their cause of action against B.O.A.C. arose at that date. I need not, I think, set out the authorities and reasoning upon which these opinions are founded except to refer to such cases as Wolmershausen v. Gullick and Robinson v. Harkin, both of which were claims to contribution between co-sureties, and M'Gillivray v. Hope, which was a claim involving the right of present and former employers to contribution inter se in respect of damages awarded to a workman employed by them consecutively.
If this view be true, Wimpeys' liability did not come into existence until judgment had been given against them, and therefore they had whatever was the appropriate period of limitation from that date. What that appropriate period may be – whether it is a year because B.O.A.C. is a public authority and the action is brought in respect of any act, neglect or default or whether it is six years, because the claim is not in respect of any act, neglect or default, but for contribution – is immaterial in the present case inasmuch as Wimpeys made their claim to contribution in the original action before judgment was given."
Lord Keith of Avonholm: "My Lords, your Lordships are not now concerned with a question which was considered in the courts below, namely, when the cause of action in the claim for contribution accrued. It is conceded, in conformity with the view taken by the Court of Appeal, that the cause of action accrued at earliest at the date when judgment was given in favour of Littlewood against the appellants."
Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 - Limitation Act 1939 21
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Baker v Jones [1954] 1 WLR 1005
1954

Lynskey J
Contract, Company, Torts - Other
There was a dispute within an unincorporated weightlifting association about an alleged misuse of its funds. Held: Words in an agreement are void to the extent that they seek to oust the jurisdiction of the court.
Lynsey J said: "The association, being an unincorporated body, could not be liable for the tortious acts either of its officials or council members. The members of the association, individually, would not be liable for such tortious acts, except in so far as they had individually authorized such acts."
and 'The common law does not approve of the intervention of any man in the litigation of another with which he had no lawful concern, whether that litigation is well founded or not' However, as to the law prohibiting maintenance of an action the common law rules were "much modified and, as some say, almost atrophied"
It is contrary to the common law and contrary to public policy to attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the courts
1 Citers


 
Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] EWCA Civ 5; (1954) 118 JP 411; [1954] 2 QB 182; [1954] 2 All ER 561; [1954] 3 WLR 200; [1954] 1 Lloyd's Rep 446
3 Jun 1954
CA
Denning, Morris LJJ
Nuisance, Negligence, Torts - Other
The defendant's tanker came aground, spilling fuel, for which the corporation claimed damages. The corporation appealed against rejection of that claim. Held: In order to support an action for private nuisance the defendant must have used his own land or some other land in such a way as injuriously to affect the enjoyment of the plaintiff's land. It was not an essential element in liability for a nuisance that it should emanate from land belonging to the defendant, although commonly it does.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Jarvis v Williams [1955] 1 WLR 71
1955
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Torts - Other
J, the owner of the goods, sued in detinue the defendant W to whom they had been delivered at the request of a third party, P, who had failed to pay for them. W refused to deliver up the goods. Held: The claim was not maintainable. Lord Evershed MR said: "I take [the judgment below] to mean that the contractual right which the plaintiff had vis-á-vis Patterson to go and collect these goods from Patterson's agent was a right of a sufficient character to enable the plaintiff to bring an action in detinue against the agent of the owner of the property in these goods. But, with all respect to the County Court Judge, I am unable to accept that as a good proposition of law. Certain classes of persons, as for example bailees have, no doubt, a special right to sustain actions in trover and detinue but the general rule is, I think, correctly stated in the text of Halsbury's Laws of England 2nd Ed Vol 33 at p62, para 98: 'in order to maintain an action of trover or detinue, a person must have the right of possession and a right of property in the goods at the time of the conversion or detention; and he cannot sue if he has parted with the property in the goods at the time of the alleged conversion, or if at the time of the alleged conversion his title to the goods has been divested by a disposition which is valid under the Factors Act 1989'.
Factors Act 1989
1 Citers


 
Phipps v Rochester Corporation [1955] 1 All ER 129
1955

Devlin J
Personal Injury, Land, Torts - Other
A 12 year old child claimed damages having been injured trespassing on the defendant's premises. Held: An occupier who resigns himself to the occasional and perhaps inevitable presence of trespassers on his premises is not to be regarded as having assumed the obligations of a licensor. The court, looking at occupier's liability to trespassing children, noted the difference between big children and little children, that is "children who know what they are about and children who do not".

