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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Transport - From: 1900 To: 1929

This page lists 50 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
The Owners of The Steamship Chittagong v The Owners of The Steamship Kostroma [1901] UKPC 44; [1901] AC 597
27 Jul 1901
PC

Commonwealth, Transport
(Constantinople) Liability after collision between two ships.
[ Bailii ]
 
Simpson v Attorney General [1904] AC 476
1904
HL
Lord Lindley
Transport, Land
Lord Lindley said: "the doctrine once a highway always a highway is, I believe, applicable to rivers as to roads"
1 Citers


 
Wehner v Dene Steam Shipping Co [1905] 2 KB 92
1905

Channell LJ
Contract, Transport
Channell LJ said: "Now, although the owner has the right to demand the bill of lading freight from the holder of the bill of lading because the contract is the owner's contract, yet the owner has also, of course contracted by the charterparty that for the use of his ship he will be satisfied with a different sum, which will also in the great majority of cases be less than the total amount of the bills of lading freights; and, therefore, if the owner were himself to demand and receive the bills of lading freight as he might do if he chose, he would still have to account to the charterer or the sub-charterer, as the case may be, for the surplus remaining in his hands after deducting the amount due for hire of the ship under the charterparty. Of course, in practice an agent is usually appointed to receive the bill of lading freight, though not necessarily, because the captain may receive it himself; and under this charterparty the captain has to appoint as agent any person whom the charterers may select, which is a very reasonable arrangement, because if the business goes smoothly and the charterparty hire is duly paid, the charterers are the persons really interested in receiving the bill of lading freight. But, if I am right as to the bill of lading contract being with the owner, then it seems to me to follow that the agent appointed to receive the bill of lading freight becomes by the very act of appointment the agent of the shipowner to receive the freight for him, and the agent's receipt binds the shipowner."

 
Attorney-General v Mersey Railway Co [1907] AC 415
1906
HL

Company, Transport
The power to make by-laws encompasses not only a company's principle activity, but also all incidental and ancillary activities. The incidental power cannot be used to expand the company's activities, in this case by extending its business by operating its own buses from its terminus.
1 Citers



 
 Anderson v Martin; 1907 - [1907] 2 KB 253

 
 Larsen v Sylvester; HL 1908 - [1908] AC 295; (1908) 96 LT 94

 
 Liverpool and North Wales SS Co Ltd v Mersey Trading Co; 1908 - [1908] 99 LT 863; [1908] 2 Ch 460; [1908] 77 LJ Ch 658; [1908] 72 JP 385; [1908] 24 TLR 712
 
The China Navigation Company Limited Owners of The SS Chinkiang v The Commissioners for Executing The Office of The Lord High Admiral of The United Kingdom and Another [1908] UKPC 12
18 Mar 1908
PC

Commonwealth, Transport
China and Corea
[ Bailii ]

 
 Liverpool and North Wales SS Co Ltd v Mersey Trading Co; CA 1909 - [1909] 1 Ch 209; [1909] 78 LJ Ch 17; [1909] 73 JP 19; [1909] 25 TLR 89
 
Robertson v The Balmain New Ferry Company Ltd [1909] UKPC 1; [1910] AC 295
10 Dec 1909
PC

Commonwealth, Transport, Contract, Torts - Other
High Court of Australia - The Plaintiff paid a penny on entering the wharf to stay there till the boat should start and then be taken by the boat to the other side. The Defendants were admittedly always ready and willing to carry out their part of this contract. Then the Plaintiff changed his mind, and wished to go back. The rules as to the exit from the wharf by the turnstile required a penny for any person who went though. This the Plaintiff refused to pay, and he was by force prevented from going through the turnstile. He then claimed damages for assault and false imprisonment,
[ Bailii ]

 
 Sheffield District Railway co v Great Central Railway Co; 1911 - (1911) 27 TLR 451; (1911) Ty & Can Tr Cas 299
 
