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Torts - Other - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 71 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Grant v Gold Exploration and Development Syndicate Ltd [1900] 1 QB 233
1900
CA
AL Smith LJ
Torts - Other
Secrecy is a badge of fraud.
1 Citers


 
Burberry's v Cording [1900] 26 RPC 693
1900


Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
Discussing the tort of passing off the court said: "The principles of law applicable to a case of this sort are well known. On the one hand, apart from the law as to trade marks, no one can claim monopoly rights in the use of a word or name. On the other hand, no one is entitled by the use of any word or name, or indeed in any other way, to represent his goods as being the goods of another to that other's injury. If an injunction be granted restraining the use of a word or name, it is no doubt granted to protect property, but the property, to protect which it is granted, is not property in the word or name, but property in the trade or goodwill which will be injured by its use."
1 Citers


 
Hickman v Maisey [1900] 1 QB 752
1900
CA
A L Smith, Collins, Romer LJJ
Land, Torts - Other
A racing tout used the public highway which crossed the plaintiff's property to watch racehorses being trained on the plaintiff's land. On a particular occasion he walked backwards and forwards on a portion of the highway 15 yards long for a period of about one and a half hours watching and taking notes of the trials of race horses on the plaintiff's land. Held: A man resting at the side of the road, or taking a sketch from the highway, would not be a trespasser. The defendant's activities, however, fell outside "an ordinary and reasonable user of the highway" and so amounted to a trespass.
Smith LJ said: "Unless what the defendant did comes within the ordinary and reasonable use of a highway as such and is therefore lawful, it is clear that it would be a trespass".
Collins LJ (applying Esher's judgment) "in modern times a reasonable extension has been given to the use of the highway as such . . The right of the public to pass and repass on a highway is subject to all those reasonable extensions which may from time to time be recognised as necessary to its exercise in accordance with the enlarged notions of people in a country becoming more populous and highly civilised, but they must be such as are not inconsistent with the maintenance of the paramount idea that the right of the public is that of passage."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Hovenden and Sons v Millhoff; 1900 - [1900] 83 LT 41
 
Davidsson v Hill [1901] 2 KB 606; (1901) 70 LJKB 788; (1901) 85 LT 118; (1901) 49 WR 630; (1901) 9 Asp MLC 223
1901
CA
Kennedy and Phillimore LJJ
International, Torts - Other
Ships collided at sea. The negligent crew were aboard the British ship. A crew member on the Norwegian ship died in the collision, and his family sued here. Held: The family had a right of action against the defendant owners of the British ship. The existence of a cause of action in favour of dependants of a person negligently killed was regarded as a universal principle which should be treated as part of the international law maritime.
Fatal Accidents Act 1846 - Fatal Accidents Act 1864
1 Citers



