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Road Traffic - From: 1970 To: 1979

This page lists 66 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.


 
 Yates v Gates; 1970 - [1970] RTR 135
 
Buckoke v Greater London Council [1970] 2 All ER 193
1970
ChD

Road Traffic
The plaintiff sought to challenge instructions from his employer as to his freedom to ignore traffic signals when driving a fire engine on an emergency run.
1 Citers


 
Henderson v Henry E Jenkins and Sons [1970] AC 282; [1970] RTR 70
1970
HL
Lord Pearson
Negligence, Road Traffic
The House described the burden of proof in a claim for negligence and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Lord Pearson said: "In an action for negligence the plaintiff must allege, and has the burden of proving, that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendants. That is the issue throughout the trial, and in giving judgment at the end of the trial the judge has to decide whether he is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendants, and if he is not so satisfied the plaintiff's action fails. The formal burden of proof does not shift." However: "if in the course of the trial there is proved a set of facts which raises a prima facie inference that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendants, the issue will be decided in the plaintiff's favour unless the defendants by their evidence provide some answer which is adequate to displace the prima facie inference. In this situation there is said to be an evidential burden of proof resting on the defendants. I have some doubts whether it is strictly correct to use the expression 'burden of proof' with this meaning, as there is a risk of it being confused with the formal burden of proof, but it is a familiar and convenient usage."

 
Regina v Seward [1970] RTR 102
1970

Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic, Criminal Practice
The section required as a precondition to a request for a breath specimen that an accident had occurred. The defendant complained that this was an issue of fact, but had been decided by the deputy chairman and not the jury. Held: The appeal succeeded. Lord Widgery CJ: "The issue whether there was an accident or not is not a matter which gives rise to a discretion of the court, it is a vital question going to guilt on this charge, because if the prosecution decide to base their proceedings upon the allegation that an accident occurred, they have to prove it as one of the essential factors in the case. Accordingly the deputy chairman, in our judgment, was wholly wrong in taking this issue away from the jury and determining it himself as he did."
Road Safety Act 1967 2(2)
1 Citers



 
 Dixons (Scholar Green) Ltd v JL Cooper Ltd; CA 1970 - [1970] RTR 222
 
Regina v Ferguson [1970] 54 Cr App R 415
1970
CACD
Lord Parker LCJ
Road Traffic
The defendant was accused of failing to give a sample of breath for testing for alcohol. The defence was that there had been no failure because the appellant had reasonably asked that he should be able to consult with a doctor and a solicitor. The deputy chairman had directed the jury that that was no defence. Held: The court upheld that direction, but stated in the course of doing so: "The Deputy Chairman, in the opinion of this Court, ruled perfectly correctly that on those facts, which were completely agreed in all respects, the only result in law was that there was a failure, even though there was no refusal. There is failure if the opportunity to do so something is given and you do not do it. Here the sample of breath was not given."
1 Citers


 
Levine v Morris [1970] 1 WLR 71
1970

Lord Widgery
Negligence, Road Traffic
Lord Widgery said: "All motorists are guilty of errors of one kind or another, and I think it would be quite unreal if roads were designed on the assumption that no driver would ever err."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Carey [1970] AC 1072
1970
HL
Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Diplock
Road Traffic
If a police officer has reason to believe that a driver suspected of driving with excess alcohol has consumed alcohol within the previous 20 minutes, he must wait until 20 minutes has elapsed after the last drink before administering the breath test. If he does not know and has no reason to suppose such consumption, he need not wait the 20 minutes. The instructions for use are not part of the device as defined in the Act. The only relevance of non-compliance with any of the instructions for the use of the Alcotest including as to inflation, but not as to assembly, was that it might be evidence from which the mala fides of the constable could be inferred.
Lord Diplock considered the words of Melford Stevenson J below: "In my view, the words 'carried out by means of a device of a type approved for the purpose of such a test' involve by necessary implication the observance of the instructions which are printed as an integral part of the device issued for the purpose of taking the breath test." He observed that: "If it were correct that the instructions were an integral part of the device, it would no doubt follow that the breath test was not carried out by means of a device of the type approved by the Secretary of State and Scott v Baker would be in point. But, in my view, Melford Stevenson J's statement involves a misconstruction of the Act."
As to the significance of the manufacturer's instructions: "The requirements of the Act are satisfied provided first, that the device used is of a type approved by the Secretary of State, and, secondly, that the test is conducted and its results are evaluated bona fide by the constable carrying out the test. He must accordingly comply with any instructions for the use of the device which to his knowledge in the circumstances in which the breath test is carried out need to be observed in order that the device may give a reliable indication whether or not the proportion of alcohol in the blood of the person to whom the test is administered exceeds the prescribed limit. If he does not, the test carried out by him is not a 'breath test' within the meaning of the Act because it is not carried out for the defined purpose. But provided that he acts bona fide in the conduct of the test and in the evaluation of its result, it matters not that it may subsequently be proved at the trial that the person to whom the test was administered that through inadvertence or ignorance of some relevant circumstances the instructions were not fully complied with."
1 Citers