The Canadian Northern Railway Company v Robinson and Another [1911] UKPC 62; [1911] AC 739
27 Jul 1911
PC

Transport
(Canada)
[ Bailii ]

 
 The Okehampton; CA 1913 - [1913] P 173
 
T S Natcheappa Chetty and Others v The Irrawaddy Flotilla Company Limited [1913] UKPC 66; [1913] UKPC 67
8 Dec 1913
PC

Commonwealth, Transport
Lower Burma
[ Bailii ] - [ Bailii ]
 
Earl of Dysart v Hammerton and Co (1914) 1 Ch 822
1914
CA

Transport

1 Citers


 
Lennard's Carrying Company Limited v Asiatic Petroleum Company Limited [1915] AC 705; [1914-15] All ER 280
1915
HL
Viscount Haldane LC
Company, Transport
The House was asked as to when the acts of an individual became those of his employer under section 502 ("any loss or damage happening without (the ship owner's) actual fault or privity"). Held: Viscount Haldane LC said: "It must be upon the true construction of that section in such a case as the present one that the fault or privity is the fault or privity of somebody who is not merely a servant or agent for whom the company is liable on the footing of respondeat superior but somebody for whom the company is liable because his action is the very action of the company itself. It is not enough that the fault should be the fault of a servant in order to exonerate the owner, the fault must also be one which is not the fault of the owner, or a fault to which the owner is not privy . ."
Viscount Haldane LC said: "My Lords, a corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation. That person may be under the direction of the shareholders in general meeting; that person may be the board of directors itself, or it may be, and in some companies it is so, that that person has an authority co-ordinate with the board of directors given to him under the articles of association, and is appointed by the general meeting of the company, and can only be removed by the general meeting of the company."
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 502
1 Citers


 
Hammerton and Another v Earl of Dysart and Another
23 Jul 1915
HL
Viscount Haldane, Lord Parker of Waddington, Lord Sumner, Lord Strathclyde, and Lord Parmoor
Transport
The plaintiff sought a declaration that he owned an ancient right of ferry over the Thames, and that th edefendant had disturbed it by setting up a new ferry a short diatnce downstream. Held: The traffic for the new ferry was largely generated by the park opened to the public by the defendant, and therefore the custom of the new ferry service was largely derived from this new business, was new traffic, and was not a disturbance of the plaintiff's ferry rights.
1 Cites


 
Strathlorne Steamship Co v Baird and Sons [1916] UKHL 3; (1916) 1 SLT 221; 1916 SC (HL) 134
1 Mar 1916
HL

Contract, Transport

[ Bailii ]
 
Thomas v Tyne and Wear SS Freight Insurance Association [1917] 1 KB 938
1917


Transport, Insurance
For an insurer to set up a defence under claim for the loss of a ship on the grounds of the unseaworthiness of the vessel, the unseaworthiness must have been causative of the relevant loss.
1 Citers


 
In re Cargo Ex Sailing-Ship Parchim NV Veendammer Kunstmesthandel v Proctor-General v The High Court of Justice [1917] UKPC 90
6 Nov 1917
PC

Transport
(England) Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (In Prize)
[ Bailii ]
 
In The Matter of Damaged Cargo Ex Steamship Sudmark Captain F. D. Gilpin Brown R.N. and Another The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and Others v His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court for Egypt (In Prize) [1918] UKPC 17
1 Mar 1918
PC

Commonwealth, Transport

[ Bailii ]
 
In The Matter of Part Cargo Ex Steamship Hellig Olav The Vendsyssel Packing Company v Her Majesty'S Procurator General v The High Court of Justice (England) Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (In Prize) [1918] UKPC 105
3 Dec 1918
PC

Transport

[ Bailii ]
 
His Majesty's Procurator In Egypt v Deutsche Kohlen Dep T Gesellschaft (His Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court for Egypt (In Prize)) [1918] UKPC 107
13 Dec 1918
PC

Transport, Commonwealth

[ Bailii ]
 
