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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  















Transport - From: 1930 To: 1959

This page lists 36 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Bournemouth-Swanage Motor Road and Ferry Co v Harvey and Sons [1930] AC 549; 99 LJ Ch 337; 143 LT 313; 46 TLR 439; 28 LGR 351
1930
HL
Lord Macmillan
Litigation Practice, Transport, Commercial
The company had, under a private Act of Parliament, constructed a jetty and a roadway. They objected to the provision of similar services by the respondents Held: Their appeal failed. An injunction against competition was refused. The Act did not confer on the ferry company an exclusive right of ferry. The respondents had in fact for many years previously carried passengers over a relate route.
After quoting the relevant section Lord Macmillan, with whom the other members of the House concurred, said: "Now this section does not purport to grant a franchise of ferry. It merely empowers the company to establish a ferry service. It imposes no obligation on the company whatever; it does not require the company to provide any service. The terms of the section are permissive not obligatory, enabling not mandatory. If the company chose not to provide a ferry service no member of the public could compel it to do so. In short the position of the company is comparable to that of a railway company which has obtained power to construct and work a new line but is under no obligation to the public either to construct it or to work it when constructed"
1 Cites


 
The Canadian Pacific Railway Company and Others v The Toronto Transportation Commission [1930] UKPC 70
18 Jul 1930
PC

Transport
(Canada)
[ Bailii ]
 
Stag Line v Foscolo, Mango and Company [1932] AC 328
1932
HL
Lord Atkin, Lord Macmillan
Transport
English statutes which give effect to international conventions need to be interpreted with the international origin of the rules well in mind. The Act only applies to contracts of carriage of goods outwards from ports in the United Kingdom, and the rules will often have to be interpreted in the courts of the foreign consignees, and should be read according to their own meaning without too great reliance on earlier cases.
The Hague Rules are an international convention. Their interpretation is "not to be rigidly controlled by domestic principles of antecedent date but they are rather to be construed on broad principles of general acceptation." - Lord Macmillan.
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924
1 Citers



 
 Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co; HL 17-Mar-1933 - [1933] UKHL 3; (1933) 45 Ll L Rep 199; [1933] All ER Rep 52; 1933 SC (HL) 21; [1933] AC 402; 1933 SLT 338
 
The Gloria (1935) 54 LILR 35
1935

Branson J
Transport
"I think that if it were shown that an owner had reason to believe that his ship was in fact unseaworthy, and deliberately refrained from an examination which would have turned his belief into knowledge, he might properly be held privy to the unseaworthiness of his ship. But the mere omission to take precautions against the possibility of the ship being unseaworthy cannot, I think, make the owner privy to any unseaworthiness which such precaution might have disclosed."
1 Citers


 
Grein v Imperial Airways Ltd [1937] 1 KB 50
1937
CA
Green LJ
Transport, Damages
A passenger met his death whilst travelling on a return air ticket between London and Antwerp. Belgium was not a state contracting under the Convention. Held: Belgium was engaged on "international carriage" within the meaning of the Convention. The Convention limiting damages to be awarded for any accident occurring on an airplane is to be construed purposively.
1 Citers



 
 Kawasaki Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha of Kobe v Bantham Steamship Company Limited; CA 1939 - [1939] 2 KB 544

 
 Robertson v Nomikos; HL 1939 - [1939] AC 371
 
Government of the Republic of Spain v National Bank of Scotland [1939] ScotCS CSIH_1; 1939 SLT 317; 1939 SC 413; (1939) 63 Ll L Rep 330
24 Feb 1939
SCS
Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison
Scotland, Transport
Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison considered a provision claiming extra territorial effect, and said: "such 'decrees' of a foreign country as purport to have extra-territorial effect, and to attach property in a subject situated, and at a time when it is situated, within this country or its territorial waters, will not be recognised by our laws and courts."
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Easson v London North Eastern Railway [1944] KB 669
1940


Transport


 
The Gudrun Maersk (1941) 70 LlL Rep 251
1941

Langton J
Transport, Damages
In a collision case there had been a reference to assess damages before the Assistant Registrar and a merchant.£97 10s. was claimed for the wages of an employed superintendent. The Assistant Registrar thought that the superintendent only did "slight extra work" in excess of his ordinary duties. He allowed only £5 5s. Held: On a motion in objection to the report of the Assistant Registrar the court considered that it was impossible to lay down any general principle but the sum allowed was much too small. The superintendent had been put to a very large amount of work outside his normal duties. It was argued that the superintendent was an employee. The court approached the matter by giving the claimants the sum they would have been entitled to if they had put forward a claim properly vouched in respect of extra outside assistance but allowed the wrongdoer some part of the "advantage from the fact that the shipowner has a marine superintendent with special expert knowledge."
1 Citers



