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Torts - Other - From: 1849 To: 1899

This page lists 120 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Duke of Athol v Torrie (1849) 12 D 328
1849


Torts - Other, Scotland

1 Citers


 
Cobbett v Grey [1849] 4 Ex 729
1849


Torts - Other, Prisons
A prisoner complained that he had been falsely imprisoned in a part of a prison in which he could not lawfully be confined.
1 Citers


 
Holford v Bailey [1849] 13 QB 426
1849


Torts - Other

1 Citers



 
 Irvine v Kirkpatrick; HL 1850 - (1850) 7 Bell App (HL) 186
 
Longmeid v Holliday (1851) 6 Ex 761; [1851] EngR 583; (1851) 6 Exch 761; (1851) 155 ER 752
1851

Parke B
Torts - Other, Personal Injury
A defective lamp was sold to a man whose wife was injured by its explosion. The seller of the lamp, against whom the action was brought, was not the manufacturer. Held: "It would be going much too far to say, that so much care is required in the ordinary intercourse of life between one individual and another, that, if a machine not in its nature dangerous, . . but which might become so by a latent defect entirely unknown, although discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care, should be lent or given by one person, even by the person who manufactured it, to another, the former should be answerable to the latter for a subsequent damage accruing by the use of it." The seller had made no fraudulent misstatement.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Embrey v Owen (1851) 6 Ex 353
1851

Parke B
Torts - Other
''It was very ably argued before us by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs had a right to the full flow of the water in its natural course and abundance, as an incident to their property in the land through which it flowed; and that any abstraction of the water, however inconsiderable, by another riparian proprietor, and though productive of no actual damage, would be actionable, because it was an injury to a right and, if continued, would be the foundation of a claim of adverse right in that proprietor. We by no means dispute the truth of this proposition, with respect to every description of right. Actual perceptible damage is not indispensable as the foundation of an action; it is sufficient to show the violation of a right, in which case the law will presume damage; injuria sine damno is actionable . . . '
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Horsfall v Thomas (1852) 1 H & C 90
1852


Torts - Other
It is a necessary requirement for an action in misrepresentation, that the misrepresentation induced the other party to enter into the contract.
1 Citers


 
Shedden v Patrick (1852) 14 D 727
1852

Lord Fullerton
Scotland, Litigation Practice, Torts - Other
Pleaded allegations of fraud must be based on clear and specific averments of fact from which an inference of fraud may legitimately be drawn
1 Citers



 
 Lumley v Gye; 1853 - (1853) 2 E & B 216; [1853] EngR 15; (1853) 2 El & Bl 216; (1853) 118 ER 749; [1853] EWHC QB J73
 
Pulsford v Richards [1853] EngR 417; (1853) 17 Beav 87; (1853) 51 ER 965
18 Apr 1853


Contract, Torts - Other
Where a party, by misrepresentation, draws another into a contract, such party may be compelled to make good the representation, if that be possible, but if it be impossible, the person deceived may avoid the contract. The same principle applies, though the party at the time believed the statement to be true, if in the clue discharge of his duty, he ought to have then known otherwise.
Third parties, who by false representations induce others to enter into contracts, are estopped from afterwards falsifying their statement, and, if necessary, may be compelled to make them good. But the false statement of one, not a party to the agreement entered into on the faith of it, is not a ground for avoiding it.
Misrepresentations may be either by a suppression of the truth or an assertion of what is false ; but to be the ground for avoiding the contract, the representation must be one “dans locum contractiui", or such that it is reasonable to infer that in its absence the party deceived would not have entered into the contract.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Foxall v Barnett [1853] EngR 985; (1853) 2 El & Bl 928; (1853) 118 ER 1014
17 Nov 1853


Torts - Other
Defendant, by a warrant of commitment on a coroner’s inquisition held without jurisdiction, caused plaintiff to be imprisoned. Plainitiff was bailed, and afterwards, while on bail, procured the inquisition to be quashed. Held that, in an action for such false imprisonment, plaintiff was entitled, under an allegation that he had incurred expense in procuring his discharge from custody, to recover damages for the expense of quashing the inquisition.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Taylor v Nesfield (1854) 3 El & Bl 724; (1854) 118 ER 1312
1854


Torts - Other
Misuse of position by judge
1 Citers



 
 Stevens v The Midland Counties Railway Company And Lander; 22-Jun-1854 - [1854] EngR 661; (1854) 10 Exch 352; (1854) 156 ER 480
 
Regina v Pratt (1855) 4 E & B 860
1855

Crompton J, Erle J
Land, Torts - Other
"I take it to be clear law that, if a man use the land over which there is a right of way for any purpose, lawful or unlawful, other than that of passing and repassing, he is a trespasser."
1 Citers


 
Jeffries v Great Western Railway RW. Co. (1856) :5:E and B 802
1856

Lord Campbell
Torts - Other
"I am of opinion that the law is that a person possessed of goods as his property has a good title as against every stranger, and that one who takes them from him having no title in himself is a wrong-doer, and cannot defend himself by showing that there was title in some third person, for against a wrong-doer possession is title."
1 Citers


 
Tozer v Child (1857) 7 El & Bl 377; (1857) 119 ER 1286
1857


Elections, Torts - Other

1 Citers


 
Wootton v Dawkins [1857] EngR 408; (1857) 2 CB NS 412; (1857) 140 ER 477
18 Apr 1857


Personal Injury, Torts - Other
The plaintiff entered the defendant’s garden at night, and without his permission, to search for a stray fowl, and, whilst looking closely into some bushes, he came in contact with a wire, which caused something to explode with a loud noise, knocking him down and slightly injuring his face and eyes: Held, that the defendant was not liable for this injuryt common law, nor, in the absence of evidence that it was caused by a spring-gun or other engine “calculated to inflict grievous bodily harm,” under the statute 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 18, s. I.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Tear v Freebody (1858) 4 CBNS 228
1858


Torts - Other
The surveyor to a parish was found to have taken possession of the plaintiff's materials so as to obtain an unfounded lien over them.
1 Citers


 
Grinham v Willey (1859) 4 H & N 496; (1859) 28 LJ 242; (1859) 33 LTOS 10; (1859) 23 JP 280; [1859] EngR 475; (1859) 157 ER 934
1859

Pollock CB
Torts - Other
A felony crime was reported to the police by the defendant. The police officer attended, and on the information supplied arrested the plaintiff who was taken to the police station and charged, signing the charge sheet. Held: The defendant was not liable to the plaintiff in an action for trespass. Pollock CB said: in the context of an arrest of a claimant by a constable following a complaint by a defendant, the defendant "ought not to be held responsible in trespass [to the claimant], unless he directly and immediately causes the imprisonment."
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]