In re Part Cargo Ex Steamship Palm Branch The Asociasion De Agricultores Del Ecuador v HM Procurator General v The High Court of Justice [1918] UKPC 109; [1919] AC 272
13 Dec 1918
PC

Transport
(England) Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (In Prize)
[ Bailii ]
 
In The Matter of Part Cargo Ex Steamship Stigstad A. F. Klaveness and Company V. Her Majesty's Procurator General v The High Court of Justice (England) Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (In Prize) [1918] UKPC 113
16 Dec 1918
PC

Transport

[ Bailii ]
 
Britain Steamship Company Limited v The King and Others ("The Matiana") [1919] 2 KB 670
1919
CA
Warrington LJ
Armed Forces, Transport
The court was asked wheter a merchant vessel was acting a a military ship when in convoy. Held: The appeal succeeded. Warrington LJ said: "Of course the sailing with convoy may easily assume the character of a warlike operation; if the convoy were actually attacked or if an attack were impending or immediately apprehended then from that moment the operations might well become warlike operations".
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Britain Steamship Company Limited v The King and Others ("The Matiana"); CA 1919 - [1919] 2 KB 670
 
Les Affreteurs Reunis SA v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd [1919] AC 801
1919
HL
Lord Birkenhead LC, Viscount Finlay and Lords Atkinson Wrenbury
Agency, Transport, Contract
With regard to Robertson -v- Wait: "My Lords, so far as I am aware, that case has not before engaged the attention of this House, and I think it right to say plainly that I agree with that decision and I agree with the reasoning, shortly as it is expressed, upon which the decision was founded. In this connection I would refer to the well-known case of In re Empress Engineering Company. In the judgment of Sir George Jessel MR the principle is examined which, in my view, underlies and is the explanation of the decision in Robertson v. Wait. The Master of the Rolls uses this language: ‘So, again, it is quite possible that one of the parties to the agreement may be the nominee or trustee of the third person. As Lord Justice James suggested to me in the course of the argument, a married woman may nominate somebody to contract on her behalf, but then the person makes the contract really as trustee for somebody else, and it is because he contracts in that character that the cestui que trust can take the benefit of the contract.’ It appears to me plain that for convenience, and under long established practice, the broker in such cases, in effect, nominates the charterer to contract on his behalf, influenced probably by the circumstance that there is always a contract between charterer and owner in which this stipulation, which is to enure to the benefit of the broker, may very conveniently be inserted. In these cases the broker, on ultimate analysis, appoints the charterer to contract on his behalf. I agree therefore with the conclusion arrived at by all the learned judges in Robertson v. Wait, that in such cases charterers can sue as trustees on behalf of the broker."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
In re Part Cargo Ex Steamship Kratatau Handelsvereeniging Voorheen Reiss and Co v Her Majesty's Procurator General [1919] UKPC 62
7 Jul 1919
PC

Transport
(The High Court of Justice (England) Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Jurisdiction (In Prize))
[ Bailii ]
 
Brys and Gylsen v J and J Drysdale and Co (1920) 4 Ll L Rep 24
1920

Greer J
Transport, Contract
A literal interpretation of the Rules indicates that, where shippers and consignees select and pay for stevedoring, cargo claimants may recover compensation from owners for the negligence of cargo owners or the negligence of their stevedores, but "It would be an odd state of things if one were to hold that a shipowner who has no contract whatever with the stevedore, and who cannot say to the stevedore: You have broken your contract with me, and therefore I will not have you any longer in my vessel; and who has no control over what is to be paid to the stevedore, should be responsible for the failure of the stevedore to do his duty."
Hague-Visby Rules
1 Citers


 
E F Newing v His Majesty's Procurator General [1920] UKPC 41
30 Apr 1920
PC

Transport
(The High Court of Justice Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (In Prize))
[ Bailii ]
 
Schoeffer and Company v His Majesty's Procurator General [1920] UKPC 68
15 Jul 1920
PC

