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Road Traffic - From: 1985 To: 1989

This page lists 42 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Regina v Skegness Magistrates' Court ex parte Cardy [1985] RTR 49
1985

Robert Goff LJ
Road Traffic, Evidence, Magistrates
Representations that the Intoximeter or other device used for measuring breath alcohol, should not have been approved or that the Secretary of State should have withdrawn approval in respect of the device should be addressed to the Secretary of State and not to the court. While an approval subsisted it is 'wholly immaterial to mount a challenge to the general reliability of these approved devices in individual prosecutions brought under the Act'. There is no provision for discovery of documents for a summary trial in a magistrates' court and section 97(1) should not be used as a disguised attempt to obtain discovery. The summons issued to compel the manufacturer to produce documents relating to the functioning and design of the breath-testing instrument was quashed as a "fishing expedition" and because the documents were not admissible per se because they would need an expert witness to interpret them.
Magistrates Courts Act 1980 97(1)
1 Citers


 
Regina v Musker [1985] RTR 84
1985

Robert Goff L
Road Traffic
The motorist defendant had been required to provide a laboratory test specimen, under section 9(1). He filled one-third of a two-pint container at 2:15 am. A constable disposed of that pursuant to section 9(6) and the container was washed out. A police sergeant who had been present throughout informed the defendant to indicate when he was ready to give the second specimen. The defendant adjusted his clothing; he sat down; he then indicated to the police constable that he was ready to give the second specimen, and provided it at 2:16 am - only a minute after the first. That specimen was taken for analysis. It showed that the proportion of alcohol in his urine exceeded the prescribed limit. The magistrates followed Prosser v Dickeson to regard what had happened as the provision of one single sample. The prosecutor appealed. Held: The appeal succeeded. He had indicated that he was ready to give a second specimen, and having given it albeit only a short time after the first, the only conclusion which could properly be reached on the facts was that two distinct specimens had been given. The procedure was complied with, and the second specimen was a proper basis for the prosecution.
Robert Goff LJ at page 89, he cited from the Court of Appeal decision in R v Radcliffe [1977] RTR 99 with this observation, that that case provided clear authority that it does not matter that the first specimen was of any particular quantity, and that it must follow that, provided two specimens are given, it does not matter whether there is any particular gap in time between the two specimens. All that matters is that the statutory procedure should be carried out.
Road Traffic Act 1972 9(1)
1 Citers


 
Nelson v Thompson [1985] RTR 220
1985


Road Traffic

1 Citers


 
Steel v Goacher [1985] RTR 98
1985
QBD

Road Traffic, Police
Griffiths LJ discussed the lawfulness of a police officer's stopping of a motorist, and said: "It should, however, be stated that the police officer was acting within the execution of his duty by virtue of his power at common law and not by virtue of any power contained in section 159 of the Road Traffic Act." Having referred to Beard v Wood he continued: "The finding that the police officer was acting lawfully in the execution of his duty at the time he stopped the defendant is sufficient to dispose of the appeal."
Road Traffic Act 1972 159
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Owen v Chesters [1985] RTR 191
1985

Watkins LJ
Road Traffic
The court considered the means of proving the reading from a breath test meter: "It was clearly the intention of the legislature, in enacting subsection (5), that the defendant should be provided in advance of the hearing with the information recorded on the automatically produced statement. This information includes not only the results of the measurement effected by the instrument of the two specimens of breath -- results of which the defendant might otherwise have only an imperfect recollection -- but also, and of even greater importance, the results of the self-calibrating exercise which the instrument carries out both before and after the two specimens of breath are provided. If the measurement produced by the instrument is to be relied on by the prosecution, it is clearly vital for the prosecution to establish that the instrument was properly calibrated.
The case stated is silent as to whether, as a matter of fact, copies of the Intoximeter statement or print-out and supporting certificate were handed to or served upon the defendant as required by subsection (5). The prosecution, as we have said, simply elected not to rely upon the statement. By so doing, in our judgment, the prosecution failed to establish matters vital to the establishment of the defendant's guilt. We would not regard the evidence of the police sergeant as inadmissible under the hearsay rule: it was direct evidence of what he had seen recorded on the instrument. The ground upon which we would uphold the decision of the justices is that the oral evidence of the police sergeant did not, and could not, come up to the standard of proof required by the legislation."
1 Citers