 
 Campbell Davys v Lloyd; 1901 - [1901] 2 Ch 518
 
Dulieu v White and Sons [1901] 2 KB 669
1901
KBD
Phillimore J, Kennedy J
Torts - Other, Damages
A pregnant barmaid suffered nervous shock causing her to give premature birth as a result of the tortfeasor's horse van bursting into her bar at the Bonner Arms in Bethnal Green from the roadway. The defendant pleaded that the damages claimed were too remote. Held: In principle "terror wrongfully induced and inducing physical mischief gives a cause of action." The plaintiff could recover in respect of the physical consequences of 'nervous shock' caused by reason of "reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself".
Kennedy J considered the argument that fright, where physical injury is directly produced by it, cannot be a ground of action merely because of the absence of any accompanying impact, to be "both unreasonable and contrary to the weight of authority." The argument was unreasonable and contrary to the weight of authority, but he limited the type of shock for which damages were recoverable to that suffered from fear for oneself only: "The shock, where it operates through the mind, must be a shock which arises from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Quinn v Leathem [1901] AC 495; [1901] UKHL 2
5 Aug 1901
HL
Lord Shand, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Lindley, Earl of Halsbury LC
Torts - Other, Contract, Constitutional
Quinn was treasurer of a Belfast butchers' association. Leathem, who traded as a butcher, employed some non-union men, although when the union made difficulties he asked for them to be admitted to the union, and offered to pay their dues. The union put pressure on Munce, a wholesale customer of Leathem, to stop buying his meat. It also called out Dickie, one of Leathem's employees. The jury found for Leathem, holding that there had been a malicious conspiracy between Quinn and other officers of the union. The Irish Court of Appeal affirmed this. Held: The appeal failed. A conspiracy 'wrongfully and maliciously' to induce customers and servants of the plaintiff not to deal with him was actionable on proof of damage. Though the coming together of a group of people is lawful, even though it results in injury to the interests of others, such an agreement for no purpose other than the pursuit of a malicious purpose to injure another would be unlawful. Any violation of legal rights, including rights under contract, committed knowingly and without justification, is a tortious act.
Lord MacNaghten said of Lumley v Gye: "I have no hesitation in saying that I think the decision was right, not on the ground of malicious intention - that was not, I think, the gist of the action - but on the ground that a violation of a legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and that it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognised by law if there be no sufficient justification for the interference."
He explained the rationale of the tort as follows: "a person's liberty or right to deal with others is nugatory, unless they are at liberty to deal with him if they choose to do so. Any interference with their liberty to deal with him affects him. If such interference is justifiable in point of law, he has no redress. Again, if such interference is wrongful, the only person who can sue in respect of it is, as a rule, the person immediately affected by it; another who suffers by it has usually no redress; the damage to him is too remote, and it would be obviously practically impossible and highly inconvenient to give legal redress to all who suffer from such wrongs. But if the interference is wrongful and is intended to damage a third person, and he is damaged in fact-in other words, if he is wrongfully and intentionally struck at through others, and is thereby damnified the whole aspect of the case is changed: the wrong done to others reaches him, his rights are infringed although indirectly, and damage to him is not remote or unforeseen, but is the direct consequence of what has been done."
Lord Lindley said that Lumley v Gye tort was an example of causing loss by unlawful means: "If the above reasoning is correct, Lumley v. Gye was rightly decided, as I am of opinion it clearly was. Further, the principle involved in it cannot be confined to inducements to break contracts of service, or indeed to inducements to break any contracts. The principle which underlies the decision reaches all wrongful acts done intentionally to damage a particular individual and actually damaging him." and
"a person's liberty or right to deal with others is nugatory, unless they are at liberty to deal with him if they choose to do so. Any interference with their liberty to deal with him affects him. If such interference is justifiable in point of law, he has no redress. Again, if such interference is wrongful, the only person who can sue in respect of it is, as a rule, the person immediately affected by it; another who suffers by it has usually no redress; the damage to him is too remote, and it would be obviously practically impossible and highly inconvenient to give legal redress to all who suffer from such wrongs. But if the interference is wrongful and is intended to damage a third person, and he is damaged in fact - in other words, if he is wrongfully and intentionally struck at through others, and is thereby damnified - the whole aspect of the case is changed: the wrong done to others reaches him, his rights are infringed although indirectly, and damage to him is not remote or unforeseen, but is the direct consequence of what has been done."
Lord Shand distinguished Allen v Flood: "As to the vital distinction between Allen v Flood and the present case, it may be stated in a single sentence. In Allen v Flood the purpose of the defendant was by the acts complained of to promote his own trade interest, which it was held he was entitled to do, although injurious to his competitors, whereas in the present case, while it is clear there was combination, the purpose of the defendants was 'to injure the plaintiff in his trade as distinguish from the intention of legitimately advancing their own interest.'"
Earl of Halsbury LC said: ". . a case is only an authority for what it actually decides."
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1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Mason v Orr [1901] ScotCS CSIH_1; (1901) 4 F 220; (1901) 9 SLT 269
28 Nov 1901
SCS
Lord M'Laren
Scotland, Torts - Other, Police
Action directed against the Superintendent of the Central Division of the Glasgow Police for an alleged assault, and the question is whether a relevant case has been stated.
[ Bailii ]

 
 Syed Mahamad Yusuf-ud-Din v Secretary of State for India; 1903 - (1903) 19 TLR 496
 
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v David Moseley and Sons Ltd (1903) 21 RPC 53
1903
ChD
Swinfen Eady J
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
The defendant sold tyre covers which were an essential feature of a combination patent for tyres and rims. The tyre covers were adapted for use in the manner described in the patent, but not necessarily solely for use in that manner. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant were liable for patent infringement as joint tortfeasors. Held: Swinfen Eady J said that most of the "covers would probably ultimately be used in one or other of" the patented method but that "those are not exhaustive of the purposes to which the covers may be put, and that they would be useful for other purposes in connection with other tyres."
1 Citers



 
 Faulder and Co Ltd v Rushton; 1903 - (1903) 20 RPC 477

 
 Demer v Cook; 1903 - (1903) 88 LT 629
 
Glenwood Lumber Co Ltd v Phillips [1904] AC 405; [1904-7] All ER Rep 203; (1904) LJPC 62; (1904) 90 LT 741; (1904) TLR 531
1904
PC
Lord Davey MR
Landlord and Tenant, Torts - Other
The Crown had granted licenses to cut timber from an area over a period of years. Held: It was well established that possession is good as against a wrong doe, who may not set up as a defence a jus terii unless his claim is derived from that right. "The appellants contended that this instrument conferred only a license to cut timber and carry it away, and did not give the respondent any right of occupation or interest in the land itself. Having regard to the provisions of the Act under the powers of which it was executed and to the language of the document itself, their Lordships cannot adopt this view of the construction or effect of it. In the so-called licence itself it is calld indifferently a licence and a demise, but in the Act it is spoken of as a lease, and the holder of it is called a lessee.It is not, however, a question of words but of substance." and "it is not open to the Defendant, being a wrong-doer to enquire into the nature or limitation of the possessor's right, and unless it is competent for him to do so the question of his relation to, or liability towards, the true owner cannot come into the discussion at all, and therefore, as between those two parties, full damages have to be paid without any further enquiry.' "
Lord Davey said: "In the so-called licence itself it is called indifferently a licence and a demise but in the Act it is spoken of as a lease, and the holder of it is described as the lessee. It is not, however, a question of words but of substance. If the effect of the instrument is to give the holder an exclusive right of occupation of the land, though subject to certain reservations or to a restriction of the purposes for which it may be used, it is in law a demise of the land itself."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 South Wales Miners' Federation v Glamorgan Coal Company; HL 1905 - [1905] AC 239
 