Transport
(The High Court of Justice Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (In Prize))
[ Bailii ]
 
L. Paulsen and Company and Others v His Majesty's Procurator General ) [1920] UKPC 120
17 Dec 1920
PC

Transport
(The High Court of Justice Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Divisions (In Prize)
[ Bailii ]
 
Britain Steamship Company Limited v The King and Others ("The Matiana") [1921] 1 AC 99
1921
HL
Lord Atkinson, Lord Wright, Viscount Cave, Lord Shaw
Armed Forces, Transport
The House considered the relationship between a merchant vessel in convoy and a convoying naval vessel. Held: The appeal succeeded. Lord Atkinson: "With all respect, I am quite unable to concur in the learned judge's view that the merchant ships convoyed, whose task was simply to sail peacefully on the course they might be directed to follow, and to keep their proper places in the convoy, became so identified with the ships of war directing and protecting them, as to be treated as members of a joint flotilla on a common enterprise. I concur with Atkin LJ in thinking that the learned judge treats as he said the sheep and the shepherd as both engaged in the operation of shepherding. The duties and proper tasks of convoying warships and the ships they convoy are respectively indicated in ss 30 and 31 of the Naval Discipline Act of 1866 . . The naval officers are to diligently perform the duties of convoying and protecting the ships they are appointed to convoy according to instructions, to defend these ships and the goods they carry without deviation, to fight in their defence if they are assailed and not to abandon them or expose them to hazard. Every master or other officer in command of any merchant or other vessel convoyed is bound to obey the commanding officer of the ships of war in all matters relating to the navigation or security of the convoy, and is also bound to take such precautions for avoiding the enemy as may be directed by this commanding officer. It does not appear, however, that this latter officer has any power to require the master, officers or crew of any merchant ship which is being convoyed to take combative action against a vessel of any kind, or to join in such action if taken by all or any of the ships of war. The roles of the two classes of ships are entirely different in nature and character. That of the ships of war is protective and if need be combative; that of the merchantmen is not at all combative in nature and character as would be their enterprise in time of peace" Viscount Cave: "But in the present case the orders were a part of the convoying operation which included the choice of the route, the setting of the course, and the precautions taken on the voyage; and I do not think that the transaction can be split up and treated as in part an operation and in part something other than an operation . . ."
Lord Shaw: "… I think that the putting of a vessel under convoy, with all that that involves, is an actual and accomplished change of circumstances and an operation which is conducted in the course of hostilities or war…." and "To all intents and purposes it is the same as if he had placed on the convoyed ship a naval officer in command as subordinate to himself. In short, so far as the direction of the course of the vessel was concerned, the merchant captain and officers were no longer in control. The naval officers were. Not only so, but the orders of the commander of the convoy were clothed with the instant sanction of force . . . I myself see great force in the view which Bailhache J. so clearly expresses to the effect that all the vessels - those acting as convoy and those under convoy - must be treated as a unity. . . . I am humbly of opinion that, so far as ships under convoy are concerned, all these ships are, along with the ships acting as convoy, under a unified command, and that command issuing from the commander of the convoy is, as part of the direction of the convoy, a military operation."
Naval Discipline Act 1866 30
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Crown of Leon (Owners) v Admiralty Commissioners [1921] 1 KB595
1921