 
MacDonald v Skelt [1985] RTR 321
1985
QBD
Taylor J May LJ
Road Traffic, Criminal Practice
At the close of the prosecution case, it was submitted that the defendant had no case to answer because there was insufficient evidence that the blood specimen taken from him and that analysed by the Scientific Officer were the same. The Justices ruled in favour of the defendant, but the prosecutor was then allowed to re-open his case and called evidence that the specimen taken and the specimen analysed were the same. Held: The court was not functus officio. "For there to be a state of functus officio, the Justices would have to indicate clearly that they had reached a conclusion on the issues which were being argued and, further, that in consequence of their conclusion they were giving a decision on the outcome of the case. Merely for them to have expressed the first half of that pair of conclusions would not, in my judgment, be enough to indicate that they had dismissed the case and were therefore functus officio."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Denneny v Harding; 1986 - [1986] RTR 350

 
 Anderton v Waring; QBD 1986 - [1986] RTR 74
 
Chatters v Burke [1986] RTR 396; [1986] 3 All ER 168
1986
QBD
Watkins LJ, Taylor J
Road Traffic
A car had rolled over and stopped in a field next to the highway and was then driven with a flat tyre a few yards from the field through a gate, onto the road and parked there. Held: In determining whether special reasons existed to justify the non-disqualification of the driver for driving over the limit, it was relevant to take into account how the vehicle was driven, the manner in which it was driven, the state of the vehicle and whether the driver intended to drive any further, the prevailing road and traffic conditions, whether there was any possibility of danger by contact with other road users, and the reason for the vehicle being driven at all.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Willer (Mark Edward); CACD 1986 - (1986) 83 Cr App R 225
 
Regina v Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Howell (1986) RTR 52
1986


Administrative, Road Traffic
After twelve years a London cab driver's licence was not renewed on medical grounds. Held: His challenge succeeded because he had been given no opportunity to make representations about the matters said to have concerned the decision-makers. An order that the matter be reconsidered and decided afresh.
1 Citers



 
 Patterson v Charlton; 1986 - [1986] RTR 18
 
Hunter v Butler [1986] RTR 396
1986


Road Traffic

1 Citers


 
Chief Constable of Northumbria v Brown [1986] RTR 113
1986


Road Traffic
The defendant had been convicted of driving with excess alcohol. He challenged the use of a machine for the breath test which was not an Intoximeter. Held: The charge was valid.
1 Citers


 
Fox v Chief Constable of Gwent [1986] 1 AC 281; [1985] 3 All ER 392; [1985] 1 WLR 1126; [1985] RTR 337; [1986] Crim LR 59; (1985) 82 Cr App R 105; (1985) 150 JP 97
1986
HL
Lord Bridge, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
Road Traffic, Criminal Evidence
The driver left an accident. The police entered his home unlawfully, and on his refusal to supply a breath test, he was arrested and charged with faiing to supply. Held: A lawful arrest is not an essential requirement before a breath test, and there was no general principle that there could be no conviction under section 6(1) if the evidence by which it was sought to prove the offence had been obtained unlawfully; On the true construction of section 10(2), the admissibility of a specimen of breath, blood or urine in proceedings for an offence under sections 5 or 6 depends on the procedure prescribed by the new section 8 for obtaining such a specimen having been correctly followed.
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton stated: "It is a well established rule of English law, which was recognised in Reg. v. Sang, that (apart from confessions as to which special considerations apply) any evidence which is relevant is admissible even if it has been obtained illegally."
Road Traffic Act 1972 8(6) 10(2)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Renouf; CACD 1986 - [1986] 2 All ER 449; [1986] 1 WLR 522
 
Gordon v Thorpe [1986] RTR 358
1986
QBD

Road Traffic
The defendant provided two specimens of breath through an intoximeter 3000. Though the machine appeared to be working otherwise properly, the two readings were wider apart than usual. Held: Each reading was still in excess of the maximum, and expert evidence was to the effect that the blood alcohol level exceeded the maximum. The prosecutor's appeal succeeded.
Road Traffic Act 1972 6(1) 8(1)
1 Citers


