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Scotland - From: 1960 To: 1969

This page lists 51 cases, and was prepared on 20 May 2019.

 
HM Advocate v Kidd 1960 SLT 82
1960


Scotland, Crime
The court set out the conditions for finding insanity in criminal law.
1 Citers


 
Watson v Fram Reinforced Concrete Co (Scotland) Ltd 1960 SC 92; 1960 SC (HL) 92
1960
HL
Lord Reid, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Denning
Scotland, Negligence, Limitation
A workman had been injured through the breaking of a defective part in the machine with which he was working. He brought an action of damages against his employers, and later convened as second defenders the manufacturers of the machine, who had supplied it to his employers, on averments that the accident had been caused by the fault of the manufacturers in that they failed to supply his employers with a machine which was safe for use by their servants. The machine had been supplied on 7 July 1955 and the accident had happened on 9 August 1956, but the manufacturers were not convened in the action until 25 March 1959. Held: The three-year limitation period provided by section 6(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Limitation of Actions &c.) Act 1954 ran from the date when the workman suffered the injury and that, accordingly, the action against the manufacturers was not time-barred. "a cause of action accrues as soon as a wrongful act has caused personal injury beyond what can be regarded as negligible."
Lord Reid said: 'The ground of any action based on negligence is a concurrence of duty and damage and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs.' and "It appears to me that default in the sense of breach of duty must persist after the act or neglect until the damage is suffered. The ground of any action based on negligence is the concurrence of breach of duty and damage, and I cannot see how there can be that concurrence unless the duty still exists and is breached when the damage occurs. Suppose that the damage occurred a year or two years after the manufacture and sale of the article: then undoubtedly the injured person can sue. But how could he sue if the manufacturer could say that his default had ceased a year before the injured person ever came near the dangerous article? Whatever be the true view with regard to the act or neglect, I think that the appellant is entitled to say that the respondents' 'default giving rise to the action' existed at the time when he suffered his injuries."
Lord Keith of Avonholm said: "Now this is a Donoghue v Stevenson type of case, and such a case undoubtedly introduces specialities into the law of negligence. But, on any view, I see difficulty in saying that there was negligence at the date of supply. At that date on the pursuer's pleadings there was no reason why the manufacturers should have known of the dangerous state of the strut. It can hardly be expected that they had a legal duty to take it to pieces and inspect it before sending it out. Undoubtedly there was an act of carelessness on the part of some workman when the pin was welded to the strut and the manufacturers would be vicariously responsible for that carelessness. But can it be said that at either date there was an act of negligence in the legal sense? The manufacturers owed a duty to anyone who should handle the machine to take reasonable steps to see that it was safe. They owed a duty not to injure, but until someone was injured there was no breach of duty. Only then could it be said that an act of negligence had been committed. That, I think, necessarily follows from the judgment of this House in Donoghue v Stevenson." and "Applying the ratio of these decisions there was, in my opinion, no act, neglect or default within the meaning of the statute affecting the pursuer until he was injured. A fortiori there was no act, neglect or default giving rise to his action before that date. It was then for the first time that there arose a breach of duty which made its impact on the pursuer. Time, in my opinion, commenced to run against the pursuer under the statute from that date."
Lord Denning said: "I think the true principle is contained simply in this: 'You must not injure your neighbour by your fault.' It is the doing of damage to him which, in my opinion, is the breach of duty giving rise to the action. It is no doubt correct to say, as Lord MacMillan did say (at p.71), that the manufacturer 'is under a duty to take care in the manufacture of these articles.' That is a duty which he owes to all those who may have occasion to use the article: and it is a duty which is broken at the time when he is negligent in making the article. But it is not a breach of duty to any particular individual. And it is not that breach of duty which gives rise to the action. There is another duty also to be considered: and that is the duty which Lord Atkin put in this wise (at p.44): 'You must not injure your neighbour': which I would expand so as to say that there is a duty on every man not to injure his neighbour by his want of reasonable care. This is a duty which he owes, not to the world at large, but to his neighbour. It is broken only when his neighbour is injured and not before. Then, and then only, is there a breach of duty giving rise to an action." and . . "The words 'act, neglect or default' are perhaps a little tautologous: for 'act' in legal terminology often includes an omission as well as an act of commission: and 'default' certainly includes 'neglect'. But tautologous as they may be, the words are apt to cover all breaches of legal duty, no matter whether it be by leaving undone those things which we ought to have done, or by doing those things which we ought not to have done."
Law Reform (Limitation of Actions) Act 1954 6(1)(a)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Smith v Grayton Estates Ltd; SCS 1960 - 1960 SC 249
 