Transport

1 Citers


 
Hansson v Hamel and Horley Ltd 1921 Lloyd's List LR 432
1921


Transport
The court explained the role of a contract of carriage: "What is meant by the expression 'Contract of Affreightment'? In my opinion, to satisfy the requirements with reference to contract of affreightment, the seller must bring into existence a contract embodied in a form capable of being transferred to the buyer and which when transferred will give the buyer two rights: (a) a right to receive the goods, and (b) a right against the shipowner, who carries the goods, should the goods be damaged or not delivered'. . . "
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
The Ship "Marlborough Hill" v Alex Cowan and Sons Limited [1921] AC 444
1921
PC
Lord Phillimore
Contract, Commercial, Transport
The question was whether a document, describing itself as a bill of lading but written in the form of a receipt of goods for (rather than of) shipment, was a bill of lading for the purposes of the Act, which set out the jurisdiction of the admiralty court for an action in rem. The claim had been brought by consignees which provided for delivery to the shipper's order. Held: It was a bill of lading within the Act. The court noted that it purported to be negotiable. If this document is a bill of lading, it is a negotiable instrument. Other incidents of the document were standard for a bill of lading, such as detailed terms and conditions in familiar form; the fact that the document was called a bill of lading many times in the course of such provisions and that it was made subject to the US Charter Act; the fact that it provides that "If required by the shipowner, one signed bill of lading, duly endorsed, must be surrendered on delivery of the goods"; and that it "ends in the time honoured form", viz "In witness whereof the master or agent of said vessel has signed three bills of lading, all of this tenor and date, of which if one is accomplished, the others shall be void" The court emphasised that the document would work as merchants would expect a bill of lading to work. It accorded wit hstandard commercial practiceand the parties agreed to call it a bill of lading, and entered into obligations and acquired rights proper to a bill of lading. All the other incidents in its very detailed language are such as are proper to such a document.
Admiralty Court Act 1861
1 Citers


 
Hansson v Hamel and Horley Ltd [1922] 2 AC 36
1922
HL

Transport
Appeal dismissed
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
London and North Western Railway Co v Neilson (1922) 38 TLR 653; [1922] 2 AC 263
1922
HL
Lord Dunedin, Lord Buckmaster, Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner
Contract, Transport
Lord Buckmaster said: "My Lords, the common law imposes upon the carriers of goods definite and well–known liabilities for the protection of owners. These liabilities are frequently modified by the terms of express contracts, but except to the extent to which plain language effects alteration they still remain and cannot be removed by subtle implications or ambiguous words. No doubt has found place in any of the judgments in this case as to the soundness of this principle and none exists."
1 Citers


 
Thrige v United Shipping Company Limited (1923) 16 Lloyds Rep 198
1923


Transport

1 Citers



 
 Brandt v Liverpool, Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co Ltd; CA 1924 - [1924] 1 KB 575

 
 Standard Oil Co of New York v Clan Line Steamers; HL 1924 - [1924] AC 100; 40 TLR 148; 68 SJ 234; 29 Com Cas 75; 130 LT 481; [1924] SC (HL) 1; 93 LJPC 49

 
 Thrige v United Shipping Company Ltd; CA 1924 - (1924) 18 Ll L Rep 6
 
Societe Du Gaz De Paris v Armateurs Francais [1925] UKHL 2; (1925) 23 Ll L Rep 209; 1926 SC (HL) 13; 1926 SLT 33
3 Dec 1925
HL

Scotland, Jurisdiction, Transport

[ Bailii ]
 
Admiralty Commissioners v Owners of the Steamship Susquehanna; The Susquehanna [1926] AC 655
1926
HL
Viscount Dunedin
Damages, Transport
An Admiralty oiler, the 'Prestol', was damaged in a collision with the defendants' vessel in the Baltic. Her place was taken by another oiler, the 'Belgol', which was withdrawn from service on the Clyde. In effect, the Admiralty was able to make do with the resources at its disposal, making it unnecessary to charter in a substitute vessel. The Admiralty claimed general damages at the rate of £225 a day in respect of the period during which the 'Prestol' was out of service while undergoing repairs, that being the rate at which she could have been chartered out. The registrar awarded damages at the rate of £200 a day. The House considered the principles to be applied in assessing damages. Held: The Admiralty was not entitled to recover general damages assessed by reference to the rate at which the vessel could be chartered out and on that point their Lordships were agreed. Viscount Dunedin said: "There is no difference in this matter between the position in Admiralty law and that of the common law . ."
1 Citers