 
 Clan Lines Steamers Ltd v Liverpool and London War Risks Insurance Association Ltd; 1942 - [1942] 73 Ll L Rep 165

 
 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport; HL 1942 - [1942] AC 691; [1942] 2 All ER 6
 
Hugh Mack and Co Ltd v Burns and Laird Lines Ltd (1944) Ll L Rep 377
1944

Andrews LCJ
Commercial, Contract, Transport
The shipment was of men’s clothing carried pursuant to a consignment note and receipt stamped "Non-negotiable". The consignment note named consignees in Scotland and stated: "Please receive for forwarding per Burns and Laird Lines’ steamers the undernoted goods . ." These documents were retained by the shipper. The goods were damaged and the shipper claimed against the carrier, which relied on terms incorporated into its receipt. The shipper said that the Hague Rules applied by virtue of the 1924 Act. Held: The claim failed on two grounds. The consignment note and receipt was not a bill of lading or any similar document of title; and in any event the parties had freedom of contract under article VI as amended in the case of coastal trade within the British Isles and Ireland by section 4 of the 1924 Act. The receipt, even if properly described as a "document of title," was not "similar to" a bill of lading. It had none of its characteristics, being different in form; given at a different time; bearing no stamp; does not acknowledge the goods to be on board any particular ship; it was retained by the consignor, not sent to the consignee; and above all, it was not a negotiable instrument, the indorsement and delivery of which could affect the property in the goods shipped.
1 Citers


 
Larrinaga Steamship Co Ltd v The King [1944] KB 124; [1945] AC 246
1944
HL
Lord Findlay LC, Mackinnon LJ and Lords Wright and Porter
Insurance, Transport, Contract
The vessel, discharging at St. Nazaire, was ordered by charterers to return to Cardiff. Despite severely deteriorating weather conditions a Sea Transport Officer instructed the vessel to sail on completion of discharge to Quiberon Bay to join a convoy bound for the Bristol Channel. The master protested but complied. The vessel grounded and suffered damage. The owners claimed against the Crown as charterers, contending that the damage had resulted from the charterers' order to return to Cardiff. Held: A ship owner's underwriters would be entitled to be subrogated to his claim for indemnity against a charterer in respect of losses caused by the master's compliance with the charterer's orders as to the employment of the ship, under a standard term of a charterparty.
Lord Wright said: "The view of the judge was that what he described as the 'sailing orders to Quiberon Bay to be obeyed forthwith . .' were orders as to employment within cl. 9. With the greatest respect, I cannot agree with that view. These sailing orders which the judge found were given were, in my opinion, merely dealing with matters of navigation, in regard to carrying out the orders to proceed to Cardiff".
Lord Porter said: "Three answers to this argument have been made by the respondent. (1) That though an order specifying the voyage to be performed is an order as to employment, yet an order as to the time of sailing is not. That order, it is contended, is one as to navigation, or, at any rate, not as to employment. My Lords, this distinction seems to me to be justified: an order to sail from port A to port B is in common parlance an order as to employment, but an order that a ship shall sail at a particular time is not an order as to employment because its object is not to direct how the ship shall be employed, but how she shall act in the course of that employment. If the word were held to include every order which affected not the employment itself but any incident arising in the course of it almost every other liability undertaken by the charterer would be otiose, since the owners would be indemnified against almost all losses which the ship would incur in prosecuting her voyages."
and "(2) The second answer of the respondents was that even if it were conceded that orders to sail in a storm were orders in respect of which an indemnity is due, they must still be orders of the charterers as charterers and such as under this charterparty they are entitled to give. The mere instruction to sail may be such an order, but such an instruction leaves it to the discretion of the master who is responsible for the safety of his ship to choose the time and opportunity for starting on his voyage. I know of no right on the part of a charterer to insist that the safety of the ship should be endangered by sailing at a time when seamanship requires her to stay in port."
Lord Findlay, LC suggested that, although the parties in Krell v Henry may have contracted in the expectation that the procession would take place, it was difficult to see why the happening of the procession was the basis of the contract.
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
In The Matter of Part Cargo Ex MV Glenroy [1945] UKPC 13
7 Mar 1945
PC

Transport
From The High Court of Justice Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (In Prize)
[ Bailii ]
 