 
 Smith v Kay; HL 1859 - [1859] EngR 38; (1859) 7 HLC 750; (1859) 11 ER 299

 
 Scholefield v Temper; 1859 - (1859) 4 De G & J 429; (1859) Johns 155; [1859] EngR 773

 
 Regina v Inhabitants of High Halden; 1859 - (1859) 1 F & F 678; 26 Digest (Repl) 383; [1860] EngR 93; (1860) 175 ER 903
 
Rogers v Rajendro Dutt (1860) 13 Moo PC 209
1860
PC
Dr Lushington
Torts - Other
The plaintiff's claim failed because the conduct complained of had not been wrongful. Dr Lushington, giving the judgment of the Board, said: "For if the act which he [the defendant] did was in itself wrongful, as against the Plaintiffs, and produced damage to them, they must have the same remedy by action against the doer, whether the act was his own, spontaneous and unauthorized, or whether it were done by the order of the superior power". The plaintiff had, at trial, proved damages of Rs 6624.
1 Citers


 
Chittenden v Day [1860] EngR 34 (B); (1860) 2 F & F 77
1860


Contract, Torts - Other
A memorandum stamped as a receipt having been rejected, because requiring a stamp as an agreement, an agreement for the hire of goods of which the value was mentioned only by reference to the receipt, was held not to require a stamp, the value of the hire not appearing to exceed the amount of 20L, and the rejected receipt allowed to be looked at, with reference to the real date of the transaction, and in order to show fraud.
Trover by the plaintiff its assignee of one Grainger, an insolvent.
Pleas. Not gullty and not possessed.
[ Commonlii ]
 
Allsop v Allsop (1860) 29 LJ (Ex) 315; [1860] EngR 661; (1860) 5 H & N 534; (1860) 157 ER 1292
25 Apr 1860

Martin B
Torts - Other
Complaint was made of illness allegedly caused by a slanderous imputation of unchastity to a married woman. The woman heard the slander at third hand. It was held that the woman could not claim special damages for her illness in an action for slander against the originator of the slander. Held: Wright J took a narrow view of the case as an authority on the type of damages recoverable in an action for slander. He said that to adopt it as a rule of general application that illness resulting from a false statement could never give rise to a claim for damages would be difficult or impossible to defend.
Martin B said: 'The law is jealous of actions for mere words, and the rules limiting these actions ought to be adhered to here'
1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Corlett v Radcliffe and Other [1860] EngR 1226; (1860) 14 Moo PC 121; (1860) 15 ER 251; [1860] UKPC 23; [1860] UKPC 23
20 Dec 1860
PC

Torts - Other
(Isle of Man) Allegation that deeds obtained by fraud and deception.
[ Commonlii ] - [ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Goff v The Great Northern Railway Company [1861] EngR 316; (1861) 3 El & El 672; (1861) 121 ER 594
13 Feb 1861


Torts - Other, Vicarious Liability
A railway Company though it be a corporation, is liable in an action for false imprisonment, if that imprisonment be committed by its authority.
[ Commonlii ]

 
 Gilding v Eyre And Another; CCP 8-Jul-1861 - [1861] EngR 793; (1861) 10 CB NS 592; (1861) 142 ER 584
 
Scott v Wakem (1862) 3 F and F 328
1862

Baron Bramwell
Torts - Other, Health
If it could be shown to be necessary to protect him from harming himself, the common law gave power for a man to be detained.
1 Citers


 
Foster v Green (1862) 7 H & N 881
1862


Torts - Other
Cash may not be subject to a claim for conversion.
1 Citers


 
Felthouse v Bindley [1862] EWHC QB J35; [1862] EWHC CP J35; [1862] EngR 931; (1862) 11 CB NS 869; (1862) 142 ER 1037
8 Jul 1862
QBD
Willes J, Byles J, Keating J
Torts - Other, Contract
(Court of Common Pleas) An offeror cannot erect a contract between himself and the offeree by the device of stating that unless he hears from the offeree he will consider the offeree bound. He cannot assert that he will regard silence as acceptance: "If I hear no more I shall consider the horse mine" was not effective to create a contract.
[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ] - [ Commonlii ]
 
Buckley v Gross (1863) 3B & S 556
1863

Blackburn J, Cockburn CJ, Crompton J
Police, Torts - Other
The court had to decide the ownership of of tallow which had been kept at warehouses. In a fire; it melted and flowed down the sewers into the river where part of it was collected by a man with no right to it; and he sold it to the claimant. The police stopped the claimant and took him before a magistrate. The magistrate discharged the claimant. Under the section the magistrate had power, where the real owner was known, to make an order for the detention and subsequent delivery of goods "charged to be stolen or fraudulently obtained" to the rightful owner, and where the owner was unknown to order delivery to the receiver of the Metropolitan Police Force who was authorised, in the absence of a claim made by the real owner within 12 months, to sell them. Pursuant to these statutory provisions the magistrate made an order for the detention of the goods. The tallow became a nuisance and the police sold the tallow to the defendant before the 12 month period expired. The claimant then sued the defendant to recover it. The court directed a verdict for the defendant with leave to the claimant to move to enter judgment if the Court of Queen's Bench should be of the opinion that he could maintain his action. The court held that he could not. Cockburn CJ said: "Under these circumstances it appears to me plain that, by virtue of the authority vested in him by the statute, an order was made by the justice, within the scope of his authority and jurisdiction, with respect to dealing with this tallow, and whether the police were or were not warranted in selling it within twelve months is immaterial. The plaintiff, who had nothing but bare naked possession (which would have been sufficient against a wrong doer) had it taken out of him by virtue of this enactment. As against the plaintiff, therefore, the defendant derives title, not from a wrong doer, but from a person selling under authority of the justice, whether rightly or not is of no consequence. I wholly disagree with the doctrine of the plaintiff's counsel, that if the policeman did anything ultra vires, that would revest the possession of this tallow in the plaintiff. He had no title beyond what mere possession gave, and, so soon as the goods were taken from him by force of law, there was a break in the chain of that possession." Crompton J said: "This action must be founded on possession; here the possession was divested out of the plaintiff, and he cannot revert to a right of property to re-establish it. I agree with my Lord Chief Justice that, where possession is lawfully divested out of a man, and the property is ultimately converted by a person who does not claim through an original wrong doer, the party whose possession was so divested had no property at the time of the conversion. Here, in my mind, the plaintiff's possession was gone. The goods were properly taken from him ...." Blackburn J: "I do not wish to question the doctrine laid down in several cases, that possession of personal property is sufficient title against a wrong doer; nor that it is no answer to the plaintiff in such a case to say that there is a third person who could lawfully take the chattel from him; and I do not know that it makes any difference whether the goods had been feloniously taken or not. But, assuming that to be the law, the plaintiff has not brought himself within it. ... I draw the inference of fact that the justice was satisfied that this tallow had come from the warehouses, and I hold that, as matter of law, the police were bound to keep it for the true owner, because they had ascertained that there was a true owner, and who he was. Their possession was the possession of the true owner and not of the wrong doer, whose possession was terminated by their taking possession. It is therefore not necessary to consider whether the sale of the tallow to the defendants by the police was right or wrong. If wrong, the true owner may complain against them; if not, no one else can, but at all events, not the plaintiff, who was himself a wrong doer."
Metropolitan Police Act 1839 29
1 Citers


