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These cases are from the lawindexpro database. They are now being transferred to the swarb.co.uk website in a better form. As a case is published there, an entry here will link to it. The swarb.co.uk site includes many later cases.  














Road Traffic - From: 1980 To: 1984

This page lists 30 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.

 
Harker v Caledonian Insurance Co [1980] 1 Lloyds Rep 556
1980

Lord Diplock
Insurance, Road Traffic
The monetary limit of the compulsory insurance was to be read into section 10, however "there are instances, of which costs and interest on the judgment are examples, where the insurer would be liable in the direct action for sums in excess of the permissible monetary limits upon the cover afforded by the policy."
Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third-Party Risks) Act 10
1 Citers


 
Roberts v Ramsbottom [1980] 1 WLR 823
1980

Neill LJ
Personal Injury, Road Traffic
A motorist was involved in an accident when unknowingly he was suffering from a stroke and was unaware of his unfitness to drive. The court considered several criminal cases about automatism before holding: "I am satisfied that in a civil case a similar approach should be adopted. The driver will be able to escape liability if his actions at the relevant time were wholly beyond his control. The most obvious case is sudden unconsciousness. But if he retained some control, albeit imperfect control, and if his driving, judged objectively, was below the required standard, he remains liable."
1 Citers


 
Ferrymasters Ltd v Adams [1980] RTR 139
1980

Waller LJ, Park J
Road Traffic
Employers were alleged to have caused or permitted an employee to drive a vehicle on the road while not holding a driving licence authorising him to do so. When the employee had entered the employment, the employers had ensured that he held a valid driving licence but it was not their practice to check thereafter that employees renewed their driving licences. Held: the appeal was dismissed. The employer "had failed to adopt any system with a view to ensuring that reasonable checks were made".
Road Traffic Act 1972 84(2)
1 Cites

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Regina v Murphy [1980] QB 434
1980
CACD

Crime, Road Traffic
The court considered the constituent elements of causing death by reckless driving.

 
Gibson v Dalton [1980] RTR 410
1980
CA
Donaldson LJ
Road Traffic
The requirement to notify a defendant of the possibility of a prosecution is to allow him to preserve any necessary evidence.
1 Citers


 
Beard v Wood [1980] RTR 454
1980


Road Traffic, Police
The court discussed the power of a constable to stop a driver. Held: Provided the officer was acting in good faith the statutory powers given to him he need have no grounds for stopping a driver. Nothing in the section required the prosecutor to show that a constable in uniform acting in the execution of his duty under that section was acting under some common law power for he derived his duty and his powers from the terms of section 159 itself. Since the facts established that the defendant, when driving a vehicle on a road, was required to stop by a uniformed constable not acting capriciously, the defendant, seemingly, had no answer to the charge.
Road Traffic Act 1972 159
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Lawrence (Stephen); HL 1981 - [1981] 2 WLR 524; [1982] AC 510; (1981) 73 Cr App R 1; [1981] 1 All ER 974

 
 Pascoe v Nicholson; HL 1981 - [1981] 1 WLR 1061
 
Ashton v Turner [1981] QB 137; [1980] 3 All ER 870
1981
QBD
Ewbank J
Road Traffic, Negligence
The plaintiff sought damages after being injured as a passenger in a car. He and the driver had both just been involved in a burglary, and the driver, who had taken alcohol was attempting to escape. The driver was driving very dangerously in order to avoid their arrest after two taxi drivers had tried to block the car. Held: The claim failed. As a matter of public policy the law would not recognise a duty of care owed by one participant in a crime to another: "a duty of care did not exist between the first defendant and the plaintiff during the course of the burglary and during the course of the subsequent flight in the get-away car."
He held in the alternative that, even if a duty of care was owed, the Claimant had willingly accepted as his the risk of negligence and injury resulting from it.
Road Traffic Act 1972 148(3)
1 Citers


 
Oxford v Austin [1981] RTR 416
1981

Kilner Brown J
Road Traffic
The court said that a road was "a definable way between two points over which vehicles could pass."
1 Citers