 
Chief Constable of Gwent v Dash [1986] RTR 41
1986

Lloyd LJ, Macpherson J
Road Traffic, Police
In the absence of malpractice, oppression, caprice or opprobrious behaviour, there is no restriction on the stopping of motorists by a police officer in the execution of his duty and subsequent requirement of a breath test if the officer then and there genuinely suspects the ingestion of alcohol.
Lloyd LJ said: "The word 'malpractice', as it has come to be used in this field, seems to me to cover cases where the police have acted from some indirect or improper motive or where the conduct on the part of the police could be described as capricious. The random stopping of cars under section 159 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 for the purpose of detecting crime, or for inquiring whether the driver has had too much to drink, cannot be so described. Nor can it be said that the police were acting from some indirect or improper motive. However much the public may dislike the random stopping of cars, I cannot agree that random stopping by itself involves malpractice, and if Donaldson LJ said otherwise in Such v Ball to which Macpherson J has referred, then, I would very respectfully disagree."
Macpherson J said: "in summary, therefore, the police are, in my judgment, not prohibited from the random stopping of cars within the limits already referred to; but are, of course, prohibited from requiring breath tests at random, which is a very different thing. That distinction must always be borne in mind."
Road Traffic Act 1972 159
1 Citers


 
Lang v Hindhaugh [1986] 2 RTR 71
1986
QBD

Road Traffic
A public footpath four to five feet in width had been tarmaced but had deteriorated with potholes and bushes to the extent that it would not naturally be called a road. The appellant rode a motorcycle along it with excess alcohol and when disqualified and was convicted by the Justices. Held: The court dismissed his appeal. The footpath was a highway, being a place where the public had a right to pass and repass either on foot or with animals or in vehicles, as the case may be, it fell within the appropriate definition.
1 Citers


 
Teape v Godfrey [1986] RTR 213
1986


Road Traffic

1 Citers



 
 Regina v Denton; CACD 1987 - (1987) Cr App R 246

 
 Nugent v Ridley; 1987 - [1987] RTR 412
 
Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary v Fleming [1987] 1 All ER 318; [1987] RTR 378
1987
QBD
Glidewell LJ
Road Traffic
The defendant was stopped pushing a motor-cycle along the road. It had been adapted for scrambling, and the registration plates lights and speedometer had been removed. He argued that it was no longer a motor vehicle 'adapted or intended for use on a public road'. The prosecutor appealed against the magistrates finding that they had not proved that it was indeed such a vehicle. Held: The appeal failed. The test was as set out in Burns v Currell.
Glidewell LJ added: "'I emphasise that that test is what would be the view of the reasonable man as to the general user of this particular vehicle; not what was the particular user to which this particular defendant put it, either at the time in question, or indeed, generally. In other words, if a reasonable man were to say: 'Yes, this vehicle might well be used on the road', then, applying the test, the vehicles is intended or adapted for such use. If that be the case, it is nothing to the point if the individual defendant says: 'I normally use it for scrambling and I am only pushing it along the road on this occasion because I have no other means of getting it home', or something of that sort.'
It was held in that case that the Justices were entitled to hold that, the onus of proof being on the prosecution to prove that the vehicle was a motor vehicle, they could not be satisfied that it was within the definition of a motor vehicle. The comparison of the facts in F with those in the present case would not be helpful. The Burns test, which has been applied for approaching forty years, should not readily be departed from.
For the respondent, Mr Reed stresses the limitations of the Go-ped. It has no efficient braking system, no pneumatic tyres, no clutch, lights or mirrors and has inadequate steering. It needs to be push started. It would not be accepted by the Department of Transport for registration, he submits, or for use on the roads under the Construction and Use Regulations. Mr Reed accepts that the intention of the manufacturer or seller is not conclusive but submits that general use on the roads cannot be contemplated as one of the uses of the Go-ped.
Miss Kelly, whilst also submitting that the Go-ped does not comply with the Construction and Use Regulations, was less inclined to belittle the attributes of the Go-ped. It is ironic that it is the defendant who is seeking to show how unsuitable, and indeed dangerous, the Go-ped is for use on the road in order to contest the charge that riding it on the road was unlawful. Miss Kelly submits that the scooter should be brought within the definition of motor vehicle so that its use can be regulated but has to accept that Lord Parker's test does not directly depend on the degree of danger presented by the vehicle. I do not accept the Justices' apparent view that the roadworthiness of a conveyance, which I understand to means its capability to be used safely on roads, is decisive on the question whether its use on the road must be contemplated.
Both parties have underlined the importance of the point at issue because of the large number of scooters of this kind in circulation. Many of them, we were told, are more sophisticated than this Go-ped in terms of the control systems provided.
This is not a case where some place other than a road is the obvious place of use. The Go-ped could not negotiate rough ground or soft or uneven surfaces. It is not a case where the vehicle is designed for use in a place other than a road, such as a dumper truck used for road construction work (MacDonald v Carmichael [1941] JC 27). Another example would be a motor cycle designed for use on a speedway track. Lord Parker's test cannot, however, in my view be applied merely by a process of elimination; it cannot be said that because there is no place other than a hard, flat surface on which a Go-ped can be used, it must be intended for use on a road. It is in any event contended that the Go-ped can be used as a toy on hard surfaces on private land and for Go-ped competitions on such land.
We are told by Mr Reed and Miss Kelly that considerable numbers of scooters of this and similar design are in circulation. I would take judicial notice of that and would expect justices to do the same. The temptation to use Go-peds on the roads is considerable, notwithstanding their limitations. They provide a ready means of getting through traffic on short journeys on busy urban roads and, for that matter, on less busy suburban roads.
The test is not whether a reasonable person would use a Go-ped on a road, which in ordinary circumstances he probably would not because of the dangers involved. The test is whether a reasonable person would say that one of its uses would be use on the roads. That person must consider whether some general use on the roads must be contemplated and not merely isolated use or use by a man losing his senses. The design and capabilities of the Go-ped and the possibilities it offers will be considered and considered in the context of an assessment of people's wish to get quickly through traffic and the pressure of time upon many people.
In my judgment the conclusion must be that general use on the roads is to be contemplated. The distributors' advice not to use the Go-ped on the roads will in practice be ignored to a considerable extent. Surrender to the temptation to use it on the roads will not be an isolated occurrence even though the vehicle may not be roadworthy in the sense used by the Justices."
Road Traffic Act 1972
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Wood v Milne Times, 27 March 1987
1987
QBD