Fielden v Cox (1906) 22 TLR 411
1906


Torts - Other, Land
The defendants had set up appliances on the highway for the purpose of catching moths. Held: The court discouraged actions for minimal obstructions.
1 Citers


 
S Pearson and Son Ltd v Dublin Corporation [1907] AC 351
1907
HL
Lord Loreburn LC, Lord Ashbourne, Lord Atkinson, Lord Halsbury
Torts - Other, Contract
A clause in a building contract provided that the contractor should satisfy himself as to the dimensions, levels and nature of all existing works. Did this exclude an action based on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations by the council's engineers as to the position of an existing wall. Held: Lord Halsbury "The action is based on the allegation of fraud, and no subtilty of language, no craft or machinery in the form of contract, can estop a person who complains that he has been defrauded from having that question of fact submitted to a jury."
Lord Loreburn said: "I will not say that a man himself innocent may not under any circumstances, however peculiar, guard himself by apt and express clauses from liability for the fraud of his own agents." but the clause as a matter of construction did not cover cases of fraudulent misrepresentation. General language will not be construed to relieve a principal of liability for the fraud of an agent. Of the exemption clauses "They contemplate honesty on both sides and protect only against honest mistakes."
1 Citers


 
Davis v Bromley Corporation [1908] 1 KB 170
1907
CA
Vaughan Williams LJ, Sir Gorell Barnes, President, and Bigham J
Torts - Other, Planning
The plaintiff had submitted building plans for the defendant's approval, which were refused for alleged non-compliance with by-laws. The Plaintiff contended that the plans complied with the by-laws and that the rejection was not bona fide. Held: The court denied the existence of a tort of misfeasance in public office.
Vaughan Williams LJ said: "It is not contested that the legislature has given power to this body to decide whether they will sanction such works or not; it is not suggested that in so deciding the Council are exercising judicial functions, and in fact they are not doing so; they are exercising a discretion vested in them by Statute . . and the whole object of this action is really to see if, by this means, the plaintiff can overrule the Council's decision."
1 Citers


 
Holden v Thompson [1907] 2 KB 489; [1907] 76 LJKB 889; [1907] 97 LT 138; [1907] 23 TLR 529
1907

Phillimore J
Torts - Other
Several children were removed by their impoverished parents from the care of a religious institution. A charity supporting them, employed solicitors to act for them to defend proceedings brought by the institution. The solicitors now sought their costs. The charity said that the agreement had been maintenance of the proceedings and was void. Held: The charitable motive underlying the action was such as to allow an exception to the rule against maintenance.
1 Citers


 
Bullen v Swan Electric Engineering Co (1907) 23 TLR 258
1907


Torts - Other
The duty of a bailee is to take reasonable care of the goods concerned, the bailee bearing the burden of proof of absence of fault.
1 Citers


 
National Phonograph Co Ltd v Edison-Bell Consolidated Phonograph Co Ltd [1908] 1 Ch 335
1908
CA
Buckley and Kennedy LJJ
Torts - Other
The defendant had intentionally caused loss to the plaintiff by fraudulently inducing a third party to act to the plaintiff's detriment. The court considered the tort of wrongful interference in contractual relations where a fraud had clearly been directed against the plaintiff.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Chaplin and Co Ltd v Brammall [1908] 1 KB 233; 97 LT 860
1908
CA
Vaughan Williams LJ
Torts - Other, Contract
The plaintiffs, having agreed to supply goods to the defendant's husband on credit if his wife would guarantee payment by him of their price, sent to the husband a form of guarantee, in order that he might obtain his wife's signature to it, leaving the matter entirely to him. The husband obtained his wife's signature to the guarantee, without sufficiently explaining to her the nature of the document, which she did not understand when she signed it. Held: The instrument of suretyship for his obligations was set aside when the wife's evidence was that she did not know that the document that she signed was a guarantee or of any importance. The case came squarely within the principle explained in Duval where the document the wife signed "was very different from what she supposed it to be"
1 Citers



 
 Doodeward v Spence; 1908 - [1908] 6 CLR 40
 
Smithies v National Association of Operative Plasterers [1909] 1 KB 310
1909
CA
Vaughan Williams LJ, Kennedy LJ
Contract, Torts - Other
It was no defence to a claim for inducing breach of contract brought by employers against a trade union for sanctioning a strike that the defendant trade union had acted in the honest belief that the employers against whom action was taken were not intending to comply with a collective agreement. Their good faith was no defence.
1 Citers


 
Robertson v The Balmain New Ferry Company Ltd [1909] UKPC 1; [1910] AC 295
10 Dec 1909
PC

Commonwealth, Transport, Contract, Torts - Other
High Court of Australia - The Plaintiff paid a penny on entering the wharf to stay there till the boat should start and then be taken by the boat to the other side. The Defendants were admittedly always ready and willing to carry out their part of this contract. Then the Plaintiff changed his mind, and wished to go back. The rules as to the exit from the wharf by the turnstile required a penny for any person who went though. This the Plaintiff refused to pay, and he was by force prevented from going through the turnstile. He then claimed damages for assault and false imprisonment,
[ Bailii ]