 
Butler v Easton [1970] RTR 109
1970
QBD
Lord Parker CJ, Ashworth and Cantley JJ
Road Traffic
The initial formalities of a request for a specimen of blood from a driver took place at one police station, but no doctor was available there and the suspect was taken to another police station where a specimen was given. He challenged his conviction on the ground that evidence of the specimen analysis was inadmissible because the specimen had been provided at a different police station. The prosecutor contended that the place for the requirement was specified by the subsection but the place for provision of the specimen was wholly and entirely within the discretion of the police. Held: Evidence of the specimen analysis had been inadmissible for want of compliance with the statutory procedure and quashed the conviction.
Road Safety Act 1967 3(1)
1 Citers



 
 Davies v Heatley; QBD 1971 - [1971] RTR 145; [1971] Crim LR 244

 
 Buckoke v Greater London Council; CA 1971 - [1971] 2 All ER 254; [1971] Ch 655

 
 British Road Services v Wurzal; 1971 - [1971] 1 WLR 1508
 
Rayner v Hampshire Chief Constable [1971] RTR 15
1971


Road Traffic
A breathalyser bag with a hole in it was not equipment which comprised a device of a type approved by the Secretary of State.
1 Citers



 
 Wright v Wenlock; 1971 - [1971] RTR 228; [1972] CLR 49
 
Albert v Motor Insurers Bureau [1971] 3 WLR 291
1971
HL

Road Traffic, Insurance, Personal Injury, Contract
The plaintiff suffered injury as a passenger when getting a lift to work from a co-worker. The driver was uninsured and had given lift to several co-workers over a period of time, mking a charge. Held: The lift arrangement was in the nature of a contract, and therefore under the MIB scheme, the MIB were obliged to pay compensation.

 
Carmichael and Sons Ltd v Cottle [1971] RTR 11
1971


Road Traffic

1 Citers


 
Milne v M'Donald [1971] JC 40
1971
HCJ

Road Traffic, Scotland
The court was asked whether a blood specimen having been requested at one police station, it could be taken at another. Held: The requirement to provide a specimen for a laboratory test is something different from the actual providing of the specimen. Subsection (1) of section 3 deals with the former only, and not with the latter.
Road Safety Act 1967 3(1)
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
James v Hall [1972] 2 All ER 59
1972