The Llanover [1947] P 80
1947

Pilcher J
Transport, Damages
The lost vessel for which the claim was made, was under charter, to the British government in wartime. The war conditions had driven up the need for shipping, and with it the market value of ships. Held: The owner was not awarded damages more than such profit as the vessel would have made if the voyage on which it was engaged at the time of its loss had been completed.
Pilcher J said: "in March, 1942, any British shipowner selling or buying a British ship would do so with the knowledge that his ship would, so long as she was kept efficient, be assured of profitable engagement probably at rates laid down by the Ministry of War Transport. If this were so, it seemed to follow that any enhanced value due to the virtual certainty of profitable employment was already reflected in the prices realized by the sales of comparable ships and was therefore already included in the sum allowed by the assistant registrar" as the going concern value of the vessel.
1 Citers


 
The Llanover [1948] 79 Lloyds LLR 159
1948
CA
Bucknill LJ
Transport, Damages
Bucknill LJ said: "On the undisputed evidence as to the circumstances leading up to the collision, it seems to me that a prima facie case of negligence is made out against the 'Llanover' which she has failed to rebut. Her rebuttal rests on her evidence that her steering gear jammed, which made it impossible for her to keep out of the way. It is not sufficient for a ship to say: 'My steering gear has jammed and therefore I can do nothing.' I think the burden is cast on her of showing that the jamming could not have been avoided by the exercise of reasonable care and skill on her part, or at least that she used all reasonable care and skill to prevent the jamming of the gear, and that it might reasonably have jammed for a cause which they could not have prevented by the exercise of reasonable care and skill."
1 Cites


 
Royal Greek Government v Minister of Transport (The Ann Stathatos) [1949] 83 Ll Rep 228
1949

Devlin J
Transport
The ship had been chartered, but the crew refused to sail without an escort, in war conditions. The charterer sought to be excused liability under a clause making allowance for 'insufficiency of crew'. Held: The presumption against surplusage is of little value in the interpretation of commercial contracts. Devlin J said: "A charter-party is built up of clauses generally agreed in the trade; and when they are added to or varied from time to time, as not infrequently they are, I doubt that the commercial draftsmen pay much attention to overlapping or that they are afraid of repetition. Secondly, the argument based on superfluity, which, as has often been said, is of little value in the construction of commercial documents, is hardly applicable at all to Clause 13. Whatever construction is put upon Clause 9, the second part of Clause 13 is, from a lawyer’s point of view, superfluous. All that it is saying legally is that the charterer is responsible for breach of the charter-party or for negligence" and "if [the owner] is to surrender his freedom of choice and put his master under the orders of the charterer, there is nothing unreasonable in his stipulating for a complete indemnity in return."
1 Citers


 
Royal Greek Government v Minister of Transport (1949) 82 Ll L Rep 196
2 Jan 1949
CA

Transport, Insurance
The charterers had ordered the vessel to sail but her crew refused to do so, except in convoy, because of the war. A dispute arose as to whether, the charterers' order to sail having been disobeyed, the vessel was off-hire. Held. The appeal failed. The charterers could not bring themselves within the off-hire clause, which contained only the printed words "deficiency of men". That wording meant "numerical insufficiency" and resulted in the vessel being off-hire when an adequate complement of officers and crew for working the ship was not available. However, the vessel had a full complement of crew, so that, on the facts, the wording did not assist charterers. "Deficiency of men" did not extend to cover a wilful refusal to work.
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Chandris v Isbrandtsen-Moller Co Inc; CA 1950 - [1951] 1 KB 240; (1950) 2 All ER 618; (1950) 84 Lloyds Rep 347
 
Lever Brothers and Unilever NV and Others v His Majesty'S Protector General In The Matter of Ss. Unitas and Cargo (Admiralty (Prize)) [1950] UKPC 11
8 May 1950
PC

Commonwealth, Transport

[ Bailii ]
 
Workington Harbour and Dock Board v Towerfield (Owners) ('The Towerfield') [1951] AC 112
1951
HL
Lord Radcliffe, Lord Normand
Transport, Equity
The occasions upon which the master is called upon to exercise his reserve of authority either by interfering with the conduct of the ship or by taking the navigation out of the hands of a competent pilot are rare and should the master exercise that reserve authority he must justify his action. Section 15 was not limited to cases where the owners of a vessel under compulsory pilotage were facing claims by third parties but extended to a claim by the owners themselves.
Lord Normand discussed the Latin maxim: frustra petis quod mox es restiturus ("it is no good trying to get something which immediately afterwards you are going to have to hand back"), saying "But if the shipowner might have recovered as damages in an action in negligence the sum paid to the harbour authority under section 74, the decision would be saved frustra petis quod mox es restiturus."
Pilotage Act 1913 15
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Pavia and Co SPA v Thurmann-Nielsen [1952] 2 QB 84
1952
CA