 
Remet Co Ltd v Newham London Borough Council [1981] RTR 502
1981
QBD
Donaldson LJ and Bingham J
Road Traffic
The defendants, when loading non-ferrous metal swarf on to lorries standing on the highway, from time to time miscalculated the available space in a lorry being loaded, and some of the swarf accidentally fell on to the road. In respect of three such occasions the defendants were charged with depositing pieces of scrap metal on the highway without lawful authority or excuse, contrary to s.127 of the 1959 Act, providing: "If, without lawful authority or excuse . . (b) a person deposits any thing whatsoever on a highway . . he shall be guilty of an offence . . " The defendants appealed against conviction. Held: The appeal succeeded.
Donaldson LJ said: "I think that the deposit of materials in this context almost certainly does mean 'consciously and deliberately depositing them' and, if there is any doubt about it, it must be resolved in favour of a narrower construction, this being a section which creates an offence."
Highways Act 1959
1 Citers


 
Knightley v Johns and others [1981] EWCA Civ 6; [1982] 1 All ER 851; [1982] 1 WLR 349
27 Mar 1981
CA
Stephenson, Dunn LJJ, Sir David Cairns
Police, Negligence, Road Traffic
There had been an accident in a tunnel, blocking it. The defendant inspector ordered a traffic constable to ride into the tunnel on his motorcycle against the flow of traffic. The constable crashed and sought damages for negligence against the inspector. Held: The inspector was liable in negligence. One police officer can have a duty of care to another.
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[ Bailii ]
 
Regina v Oxford City Justices, ex parte Smith (1982) 75 Cr App R 200
1982
QBD
Lord Lane CJ
Criminal Practice, Road Traffic, Natural Justice
The defendant had given a positive breath test. The laboratory test showed a urine/alcohol proportion above the prescribed limit. He was warned that proceedings were possible. The summons was issued within the six months' period prescribed by the Act, but service was delayed for over two years. He objected that any hearing would be contrary to the rules of natural justice and prejudicial. Held: The delay was inordinate, and due to the police's non-observance or inefficiency or both; it was both unjustified and unnecessary, and of such length as to be unconscionable. It could not be said that he was not prejudiced thereby, and the justices were not justified in exercising any discretion. Accordingly, prohibition was granted to prohibit them from continuing the hearing.
Magistrates' Courts Act 1952
1 Citers



 
 Prosser v Dickeson; QBD 1982 - [1982] RTR 96

 
 Harrison v Vincent; 1982 - [1982] RTR 8
 
Gilham v Breidenbach [1982] RTR 328
1982
QBD

Road Traffic, Crime
Whether telling a police offer to 'Fuck off' was a withdrawal of the officer's implied licence to be on private land. Held: The meaning to be inferred from such words was to be worked out in the context of the particular case.
1 Citers


 
Snook v Mannion [1982] RTR 321; [1982] Crim LR 601
1982
QBD

Road Traffic, Police
The police officer refused to leave premises after being told to 'Fuck off'. Held: Whether such words amounted to a withdrawal of the officer's licence to be on the land was a question of fact in the circumstances.
1 Citers


 
Regina v Stacey [1982] RTR 20
1982
CA
Woolf J
Road Traffic
The defendant had been arrested for driving whilst unfit through drink. He was warned three hours later that he might be prosecuted for reckless driving. In fact he was not charged with any offence relating to drink. When tried for reckless driving he argued no case to answer because he had not been warned "at the time the offence was committed" within the meaning of the section. Held: The Court applied Bolkis. The decision was one for the judge. As he had arrived at the only appropriate answer on the facts the appeal was dismissed. Woolf J said that there was no authority on all fours but added: ". . . it does appear to this court that the question is one which is much more suited to a decision by the judge than by a jury. It would be very unsatisfactory if one were to get a situation where one jury would come to one conclusion and another jury would come to another conclusion when exactly the same direction in law was given to them. It is therefore some comfort to find that whereas this point has not been considered on S179(4)…..(it) was in Rex v Bolkis [1932] 24 Cr App R 19 . . . This court, in so far as the decision deals with the proper interpretation of S179(4) is bound by the decision in Rex v Bolkis. Quite clearly, if the court came to the conclusion that the word "court" in subsection 4 referred to the judge, then that is a very real indication as to the proper interpretation of subsection (2).
The position is that in view of the decision in Rex v Bolkis . . . this court must take the view that the word "court" in subsection (4) refers to the judge. Accordingly, when an issue under subsection (4) is raised before the court, the judge will be the person who determines the issue. It would lead to absurd results if a judge had to determine that issue but a jury had to determine an issue under subsection (2). Quite clearly, under subsection (4) the court is going to determine questions of fact as well as of law, and if the court, in the form of the judge has to determine the facts on subsection (4), it is only sensible and desirable that the judge should determine an issue under subsection (2)."
Road Traffic Act 1972 179(2)(a)
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 Regina v Government of Holloway Prison, Ex parte Jennings; HL 1983 - [1982] 3 All ER 104; [1983] RTR 1; (1982) 75 Cr App R 367; [1983] 1 AC 624; [1982] 3 WLR 450; (1982) 146 JP 396