Road Traffic

1 Citers


 
Coombs v Kehoe [1972] 2 All ER 55
1972


Road Traffic

1 Citers


 
Regina v Morris [1972] RTR 201
1972

Lord Widgery CJ, Sachs LJ
Road Traffic
Whether the particular facts of a case amount to an accident is a question of law. In a case of disputed facts under s2(2) of the 1967 Act it is for the jury to decide the facts and apply to the facts found the judge's direction as to the meaning of accident.
Lord Widgery CJ:"We would add only one other point on this aspect of the case. It is now recognised and has been recognised in a number of instances that there will be cases under section 2(2) where the primary facts are not in dispute and when the question of accident or no becomes a matter of pure law, in the same way that cases sometimes arise where the primary facts are not in dispute and in which the question of whether a person is driving or not becomes a pure matter of law. We think that in this case the deputy chairman would not have erred if he had directed the jury in that sense. We do not criticise him for not taking that line – he may well have been wise in seeking the verdict of the jury on the facts before them – but cases of this kind, where there really is no factual dispute left and the matter is one of law only, are cases in which the presiding judge can, if he thinks fit, give a ruling to that effect. If there is a dispute as to fact the issue must of course be left to the jury."
As to the meaning of 'accident': "Several attempts at definitions of the words "accident" have been made in the course of argument. (he referred to Fenton v J Thorley and Co Ltd) Sachs LJ in the course of the argument supplied an alternative, with which the other members of the court agree, in which he suggested that "accident" in the present context means an unintended occurrence which has an adverse physical result. We think that it would be wrong to construe "accident" in this context too narrowly. We are conscious of the fact that this is an interference with the liberty of the subject, but the Act does not make the having of an accident an offence, it merely provides it as a qualification for the taking of a breath test, and the underlying conception of section 2(2) is that if some unintended occurrence which has adverse physical result arises out of the presence of motor vehicle on a road, that is a fair basis on which a police officer may request the provision of a specimen of breath. Such an occurrence is one in which, prima facie at any rate, the circumstances of the occurrence and of the driver involved in it deserves consideration by authority, and accordingly we think that the definition suggested by Sachs LJ is one which fits the intention of Parliament and will not open the door unduly widely to the suggestion that random breath tests can be taken in purported consequence of it."
Road Safety Act 1967 2(2)
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Butty v Davey; 1972 - [1972] CLR 48
 
Crawford v Haughton [1972] RTR 125
1972
QBD

Road Traffic
The defendant appealed a conviction for using a vehicle, which had been adapted for stock car racing, without insurance. He did not give evidence, but he was present and he admitted that he was the owner of the vehicle. Held: The court allowed his appeal because there was no evidence that the actual driver of the vehicle was employed by him.
1 Citers


 
Nicholson v Tapp [1972] 1 WLR 1044
1972


Road Traffic
A traffic summons had to be served within 14 days and it was sent by registered post on the fourteenth day, so that in the normal course of post it would not have arrived until after the 14 days had elapsed. The prosecution sought to rely upon the deeming provision in Schedule 4. Held: The provision only appliied in circumstances where, in the ordinary course of post, the letter would have been received in time.
Road Traffic Act 1962 Sch4
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Pugh v Knipe [1972] RTR 286
1972


Road Traffic
Where land is on the face of it private land, the prosecutor accusing the defendant of driving on a public road, must establish the fact of public access, as here in relation to the forecourt of a private members club.
1 Citers


 
Dymond v Pearce [1972] 1 All ER 1142; [1972] EWCA Civ 7; [1972] 2 WLR 633; [1972] 1 QB 496; [1972] RTR 169
13 Jan 1972
CA
Sachs LJ, Edmund Davies LJ, Stephenson LJ
Crime, Road Traffic, Nuisance
A motorcyclist crashed into the rear of a lorry stationary on the carriageway. The plaintff said that the parking of the lorry was a nuisance, and that if it had not been so parked, there would have been no accident. Held: The appeal failed. The accident was due wholly to the negligence of the motorcyclist. 'sine qua non is not an all-sufficient basis for establishing liability.' In criminal law at least nuisance must be actual as opposed to potential.
1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Rider v Rider [1973] QB 505
1973
CA

Road Traffic, Personal Injury
Sachs LJ stated that "it is in my judgment clear that the corporation's statutory duty under section 44 of the Act of 1959 is reasonably to maintain and repair the highway so that it is free of danger to all users who use that highway in the way normally to be expected of them -- taking account, of course, of the traffic reasonably to be expected on the particular highway. Motorists who thus use the highway, and to whom a duty is owed, are not to be expected by the authority all to be model drivers. Drivers in general are liable to make mistakes, including some rated as negligent by the courts, without being merely for that reason stigmatised as unreasonable or abnormal drivers; some drivers may be inexperienced, and some drivers may find themselves in difficulties from which the more adept could escape. The highway authority must provide not merely for model drivers, but for the normal run of drivers to be found on their highways, and that includes those who make the mistakes which experience and common sense teaches are likely to occur." and "mere unevenness, undulations and minor potholes do not normally constitute a danger" within the section.
Highways Act 1959 44
1 Citers