Transport
In cif contracts the credit must be opened at the latest at the beginning of the shipment period. The seller is entitled, before he ships the goods to be assured that when he does so, he will get paid.
1 Citers



 
 The Firestone Tire and Rubber Company (SS) Limited v Singapore Harbour Board; PC 10-Jun-1952 - [1952] UKPC 17; 50 LGR 619; [1952] 1 TLR 1625; [1952] 2 Lloyd's Rep 1; [1952] AC 452; [1952] 2 All ER 219

 
 Pyrene Co Ltd v Scindia Navigation Co Ltd; QBD 1954 - [1954] 2 QB 402

 
 Compania Naviera Maropan S/A v Bowater's Pulp and Paper Mills Limited (The "Stork"); CA 1954 - [1955] 2 QB 68; [1954] 2 Lloyds Rep 397

 
 Pyrene v Scindia Navigation Co; 1954 - [1954] 2 QB 402; [1954] 2 WLR 1005; [1954] 1 Lloyds Rep 321; [1954] 2 All ER 158
 
Kelman v Livanos [1955] 1 Lloyds Rep 120
1955


Transport, Insurance

1 Citers


 
Stafford Allen and Sons Ltd v Pacific Steam Navigation Company (1956) Ll L Rep 105
1956

Sellers J
Transport
A first carrier’s bill of lading provided for shipment at Nicaragua, discharge and transshipment at Cristobal by a named "on carrier" and a final destination in London. Clause 11, dealt with the circumstances of transshipment, to the effect that the first carrier made arrangements for the transshipment and on-carriage "solely as the forwarding agent of the shipper and without any other responsibility whatsoever" and that the transshipment and on-carriage would be subject to "all the provisions of the regular form of bill of lading" of the second carrier. No further bill of lading was issued, but the second carrier did have a regular form of bill of lading. The plaintiff’s cargo was damaged on the second leg and it sued the second carrier. The issue was whether the regime terms of the first carrier’s bill of lading applied throughout the voyage to London, or whether the terms of the second carrier’s regular bill of lading applied. Held: The second carrier’s terms applied.
1 Citers



 
 GH Renton and Co Ltd v Palmyra Trading Corporation of Panama; HL 1957 - [1957] AC 149
 
The Empire Jamaica [1957] AC 386
1957

Sir Raymond Evershed MR
Transport
A collision was caused by a 'blunder in seamanship of . . a somewhat serious and startling character' by an uncertified second mate. The owners knew that the mate was not certificated and the collision would not have happened if he had not been employed. Held: In limitation proceedings the damage was found to have taken place without the employers' 'actual fault or privity'.
1 Citers


 
Goulandris Bros v Goldmann and Sons [1958] 1 QB 74
1958

Pearson J
Transport, Damages
An insurance clause ensuring "loss or damage in connexion with the goods" under the Hague Rules for carriage of goods by sea includes economic loss even in the absence of such physical damage.
1 Citers


 
British Imex v Midland Bank [1958] 1QB 542
1958

Salmon J
Transport
Salmon J emphasised that the term "a clean" bill of lading had never been exhaustively defined and that he did not attempt to do so in that case, but described a "clean" bill of lading as "one that does not contain any reservations as to the apparent good order and condition of the goods or the packing".
1 Citers


 
Maxine Footwear Co v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd [1959] AC 589
1959
PC

Transport
Cargo was ignited as a result of fire in insulation in the hold caused before the cargo was loaded. Held: the vessel was unseaworthy from the time that the vessel caught fire and that the damage to the cargo was caused by the unseaworthiness.

 
Adamastos Shipping v Anglo Saxon Petroleum [1959] AC 133
1959
HL
Viscount Simonds
Transport
Where the terms of a statute are incorporated into a contract by reference, the contract has to be read as if the words of the statute are written out in the contract and construed, as a matter of contract, in that contractual context. The Hague Rules applied to ballast voyages: "My Lords, it is, I think permissible in a consideration of this commercial transaction to ask what possible difference it makes to the charterers whether the delay, to which their loss is due, occurs when the ship is in ballast or is loaded with a cargo of oil or of water. It matters not for this purpose whether the charterparty was for a single voyage, as the original document seemed to contemplate, or for a number of consecutive voyages. The contractual subject-matter was the whole period during which the vessel was under charter, and it is, in my opinion, to this whole period that the parties agreed that the statutory standard of obligation and immunity should relate."
1 Citers


 
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