 
In re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606
1927


Transport, Contract
In the case of a Bill of lading issued for quantities out of undivided consignments and where those quantities had been sold to different buyers and the various bills of lading endorsed over to them, those endorsements were ineffective to pass the legal title in the parts of an undivided whole to a purchaser.
Bills of Lading Act 1855
1 Citers


 
W. Angliss v Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co [1927] 1 KB 456
1927

Wright J
Transport, Contract
Wright J held: "The Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts have introduced a new and obligatory code of responsibilities and immunities as affecting carriers under bills of lading in place of the former rule that carriers by sea, while generally under the liability of common carriers, were free by contract to vary and limit their liabilities. In particular, the Acts have expressly abolished the previous absolute obligation to provide a seaworthy ship and have substituted an obligation to use due diligence to that effect. The carrier may not be the owner of the ship, but merely the charterer; he may not have contracted for the building of the ship, but merely have purchased her, possibly years after she has been built. In the two latter cases the builders and their men cannot possibly be deemed to have been the agents or servants of the carrier and it is illogical that there should be such difference in the carrier's obligations merely because he has bought the ship by the method of contracting with the builders to build it for him. In addition, if the carrier were held liable for the bad workmanship of the builders' men, he might equally be held liable for bad workmanship by the men employed by the various sub-contractors who supply material for the builders, such as steel-workers in furnaces and rolling mills, or who supply special articles such as castings, pumps or proprietary machines, which would involve an almost unlimited retrogression."
1 Citers


 
Great Western Railway Co v Mostyn (Owners) [1928] AC 57; 97 LJP8; 138 LT 403
1928
HL
Viscount Haldane, Viscount Dunedin
Transport, Constitutional
The House considered the application of a case precedent where they had been uunable to extract a binding ratio decidendi. Held: A ratio decidendi cannot be created by aggregating views of minority judges and views of majority judges to secure a numerical majority on a particular issue. Viscount Dunedin (dissenting) said as to the ratio of the case referred to: "Now, when any tribunal is bound by the judgment of another Court, either superior or co-ordinate, it is, of course, bound by the judgment itself. And if from the opinions delivered it is clear - as is the case in most instances - what the ratio decidendi was which led to the judgment, then that ratio decidendi is also binding. But it is not clear, then I do not think it is part of the tribunal's duty to spell out with great difficulty a ratio decidendi in order to be bound by it. That is what the Court of Appeal has done here. With great hesitation they have added the opinion of Lord Hatherley to that of Lord Cairns and then, with still greater difficulty, that of Lord Blackburn, and so have secured what they think was a majority in favour of Lord Cairns's very clear view. I do not think that the respect which they hold and have expressed for the judgments of your Lordships' House compelled them to go through this difficult and most unsatisfactory performance." and "[Y]ou cannot extract from the judgments in Wear v Adamson such a ratio decidendi as is binding. That, however, is far from wiping Wear v Adamson off the slate. It remains for two purposes. First, for the judgment itself and, second, for the opinions of the noble Lords, which are entitled to the greatest respect. Now, the judgment is binding. What, therefore, I think is our duty on this occasion is to consider the statute for ourselves in the light of the opinions, diverging as they are, and to give an interpretation; but that interpretation must necessarily be one which would not, if it applied to the facts of Wear v Adamson, lead to a different result."
Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847 74
1 Cites



 
 Bournemouth-Swanage Motor Road and Ferry Co v Harvey and Sons; CA 1929 - (1929) 94 JP 10; [1929] 1 Ch 686; [1929] 98 LJ Ch 118; [1929] 140 LT 415; [1929] 93 JP 129; [1929] 27 LGR 264
 
Bournemouth-Swanage Motor Road and Ferry Co v Harvey and Sons (No 2) [1929] 144 LT 132; 95 JP 9; 47 TLR 16; 29 LGR 22
2 Jan 1929
CA

Transport
The Company had constructed a jetty under powers granted by a private Act of Parliament. It asserted a claim to own the subsoil. Held: It did so own the sub-soil and had the right under the statute to control who used the jetty.
1 Cites


 
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