 
 Regina v Bogacki; CACD 1973 - [1973] 1 QB 832
 
Regina v Lennard [1973] RTR 252
1973
CACD
Lawton LJ
Road Traffic
The defendant faced with an allegation of failng to provide a specimen of breath, argued that the consumption of alcohol since he had been driving could amount to a reasonable excuse. Held: The court considered what would amount to a reasonable excuse for a driver failing to provide a specimen of breath: "A state of affairs which does not affect ability to take a breath test or supply a specimen does not seem, on the authorities, to amount to a reasonable excuse." and "In our judgment no excuse can be adjudged a reasonable one unless the person from whom the specimen is required is physically or mentally unable to provide it or the provision of the specimen would entail a substantial risk to his health."
Road Safety Act 1967
1 Citers



 
 Paul v Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications; 1973 - [1973] RTR 245

 
 Pugsley v Hunter; 1973 - [1973] RTR 284; [1973] 1 WLR 578
 
Rider v Rider [1973] 1 QB 505; [1973] RTR 178
1973
CA
Sachs LJ
Road Traffic, Negligence
The plaintiff was a passenger in a car which her husband was driving and which collided with a van. The husband had been driving too fast. The edge of the tarmac on the road abutted grass verges at a lower level and the edge had been inadequately repaired and in places "bitten off" so as to have become uneven. The trial judge found that the nearside wheels of the car had encountered an indentation on the edge of the tarmac and that such was, as to two thirds, the cause of the husband's loss of control. The highway authority was, as to two thirds, responsible for the collision. The driver who lost control of his vehicle as a result of carriageway edge deterioration was found one third to blame on the basis that he had special knowledge of the state of the road and was therefore driving too fast. Held: The highway authority's appeal was dismissed.
Sachs LJ described the authority's statutory duty: "it is in my judgment clear that the corporation's statutory duty under section 44 of the Act of 1959" (the precursor of the current statutory position) "is reasonably to maintain and repair the highway so that it is free of danger to all users who use that highway in the way normally to be expected of them -- taking account, of course, of the traffic reasonably to be expected on the particular highway. Motorists who thus use the highway, and to whom a duty is owed, are not to be expected by the authority all to be model drivers. Drivers in general are liable to make mistakes, including some rated as negligent by the courts, without being merely for that reason stigmatised as unreasonable or abnormal drivers; some drivers may be inexperienced, and some drivers may find themselves in difficulties from which the more adept could escape. The highway authority must provide not merely for model drivers, but for the normal run of drivers to be found on their highways, and that includes those who make the mistakes which experience and common sense teaches are likely to occur."
1 Citers


 
Rouse v Squires [1973] EWCA Civ 9; [1972] 2 All ER 903; [1973] 2 WLR 925; [1973] RTR 550; [1973] QB 889
22 Mar 1973
CA

Road Traffic, Negligence

1 Cites

1 Citers

[ Bailii ]
 
Scott v Jelf [1974] RTR 256
1974

Lord Widgery CJ, MacKenna J
Road Traffic
The defendant was accused of driving whilst disqualified. He drove in breach of the conditions of a provisional licence having been disqualified until he took the test. Held: Lord Widgery CJ: "That provision has appeared in the road traffic legislation for a good many years and its purpose is obvious. If the man has to take a test before his disqualification can be removed, then machinery must be provided to enable him to take the test. Taking the test involves driving on a road and thus involves the obtaining by him of a provisional licence, as was done in this case. If the defendant had been driving on the road with a qualified passenger he would have committed no offence because, although still disqualified within the meaning of section 99, he would have the specific excuse provided for him by section 98(3). He did not have a qualified driver, and the issue in this case is whether the fact that he drove in defiance of the conditions attached to a provisional licence had the effect of removing the protection of section 98(3) altogether so as to make him a driver driving when disqualified, or whether it had prosecuted under section 88(6) of the Act for failing to comply with the terms of a provisional licence. That is the issue." and "I find myself left in absolutely no doubt that section 98(3) is carefully worded so as to allow a disqualified driver to use a provisional licence on the road provided he complies with the terms of the provisional licence. I think that that is the only meaning which can be derived from the language used if given its ordinary meaning. The terms of section 98(3) provide an exemption for a disqualified driver driving on a road provided that he holds a provisional licence and drives in accordance with the provisions of that licence. I cannot understand why specific reference should have been made to driving in accordance with the conditions of the provisional licence unless it was intended that the exemption provided by the subsection should be restricted to those who drive in accordance with the provisional licence to which it refers." MacKenna J: "A person disqualified for holding a licence until he has passed another driving test is a disqualified person within the meaning of section 99. He is forbidden to drive unless he can bring himself within section 98(3). That subsection gives him a limited right to drive, notwithstanding the provisions of section 99. He can drive if he obtains a provisional licence and if he drives in accordance with the conditions subject to which it is granted. That is what section 98(3) says and it cannot reasonably be given any other meaning. If the disqualified person drives otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of the provisional licence, he loses the protection of this subsection and is caught by section 99."
1 Citers