Orlandi v Casteli [1960] ScotCS CSOH - 1
5 Nov 1960
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Rodden v Whatlings Ltd [1960] ScotCS CSOH - 2
22 Nov 1960
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]

 
 Adams v National Bank of Greece; HL 1961 - [1961] AC 255
 
Wissenbruch v Wissenbruch 1961 SC 340
1961


Scotland, Trusts

1 Citers



 
 Macrae v Reed and Mallik Ltd; SCS 1961 - 1961 SC 68
 
Douglas-Hamilton v Hamilton's Trustees [1961] ScotCS CSIH - 1
5 May 1961
SCS

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Munro v Stein [1961] ScotCS CSOH - 3
23 Jun 1961
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Colville, Petitioner [1961] SCotCS CSIH - 2
15 Dec 1961
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Close v Steel Company of Wales Ltd [1962] AC 367
1962

Lord Denning
Health and Safety, Scotland, Constitutional
The pursuer sought damages after injury arising from the use of a tool for a purpose other than that for which it was intended to be used. Lord Denning quoted Sir Frederick Pollock to say: "Judicial authority belongs not to the exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision." referring to Selborne LC's judgment in Caledonian Railway, he said: "A judgment which is right, and consistent with sound principles, upon the facts and circumstances of the case which the House had to decide, need not be construed as laying down a rule for a substantially different state of facts and circumstances, though some propositions, wider than the case itself required, may appear to have received countenance from those who then advised the House."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v John M Whiteford and Son (1962) 40 TC 379
1962

Lord President, Lord Clyde
Income Tax, Scotland
The farm was farmed by a father and son in partnership. They had both lived in the original farmhouse, but a new house was built to house the son. The issue was whether the new house was a farmhouse or an agricultural cottage. If it was a cottage the whole of the expenditure on it could be claimed as an allowance, but if it was a farmhouse, only one-third could be claimed. Held: It was a cottage. The fact that the son worked full time on the farm was decisive. After referring to Lindsay, Lord Clyde said: "Obviously, except in some very special case, a farm can only have one farmhouse from which the business is run. In the present case, it appears to me to be clear that the father's house is the farmhouse for the purpose of the present farm, for according to the findings, his house is the place from which the farm operations are conducted." The court rejected the Crown's contention that the new house could not be an agricultural cottage because the son was not an employee but a partner: "In my view the status or employment of the occupier of the premises is not the test, and the proper criterion is the purpose of the occupation of the premises in question. Here, indubitably, the purpose of the occupation of this 'Dorran' house is husbandry, for under the partnership agreement the son for whom it was built and who occupies it must give his whole time and attention to the business of the partnership. Upon that test, therefore, it seems to me clear that the 'Dorran' house in question is an agricultural cottage within the meaning of section 314…"
Income Tax Act 1952 314
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Gray v University of Edinburgh [1962] ScotCS CSIH - 1
1 Mar 1962
SCS

Scotland
Inner House
[ Bailii ]
 
Argyllshire Weavers v Macauley [1962] ScotCS CSIH - 2
25 May 1962
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
HM Advocate v Cunningham 1963 SLT 345
1963


Scotland, Crime

1 Citers


 
Palmer v Inverness Hospitals Board of Management [1963] ScotCS CSOH - 3
18 Jan 1963
SCS

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Bankhead v Mccarthy [1963] ScotCS CSOH - 2
8 Feb 1963
SCS