 
 Clissold v Cratchley; CA 1910 - [1910] 2 KB 244
 
Lowery v Walker [1910] 1 KB 173
1910


Torts - Other
An occupier of land who knows that members of the public are in the habit of going on to his land and does nothing to prevent it, may be deemed to have licensed them to do so.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Lowery v Walker; HL 9-Nov-1910 - [1911] AC 10; [1910] UKHL 1

 
 Whitehorn Brothers v Davison; CA 1911 - [1911] 1 KB 463
 
International Sponge Importers Ltd v Andrew Watt and Sons [1911] UKHL 1; [1911] AC 279; 1911 1 SLT 414; 1911 SC (HL) 57
31 Mar 1911
HL

Scotland, Contract, Agency, Torts - Other

[ Bailii ]
 
Cope v Sharpe (No 2) [1912] 1 KB 496
1912
CA
Buckley LJ, Vaughan-Williams LJ
Torts - Other
The court considered defences to assault; whether the defendant was justified in doing certain acts of trespass on the plaintiff's land for the purpose of preventing heath fire and consequent loss and damage to the property of the defendant's master. Held: The defendant had made out his plea of justification. The principle was "one of general application to justification for acts of trespass. Chasing by dogs which caused a real and present danger of serious harm to the plaintiffs animals chased constitutes an "attack" entitling the owner to take effective action of prevention. The onus of proof is on the defendant to justify the preventive measure of shooting the attacking dogs. He has, by proof, to establish two propositions, but each proposition may be established in either of two ways: Proposition No 1: That at the time of shooting, the dog was either (a) actually (in the above sense) attacking the animals in question, or (b) if left at large would renew the attack so that the animals would be left presently subject to real and imminent danger unless renewal was prevented. Proposition No 2: That either (a) there was in fact no practicable means, other than shooting, of stopping the present attack or preventing such renewal, or (b) that the defendant, having regard to all the circumstances in which he found himself, acted reasonably in regarding the shooting as necessary for the protection of the animals against attack or renewed attack. (As summarised by Scott LJ n Cresswell v Sirl)
Buckley LJ: "They (the jury) found that the defendant's acts were not in fact (i.e., in the result), but were in reason, necessary. I decline to go back upon the evidence. The jury have in my opinion by their findings affirmed the propositions which I have stated.
In this state of facts the question is whether, as matter of law, the defendant has justified that which in the absence of sufficient justification would be a trespass. I notice that Hamilton J. says that in his view the finding of the jury that the method adopted by the defendant was not in fact necessary is conclusive of the case. I do not agree. The test is not whether, if the defendant had not done those acts, the danger would in fact have resulted in injury. Neither is it whether the defendant believed that it would have resulted in injury. The test, I think, is whether, having regard to the rights of the sporting lessee, there was such real and imminent danger to his property as that he was entitled to act and whether his acts were reasonably necessary in the sense of acts which a reasonable man would properly do to meet a real danger."
Kennedy LJ: "With parts of the judgments pronounced in the Divisional Court I agree. I agree in holding that an interference with the property or the person of another, which otherwise would certainly constitute an actionable trespass, cannot be justified by mere proof on the part of the alleged trespasser of his good intention and of his belief in the existence of a danger which he sought by his act of interference to avert, but which in fact did not exist at all."
1 Citers



 
 Boyd and Forrest v GWSR Co; HL 16-May-1912 - [1912] UKHL 5; 1912 SC (HL) 93; 1912 1 SLT 476
 
Heilbut Symons and Co v Buckleton [1911-13] All ER 83; [1913] 82 LJKB 245; [1913] 107 LT 769; [1912] UKHL 2; [1913] AC 30; (1912) 107 LT 769
11 Nov 1912
HL
Viscount Haldane LC, Lord Moulton
Contract, Torts - Other
The House considered the genesis of collateral contracts: "there may be a contract the consideration for which is the making of some other contract, 'If you will make such and such a contract I will give you one hundred pounds', is in every sense of the word a complete legal contract. It is collateral to the main contract." and
"such collateral contracts must from their very nature be rare . . the more natural and usual way of carrying this out would be by so modifying the main contract and not by executing a concurrent and collateral contract. Such collateral contracts . . are therefore viewed with suspicion by the law. They must be proved strictly. Not only the terms of such contract but the existence of an animus contrahendi on the part of all the parties to them must be clearly shown." An innocent misrepresentation gives no right to damages.
Speaking as to De Lasalle v. Guildford: "With all deference to the authority of the Court that decided that case, the proposition which it thus formulates cannot be supported. It is clear that the Court did not intend to depart from the law laid down by Holt CJ. And cited above, for in the same judgment that dictum is referred to and accepted as a correct statement of the law. It is, therefore, evidence that the use of the phrase 'decisive test' cannot be defended. Otherwise it would be the duty of a judge to direct a jury that if a vendor states a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, they must, as a matter of law, find the existence of a warranty, whether or not the totality of the evidence shows that the parties intended the affirmation to form part of the contract; and this would be inconsistent with the law as laid down by Holt CJ. It may well be that the features thus referred to in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in that case may be criteria of value in guiding a jury in coming to a decision whether or not a warranty was intended; but they cannot be said to furnish decisive tests, because it cannot be said as a matter of law that the presence or absence of those features is conclusive of the intention of the parties. The intention of the parties can only be deduced from the totality of the evidence, and no secondary principles of such a kind can be universally true." It is of the greatest importance to 'maintain in its full integrity the principle that a person is not liable in damages for an innocent misrepresentation, no matter in what way or under what form the attack is made.'
Investors in a new company claimed to have done so only on the basis of an alleged representation in the company's name and by an intermediary that it was a rubber company. They sought damages when the company failed, saying that the representatin was a warranty. Held: The appeal succeeded. The plaintiff had not shown that he had relied on any such representation, but rather on the general reputation of the appellants. Lord Moulton set out how to decide whether a clause was a warranty "The intention of the parties can only be deduced from the totality of the evidence". The question whether a warranty was intended depends on the conduct of the parties, on their words and behaviour, rather than on their thoughts. If an intelligent bystander would reasonably infer that a warranty was intended, that will suffice. And this, when the facts are not in dispute, is a question of law.
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[ Bailii ]
 