 
Newbury v Davis [1974] RTR 367
1974
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ, MacKenna J
Road Traffic, Insurance
The owner of a vehicle agreed to lend it to someone else on condition that that person insured against third party risks. In the owner's absence, that person drove the car on a road without insurance. Held: The appeal against conviction was allowed: "the defendant did not permit Mr Jarvis to use the car. The defendant gave no permission to use it unless Mr Jarvis had a policy of insurance to cover its use, and he had none. Having no policy of insurance, he took the vehicle without the defendant's permission. In other words, permission given subject to a condition which is unfulfilled is no permission at all. It may be that the difference is a small one between a case where the owner gives unconditional permission in the mistaken belief that the use is covered by insurance, or in the disappointed hope that it will be covered, and the case where the permission is given subject to a condition and that condition is not fulfilled. But to my mind there is a difference and it is one of legal substance. On this view of the case the defendant committed no offence."
Road Traffic Act 1972
1 Citers


 
Regina v MacDonagh [1974] RTR 372; [1974] 1 QB 448
1974
CA
Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic
The Road Traffic Acts do not define the word 'drive' and in its simplest meaning it refers to a person using the driver's controls for the purpose of directing the movement of the vehicle. It matters not that the vehicle is not moving under its own power, or driven by the force of gravity, or even that it is being pushed by other well-wishers. The essence of driving is the use of the driver's controls in order to direct the movement, however that movement is produced.
Lord Widgery CJ said: "The essence of driving is the use of the driver's controls in order to direct the movement, however that movement is produced." and
"There are an infinite number of ways in which a person may control the movement of a motor vehicle, apart from the orthodox one of sitting in the driving seat and using the engine for propulsion. He may be coasting down a hill with the gears in neutral and the engine switched off; he may be steering a vehicle which is being towed by another. As has already been pointed out, he may be sitting in the driving seat while others push, or half sitting in the driving seat but keeping one foot on the road in order to induce the car to move. Finally, as in the present case, he may be standing in the road and himself pushing the car with or without using the steering wheel to direct it. Although the word 'drive' must be given a wide meaning, the courts must be alert to see that the net is not thrown so widely that it includes activities which cannot be said to be driving a motor vehicle in any ordinary use of that word in the English language."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Ross Hillman v Bond [1974] QB 435
1974


Road Traffic, Vicarious Liability
An employer can be found to be causing or permitting an employee to overload a vehicle when he was acting in the course of his employment even though the employer is unaware of the employee's exact activities.
1 Citers


 
McKnight v Davies [1974] RTR 4
1974


Road Traffic


 
Holliday v Henry [1974] RTR 101
1974
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ, Ashworth and Melford Stevenson JJ
Road Traffic
The prosecutor appealed by case stated from the magistrates acquittal of the respondent under section 8(1) of the Vehicles Excise Act 1971, which provides that a person is liable to a penalty if he keeps on a public road any mechanically propelled vehicle for which a licence is not in force. The respondent had an Austin motor vehicle. He did not have a current tax disk. When, absent its gearbox, the vehicle was left parked on a public highway in Walton with a roller skate under each of the four wheels of the vehicle so that it was totally supported by the skates, and its wheels were not in contact with the road surface, he argued that because the Austin was not in actual contact with the road but was supported on roller skates, its position was analogous to that of being on a trailer. It could not be said that the vehicle was on the road if the roller skates were interposed between the road and the vehicle so that the vehicle was on roller skates, not on the road. Lord Widgery CJ observed, this argument, taken to its logical extent, would mean that if "one put a piece of newspaper under each wheel, the vehicle would no longer be on the road and no longer be liable to an excise licence". He observed: "Unfortunately for the defendant, that would not do. It is perfectly clear that it was on the road for present purposes at the time of the alleged offence and I would allow the appeal and send the case back to the justices with a direction to convict." The other members of the court agreed.
Vehicles Excise Act 1971 8(1)
1 Citers