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Lord Advocate v University of Aberdeen and Budge [1963] ScotCS CSIH - 1
2 Aug 1963
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
B and B [1964] ScotCS CSIH - 2
12 Nov 1964
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]

 
 Grieve v Douglas-Home; SCS 23-Dec-1964 - [1964] ScotCS 3; 1965 SC 315; 1965 SLT 186
 
St Johnstone Football Club v Scottish Football Association Ltd 1965 SLT 171
1965


Natural Justice, Scotland
The Supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session was available to check whether the proceedings leading to a disciplinary decision of the Scottish Football Association, a private association, had been conducted in accordance with natural justice.
1 Citers


 
Macleod v Hamilton [1965] SLT 305
1965


Road Traffic, Scotland
Unless an authority which makes a traffic control order complies with the requirements imposed on the making of such an order and the publication of the order is adequate, any offence which it purports to create cannot be effectively prosecuted.
1 Citers


 
Noble v Noble [1965] SLT 415
1965
OHCS
Lord Migdale, Lord Strachan, Lord Clyde
Scotland, Company
A father took his son into a farming partnership. The agreement recited that they agreed that "the heritable property should be taken as of the value of eight thousand pounds, but which is burdened with a heritable security for three thousand five hundred pounds". Proper books of account were to be kept. Until 1963 the books of account were prepared on the basis of those values. In 1963 the father sought a declaration that he was entitled to have the capital value of the assets of the partnership entered in the balance sheet at a real and not an arbitrary or notional value. Held: The issue is one of construction: what did the partners intend by the agreement which they made. Lord Strachan, sitting in the Outer House of the Court of Session, granted the declaration. As to Cruikshank v Sutherland: "The fact that Cruikshank was dealing with the share of a deceased partner is not, in my opinion, a material ground for distinguishing it from the present case. Similar issues are involved in this case, because under clause seventh of the contract a retiring partner or the representatives of a deceased partner are to be paid the sum at his credit as shown in the last preceding balance sheet. The same issues are therefore raised, but ab ante. It was argued for the defender, however, that there is vital distinction between Cruikshank and the present case in respect that the agreement that the heritable property is to be taken as of the value of £8,000 laid down a definite figure which was to be adopted in preparing the accounts and that it therefore cannot be said that the contract is silent as to the principle to be adopted in entering the heritable property. That point is the crux of the case, and with some hesitation, I have come to the opinion that the narrative references in the contract and the disposition cannot reasonably be read as meaning that the figure of £8,000 was to be entered in every balance sheet. It was a figure which was agreed for the purpose of fixing the capital of the company but on a construction of the whole deeds I find insufficient warrant for holding that it was intended to be a permanent valuation to be entered in every balance sheet. If that were so, a retiring or deceased partner would have no share whatever in any increase in the market value of the property, and if such an apparently unfair result had been intended, I think it would have been provided for in the eight clauses in which the terms and conditions of the partnership are reduced to writing, and would not have been left to be inferred from the narrative clauses. In my opinion, therefore, the contract is silent as to the principle to be adopted in framing the balance sheet, and Cruikshank is not distinguishable on that ground."
Lord Clyde: "In my opinion the provision requiring the keeping of proper books annually balanced and regularly audited requires the inclusion in the balance sheet of the assets of the partnership at their true value at the end of the year in question. The language of cl.6 of the contract of co-partnery will not therefore be complied with if any of the assets, one of which is the farm itself, is entered at a mere nominal value which was fixed by agreement between the parties when the contract was made. I can find nothing in art. 6 of the contract to support the view that the value of the farm itself - the main asset - was to be frozen year by year at a constant figure throughout the partnership . . . It was contended by the defender that in solicitors' partnership agreements it is quite common to provide that the heritable property in which the business is carried on should be entered at a constant figure in the balance sheets of the partnership throughout its term. It is of course quite legitimate for parties to make such a provision, but clear language to that effect is essential. There is no such provision in the present case."
Lord Migdale: "As I understood their arguments counsel on both sides are agreed that it is always open to partners to provide that an asset acquired by the partnership should continue to appear in the partnership books at its original value. The question raised here is not whether it can be so agreed but whether in this case it was so agreed."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Macleod v Hamilton 1965 SLT 305
1965