Vacher and Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors [1912] UKHL 3; [1913] AC 107
18 Nov 1912
HL
Lord Haldane LC, Lord Moulton, Lord MacNaghten
Employment, Torts - Other
Lord Moulton said that the danger of departing from the ordinary meaning of unambiguous provisions is that "it may degrade into mere judicial criticism of the propriety of the acts of the Legislature".
Lord Haldane LC after stating that speculation on the motives of the Legislature was a topic which Judges cannot profitably or properly enter upon, said:—"Their province is the very different one of construing the language in which the Legislature has finally expressed its conclusions, and if they undertake the other province which belongs to those who, in making the laws, have to endeavour to interpret the desire of the country, they are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they have no sufficient guide. In endeavouring to place the proper interpretation on the sections of the statute before this House sitting in its judicial capacity. I propose, therefore, to exclude consideration of everything excepting the state of the law as it was when the statute was passed, and the light to be got by reading it as a whole, before attempting to construe any particular section. Subject to this consideration. I think that the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense."
Lord Macnaghten said: "a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the Court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules of construction." and
"Now it is 'the universal rule', as Lord Wensleydale observed in Grey v Pearson, that in construing statutes, as in construing all other written instruments ' the grammatical and ordinary sense of the word is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further'. Acts of Parliament are, of course, to be construed acording to the intent of the Parliament' which passes them. That is 'the only rule' said Tindal CJ, delivering the opinion of the judges who advised this House, in the Sussex Peerage Case. But his Lordship was careful to add this note of warning: If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver'. Nowadays, when it is a rare thing to find a preamble in any public general statute, the field of inquiry is even narrower than it was in former times. In the absence of a preamble there can, I think, be only two cases in which it is permissible to depart from the ordinary and natural sense of the words of an enactment. It must be shewn either that the words taken in their natural sense lead to some absurdity or that there is some other clause in the body of the Act inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the enactment in question construed in the ordinary sense of the language in which it is expressed."
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]

 
 Herd v Weardale Steel Coal and Coke Co Ltd; CA 1913 - [1913] 3 KB 77

 
 McAra v Magistrates of Edinburgh; 1913 - 1913 SC 1059

 
 Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital; 1913 - (1914) 105 NE 92; (1914) 211 NY 125; (1914) 52 LRANS 505

 
 Nocton v Lord Ashburton; HL 1914 - [1914] AC 932

 
 Smith v Selwyn; 1914 - [1914] 3 KB 98
 
Walters v WH Smith and Son Ltd [1914] 1 KB 595
1914
CA
Sir Rufus Isaacs CJ
Torts - Other
The plaintiff alleged false imprisonment and malicious prosecution after a private guard had arrested him at the defendant's store. Held: A private individual may justify his arrest of another on suspicion of having committed a felony only if he can show both that the offence was committed usually by a conviction for that same offence, and also that he had reasonable and probable cause for the suspicion giving rise to the arrest.
Sir Rufus Isaacs CJ quoted from Hale's Pleas of the Crown: "The third case is, there is a felony committed, but whether committed by B or not, non constat, and therefore we will suppose that in truth it were not committed by B but by some person else, yet A hath probable causes to suspect B to be the felon, and accordingly doth arrest him; this arrest is lawful and justifiable, and the reason is because if a person should be punished by an action of trespass or false imprisonment for an arrest of a man for felony under these circumstances, malefactors would escape to the common detriment of the people."
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Boyd and Forrest v GWSR Co [1914] ScotCS CSIH_2
7 Mar 1914
SCS

