swarb.co.uk - law index
These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.
Road Traffic - From: 1992 To: 1992
This page lists 9 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Hassan v Director of Public Prosecutions [1992] RTR 209
1992
Road Traffic
The defendant said there had been no sign plate displaying the times of restricted parking. Held: That was a failure to provide adequate information, and the motorist's conviction was quashed.
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Mills v Barnsley Borough Council [1992] PIQR 291
1992
CA
Steyn LJ
Personal Injury, Road Traffic
The court considered the extent of defect in a highway needed to found a claim that it was dangerous. It emphasised that the duty must not be made too high, balancing the public need against the private interest.
Steyn LJ said: "For my part I find it a sterile exercise to make a comparison between the facts of reported decisions in tripping cases and the facts of the present case. In order for a plaintiff to succeed against a highway authority in a claim for personal injury for failure to maintain or repair the highway, the plaintiff must prove that:
(a) the highway was in such a condition that it was dangerous to traffic or pedestrians in the sense that, in the ordinary course of human affairs, danger may reasonably have been anticipated from its continued use by the public;
(b) the dangerous condition was created by the failure to maintain or repair the highway; and
(c) the injury or damage resulted from such a failure. Only if the plaintiff proves these facta probanda does it become necessary to turn to the highway authority's reliance on the special defence under section 58(1) of the 1980 Act, namely, that the authority had taken such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably required to secure that the particular part of the highway was not dangerous to traffic. On this aspect the burden rests on the highway authority."
Two findings of fact could not be sustained. He continued: "The short point is whether the judge was right in these circumstances in regarding this as a danger to women. Like the judge, I do not consider that it would be right to say that a depression of less than one inch will never be dangerous but one above will always be dangerous. Such mechanical jurisprudence is not to be encouraged. All that one can say is that the test of dangerousness is one of reasonable foresight of harm to users of the highway, and that each case will turn on its own facts. Here the photographs are particularly helpful. In my judgment the photographs reveal a wholly unremarkable scene. Indeed, it could be said that the layout of the slabs and the paving bricks appears to be excellent, and that the missing corner of the brick is less significant than the irregularities and depressions which are a feature of streets in towns and cities up and down the country. In the same way as the public must expect minor obstructions on roads, such as cobblestones, cats eyes and pedestrian crossing studs, and so forth, the public must expect minor depressions. Not surprisingly, there was no evidence of any other tripping accident at this particular place although thousands of pedestrians probably passed along that part of the pavement while the corner of the brick was missing. Nor is there any evidence of any complaint before or after the accident about that part of the pavement. Like Mr Booth, I regard the missing corner of the paving brick as a minor defect. The fact that Mrs Mills fell must either have been caused by her inattention while passing over an uneven surface or by misfortune and for present purposes it does not matter what precisely the cause is.
Finally, I add that, in drawing the inference of dangerousness in this case, the judge impliedly set a standard which, if generally used in the thousands of tripping cases which come before the courts ever year, would impose an unreasonable burden upon highway authorities in respect of minor depressions and holes in streets which in a less than perfect world the public must simply regard as a fact of life. It is important that our tort law should not impose unreasonably high standards, otherwise scarce resources would be diverted from situations where maintenance and repair of the highways is more urgently needed. This branch of the law of tort ought to represent a sensible balance or compromise between private and public interest. The judge's ruling in this case, if allowed to stand, would tilt the balance too far in favour of the woman who was unfortunately injured in this case. The risk was of a low order and the cost of remedying such minor defects all over the country would be enormous. In my judgment the plaintiff's claim fails on this first point.
In view of this conclusion on the first point, it is unnecessary to consider the judge's conclusion on the special defence under section 58 of the Act or the issue of contributory negligence."