Road Traffic
The "state of the vehicle" includes the manufactured condition of the vehicle. As a matter of construction, it was not necessary to prove a lack of maintenance in order to prove a breach of the Regulations
Motor Vehicle (Construction and Use Regulations 1978
1 Citers


 
Young v Flint [1987] RTR 300
1987


Road Traffic
Alterations to an intoximeter can be so fundamental that they can cause an approved device to lose its approval or at least to lead to the conclusion that the device is no longer an example of the device as approved.
1 Citers



 
 Gumbley v Cunningham; 1987 - [1987] 3 All ER 733; [1988] QB 170; [1987] Crim LR 776; (1987) 86 Cr App R 282; [1987] 3 WLR 1072
 
Ramwade Ltd v W J Emson and Co Ltd [1987] RTR 72
1987
CA
Parker LJ
Road Traffic, Damages
The plaintiffs had been obliged to hire vehicles to perform the work carried out by their skip lorry which had been damaged beyond repair in a road accident. Their insurance brokers had, contrary to instructions, failed to procure a comprehensive insurance policy, and the claimants could not afford to replace it by buying another skip lorry. Held: The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the damage consisting in the hire of the vehicles flowed from the defendants' failure to provide them with a comprehensive insurance policy. One of the reasons which he gave for reaching this conclusion was that it flowed from the impecuniosity of the plaintiffs which rendered them unable to afford a substitute vehicle, adding that "if that is the true cause the hire charges are irrecoverable on the principles laid down in The Liesbosch."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Badkin v Director of Public Prosecutions [1988] RTR 401
1988

Glidewell LJ, McNeill J
Road Traffic
The defendant driver had provided two specimens of breath at the police station. The device used failed to provide a printout and the constable operating it decided that it could be unreliable. He required the defendant to provide a specimen of blood, which the defendant did. The part-specimen of blood retained by the police was analysed but no evidence of the blood analysis was produced at the trial. No notice of analysis results was given to the defendant. The defendant appealed his conviction. Held: The appeal succeeded. Once the constable decided that the device analysing breath was not reliable, any prosecution could be based only the subsequent blood analysis. However, Glidewell LJ said: "Secondly, . . the failure by the prosecution to give notice to the defendant of the results of the blood analysis, and to call evidence of the results of that analysis, is a breach of the requirement in Section 10(2) of the [predecessor] Act that 'Evidence of the proportion of alcohol … in a specimen of … blood … provided by the accused shall in all cases be taken into account.
It follows, therefore, that even if a prosecution for driving with excess alcohol in the breath could properly proceed in the circumstances of the present case (which I do not accept), it was still necessary for the results of the blood analysis to be put in evidence. The failure to do so, in my judgment, vitiated the prosecution case."
1 Citers



 
 Selby v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset; QBD 1988 - [1988] RTR 216
 