 
Shaw v Knill [1974] RTR 142
1974
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic
The driver entered a car park and walked over to a motor cycle parked in the car park. He placed his haversack on the platform of the motor cycle and pushed it for a distance of approximately six yards towards the entrance of the car park, which abutted on to the public road. He was stopped approximately seven yards from the entrance and before he had left the car park. On being asked where he was going he stated that he wanted to go for a ride. Held: The defendant was guilty of attempting to drive the motor cycle whilst disqualified.
1 Citers


 
Regina v David Newton [1974] RTR 451
1974


Road Traffic
The Lord Chief Justice was unable to accept that someone with 127 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, a little over half the legal limit, did not feel any effect. The process of considering whether special reasons might avoid a disqualification, the magistrates had a two stage. First to test the evidence to see whether special reasons existed, and second whether as an exercise of discretion, they should not disqualify.
1 Citers


 
McNight v Davies [1974] RTR 4
1974

Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic, Crime
The court considered whether a driver had teken a vehicle without the owners consent, and having had that consent for one purpose, continued to use the car beyond that purpose: "[n]ot every brief, unauthorised diversion from his proper route by an employed driver in the course of his working day [would] necessarily involve a 'taking' of the vehicle for his own use". The test was whether "he appropriate[d] it to his own use in a manner which repudiates the rights of the true owner, and shows that he has assumed control of the vehicle for his own purposes".
Theft Act 1968 12
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Department of Trade and Industry v St Christopher Motorists Association Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 99
1974

Templeman J
Insurance, Road Traffic
The defendant company provided for the hire of a chauffeur if the insured was disqualified from driving. Held: Contracts of insurance are not confined to contracts for the payment of money, but may include a contract for some benefit corresponding to the payment of money.
Templeman J referred to Prudential and said: "That definition, including Channell J's careful pronouncement that there must either be the payment of a sum or some corresponding benefit, seems to me to meet the present case and particularly so when, in substance, there seems to me to be no difference between the defendant company paying a chauffeur on the one hand and on the other hand agreeing to pay to the individual member a sum of money which would represent the cost to him of providing himself with a chauffeur in the event of his being disabled from driving himself. I cannot see any difference in logic between the two and therefore I see no reason why, in the present case, the arrangement made by the defendant company should not amount to insurance."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Jacobs v Reid; 1974 - [1974] RLT 71
 
Taylor v Rajan [1974] RTR 304; [1974] 1 All ER 1087; [1974] QB 424
2 Jan 1974

Lord Widgery Chief Justice
Road Traffic
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him. Held: The court considered when it should find special reasons allowing it a discretion not to disqualify a driver who was subject to an automatic disqualification for driving with excess alcohol. The test of whether the circumstances exist to find special reasons is an objective one. A higher reading would make the exercise of the discretion more difficult.
Lord Widgery CJ said: "This is not the first case in which the court had had to consider whether driving in an emergency can justify a conclusion that there are special reasons for not disqualifying the driver. If a man, in the well-founded belief that he will not drive again, puts his car into the garage, goes into his house, and has a certain amount of drink in the belief that he is not going to drive again, and if thereafter there is an emergency which requires him, in order to deal with it, to take his car out despite his intention to leave it in the garage, then that is a situation which can in law amount to a special reason for not disqualifying a driver.
On the other hand, justices who are primarily concerned with dealing with this legislation, should approach the exercise of the resultant discretion with great care. The mere fact that the facts disclosed a special reason does not mean that the driver is to escape disqualification as a matter of course. There is a very serious burden on the justices, even when a special reason had been disclosed, to decide whether in their discretion they should decline to disqualify in a particular case. The justices should have very much in mind that if a man deliberately drives when he knows he has consumed a considerable quantity of drink, he presents a potential source of danger to the public which no private crisis can lightly excuse.
One of the most important matters which justices have to consider in the exercise of this discretion is whether the emergency -- and I call it such for want of a more convenient word -- was sufficiently acute to justify the driver taking his car out. The Justices should only exercise the discretion in favour of the driver in clear and compelling circumstances. They ought to remember that the special reasons which they are considering and which are relevant are not the reasons which caused the driver to take his car on the road . . . The Justices therefore must consider the whole of the circumstances. They must consider the nature and degree of the crisis or emergency which has caused the defendant to take the car out. They must consider whether there was alternative means of transport or methods of dealing with the crisis other than and alternative to the use by the defendant of his own car. They should have regard to the manner in which the defendant drove, because if he committed traffic offences such as excessive speed or driving without due care and attention this again is a consideration which tells against his having discretion exercised in his favour, and they should generally have regard to whether the defendant acted responsibly or otherwise."
The test for the existence of special reasons for not disqualifying is an objective one and not a subjective one, and "Last but by no means least, if the alcohol content of the defendant's body is very high, that is a very powerful reason for saying that discretion should not be exercised in his favour. Indeed, if the alcohol content exceeds 100 milligrams per hundred millilitres of blood, the Justices should rarely exercise the discretion in favour of the defendant driver."
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Snelling v Whitehead; HL 1975 - Unreported, 1975
 