 
Dawson v Vansandau (1863) 11 WR 516
1863
QBD
Cockburn CJ, Crompton and Blackburn JJ
Torts - Other
The plaintiff, Dawson, a solicitor, had been charged by the defendant with conspiracy to defraud, in the form of collusion with a client and others to defraud the client’s creditors. When the charge was first laid, the only evidence available to the defendant was that of an accomplice which would require corroboration. Such other evidence only became available after he had been charged. Dawson was subsequently acquitted. The trial judge directed the jury that there was no evidence of reasonable and probable cause because the only evidence available at the time of charge was the uncorroborated evidence of the accomplice and the other material which supported the commission of the offence had only become available after Dawson was taken into custody. Held: Evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case was sufficient to establish reasonable and probable cause even if it was not sufficient evidence to convict. The direction was wrong: "An accomplice, or a tainted witness, may give evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case, and warrant the preferring of a criminal charge, though it might not be sufficient evidence upon which to convict."
1 Citers


 
Symm v Fraser (1863) 3 F and F 859
1863

Cockburn CJ
Health, Torts - Other
The common law permitted the detention of those who were a danger, or potential danger, to themselves or others, in so far as this was shown to be necessary.
1 Citers


 
The Leather Cloth Company, Limited, v The American Leather Cloth Company, Limited [1863] EngR 1050; (1863) 4 De G J & S 137; (1863) 46 ER 868
5 Dec 1863

Lord Chancellor Lord Westbury
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in the protection given to trade marks rests upon property, and the Court interferes by injunction, because that is the only mode by which property of this description can be effectually protected.
Property in a trade mark is the right to an exclusive use of some mark, name or symbol in connection with a particular manufacture or vendible commodity.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Parton v Hill (1864) 10 LT 414
1864

Blackburn J
Torts - Other
The plaintiff asserted the malicious issue of an attachment of a debt owing from a third person to the plaintiff, without reasonable or probable cause. Held: The claim failed.
1 Citers



 
 Britton v The Royal Insurance Company; 1865 - [1865] EngR 66; (1865) 4 F & F 905; (1865) 176 ER 843
 
Scott v The London and St Katherine Docks Co (1865) 3 H & C 596
1865
CEC
Erle LCJ
Torts - Other
The maxim res ipsa loquitur applies only where circumstances are established which afford reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defenders, that the accident arose from their negligence. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that: "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence, but, where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant, or his servants, and the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not happen if those who have the management of the machinery use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." As to the burden of proof: “So in an appropriate case the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by relying upon the fact of the accident. If the defendant adduces no evidence there is nothing to rebut the inference of negligence and the plaintiff will have proved his case. But if the defendant does adduce evidence that evidence must be evaluated to see if it is still reasonable to draw the inference of negligence from the mere fact of the accident. Loosely speaking this may be referred to as a burden on the defendant to show he was not negligent, but that only means that faced with a prima facie case of negligence the defendant will be found negligent unless he produces evidence that is capable of rebutting the prima facie case.”
"But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident as such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants that the accident arose from want of care. . "
1 Citers


 
Leather Cloth Co Ltd v American Leather Cloth Co Ltd (1865) 11 HL Cas 523; [1865] EngR 199; (1865) 11 HLC 523; (1865) 11 ER 1435
1 Feb 1865
HL
Lord Kingsdown
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
Where an individual works in a partnership the goodwill generated by his acts will in the normal course vest in the partnership.
Lord Kingsdown said: "Nobody doubts that a trader may be guilty of such misrepresentations with regard to his goods, as to amount to a fraud upon the public, and to disentitle him on that ground, as against a rival trader, to the relief in a court of equity which he might otherwise claim. What would constitute a misrepresentation of this description, may in particular cases be a reasonable subject of doubt, and it was in the present case the ground of the difference between the two judgments under consideration. The general rule seems to be that the mis-statement of any material fact calculated to deceive the public, will be sufficient for this purpose."
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
The Glamotgansgire Iron And Coal Companu v Irvine [1866] EngR 45; (1866) 4 F & F 947; (1866) 176 ER 861
1866


Company, Torts - Other

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ball v Axten (1866) 4 F & F 1019; 176 ER 890
1866

Lord Cockburn CJ
Torts - Other
A defendant who was aiming to hit a farmer's dog and by mistake hit the farmer's wife who was trying to protect it was liable in assault.
1 Citers


 
Woodhouse v Whiteley [1866] EngR 49; (1866) 4 F & F 1086; (1866) A)
1866


Torts - Other

[ Commonlii ]
 
Perionowsky v Freeman And Another [1866] EngR 13; (1866) 4 F & F 978; (1866) 176 ER 873
1866


Torts - Other

[ Commonlii ]
 
Stewart v Beaumont [1866] EngR 40; (1866) 4 F & F 1034; (1866) B)
1866


Torts - Other

[ Commonlii ]
 
Aldworth v Stewart [1866] EngR 1; (1866) 4 F & F 957; (1866) 176 ER 865
1866


Torts - Other

[ Commonlii ]
 
Dawkins v Lord Rokeby [1866] EngR 5; (1866) 4 F & F 806; (1866) 176 ER 800
1866


Police, Torts - Other

1 Citers

[ Commonlii ]
 
Ball Et Uxor v Axten [1866] EngR 2; (1866) 4 F & F 1019; (1866) 176 ER 890
1866


Torts - Other

[ Commonlii ]
 
In re Gomersall (1875) 1 ChD 137
1867

Brett J
Torts - Other
Bills with a face value of £1,700 were purchased for £200. Held: Proof that the goods were purchased at a much lower price than the ordinary trade price is not absolute proof of bad faith but is very strong evidence of fraudulent knowledge.
1 Citers


 
Harrop v Hirst (1868) LR 4 Ex 43
1868


Torts - Other
The claim was for diverting water. Held: An action for diverting water is maintainable without proof of any actual personal damage, inasmuch as the act of the defendant might, if repeated often enough without interruption, furnish evidence in derogation of the plaintiff's legal rights. If you have an infringement of a legal right there is a right of action without actual damage being proved.
1 Citers


 
Austin v Dowling (1870) LR 5 CP 534
1870


Torts - Other
The defendant's wife falsely accused the plaintiff of a crime. He was arrested and taken to the police station where the police said they would not detain the plaintiff unless the defendant signed the charge sheet.