 
 Regina v Seymour; HL 1983 - [1983] 2 AC 493; 1983] 2 All ER 1058
 
Bentley v Dickinson [1983] RTR 3456
1983
QBD

Road Traffic
The driver had a minor accident reversing out of his drive. He was unaware of it. A few hours later, he was interviewed by a police officer, but the officer gave him neither oral or written warning pursuant to section 179(a) of the 1972 Act that he might be prosecuted. Four days later he was seen again, and was told that he would be reported for driving without due care and attention. The prosecutor now appealed against dismissal of the information by the Magistrates on the basis that no summons and notice had been served within 14 days as required by section 179(2)(b) and (c). The prosecutor argued that under section 179(3), since there had been an accident, no notice was needed. Held: The appeal failed. The oral warning had not been given "at the time the offence was committed" and therefore did not satisfy section 179(2)(a). Section 179(3) could not be read to have removed this protection from the public.
Road Traffic Act 1972 179(2)(a)(b)(c)(3A) - Road Traffic Act 1974 2492)

 
Marshall v Osmond [1983] 2 All ER 367; [1983] 1 QB 1034; [1983] 3 WLR 13
1983
CA
Sir John Donaldson MR, Dillon LJ, Sir Denis Buckley
Police, Negligence, Road Traffic
The plaintiff was passenger in a stolen car seeking to escape the police as they chased. The car was stopped, the plaintiff got out of the car, and was hit by a police car. He sought damages. Held: His appeal against dismissal of his claim was dismissed. A police officer in such circumstances owed the same duty of care to the plaintiff as he would to anybody else. He was to exercise such care and skill as was reasonable in the circumstances. Though the officer might have made errors of judgment, he had not in fact been negligent. Though the claimant had helped to create the circumstances which gave rise to the accident, the defence of volenti non fit injuria did not apply. "I think that the duty owed by a police driver to the suspect is, as Mr Spokes, on behalf of the plaintiff, has contended, the same duty as that owed to anyone else, namely to exercise such care and skill as is reasonable in all the circumstances. The vital words in that proposition of law are 'in all the circumstances', and of course one of the circumstances was that the plaintiff bore all the appearance of having been somebody engaged in a criminal activity for which there was a power of arrest."
and "As I see it, what happened was that this police officer pursued a line in steering his car which would, in the ordinary course of events, have led to his ending up sufficiently far away from the Cortina to clear its open door. He was driving on a gravelly surface at night in what were no doubt stressful circumstances. There is no doubt that he made an error of judgment because, in the absence of an error of judgment, there would have been no contact between the cars. I am far from satisfied on the evidence that the police officer was negligent."
1 Cites

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Cotterill v Chapman [1984] RTR 73
1984


Road Traffic
A trivial departure from the statutory specification for a road sign did not invalidate the sign nor exculpate the defendant.
1 Citers


 
Lomas v Bowler [1984] Crim LR 178
1984


Road Traffic
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving with excess alcohol. He had wanted to bring his own expert evidence. At the roadside, he had failed fully to inflate the device. Held: The trial court had been entitled to be satisfied of the defendant's guilt on the evidence as a whole. It included not only that of the forensic scientist but also that relating to the manner in which the defendant had been seen to drive and the positive breathalyser test obtained later.
Road Traffic Act 1972 6(1)
1 Citers