Highways Act 1980 41 58(1)
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Director of Public Prosecutions v Fisher [1992] RTR 93
1992
QBD
Watkins LJ
Road Traffic
F was asked to lend L a car. F knew L was disqualified, but agreed provided L found an insured driver with a full valid driving licence. F did not know who L would ask or that he in fact asked R to drive; R was employed as delivery driver and the defendant neither knew or met him. L did not ask R if he was insured to drive the defendant's car, both L and R assuming without discussion that R would be insured by virtue of his employment as a delivery driver. R drove the defendant's car, was uninsured to drive it and was involved in a road traffic accident with another car as a result of which a passenger in the other car lost a leg. Held: Distinguishing Newbury v Davis: "There was no communication of any kind between the owner and the driver. The defendant was unaware who [L] was going to ask to drive the vehicle and the defendant simply could not and did not know whether his so-called conditional permission would be passed on to that person. Thus it may be that [R] was wholly unaware of the qualified permission. Moreover he personally had not been made subject by the defendant. So far as the defendant knew, [R] could have been disqualified from driving and was uninsurable. It is quite ludicrous, I think, therefore to suppose that a so-called conditional permission was granted to him. To begin to establish such an unusual permission, a conditional one that is, the owner would have at least to have been found to have given it directly to the would-be driver of his vehicle, regardless as to whether he has also given it to some other person, a would-be passenger in the vehicle, for instance. For those reasons I would allow this appeal and send the case back to the justices with a direction to convict."
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James v South Glamorgan County Council [1992] RTR 312
1992
Leggatt LJ
Road Traffic, Magistrates
On trial of a charge of supplying a motor vehicle in an un-roadworthy condition, a prosecution witness (the person to whom the vehicle was supplied) had difficulty in locating the Court House. Before he arrived, the prosecution had closed its case, and the defendant had given evidence in chief, but there had been no submission. The Justices allowed the prosecution to re-open its case. Held: The appeal failed. The Justices had a discretionary power to admit the evidence, but the issue was as to the circumstances in which that power should be exercised. The stressed the exceptional nature of the contingency, and the fact that the Justices seemed to have been satisfied that the evidence could be admitted without unfairness to the defendant.
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Director of Public Prosecutions v Vincent; QBD 1992 - Unreported
Regina v Reid; HL 1992 - [1992] 1 WLR 793
Lavis v Kent County Council Times, 24 November 1994; (1992) 90 LGR 416; [1993] CLY 2949
18 Feb 1992
QBD
Negligence, Local Government, Road Traffic
The plaintiff had received serious injuries whilst riding his motor cycle at a road junction for which the defendants were responsible. He alleged that they were liable to him for failing to ensure that proper warning signs were placed at the approach to the junction. The defendants were empowered to place such signs, but not under a duty to do so. They applied to strike out the plaintiff's claim as disclosing no cause of action. Held: A Local Authority had a discretion not to erect a particular road sign, but the decision was to be made according to the standards of a competent road engineer. "In my judgment it is perfectly clear that the duty imposed is not capable of covering the erection of traffic signs, and nothing more need be said about that particular provision".
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Licensing Authority South Eastern Traffic Area v British Gas plc C-116/91; [1992] ECR I-4071; [1992] EUECJ C-116/91
25 Jun 1992
ECJ
European, Road Traffic
Europa The derogation from the requirement to install and use a tachograph in vehicles registered in a Member State which are used for the carriage of passengers or goods by road, laid down for vehicles used in connection with the gas service under Article 3(1) of Regulation No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport in conjunction with Article 4(6) of Regulation No 3820/85 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport, applies solely to vehicles used, at the relevant time, for carriage wholly and exclusively in connection with the production, transport or distribution of gas, or the maintenance of the necessary installations for that purpose. However, that derogation does not apply to vehicles wholly or partly used at the relevant time in connection with the carriage of domestic gas appliances.
"In that respect it is apparent from the list in Article 4(6) that the services envisaged by that provision are all general services performed in the public interest." and "The derogation from the requirement to install and use a tachograph . . . applies solely to vehicles used, at the relevant time, for carriage wholly and exclusively in connection with the production, transport or distribution of gas, or the maintenance of the necessary installations for that purpose. However, that derogation does not apply to vehicles wholly or partly used at the relevant time in connection with the carriage of domestic gas appliances."
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[ Bailii ]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Warren; HL 9-Dec-1992 - Gazette, 09 December 1992; [1993] AC 319