 
Lister v Perryman (1870) LR 4 HL 521; (1870) 39 LJEx 177
1870
HL
Lord Chelmsford
Torts - Other
In a case alleging malicious prosecution, the existence of reasonable and probable cause is a question for the judge and not for the jury.
Lord Chelmsford said: "[T]here can be no doubt since the case of Panton v Williams, in which the question was solemnly decided in the Exchequer Chamber, that what is reasonable and probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution, or for false imprisonment, is to be determined by the Judge . . No definite rule can be laid down for the exercise of the Judge's judgment. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances, and the result is a conclusion drawn by each Judge for himself, whether the facts found by the jury, in his opinion, constitute a defence to the action."
1 Citers



 
 Johnson v Emerson; 1871 - (1871) Law Rep 6 Ex 329; (1871) LR 6 Ex 329
 
Fowler v Hollins (1872) LR 7 QB 616
1872

Cleasby J
Torts - Other
The plaintiff claimed in conversion of bales of cotton bought in good faith through a broker in Liverpool. Held: The purchasers were strictly liable.
Cleasby J said: "the liability under it is founded upon what has been regarded as a salutary rule for the protection of property, namely, that persons deal with the property in chattels or exercise acts of ownership over them at their peril."
1 Citers


 
Richardson v Silvester (1873) LR IX QB 34
1873

Blackburn J, Quain J, Archibald J
Torts - Other
An advertisement was placed in the press offering a farm house to let when the advertiser had no authority to let it. Held: The action gave rise to an action in deceit founded on the implied representation that he did have authority.
Blackburn J: "I think, in the present case, on the face of the particulars, especially when amended as proposed, a cause of action was disclosed. It must be taken upon the statement of the plaintiff that the advertisement was issued some indirect motive, and that the farm was not to be let. This amounts to a false representation. It was a false statement knowingly made and published in order to be read by persons who would be likely to be tenants of farms, and the natural consequence would be that the person who was desirous of becoming a tenant would, upon reading the advertisement, incur expense in looking at the farm. This, it is alleged, is what the plaintiff did. It must also be taken that this was a representation made to the plaintiff."
Quain J: "I think the particulars disclose a cause of action, which ought to have been heard on the merits. They in effect allege the plaintiff falsely, and well knowing he had no authority to sell the farm, represented that he had, and published an advertisement to that effect. It is quite clear that all persons who were likely to take a farm, or might be reasonably contemplating taking a farm, acting upon that advertisement, and incurring expense in consequence of that false representation, have a remedy by action for deceit. It appears to me that the particulars and the amendment do disclose a cause of action for deceit; and under such circumstances I think the judge ought to have heard the case, and the case should be sent back to him to be further heard."
1 Citers


 
Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10
1874

Lord Coleridge CJ
Torts - Other, Torts - Other, Nuisance, Animals, Agriculture, Land
The pasturing of cattle must be one of the most ordinary uses of land, and strict liability for damage done by cattle enclosed on one man's land if they escape thence into the land of another, is one of the most ancient propositions of our law. It is in fact a case of pure trespass to property, and thus constitutes a wrong without any question of negligence.
Lord Coleridge CJ said: "It is clear that, in determining the question of trespass or no trespass, the court cannot measure the amount of the alleged trespass; if the defendant places a part of his foot on the plaintiff's land unlawfully, it is in law as much a trespass as if he had walked half a mile on it."
1 Citers


 
Ellis v Loftus Iron Co (1874) LR 10 CP 10
1874

Lord Coleridge CJ
Torts - Other, Torts - Other, Nuisance, Animals, Agriculture, Land
The pasturing of cattle must be one of the most ordinary uses of land, and strict liability for damage done by cattle enclosed on one man's land if they escape thence into the land of another, is one of the most ancient propositions of our law. It is in fact a case of pure trespass to property, and thus constitutes a wrong without any question of negligence.
Lord Coleridge CJ said: "It is clear that, in determining the question of trespass or no trespass, the court cannot measure the amount of the alleged trespass; if the defendant places a part of his foot on the plaintiff's land unlawfully, it is in law as much a trespass as if he had walked half a mile on it."
1 Citers



 
 Hollins v Fowler; HL 1875 - (1875) LR 7 HL 757
 
Brasyer v Maclean (1875) LR 6 PC 398
1875
PC

Torts - Other
(New South Wales) A false return was made by a sheriff which led to the arrest of the plaintiff and his attachment for 24 hours. The court had non-suited the plaintiff since no malice had been shown. Held: The appeal succeeded. It was "impossible to say that no damage was sustained by the Plaintiff in consequence of that arrest." The sheriff was guilty of a misfeasance and the damage resulting from the misfeasance was "sufficient damage to enable the Plaintiff to maintain an action against the sheriff for that misfeasance".
1 Citers


 
Townsend v Haworth (1879) 48 LJ Ch 770
1875
CA
Sir George Jessel MR, Mellish LJ
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
The defendant sold chemicals to be used by the purchaser in infringement of patent and agreed to indemnify the purchaser if the patent should prove to be valid. Held: Only the person who actually manufactures or sells infringing goods is the infringer except where the direct infringer is the "mere cat's-paw" of someone else.
Mellish LJ said: "Selling materials for the purpose of infringing a patent to the man who is going to infringe it, even although the party who sells it knows that he is going to infringe it and indemnifies him, does not by itself make the person who so sells an infringer. He must be a party with the man who so infringes and actually infringe."
1 Citers


 
Dugdale v Lovering [1875] LR 10 CP 196
1875


Torts - Other
The court adopted the position proposed by Mr Cave, for the Plaintiff: "It is a general principle of law when an act is done by one person at the request of another which act is not in itself manifestly tortious to the knowledge of the person doing it, and such act turns out to be injurious to the rights of a third party, the person doing it is entitled to an indemnity from him who requested that it should be done".
1 Citers