Scotland, Contract, Torts - Other
The pursuers' case is that they were led to enter into a contract with the defenders to execute certain works of construction of a railway for a lump sum, and that they were led to tender to do the work for a certain price, by the other party, the defenders, having, through their responsible officials, supplied them with information which was in essential particulars misleading information; and that thus they, the pursuers, were induced to enter into the contract by fraud, or otherwise that they were misinformed by an incorrect representation of facts, and were thus under essential error. They claim that the sum to which they were entitled for the work done is much larger than what they have received, and they sue for the excess. TThe pursuers' case is that they were led to enter into a contract with the defenders to execute certain works of construction of a railway for a lump sum, and that they were led to tender to do the work for a certain price, by the other party, the defenders, having, through their responsible officials, supplied them with information which was in essential particulars misleading information; and that thus they, the pursuers, were induced to enter into the contract by fraud, or otherwise that they were misinformed by an incorrect representation of facts, and were thus under essential error. They claim that the sum to which they were entitled for the work done is much larger than what they have received, and they sue for the excess. T
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[ Bailii ]
 
Herd v Weardale Steel Coal and Coke Co Ltd [1914] UKHL 2; [1915] AC 67
30 Jun 1914
HL
Viscount Haldane LC
Torts - Other
The claimant, a miner, said that his work was dangerous, and threw down his tools. He now sought damages saying that his employer had falsely imprisoned him by failing to bring him to the surface until the end of his shift. Held: The employee's appeal against dismissal of his claim failed. The existence of a contractual relationship between the parties, including an implied obligation on the defendants to take the plaintiff up to the surface at the end of his shift, and left no room for such a claim in tort.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]

 
 Wiffen v Bailey and Romford Urban District Council; CA 1915 - [1915] 1 KB 600
 
Robinson v National Bank of Scotland [1916] SC (HL) 154; [1916] UKHL 4; 1916 1 SLT 336
10 Apr 1916
HL
Lord Haldane, Earl Loreburn
Scotland, Negligence, Torts - Other, Banking
The pursuer claimed for false and fraudulent misrepresentation againt his bankers. Held: A duty of care is not only owed in cases of fiduciary relationship in the narrow sense of relationships which had been recognised by the court of Chancery as being of a fiduciary character. There are other special relationships.
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[ Bailii ]

 
 Coldman v Hill; CA 1918 - 120 LT 412; [1919] 1 KB 443; [1918] All ER Rep 438

 
 Aberconway v- Whetnall; 1918 - (1918) 87 LJ Ch 524
 
Musgrove v Pandelis [1919] 1 KB 314
1919

Lush J
Torts - Other, Nuisance
Mr Musgrove rented rooms above a domestic garage, in which Mr Pandelis kept a car. Mr Pandelis sent his chauffeur, Mr Coumis, to clean the car. Mr Coumis had to move the car within the garage. For that purpose he went to the bonnet and turned on the petrol tap to allow the flow of petrol from the tank to the carburettor, and started the engine, when suddenly there was an explosion, and flames were seen to be coming from the carburettor. There was no woodwork within eighteen inches of the carburettor, and if Mr Coumis had immediately turned off the tap of the pipe leading from the petrol tank the petrol in the carburettor would have soon burnt out, and the fire would have been prevented from spreading. But instead of doing so Mr Coumis wasted his time in looking for a cloth which he failed to find. He then went to the bonnet to turn off the tap, but was too late, for owing to the continued flow of the petrol into the carburettor the fire had spread to the body of the car. The garage itself then caught fire and the whole building was burnt, including Mr Musgrove's rooms overhead, together with a quantity of furniture belonging to him. Held: The petrol was "liable to cause a fire" and "not unlikely to get on fire". Mr Coumis was negligent in not immediately turning off the petrol tap.
Lush J said: "But, nevertheless, I am of opinion that the statute affords the defendant no protection; for though the fire in the carburettor was accidental in a popular sense, I do not think it was accidental in the sense in which that term is used in the statute. If a man brings on to his premises a dangerous thing which is liable to cause fire, such as a motor car with petrol in it, the carburettor of which is not unlikely to get on fire when the engine is started, and a fire results, though without any negligence on his part, he must be held liable, the statute notwithstanding, for the rule is that he must keep such a thing under control at his peril."
Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774
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Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316
1919


Torts - Other
During the First World War Mlle Janvier lived as a paid companion in a house in Mayfair and corresponded with her German lover who was interned as an enemy alien on the Isle of Man. Sweeney was a private detective who wanted secretly to obtain some of her employer's documents and sent his assistant to induce her to co-operate by pretending to be from Scotland Yard and saying that the authorities wanted her because she was corresponding with a German spy. Mlle Janvier suffered severe nervous shock from which she took a long time to recover. Held: The assistant was acting within the scope of his employment and the two detectives were liable. The jury awarded her £250.
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Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co Ltd (1919) 122 LT 44
1919
CA
Atkin LJ, Warrington LJ
Torts - Other
cw An unconscious or drugged person may be detained. For the tort of false imprisonment there must be shown a complete restriction in fact on the plaintiff's freedom to move: "any restraint within defined bounds which is a restraint in fact may be an imprisonment."
The court distinguished between restraint upon the plaintiff's liberty which is conditional upon his seeking to exercise his freedom (which would not amount to false imprisonment), and an actual restraint upon his liberty, as where the defendant decided to restrain the plaintiff within a room and placed a policeman outside the door to stop him leaving (which would amount to false imprisonment). The fact that he does not know that he is detained is of no matter since "a person can be imprisoned while he is asleep, while he is in a state of drunkenness, while he is unconscious and while he is a lunatic": The court considered the absence of "reasonable cause" although that could be evidence of malice.
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Neville v London Express Newspaper [1919] AC 368
1919
HL
Lord Finlay LC, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline and Lord Phillimore, Lord Finlay
Torts - Other
The question was whether, in order to recover damages for the tort which existed, it was necessary to show specific loss. Held: An action for damages for maintenance will not lie in the absence of proof of special damage.
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 Attorney-General for the Dominion of Canada v Ritchie Contracting and Supply Co Ltd; HL 1919 - [1919] AC 999
 
Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399
1920
CA
Scrutton LJ
Torts - Other, Landlord and Tenant
An assignment of the benefit of a covenant in a lease held to be sufficiently connected with enjoyment of the property as not to be a bare right of action. The assignment was not void.
Scrutton LJ stated that the assignee of a cause of action was not guilty of maintenance or champerty by reason of the assignment he took because he was buying not in order to obtain a cause of action but in order to protect the property which he had bought.
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Great Central Railway Co v Bates [1921] 3 KB 578
1921
CA
Atkin LJ
Torts - Other, Police
A police officer has no right to enter land merely because most reasonable householders "would not as a rule object if the matter was done bona fide and no nuisance was caused"
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 Johnstone v Pedlar; HL 24-Jun-1921 - [1921] 2 AC 262; [1921] UKHL 1
 
Stevenson v Basham [1922] NZLR 225
1922


Torts - Other
(New Zealand) The defendant made a threat to the plaintiff's husband inside the house that she and her husband were occupying to burn it down, the threat being overheard by her when she was in a bedroom where she was lying and when she was pregnant at the time. Held: He was held liable for the nervous shock she sustained. He knew that she was there
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Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500
1923
CA
Atkin LJ
Torts - Other, Contract
A car dealer had bought a car to which the seller had no title. Held: The dealer succeeded in his claim to recover the purchase price on the ground of total failure of consideration. The vendor had gone through the motions of performance of his contract by handing over a car, but in the eyes of the law that was no performance because the car was stolen. In the case of a theft the title acquired by the thief or later possessor is frail, and of likely limited value, but nonetheless remains a title to which the law can afford protection.
Atkin LJ said: "It seems to me that in this case there has been a total failure of consideration, that is to say that the buyer has not got any part of that for which he paid the purchase money. He paid the money in order that he might get the property, and he has not got it. It is true that the seller delivered to him the de facto possession, but the seller had not got the right to possession and consequently could not give it to the buyer. . There can be no sale at all of goods which the seller has no right to sell. The whole object of a sale is to transfer property from one person to another … can it make any difference that the buyer had used the car before he found out that there was a breach of the condition? To my mind it makes no difference at all. The buyer accepted the car in the representation of the seller that he had a right to sell it, and in as much as the seller had no such right he is not entitled to say that the buyer has enjoyed a benefit under the contract. In fact the buyer has not received any part of that which he contracted to receive, namely the property and right to possession – and that being so there has been a total failure of consideration."
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Field v Sullivan [1923] VLR 70
1923

Macfarlan J, Cullen J
Torts - Other
(Supreme Court of Victoria) The claimant claimed return of goods seized by the police believing them to be stolen. The theft was not established and the claimant as the party in possession at the time of the seizure was held entitled to their return. "If A is in possession of goods, he is prima facie in lawful possession of them and prima facie has the right to that possession; in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, in any proceedings that possession is proof of ownership; but that possession may be divested out of him lawfully or unlawfully. If unlawfully, his right of possession remains. As against the person who unlawfully deprived him of possession (B) or those claiming through him, A's possession (even if wrongful) up to the time of seizure, is sufficient evidence to establish his right to possession: nor can those persons set up that the goods were A's possession, but were really the property of X, though, of course, if B took possession on behalf of and with the authority of X, who is shown to be the true owner, that might be set up to show that B's seizure was not unlawful. If the divesting is lawful, A's right of possession may be destroyed entirely or may be merely suspended or temporarily divested ... So where the law permits them to be seized or detained for a certain time or for a certain purpose or until a certain event, As possession is suspended or temporarily divested and the right of possession is vested in, or A's right to possession is displaced by, the right of possession in the person authorised to seize them or detain them for the period during which he is authorised. In other words, A's property and right to possession are made subject to the right of the police or other person seizing under the authority of the law to detain them during the period during which the detention is authorised; when that time expires, and no lawful order has been made for the disposition, his right to possession, if nothing more appears, again operates. I say `if nothing more appears', for if it may appear by evidence that A never had a right of possession, as in [Buckley], and that therefore there was no suspended right of possession to revive or again operate ..."
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 Clarkson v Davies; PC 1923 - [1923] AC 100
 