Lord Clyde, Lord Migdale
Scotland, Road Traffic
Lord Clyde said: "It was an integral part of the statutory scheme for a traffic regulation order that notice by means of traffic signs should be given to the public using the roads which were restricted so as to warn users of their obligations. Unless these traffic signs were there accordingly and the opportunity was thus afforded to the public to know what they could not legally do, no offence would be committed. It would, indeed, be anomalous and absurd were the position otherwise."
Lord Migdale said: "the order is not effective unless and until the council complies with Regulation 15(c) and erects road signs at the locus. Signs were erected but they were not the proper ones nor were they clear."
1 Citers


 
Law v McNicol 1965 JC 32
1965


Scotland, Criminal Practice

1 Citers


 
Forbes v Aberdeen Motors Ltd. [1965] ScotCS CSIH - 1
12 Mar 1965
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Macleod v Kerr [1965] ScotCS CSIH - 2
14 May 1965
SCS

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Kelly v Edmund Nuttall Sons and Co. (London) Ltd [1965] ScotCS CSIH - 3; 1965 SC 427; 1965 SLT 418
15 Jul 1965
SCS

Scotland, Personal Injury

1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Assessor for Fife v Hodgson (Lands Valuation Appeal Court) [1965] ScotCS 4
11 Nov 1965
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Reid v Mini-Cabs 1966 SC 137
1966
SCS
Lord Avonside
Scotland, Licensing
The general aim of regulations imposed by local authorities on traders was to ensure the good conduct and efficiency of the various trades and activities for the benefit and protection of the citizens in the burgh.
1 Citers


 
Beedie v Norrie 1966 SC 207
1966


Negligence, Scotland
Chapter 26 of the Rules of the Court of Session 1994, which is headed Third Party Procedure, enables questions arising out of claims by a defender against a third party for contribution, relief or indemnity and liability to be disposed of in the same action as that in which the defender is himself being sued.
Rules of the Court of Session 1994 824 - Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 3(2)
1 Citers


 
Noble v Noble Unreported, 26 January 1996
26 Jan 1966
IHCS

Company, Scotland

1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Errol v Walker [1966] ScotCS CSIH - 2
11 Mar 1966
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
White v White [1966] ScotCS CSIH - 1
2 Jun 1966
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Makouipour v Makouipour [1966] ScotCS CSOH - 3
15 Dec 1966
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Nimmo v Alexander Cowan and Sons Ltd 1967 SC (HL) 79; [1968] AC 107
1967
HL
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Guest, Lord Upjohn
Scotland, Health and Safety
The employer was prosecuted under the 1961 Act. Held: the burden of proving that it was not reasonably practicable to make and keep a place of work safe rested upon the defendant employer. If an exception was to be established, it was for the party claiming the exception to establish it. (Majority) Where a linguistic construction of the statute could not clearly indicate upon whom the burden should lie the court should look to other considerations to determine the intention of Parliament such as the mischief at which the Act was aimed and practical considerations affecting the burden of proof and, in particular, the ease or difficulty that the respective parties would encounter in discharging the burden.
Lord Wilberforce: "the orthodox principle (common to both the criminal and the civil law) that exceptions, etc., are to be set up by those who rely on them."
Factories Act 1961 29(1) - Mines and Quarries Act 1954 48(1)
1 Citers