 
Cattle v The Stockton Waterworks (1875) LR 10 QB 453
1875

Blackburn J
Land, Torts - Other
The owner of land had contracted with the plaintiff for him to build a tunnel under a road, along which there was a defective water pipe. The pipe leaked, and when the contractor started to dig, the water that had accumulated under the road flowed out, obstructing the works. This either reduced the contractor's profit or caused him to make a loss, and he claimed in Rylands v Fletcher. Held. The contractor had no title to claim.
Blackburn J said: "In the present case the objection is technical and against the merits, and we should be glad to avoid giving it effect. But if we did so, we should establish an authority for saying that, in such a case as that of Fletcher v. Rylands … the defendant would be liable, not only to an action by the owner of the drowned mine, and by such of his workmen as had their tools or clothes destroyed, but also to an action by every workman and person employed in the mine, who in consequence of its stoppage made less wages than he would otherwise have done. And many similar cases to which this would apply might be suggested. It may be said that it is just that all such persons should have compensation for such a loss, and that, if the law does not give them redress, it is imperfect. Perhaps it may be so. But, as was pointed out by Coleridge, J., in Lumley v. Gye . . Courts of justice should not "allow themselves, in the pursuit of perfectly complete remedies for all wrongful acts, to transgress the bounds, which our law, in a wise consciousness as I conceive of its limited powers, has imposed on itself, of redressing only the proximate and direct consequences of wrongful acts." In this we quite agree."
1 Citers



 
 Wilson v Waddell; HL 1876 - (1876) 2 App Cas 95
 
Hicks v Faulkner [1878] 8 QBD 167
1878

Judge Hawkins
Police, Torts - Other
Before charging a prisoner, a police officer must have "an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser to the conclusion that the person was probably guilty of the crime imputed."
1 Citers


 
Weir v Bell (1878) 3 Exch D 238
1878

Bramwell LJ
Contract, Torts - Other
"I think that every person who authorizes another to act for him in the making of any contract, undertakes for the absence of fraud in that person in the execution of the authority given, as much as he undertakes for its absence in himself when he makes the contract".
1 Citers



 
 Davy v Garrett; 1878 - (1878) 7 ChD 473
 
Mitchell v Henry (1880) 15 Ch D 181
1880


Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
Passing off actions remained unaffected by the passing of the 1875 Act.
Trade-Marks Registration Act 1875
1 Citers



 
 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co; HL 1880 - (1880) 5 App Cas 25
 
Danby v Beardsley (1880) 43 LT 603
1880

Lopes J
Torts - Other
The court heard a claim of malicious prosecution. Held: A person who is not a party to a prosecution but actively puts the criminal process in motion may be liable for malicious prosecution.
Where an individual falsely and maliciously gives a police officer information indicating that some person is guilty of a criminal offence and states that he is willing to give evidence in court of the matters in question, it is properly to be inferred that he desires and intends that the person he names should be prosecuted. Where the circumstances are such that the facts relating to the alleged offence can be within the knowledge only of the complainant, as was the position here, then it becomes virtually impossible for the police officer to exercise any independent discretion or judgment, and if a prosecution is instituted by the police officer the proper view of the matter is that the prosecution has been procured by the complainant.
The question to be asked was: "Is there any evidence to show that the defendant was actively instrumental in putting the law in force?"
1 Citers



 
 Brownlie v Campbell; Brownlie v Miller; HL 1880 - (1880) 5 AC 925; (1880) 7 R (HL) 66
 
Wallingford v Mutual Society (1880) 5 App Cas 685
1880
HL
Lord Hatherley, Lord Selbourne LC, (Lord Blackburn
Contract, Litigation Practice, Torts - Other
Lord Hatherley said: "Now I take it to be as settled as anything well can be by repeated decisions, that the mere averment of fraud, in general terms, is not sufficient for any practical purpose in [a pleading]. Fraud may be alleged in the largest and most sweeping terms imaginable. What you have to do is, if it be matter of account, to point out a specific error, and bring evidence of that error, and establish it by that evidence. Nobody can be expected to meet a case, and still less to dispose of a case, summarily upon mere allegations of fraud without any definite character being given to those charges by stating the facts upon which they rest."
Lord Selbourne LC said: "With regards to fraud, if there be any principle which is perfectly well settled, it is that general allegations, however strong may be the words in which they are stated, are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice. And here I find nothing but perfectly general and vague allegations of fraud. No single material fact is condescended upon; in a manner which would enable any Court to understand what it was that was alleged to be fraudulent."
1 Citers


 
Burgess v Northwich Local Board (1880) 6 QBD 264; [1880] LJQB 219; [1880] 44 LT 154; [1880] JP 256; [1880] 26 Digest (Repl) 352
1880

Lindley J
Land, Torts - Other, Local Government
In the context of the duty of a local parish to maintain a highway, Lindley J said: "An occasional flooding, even if it temporarily renders a highway impassable, is not sufficient to sustain an indictment for non-repair." Counsel accepted that: "There is no authority whatever for indicting a parish in respect of a road being impassable by reason of water, unless of course the water was a consequence of neglect to cleanse ditches or some such omission of duty."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 National Mercantile Bank Ltd v Rymill; CA 1881 - [1881] 44 LTNS 767

 
 Arkwright v Newbold; CA 1881 - (1881) 17 ChD 301

 
 Regina v Coney; QBD 1882 - (1882) 8 QBD 534

 
 Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co v Eyre; CA 1883 - (1883) 11 QBD 674
 
Arbroath v North Eastern Railway (1883) II QBD 440
1883


Evidence, Torts - Other
In a case alleging malicious prosecution, the burden of proving absence of reasonable and probable cause is on the Plaintiff, who thus takes on the notoriously difficult task of proving a negative
1 Citers


 
Mcellister and Others v Biggs and Others [1883] UKPC 16; , (1882-83) LR 8 App Cas 314
15 Mar 1883
PC

Torts - Other
(South Australia)
[ Bailii ]
 
Wandsworth Board of Works v United Telephone Co (1884) 13 QBD 904
1884
CA

Land, Torts - Other
A land-owner had the right to cut a wire wrongfully placed over his property.
1 Citers