 
Williams v Owen [1955] 1 WLR 1293
1955
QBD
Finnemore J
Negligence, Torts - Other
Mr Williams left his car overnight in the hotel garage. A fire broke out and destroyed his car. Held: The strict liability of an innkeeper was limited to loss of his guest's goods rather than to their destruction.
As to section 86 of the 1774 Act, he said: "I think that this liability of the innkeeper was a custom of the realm. It is true it is embodied in common law rules, but then common law is the legal expression of custom, and it seems to me that that also would be an answer in this particular case. I suppose that by 1774 the legislature had appreciated what Lord Goddard CJ laid down in Sochacki v Sas: "Everybody knows fires occur through accidents which happen without negligence on anybody's part." Parliament in 1774 apparently thought it right that they should make it plain that whatever customs or usages there were to the contrary, in this country a man should not be held to be responsible for a fire which occurred accidentally - which I take to mean "without negligence on his part."
Those are two points which I think would be enough to decide that there is in this case no absolute liability on the part of the innkeeper, first, because there was injury to the car and not theft or loss; and, secondly, because, in any event, as it was a fire the Act of 1774 would limit the liability of the innkeeper, so far as a fire is concerned."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 86
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Randall v Tarrant; CA 1955 - [1955] 1 WLR 255

 
 In re Ellenborough Park; CA 15-Nov-1955 - [1956] 1 Ch 131; [1956] 3 All ER 667; [1955] EWCA Civ 4

 
 Alati v Kruger; 29-Nov-1955 - (1955) 94 CLR 216; [1955] HCA 64; [1955] ALR 1047

 
 Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd; CA 1956 - [1957] 1 QB 247; [1956] 3 All ER 970

 
 Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley; CA 1956 - [1956] 1 QB 702; [1956] 1 All ER 341

 
 Smith (Kathleen Rose) v East Elloe Rural District Council; HL 26-Mar-1956 - [1956] AC 736; [1956] 1 All ER 855; [1956] UKHL 2

 
 Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) Ltd; 1957 - [1957] 2 QB 344; [1957] 2 All ER 343

 
 Huntley v Thornton; 1957 - [1957] 1 WLR 321; [1957] 1 All ER 234

 
 Kelson v Imperial Tobacco Company; 1957 - [1957] 2 QB 344
 
Kuchenmeister v Home Office [1958] 1 QB 496
1958
QBD
Barry J
Torts - Other, Damages
The plaintiff, a German national landed at Heathrow airport en route to Dublin. The immigration officers, instead of refusing him leave to land (as they had been instructed to do), detained him at the airport until it was too late for him to catch the Dublin flight. They might have had other powers to detain him, but had wrongly acted under the 1953 Order which gave no such power. Held: He had been wrongfully imprisoned. The immigration officers had no power to detain the claimant in such a way as to prevent his transiting from one aircraft to another The right of liberty is a precious right entitled to protection. Barry J said: "His liberty was restricted to a greater degree than the immigration authorities were entitled to restrict it under [the particular power they sought to rely upon]. The fact that they might have restricted his mobility by employing the powers conferred upon them by other articles of the Order seems to me to be immaterial. It is no answer, when a man says 'I have been unlawfully arrested without a warrant,' to say 'Well, had I (the person making the arrest) taken the trouble to go and ask for a warrant, I would undoubtedly have got it.' That would be no answer to a claim for unlawful arrest. Similarly here, although the [immigration officers] could have detained the plaintiff by refusing him leave to land, that does not entitle them to detain him on the grounds on which they did."
The judge awarded damages of £150 even though "no pecuniary damage [had] been suffered" on the basis that it was "a fair figure which will vindicate the plaintiff's rights without amounting to a vindictive award".
Aliens Order 1953 2(1)(b)
1 Citers



 
 National Coal Board v Gamble; QBD 1958 - [1958] 3 All ER 203; [1959] 42 CAR 240; [1959] 1 QB 11; (1958) 42 Cr App R 240; [1958] 3 WLR 434; (1958) 122 JP 453
 
Farrington v Thomson and Bridgland [1959] VR 286
1959

Smith J
Commonwealth, Torts - Other
(Supreme Court of Victoria) Smith J said: "Proof of damage is, of course, necessary in addition. In my view, therefore, the rule should be taken to go this far at least, that if a public officer does an act which, to his knowledge, amounts to an abuse of his office, and he thereby causes damage to another person, then an action in tort for misfeasance in a public office will lie against him at the suit of that person".
1 Citers