 
James Kemp (Leslie) Ltd v Robertson [1967] ScotCS CSOH - 1
10 Apr 1967
SCS

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Brown v North British Steel Foundry Ltd 1968 SC 51
1968
OHCS
Lord President Clyde
Scotland, Personal Injury, Limitation
The 1954 Act passed on 4 June 1954 but was not to affect any action or proceeding if the cause of action arose before that date. The Lord Ordinary found that the pursuer who sought damages for pneumoconiosis did not begin to suffer from until 1955. But the pursuer contended that the injury had been done to his lungs by 1949 because he had been inhaling dangerous dust for some years before that and, as subsequent events showed, he was susceptible to pneumoconiosis in 1949. So the cause of action had arisen at that date. The First Division of the Court of Session rejected that argument. Held: Lord President Clyde said that there was no cause of action in 1949 and added: "To create a cause of action, injuria and damnum are essential ingredients. In the present case there is no evidence of any injuries to the workman's lungs in 1949. He had then merely a deposit of dust in his lungs, which might or might not subsequently create an injury. But, in addition, he had then sustained no damnum. He could not then have been awarded damages for any loss, because at that stage he had sustained no loss of wages and had suffered none of the discomforts and disabilities which, he avers, followed upon the onset of pneumoconiosis and which in fact flowed from the outbreak of that disease in 1955."
Law Reform (Limitation of Actions etc) Act 1954
1 Citers


 
Lucass Executors v Demarco 1968 SLT 89
1968


Scotland, Landlord and Tenant
The tenant argued as to the unreasonableness of the exercise of an irritancy.

 
Shaw v Shaw 1968 SLT 94
1968
OHCS
Lord Hunter
Scotland
"The authorities to which I was referred, including, in particular, Noble v Noble; Inner House, 28th January 1966 (unreported), and Cruickshank's Trustees v Sutherland, satisfy me that, as a general principle, where in a partnership it is necessary to make up a balance sheet affecting the money interests of the partners, the partnership assets should be entered in the balance sheet at their fair value to the partners, unless there is provision to the contrary in the contract of co-partnery . . . "
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Barton v William Low and Co Ltd 1968 SLT (Notes) 27
1968

Lord Stott
Scotland, Litigation Practice
The court was asked the question as to whether it was competent for a party who had been brought into the action under the third party procedure to challenge the relevancy of averments which the pursuer, who made no case against the third party, was seeking to incorporate in her pleadings as part of her case against the defenders. Held: Lord Stott said: "The third parties have been convened into the process by the defenders, and the pursuer makes no case against them. The defenders, however, have set out in their pleadings what is, in effect, a right of relief against the third parties. The third parties have therefore a clear interest in the success or failure of the pursuer's case against the defenders, and one of the objects of third party procedure, as I see it, is to enable the third parties to be heard on any matter in which they have a relevant interest in relation to the case between pursuer and defender. The question of whether the pursuer has made a competent or relevant case against the defenders is such a matter, and in my opinion the third parties are entitled to take a plea to the relevancy of the pursuer's pleadings and to be heard upon that plea."
1 Citers


 
Cawthorne (Richard Graves) v Hm Advocate [1968] ScotHC HCJ - 1
15 May 1968
HCJ

Scotland, Crime

[ Bailii ]
 
Denvir v Denvir 1969 SLT 301
1969


Scotland, Trusts

1 Citers



 
 Flannigan v British Dyewood Co Ltd; SCS 1969 - [1969] SLT 223
 
M'Kew v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621; 1969 SC 14
1969

Lord Justice Clerk (Grant)
Scotland, Negligence, Damages

1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Lothian v Jenolite; SCS 6-Feb-1969 - 1969 SC 111; [1969] ScotCS CSIH - 1; [1970] SLT 31
 