 
Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App Cas 187
1884
HL
Lord Blackburn, Lord Selborne LC
Contract, Insurance, Torts - Other
A purchaser claimed to have entered into the contract in reliance on the truth of a misrepresentation by the seller. The plaintiff claimed damages for deceit through having been induced to buy shares in an iron company by false representations in a prospectus as to the output of the iron works. Held: his claim failed because the critical words of the prospectus were ambiguous, and the plaintiff had failed to show that he understood them in a sense which was false.
An inference of inducement can be made or rebutted on evidence. Lord Blackburn, said: "I think if it is proved that the defendants with a view to induce the plaintiff to enter a contract made a statement to the plaintiff of such a nature as would be likely to induce a person to enter into a contract, and it is proved that the plaintiff did enter into the contract, it is a fair inference of fact that he was induced to do so by the statement."
. . and "In Pasley v Freeman, 2 Smith's Leading Cases 66, 73, 86 (8th ed), Buller J says: 'The foundation of this action is fraud and deceit in the defendant and damage to the plaintiffs. And the question is whether an action thus founded can be sustained in a court of law. Fraud without damage, or damage without fraud, gives no cause of action, but where these two concur an action lies, per Croke J, 3 Bulst 95.'
Whatever difficulties there may be as to defining what is fraud and deceit, I think no one will venture to dispute that the plaintiff cannot recover unless he proves damage. In an ordinary action of deceit the plaintiff alleges that false and fraudulent representations were made by the defendant to the plaintiff in order to induce him, the plaintiff, to act upon them. I think that if he did act upon these representations, he shews damage; if he did not, he shews none."
Lord Selborne LC said: "My Lords, I conceive that in an action of deceit, like the present, it is the duty of the plaintiff to establish two things; first, actual fraud, which is to be judged by the nature and character of the representations made, considered with reference to the object for which they were made, the knowledge or means of knowledge of the person making them, and the intention which the law justly imputes to every man to produce those consequences which are the natural result of his acts: and, secondly, he must establish that this fraud was an inducing cause to the contract; for which purpose it must be material, and it must have produced in his mind an erroneous belief, influencing his conduct."
1 Citers


 
Smith v Land and House Property Corporation (1885) LR 28 Ch D 7
1885
CA
Bowen LJ
Contract, Torts - Other
Bowen LJ said: "if the facts are not equally known to both sides, then a statement of opinion by the one who knows the facts best involves very often a statement of material fact, for he impliedly states that he knows facts which justify his opinion".
1 Citers



 
 Edgington v Fitzmaurice; CA 1885 - (1885) 29 Ch D 459
 
Blackburn, Low and Co v Vigors (1886) 17 QBD 553
1886
CA
Lord Esher MR, Lindley LJ,
Agency, Insurance, Torts - Other
Lord Esher MR: "This seems to me to be the true doctrine. The freedom from mis-representation or concealment is a condition precedent to the right of the assured to insist on the performance of the contract, so that on a failure of the performance of the condition the assured cannot enforce the contract." Lindley LJ: "It is a condition of the contract that there is no misrepresentation or concealment either by the assured or by anyone who ought as a matter of business and fair dealing to have stated or disclosed the facts to him or to the underwriter for him." Lord Halsbury LC warned against "the somewhat vague use of the word 'agent'" which, he said, "leads to confusion" in insurance cases.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Osborne v Milman; 1886 - (1886) 17 QBD 514
 
Hope v Evered (1886) 17 QBD 338
1886


Torts - Other, Police
It is an actionable wrong to procure the issue of a search warrant without reasonable cause and with malice.
1 Citers


 
MacPherson v Scottish Rights of Way and Recreation Society Ltd (1887) 13 App Cas 744
1887


Scotland, Torts - Other

1 Citers



 
 Peek v Derry; CA 1887 - (1887) 37 ChD 541; [1887] 57 LJ Ch 347; [1887] 59 LT 78; [1887] 9 Digest (Rep 1) 127
 
Turner v Hockey (1887) 56 LJQB 301
1887


Torts - Other
The owner of a cow gave a bill of sale over it (and others) but then asked the defendant auctioneer to sell it. He did not inform the auctioneer of the bill of sale. Held: An auctioneer who unknowingly but in the ordinary course of business sells the goods of one person having been told they are the goods of another, and pays the proceeds of sale to that other, is not guilty of conversion of the goods. The original purchaser was not able to pursue an action against the auctioneer.
1 Citers



 
 The Queen v D'Eyncourt; 1888 - (1888) 21 QBD 109

 
 Ex parte Lewis (The Trafalgar Square Case); QBD 1888 - (1888) 21 QBD 191

 
 Mogul Steamship Company Limited v McGregor Gow and Co; 1888 - (1888) 20 QBD 544
 
Mogul Steamship Company Limited v McGregor Gow and Co (1889) 23 QBD 598
1889
CA
Lord Esher MR, Bowen LJ, Fry LJ
Torts - Other
Ship-owners formed an association which in this action others claimed to be a tortious conspiracy. Held: There is a cause of action against the conspirators where there is an agreement which constitutes an indictable conspiracy and that agreement is carried into execution by the conspirators by means of an unlawful act or acts which produce private injury to the claimant. "[M]alicious" was not to be given its ordinary meaning (malice in fact), but rather a technical legal meaning (malice in law), meaning an intention to carry out an act that was wrongful in order to damage another or to the detriment of another, or to hurt another. Bowen LJ: "No man, whether trader or not, can however justify damaging another in his commercial business by fraud or misrepresentation. Intimidation, obstruction and molestation are forbidden; so is the intentional procurement or violation of individual rights, contractual or other, assuming always that there is no just cause for it … but the defendants have been guilty of none of these acts. They have done nothing more against the plaintiffs than pursue to the bitter end a war of competition waged in the context of their own trade. To the argument that a competition so pursued ceases to have a just cause or excuse when there is ill-will or a personal intention to harm it is sufficient to reply (as I have already pointed out) that there was here no personal intention to do any other than such as was necessarily involved in the desire to attract to the defendant's ships the entire tea freights of the ports."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Jeanneret v Bailey [1889] UKPC 26
14 May 1889
PC

Torts - Other, Animals
(New South Wales)
[ Bailii ]

 
 Derry v Peek; HL 1-Jul-1889 - (1889) 14 App Cas 337; [1889] 58 LJ Ch 864; [1889] 61 LT 265; [1889] 54 JP 148; [1889] UKHL 1
 
Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494
1890

Lord Esher
Criminal Practice, Torts - Other
The plaintiff claimed damages for malicious prosecution. He called the Director of Public Prosecutions as a witness, who refused to identify the name of the person who had given him the information on which he had acted against the plaintiff. Held: The judge's decision not to do so was upheld.
Lord Esher said: "this rule as to public prosecutions was founded on grounds of public policy, and if this prosecution was a public prosecution the rule attaches . . I do not say it is a rule which can never be departed from; if upon the trial of a prisoner the judge should be of opinion that the disclosure of the name of the informant is necessary or right in order to shew the prisoner's innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is not to be condemned when his innocence can be proved is the policy that must prevail. But except in that case, this rule of public policy is not a matter of discretion; it is a rule of law, and as such should be applied by the judge at the trial, who should not treat it as a matter of discretion."
The rule applied: "not only to the trial of the prisoner, but also to a subsequent civil action between the parties on the ground that the criminal prosecution was maliciously instituted or brought about."
1 Citers


 
Montgomery v Thompson [1891] AC 217
1891
HL

Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
Thompson had registered Stone Ale as a trade mark. He had sued the plaintiff, his competitor and the said mark was removed from the register. Nevertheless Thompson succeeded in an action to restrain Mr Montgomery from using the mark in relation to his beer. The cause of action in passing off was independent of the trade mark rights.
1 Citers