Phillips v Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co Ltd [1923] 2 KB 832
1923
CA
Atkin LJ
Torts - Other
A breach of the regulation does not give rise to an action for damages. The distinction between misfeasance and non-feasance should no longer have significance. Atkin LJ said: "one who cannot be otherwise specified than as a person using the highway" met the requirement of being a road user. The regulations required a motor car and all its fittings to be "in such a condition as not to cause, or be likely to cause, danger to any person on the motor car or on any highway".
Motor Cars (Use and Construction) Order 1904
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The Koursk [1924] P 140
1924
CA
Scrutton LJ
Vicarious Liability, Torts - Other
The navigators of two ships had committed two separate torts or one tort in which they were both tortfeasors. Held: Three situations were identified where A might be jointly liable with B for B's tortious act. Where A was master and B servant; where A was principal and B agent; and where the two were concerned in a joint act done in pursuance of a common purpose: "Certain classes of persons seem clearly to be "joint tortfeasors": The agent who commits a tort within the scope of his employment for his principal, and the principal; the servant who commits a tort in the course of his employment, and his master; two persons who agree on common action, in the course of, and to further which, one of them commits a tort. These seem clearly joint tortfeasors; there is one tort committed by one of them on behalf of, or in concert with another." and "I am of the opinion that the definition in Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 7th ed., p59, is much nearer the correct view : "Persons are said to be joint tortfeasors when their respective shares in the commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a common design" . . "but mere similarity of design on the part of independent actors, causing independent damage, is not enough; there must be concerted action to a common end."
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 Sorrell v Smith; HL 1925 - [1925] AC 700
 
Parkinson v College of Ambulance Ltd and Harrison [1925] 2 KB 1
1925

Lush J
Torts - Other, Contract
Lush J said of a contract to procure an honour, that "[n]o Court could try such an action and allow such damages to be awarded with any propriety or decency."
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The Spathari [1925] UKHL 1; 1925 SLT 322; 1925 SC (HL) 6; (1925) 21 Ll L Rep 265
23 Mar 1925
HL
Lord Chancellor Cave
Scotland, Torts - Other, Insurance

Marine Insurance Act 1906 17
[ Bailii ]
 
GWK Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd (1926) 42 TLR 376
1926

Lord Hewart CJ
Torts - Other
GWK company made motor cars and the ARM company made tyres. GWK contracted to fit all their new cars with ARM tyres and to show them with ARM tyres at trade exhibitions. On the night before a motor show in Glasgow, Dunlop employees removed the ARM tyres from two GWK cars on the exhibition and substituted Dunlop tyres. Dunlop knew of ARM's contractual right to have their tyres displayed. Held: Dunlop were liable. Lord Hewart CJ referred to Quinn v Leathem and said: "In [my] opinion the defendants knowingly committed a violation of the ARM company's legal rights by interfering, without any justification whatever, with the contractual relations existing between them and the GWK company and [I think] that the defendants so interfered with the intention of damaging the ARM company and that the company [has] been thereby damnified."
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McCowan v McCullogh (1926) 1 DLR 312
1926


Torts - Other
A man mistakenly took the plaintiff's suitcase from a train. Held: As a gratuitous bailee his duties of care were limited.

 
Gifford v Dent (1926) 71 SJ 83
1926

Romer J
Land, Torts - Other
It was a trespass over the plaintiff's land for the defendant to erect a sign projecting 4 ft 8 in over the plaintiff's forecourt.
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 Lagan Navigation Co v Lambeg Bleaching, Dyeing and Finishing Co Ltd; HL 1927 - [1927] AC 226
 
The Carlgarth [1927] P 93
1927

Scrutton LJ
Torts - Other, Land
Scrutton LJ said: "When you invite a person into your house to use the staircase, you do not invite him to slide down the banisters, you invite him to use the staircase in the ordinary way in which it is used." and "Another distinction is that in a highway by land one proceeds by physical contact, but in water one proceeds by floating along in the water and it is only in special circumstances that there is any right to ground or sit on the bottom of a river just as there is no right to sit in the middle of a road and say one is exercising a right to use a public roadway."
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Robert Addie and Sons (Collieries) Ltd v Dumbreck 1928 SC 547
1928
SCS
Lord President Clyde
Torts - Other, Scotland, Land
A boy trespassed on land and was injured on machinery there. The local working-classes resorted to the field regularly '(1) as an open space; (2) as a playground; (3) as a means of access to chapel and railway station; and (4) - as regards the less well disposed members of the local community - as a means of approach to the defenders' coal bing and wood depot for purposes of depredation. ' The defendant had taken steps to prevent the latter, but not otherwise. Held: Lord President Clyde said that if the presence of a trespasser near a dangerous machine is known to the proprietor he cannot disregard it: "I am unable to distinguish that case from the case in which the proprietor knows of the habitual resort of adults or children, or both, to the near neighbourhood of the dangerous machine - a habit of resort which makes it to his knowledge likely that one or more of such persons may be at the machine when he applies the motive power."
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 Brooke v Bool; 1928 - [1928] 2 KB 578
 
Scammel and Nephew Ltd v Hurley [1929] 1 KB 419
1929
CA
Scrutton LJ
Torts - Other
The court considered when a public authority may lose any statutory protection for its acts.
Scrutton LJ said: "if illegal acts are really done from some motive other than an honest desire to execute the statutory or other legal duty and an honest belief that they are justified by statutory or other legal authority; if they are done from a desire to injure a person or to assist some person or cause, without any honest belief that they are covered by statutory authority, or are necessary in the execution of statutory duty, the Public Authorities Protection Act is no defence, for the acts complained of are not done in intended exercise of a statute, but only in pretended execution thereof."
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