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Korner [1969] 1 All ER 679; [1969] 1 WLR 554; [1969] UKHL TC - 45 - 287; 1969 SLT 109; [1969] 1 WLR 554; 45 TC 287
19 Feb 1969
HL
Lord Upjohn
Income Tax, Scotland
Income tax, Schedule D - D eduction - Farm ing - Maintenance, etc., expenditure on farm house - Whether expenditure for domestic purposes distinct from those of the trade - Income Tax A c t 1952 (15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 10) 55. 124, 137(6) and (d) and 526(1).
The House was asked whether expenses in repairing and maintaining a farmhouse, the House of Elrig, could be set off against income tax. The farmhouse had twenty rooms, but only one was used for the farm. Held: The expenditure could be set off in full. The test of whether property was such as could benefit from income tax relief as an agricultural property was that of the reasonable man.
Lord Upjohn said: "My Lords, the Special Commissioners in the Case Stated said that they were not satisfied that the House of Elrig was 'the farmhouse', within the meaning of the Income Tax Act 1952, of the land occupied for the purposes of husbandry by the Korner family. In its Case before your Lordships' House the Crown said that it shared those doubts but was prepared to make the concession, so your Lordships are not directly concerned with the question. But I think it right to say that I am no more satisfied than were the Special Commissioners that this house could properly be described as "the farmhouse" within section 526. This is a matter of fact to be decided in the circumstances of each case, and I would think that to be "the farmhouse" for the purposes of the section it must be judged in accordance with ordinary ideas of what is appropriate in size, content and layout, taken in conjunction with the farm buildings and the particular area of farmland being farmed and not part of a rich man's considerable residence."
And "The result of . . Schedule D was that, apart altogether from s.526, the farmer occupying a house (no doubt with his wife and children) for the purpose of his farming activities would be entitled to claim a proportion of the reasonable and necessary expenditure upon the maintenance of his house as a deduction from his assessment to tax for the purposes of Schedule D. This practice is very old, works great justice between the Crown and the subject and I trust will never be disturbed. Thus speaking generally the grocer living above his shop, the doctor who has a surgery in his house and the barrister who works in his house where he keeps or brings his law books and works on his briefs in the evenings and at weekends is allowed by the Crown a reasonable sum in respect of the necessary upkeep of his dwelling as being properly attributable to his trading or professional activities.
So that in the present case there is no doubt, and indeed it is not disputed, for I did not understand the Solicitor- General for Scotland to challenge this proposition in his reply, that, apart from s.526, the respondents are, in any event, entitled to a proportion of the expenses, and it is agreed between the parties that this proportion should be one tenth ."
Income Tax Act 1952 124(1) 137 526
1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Devine v Colvilles Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 475; [1969] UKHL 11; [1969] 2 All ER 53; 1969 SC (HL) 67
11 Mar 1969
HL

Scotland, Personal Injury
The House considered the position of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitir. The plaintiff had been injured falling or jumping from a raised platform. Held: The claim succeeded. " I hold it proved that there was a general panic. Now the defenders must take men as they are, and all men are not brave and wise neither are all men cowardly and foolish. Within these two limits there must be infinite variety. All men would not act with the exemplary courage which was shown by Mr Haggart. Plainly he was the exception amongst those who were present. If the pursuer did jump from the platform, which is the worst for him, in my opinion that was a reaction which, in the circumstances of this explosion, must be held as being within reasonable contemplation. If he had been a man of stronger fibre, possibly his reaction would have been different, but his reaction to the situation was not so absurd as to be beyond foreseeability. On the contrary, in my opinion it was just the reaction which might be anticipated where conditions were such as to have caused a general panic among the men at the plant.
It follows in my view that the defence of foreseeability fails."
1 Cites

[ Bailii ]
 
Bruce's Judicial Factor v Lord Advocate [1969] ScotCS CSIH - 2
19 Jun 1969
scs

Scotland

[ Bailii ]
 
Aitken's Trustees v Aitken [1969] UKHL 13; 1970 SC (HL) 28; 1970 SLT 66,
26 Nov 1969
HL
Lord Clyde
Scotland, Wills and Probate
"The first question put to us in the case is whether the third party is entitled to a one-third share in the residue of the testator's estate. The answer to that question depends primarily upon the meaning to be given to the words in the residue clause, which I have quoted, "jointly with the issue who may survive me of such of my children as may have predeceased." If "my children" means "my said children," that is, the two named children, who are the second parties, then the clause would clearly exclude the third party from participation in the residue. But I am unable so to construe the residue clause. If that had been what the testator had intended to provide, it would have been very easy to have said so. But in place of doing this he has made what he describes as a joint gift to two named children and to the issue of such of his children as may have predeceased him. The words "my children" are not confined to the named persons in the immediately preceding part of the clause. The third group, therefore, to whom this bequest was made would cover the third party, who was, in fact, the issue of a child who had, in fact, predeceased him."
[ Bailii ]
 
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