 
New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad Company v Jopes (1891) 142 US 18
1891

Justice Brewer
International, Torts - Other
(United States Supreme Court) The test of necessity as a defence to an accusation of assault is one of the actual presence of imminent danger and a reasonably apparent necessity of taking such action as was taken: "We hold, therefore, that the record shows that the exception to this instruction was duly taken, and pass to a consideration of the principal question, and that is, whether such instruction contains a correct statement of the law applicable. Its import is, that if the conductor shot when there was in fact no actual danger, although, from the manner, attitude and conduct of the plaintiff, the former had reasonable cause to believe, and did believe, that an assault upon him with a deadly weapon was intended, and only fired to protect himself from such apprehended assault, the company was liable for compensatory damages. In this view of the law we think the learned court erred. It will be scarcely doubted that if the conductor was prosecuted criminally, it would be sufficient defence that he honestly believed he was in imminent danger, and had reasonable ground for such belief. In other words, the law of self-defence justifies an act done in honest and reasonable belief of immediate danger. The familiar illustration is, that if one approaches another, pointing a pistol and indicating an intention to shoot, the latter is justified by the rule of self-defence in shooting, even to death; and that such justification is not avoided by proof that the party killed was only intending a joke, and that the pistol in his hand was unloaded. Such a defence does not rest on the actual, but on the apparent facts and the honesty of belief in danger. … And the same rule of immunity extends to civil as to criminal cases. If the injury was done by the defendant in justifiable self-defence, he can neither be punished criminally nor held responsible for damages in a civil action. Because the act was lawful, he is wholly relieved from responsibility for its consequences."
1 Citers


 
Angus v Clifford [1891] 2 Ch 449
1891

Bowen LJ
Torts - Other
The court considered what would be required to be shown for proof of fraud where recklessness was relied on: 'Not caring, in that context, did not mean not taking care, it meant indifference to the truth, the moral obliquity of which consists in a wilful disregard of the importance of truth, and unless you keep it clear that that is the true meaning of the term, you are constantly in danger of confusing the evidence from which the inference of dishonesty in the mind is to be drawn-evidence which consists in a great many cases of gross want of caution-with the inference of fraud, or of dishonesty itself, which has to be drawn after you have weighed all the evidence.'
1 Citers



 
 Lane v Capsey; 1891 - [1891] 3 Ch 411; (1891) 61 LJ Ch 55; (1891) 65 LT 375; (1891) 40 WR 87

 
 Barker v Furlong; 1891 - [1891] 2 CH 172

 
 Brown v Hawkes; CA 1891 - [1891] 1 QB 718
 
Consolidated Co v Curtis and Son (1892) 1 QB 495
1892
QBD

Torts - Other, Agency
An auctioneer who sold and delivered goods the subject of a bill of sale. An auctioneer who sells and delivers is liable in conversion because he is acting as more than a mere broker or intermediary. Held: It is not easy to draw the line at the precise point where a dealing with goods by an intermediary becomes a conversion. The difficulty is diminished by remembering that in trover the original possession was by a fiction deemed to be lawful … and some act had therefore to be shown constituting a conversion by the defendant of the chattel to his own use, some act incompatible with a recognition on his part of the continuous right of the true owner to the dominion over it. All acts which are consistent with the duty of a mere finder such as the safeguarding by warehousing or asportation for the like purpose, may well be looked upon as entirely compatible with the right of the true owner, and, therefore, as not constituting a conversion by the defendant. The test may be whether there is an intent to interfere in any manner with the title of or ownership in the chattel, not merely with the possession. The difficulty is rather in drawing the true inference from facts in particular cases than in grasping the principle. There can be no conversion by a mere bargain and sale without a transfer of possession. The act, unless in market overt, is merely void, and does not change the property or the possession: Lancashire Wagon Co. v Fitzhugh A fortiori, mere intervention as broker or intermediary in a sale by others is not a conversion.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Barnardo v Ford [1892] AC 326
1892
HL
Lord Herschell
Litigation Practice, Torts - Other
A boy who had been 'found destitute and homeless' by a 'clergyman residing in Folkestone' had been placed in an institution run by Dr Barnardo, who in turn said that he had handed over the boy to 'an American gentleman', who had taken him to Canada. A writ of habeas corpus against Dr Barnardo at the suit of the boy's mother was refused by Mathew J some three months after the boy had been handed over to the American. The Divisional Court did granted the writ some six months later on a renewed application, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. Held: The defendant's appeal failed. Lord Herschell said that a writ of habeas corpus should not be 'used as a means of compelling one who has unlawfully parted with the custody of another person to regain that custody, or of punishing him for having parted with it . . If . . it had been an admitted fact that before notice of the application for the writ the appellant had ceased to have the custody of or any control over the boy alleged to be detained, that might have been ground for reversing the order of the Queen's Bench Division. But where the Court entertains a doubt whether this be the fact, it is unquestionably entitled to use the pressure of the writ to test the truth of the allegation, and to require a return to be made to it. Now, it is impossible to read the judgment of the Lord Chief Justice without seeing that he did entertain such a doubt, and that he was not prepared upon the affidavits to accept as conclusive the statements of the appellant... I must not be understood as indicating that I think the story told by the appellant is untrue. But, as the matter is to undergo further investigation, it would obviously be improper to enter upon any discussion of the statements contained in the affidavits, or to express any opinion upon them."
1 Citers



 
 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow and Co; HL 1892 - [1892] AC 25
 
Morley v Loughnan [1893] Ch 736
1893

Wright J
Torts - Other, Undue Influence
Wright J in the context of this claim for undue influence, relied on a passage from an earlier case in which Wilmot CJ had said, "Let the hand receiving [a gift] be ever so chaste, yet, if it comes through a polluted channel, the obligation of restitution will follow it".
1 Citers



 
 The Walter D Wallet; 1893 - [1893] P 202
 
Lemmon v Webb [1894] 3 Ch 1
1894
CA
Lindley, Lopes and Kay LJJ
Land, Torts - Other
A neighbour could lop boughs overhanging his property without notice to the owner of the tree, provided that he could do so without entering the owner's land. A similar right of abatement by cutting applied to encroaching roots.
Lindley LJ said: "But to plant a tree on one’s own land infringes no rights, and, if the tree grows over the soil of another, I cannot discover that any action lies for the encroachment unless damage can be proved. I can find no authority for the proposition that an action of trespass would lie in such a case." Kay LJ: "The encroachment of the boughs and roots over and within the land of the adjoining owner is not a trespass or occupation of that land which by lapse of time could become a right. It is a nuisance. For any damage occasioned by this an action on the case would lie. Also, the person whose land is so affected may abate the nuisance if the owner of the tree after notice neglects to do so."
1 Citers