 
Hargreaves v Bretherton [1959] 1 QB 45
1959

Lord Goddard CJ
Torts - Other
The Plaintiff pleaded that the First Defendant police officer had falsely and maliciously and without justification or excuse committed perjury at the Plaintiff's trial on charges of criminal offences and that as a result the Plaintiff had been convicted and sentenced to eight years preventive detention. Held: The claim was struck out as disclosing no cause of action. Telling lies about a defendant is not by itself tortious. Even if there was provable perjury in the proceedings, no second cause of action arises in civil proceedings from that. Lord Goddard CJ said: "The simple point that I have to decide is whether or not an action lies at the suit of the person who says that he has been demnified by false evidence given against him. In my opinion it is perfectly clear and beyond peradventure nowadays that such an action will not lie".
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Akerhielm v De Mare [1959] AC 789; [1959] 3 All ER 485
1959
PC
Lord Jenkins
Litigation Practice, Torts - Other, Company
A company prospectus contained the following: "About a third of the capital has already been subscribed in Denmark." Though the directors believed this to be true, it was not true at the time the prospectus was issued. Held: The statement was not fraudulent having been made with an honest belief in its truth. When a party has been acquitted of fraud the decision in his favour should not be displaced except on the clearest grounds.
Lord Jenkins said: "their Lordships are satisfied that this is not one of those exceptional cases in which an appellate court is justified in reversing the decision of a judge at first instance when the decision under review is founded upon the judge's opinion of the credibility of a witness formed after seeing and hearing him give his evidence. Their Lordships can hardly imagine a case in which the credibility of a witness could be more vital than a case like the present where the claim is based on deceit, and the witness in question is one of the defendants charged with deceit. Their Lordships would add that they accept, and would apply in the present case, the principle that where a defendant has been acquitted of fraud in a court of first instance the decision in his favour should not be displaced on appeal except on the clearest grounds." and "The question is not whether the defendant in any given case honestly believed the representation to be true in the sense assigned to it by the court on an objective consideration of its truth or falsity, but whether he honestly believed the representation to be true in the sense in which he understood it albeit erroneously when it was made."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Armstrong v Sheppard and Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384; [1959] 2 All ER 651; [1959] 3 WLR 84; (1959) 123 JP 401; (1959) Sol Jo 508
1959
CA
Lord Evershed MR
Estoppel, Equity, Nuisance, Torts - Other, Land
The plaintiff had a path at the rear of his property. The defendant constructed a sewer under the path, and asked the plaintiff for permission. He gave it informally, not knowing at the time that he owned the land. The sewer was constructed. Though suffering no inconvenience, on discovering his ownership, the plaintiff requested the removal of the sewer and its manhole, and an associated injunction. The judge at trial found a trespass, but gave only nominal damages and refused an injunction. Held: The plaintiff was not debarred from objecting when his acquiescence arose through ignorance. However the trespass was trivial, and no injunction was granted.
As to the cross appeal, though the trespass was forgiven by the consent, that could not answer the claim as to the continuing discharge since that would amount to an easement which would require a formal grant.
Lord Evershed MR said: "it is true to say that if a man, having a proprietary right, proves an infringement of that right, prima facie he is entitled to an injunction: but that needs some qualification. It is not a matter of unqualified right; and one ground for denying an injunction would be that the wrong done is, in the circumstances, trivial. That proposition is founded on the well-known case of Imperial Gas Light and Coke Co. (Directors) v. Broadbent . . The judge was here dealing with the claim as I have formulated it: and he came to the conclusion that the circumstances of this case were special, and, as his judgment shows, that the damage was trivial . . But there were other good grounds, and formidable grounds (as I think) for refusing the plaintiff an injunction. That he misled the defendants is beyond a peradventure. It is no less clear that he attempted to mislead the court. He asserted - contrary to the fact - that he had never had any conversation with the defendants about the matter at all; and in his evidence in chief he so swore, untruly. It is not, therefore, surprising that the judge came to the conclusion that he should grant no equitable relief; and in my judgment, on the facts of this case, he was well entitled to take that view."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121
1959


Commonwealth, Torts - Other
(Canada) The court discussed what was 'targeted malice' in the context of misfeasance.
1 Citers


 
Williams v Hursey (1959) 103 CLR 30; [1959] ALR 1383; (1959) 33 ALJR 269
1959

Dixon CJ (1), Fullagar(2), Kitto(3), Taylor(4) and Menzies(5) JJ
Torts - Other
High Court of Australia - For an unlawful means conspiracy, the plaintiff must prove that the combination or agreement was to engage in conduct which amounted to unlawful means
1 Citers


 
Smith v Pywell Times, 29 April 1959
29 Apr 1959

Diplock J
Torts - Other
There is no separate tort of procuring a third person to commit a tort, but the procurer was a joint tortfeasor with the person who actually committed it.
1 Citers


 
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