Cracknell v Willis [1988] RTR 1; [1988] AC 450
1988
HL
Lord Griffiths
Road Traffic
The evidence which is admissible on a challenge to the reliability of an intoximeter device is not limited to direct evidence of the unreliability of the breath testing device, but can be based on evidence such as the level of consumption, and the activities of the defendant before arrest and on his or her condition on arrest. Lord Griffiths said: "In the case of a breath specimen, there is of course a presumption that the machine is reliable. But if that presumption is challenged by relevant evidence, the magistrates will have to be satisfied that the machine has provided a reading upon which they can rely before making the assumption." However: "The magistrates will remember that the presumption of law is that the machine is reliable, and they will no doubt look with a critical eye on evidence such as was produced by Hughes and MacDonald [1985] Road Traffic Act 244, before being persuaded that it is not safe to rely on the reading that it produces."
1 Citers


 
Sophocleous v Ringer [1988] RTR 52 DC
1988


Road Traffic

1 Citers


 
Mayon v Director of Public Prosecutions [1988] RTR 281
1988


Road Traffic
In the absence of evidence of calibration of an Intoximeter either before or after the second specimen was produced, there had been a failure to prove the precondition that the machine was working satisfactorily.
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Conway; CACD 28-Jul-1988 - [1988] EWCA Crim 1; [1989] QB 290

 
 Regina v Martin (Colin); CACD 29-Nov-1988 - [1989] 1 All ER 652; [1988] 88 Cr App Rep 343; [1988] EWCA Crim 2
 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Potts Unreported, 4 December 1988
4 Dec 1988
QBD
Otton LJ and Astill LJ
Road Traffic
Whether or not the condition of a vehicle is such that it is a danger to any person is a question of fact.
1 Citers


 
Smith (Nicholas) v Director of Public Prosecutions [1992] RTR 413
1989

Stocker LJ
Road Traffic
Medical evidence is not always required for a driver to support a reasonable excuse for failing to provide a specimen of breath. Stocker LJ: 'It would seem to me that in the vast majority of cases at least it will be necessary to have some medical or other expert evidence to say that the observations made of nervousness are, in the context of the defendant concerned, at least a possible explanation for the failure to provide the breath specimen. In the absence of such evidence it will be rare indeed, if indeed it could ever exist, that a condition of nervousness would be sufficient to explain a failure to be able to provide the breath test.'
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Conway; 1989 - [1989] QB 290; (1989) 88 Cr App Rep 159
 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Watkins [1989] QB 821
1989
QBD
Taylor LJ
Road Traffic
The offence in section 5 does not require proof that a defendant is likely to drive when accused of being in charge of a motor vehicle whilst unfit through drink or drugs: "In regard to that section two broad propositions are clear. First, the offence of being 'in charge' is the lowest in the scale of three charges relating to driving and drink. The two higher in the scale are driving and attempting to drive. Therefore a defendant can be 'in charge' although neither driving nor attempting to drive. Clearly however the mischief aimed at is to prevent driving when unfit through drink. The offence of being 'in charge' must therefore be intended to convict those who are not driving and have not yet done more than a preparatory act towards driving, but who in all the circumstances have already formed or may yet form the intention to drive the vehicle, and may try to drive it whilst still unfit." The words "in charge" have been too broadly interpreted and applied.
Road Traffic Act 1972 5
1 Citers


 
Regina v Pettipher [1989] 11 CAR (S) 321
1989
CACD

Criminal Sentencing, Road Traffic

1 Citers


 
O'Halloran v Director of Public Prosections [1990] RTR 621; (1990) 154 JP 837; [1989] 87 LGR 748
1989


Road Traffic
A motorcyclist appealed against his conviction for having overtaken a line of vehicles driving down the outside of dashed white lines, only returning to the nearside when the lines became solid. He said that there was no white arrow painted to indicate the requirement to return to the nearside. Held: The signage did not meet the staututory description and was ineffective to create the restriction. It was not lawfully placed on the road. The appeal succeeded.
Road Traffic Act 1972 22 - Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 65 - Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 1981 No 859 of 1981 42

 
Gumbley v Cunningham [1989] AC 281
1989
HL

Road Traffic
The prosecution should not seek to rely on evidence of back-calculation unless it is both easily understood and clearly establishes the presence of excess alcohol at the time when the defendant was driving.
1 Cites



 
 Beauchamp Thomson v Director of Public Prosecutions; 1989 - [1989] RTR 54
 
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