 
Lemmon v Webb [1895] AC 1; [1894] UKHL 1
27 Nov 1894
HL
Lord Heschell LC
Nuisance, Torts - Other
A land-owner was free to lop off boughs from his neighbours trees to the extent that they reached over his land, and he could lop them without going on to the land. He was not required to give notice of his intention to do so.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Anderson v Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668
1895
CA
Lord Esher MR
Torts - Other, Legal Professions
An action had been brought against a colonial judge, alleging malice. Held: Lord Esher MR said: "the question arises whether there can be an action against a judge of a court of record for doing something within his jurisdiction, but doing it maliciously and contrary to good faith. By the common law of England it is the law that no such action will lie." and "The ground alleged from the earliest times as that on which this rule rests is that if such an action would lie the judges would lose their independence, and that the absolute freedom and independence of the judges is necessary for the administration of justice . . The public are deeply interested in this rule, which indeed exists for their benefit, and was established in order to secure the independence of the judges, and prevent their being harassed by vexatious actions."
1 Citers


 
Betjemann v Betjemann [1895] 2 Ch 474
1895
CA
Rigby, Lindley LJJ
Torts - Other, Company
A father and his two sons had carried on the business as partners from 1856 to 1886; the father died in 1886 but the sons continued the business until 1893 when one of the sons died. The deceased son's executor brought an action against the surviving partner for an account of the partnership dealings from 1886. The surviving partner claimed that the accounts of the old partnership should be taken from 1856. Held: The surviving son was entitled to an order for the accounts to be taken against the deceased son's executor with effect from 1856, on the basis that the accounts of the original firm had been carried on into the new firm without interruption or settlement.
Rigby LJ said: "What is the duty of a man to inquire? To whom does he owe that duty? Certainly not to the person who had committed the concealed fraud."
1 Citers



 
 Mayor of Bradford v Pickles; HL 29-Jul-1895 - [1895] AC 587; [1895] UKHL 1
 
Reddaway and Co Ltd v Banham and Co Ltd [1896] AC 199; (1895) 1 QB 286; 13 RPC 218; [1895-96] All ER 133
1896
HL
Lord Herschell, Lord Macnaughten
Intellectual Property, Torts - Other
The plaintiff manufactured and sold Camel Hair Belting. The defendant also began to sell belting made of camel's hair in the name of Camel Hair Belting. The trader claimed a right in the term 'Camel Hair'. Held: The term was descriptive. Where a trader uses a mark or a name which is descriptive of its products or services, the trader must show that the public understands that the products or services come from him when they see the mark so that the mark has in this way acquired a "secondary meaning" in order to found a claim for a trade mark. In this case the phrase had come to be associated with the plaintiff's business and the defendants must adopt some other device to distinguish his goods. Whether the words are descriptive of the goods or not, the true test in determining is whether, as it is commonly used, it is reasonably indicative and descriptive of the thing intended.
In order to be descriptive, within the condemnation of the Rule, it is sufficient if information is afforded as to the general nature or character of the articles and it is not necessary that the words or marks used shall compromise a clear, completes and accurate description.
Lord Macnaughten said that fraud is infinite in variety: sometimes it is audacious and unblushing; sometimes it pays a sort of homage to virtue, and then it is modest and retiring; it would be honesty itself if it could only afford it. If facts amounting to fraud are plainly alleged it is no defect in the pleading if the word ‘fraud’ is not used. "Cases of this sort must depend upon their particular circumstances. The facts of one case are little or no guide to the determination of another."
Lord Herschell said: "In my opinion, the doctrine on which the judgment of the Court of Appeal was based, that where a manufacturer has used as his trade-mark a descriptive word he is never entitled to relief against a person who so uses it as to induce in purchasers the belief that they are getting the goods of the manufacturer who has theretofore employed it as his trade-mark, is not supported by authority, and cannot be defended on principled. I am unable to see why a man should be allowed in this way more than in any other to deceive purchasers into the belief that they are getting what they are not, and thus to filch the business of a rival".
1 Citers



 
 Fitzgerald v Firbank; 1897 - [1897] 2 Ch 96
 
Innes v Short and Beal (1898) 15 RPC 449
1898

Bigham J
Torts - Other, Intellectual Property
The defendant Short sold powdered zinc and gave instructions to a purchaser to enable the purchaser to infringe a process patent. The plaintiff patent holder sought damages saying that he was a joint tortfeasor. Held; Bingham J said: "There is no reason whatever why Mr. Short should not sell powdered zinc, and he will not be in the wrong, though he may know or expect the people who buy it from him are going to use it in such a way it will amount to an infringement of Mr. Innes' patent rights. But he must not ask the people to use it in that way, and he must not ask the people to use it in that way in order to induce them to buy his powdered zinc from him."
1 Citers



 
 Allen v Flood; HL 1898 - [1898] AC 1

 
 Manners v Whitehead; SCS 1898 - (1898) 1 F 171; 36 Sc LR 94; 6 SLT 190
 
Llandudno Urban District Council v Woods [1899] 2 Ch 705
1899

Cozens-Hardy J
Torts - Other, Land
A clergyman set up a pulpit and was holding services and delivering addresses on the seashore. Held: An injunction was refused. The court discouraged actions for trespass on public highways where the inteference was trivial. In this case, although he had no right to do what he was doing, it was harming nobody.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
The Bulli Coal Mining Company v Patrick Hill Osbourne and Another [1899] AC 351; [1899] UKPC 13
1899
PC

Torts - Other, Commonwealth
(New South Wales)
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Waunton v Coppard [1899] 1 Ch 92
1899

Romer J
Contract, Torts - Other
A statement was made by the vendor's agent as to the effect of a restrictive covenant to a lay person who, as a prospective purchaser, did not (to the knowledge of the vendor's agent) have a copy of the covenant. Held: Running a boys' school was capable of amounting to nuisance. A statement as to the meaning or effect of a document can amount to an actionable misrepresentation
1 Citers


 
Burrows v Rhodes [1899] 1 QB 816
1899

Kennedy J
Negligence, Torts - Other
The plaintiff was induced to enlist in the Jameson Raid of 1895, contrary to section 11 of the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, by the defendants' fraudulent representation that it had the sanction of the Crown (which would have made it lawful). Kennedy J held that no claim for damages could be founded on an act "if the act is manifestly unlawful or the doer of it knows it to be unlawful as constituting either a civil wrong or a criminal offence."
Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 11
1 Citers



 
 Wauton v Coppard; 1899 - [1899] 1 Ch 92
 
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