 
Bennington v Peter; Regina v Swaffham Justices ex parte Peter Times, 11 February 1984; [1984] RTR 383
1984
QBD
Woolf J
Road Traffic, Health
The applicant held a heavy goods vehicle licence. He became diabetic. The licensing authority refused to renew his licence. He appealed. Held: The justices had used the wrong test, saying he could not be said not to be likeley to suffer a hypoglycaemis attack. The test should be whether the disability was likely to cause the driver's actions so as to be a danger. They had no jurisdiction to extend the effect of the licence, but since they had made a decision wrong in law, and the matter was to be remitted, the licence would stay in effect until they reached their decision.
Road Traffic Act 1972 118(2) - Heavy Goods Vehicle (Drivers' Licences) Regulations 1977 (1977 No 1309) 3
1 Citers


 
Winnik v Dick 1984 SLT 185
1984

Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Wheatley
Scotland, Road Traffic, Negligence
The respondent, was a passenger in a motor car who was injured in an accident. He raised an action of damages against the driver, the appellant, who had been convicted of an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1972. The men had been drinking together in public houses for most of the day and when the respondent entered the appellant's car to return home, he knew that the appellant was drunk. The appellant contended that he was not liable in damages to the respondent inter alia because the respondent had voluntarily accepted the risk of an accident. Held: After reviewing the Scotish cases: including McCaig v Langan and Fowler v Tierney: "From these expressions of view as to what is involved in the maxim so far as the law of Scotland is concerned, I can find no support for, but rather refutation of, the contention that its effect here is to establish that on this journey there never was any duty on the defender as the driver of the car to take reasonable care quoad the pursuer [...]. In my opinion the effect of the maxim was not to relieve the defender from any duty to take care quoad his passengers. On the contrary the maxim proceeds on the basis that there is duty to take care and not be negligent, but the successful establishment of the maxim means that the pursuer has accepted the risk of the defender's negligence in the exercise of his legal duties and has absolved the defender from the consequences arising from that negligence."
1 Citers


 
Johnson v Whitehouse [1984] RTR 47
1984

Nolan J
Road Traffic, Police
There is a relevant distinction between suspecting and believing in a police officer's mind: "the dictionary definitions of those words . . of course, do show that the word 'believe' connotes a greater degree of certainty, or perhaps a smaller degree of uncertainty, than the word 'suspect'."
1 Citers


 
Howard v Hallett [1984] RTR 353
1984
QBD
Robert Goff LJ
Road Traffic
The police adduced in evidence against the defendant the analysis of a specimen of breath which was not the specimen required under the Act. Held: The evidence of the analysis of the specimen relied on by the police was inadmissible in evidence. The Act lays down a procedure for requiring a suspected motorist to provide specimens of breath and for analysing them and presenting them before a court. That policy cannot be disregarded. Section 10(2) refers to specimens taken in accordance with the statutory procedure laid down under section 8 of the Act. There must be read into the section as implicit in it, after the words 'specimen of breath, blood or urine provided by the accused', the words 'pursuant to the provisions of this Act.' That must include a reference in particular, to the procedure laid down under section 8 of the Act.
Road Traffic Act 1972 8(6) 10(2)
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Vaughan v Dunn [1984] RTR 376
1984

Goff LJ
Road Traffic
Goff LJ considered the circumstances where, a defendant having been convicted of driving wih excess alcohol, the court could find special reasons for not disqualifying him. He referred to Taylor v Rajan and said: "The first is that the exercise of discretion should only be exercised in clear and compelling circumstances. I do not think that the present case could possibly be described as one where there were clear and compelling circumstances.
The next matter is the manner in which the defendant drove. Here we have a case where the man was so drunk that he simply drove his car straight into a lamp-post, without any other vehicle being involved. Then it is said by Lord Widgery CJ that it will be a very powerful reason against exercising the discretion in favour of the defendant if the relevant alcohol content is very high. In the present case, the alcohol content in the defendant's breath [the reading there was 100] exceeded the permitted limit by nearly 200 per cent.
Finally Lord Widgery CJ referred to the fact that even in cases of emergency -- and the present case, I repeat, was not one of emergency -- it is much more difficult for a driver to justify using a car to go home, the obvious reason being that he can, if necessary, take steps to obtain alternative transport. He can get a lift, hire a taxi or, if it is available, use public transport."
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Regina v Thomas Scott and Sons Bakers Ltd [1984] ECR 2863
1984


Road Traffic, European
In the field of road transport, Community social legislation "aims at the harmonisation of conditions of competition between methods of inland transport, especially with regard to the road sector and the improvement of working conditions and road safety."
1 Citers


 
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