Cornish v Ferry Masters Ltd [1975] RTR 292
1975

Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic
The court discussed the criminal liability imposed for dangerous heavy goods vehicles: "I think that the general principle that these offences are absolute offences has to be applied here and I think that, in deciding whether the condition of the load is such that danger is or is likely to be caused, it must be determined according to the factual circumstances as they were, regardless of the knowledge of the defendant."
1 Citers



 
 Blayney v Knight; 1975 - [1975] RTR 279
 
Baugh v Crago [1975] RTR 453
1975
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic
The defendant believed that a driver was the holder of a driving licence and permitted him to use the vehicle, when the driver was not in fact such a holder. The prosecutor appealed his acquittal. Held: Considering Newbury v Davis. The justices did not find that he imposed a condition on the use of the van. They found that he permitted the van to be used in the honest and mistaken belief that all would be well. That is not enough on authority to excuse him and the justices were wrong here in deciding that they could acquit.
Road Traffic Act 1972 143
1 Cites

1 Citers



 
 Roney v Matthews; QBD 1975 - [1975] RTR 273

 
 Froom v Butcher; CA 21-Jul-1975 - [1976] QB 286; [1975] EWCA Civ 6; [1975] 3 All ER 520

 
 Invicta Plastics Limited v Clare; QBD 1976 - [1976] RTR 251; [1976] Crim LR 131
 
Deacon v AT (a minor) [1976] RTR 244
1976

May J
Road Traffic

1 Citers


 
Regina v Kershberg [1976] RTR 526
1976
CACD

Road Traffic, Criminal Evidence
An appropriately qualified member of staff at a forensic laboratory may give expert evidence as to results found by a co-worker.


 
 Hood v Lewis; QBD 1976 - [1976] RTR 99

 
 Regina v Rutter; 1976 - [1976] RTR 105
 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner v Curran; Regina v Curran [1976] 1 All ER 162
1976
HL

Crime, Road Traffic
The defendant had been found drunk at the wheel of his car. His keys were not in the ignition. He was convicted of being drunk in charge of the car, but appealed his conviction for failing to provide a specimen of urine. He appealed saying the verdicts were not consistent with each other. Held: The statute was confusing. The Act was a consolidating Act, and the House considered its ability to look to earlier versions to help in interpreting the statute: "[where] the actual words are clear and unambiguous in their meaning it is not permissible to have recourse to the corresponding provisions in the earlier Act repealed by the consolidation Act and to treat any difference in their wording as capable of casting doubt on what is clear and unambiguous language in the consolidation Act itself." and "... in the instant case, ... the actual words are clear and unambiguous in their meaning it is not permissible to have recourse to the corresponding provisions in the earlier Act repealed by the consolidation Act and to treat any difference in their wording as capable of casting doubt on what is clear and unambiguous language in the consolidation Act itself"
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Regina v Radcliffe [1977] RTR 99
1977
CACD

Road Traffic
In the procedure for giving two specimens of urine at a police station to test for driving over the prescribed limit, it does not matter that the first specimen was of any particular quantity. It therefore follows that, provided two specimens are given, it does not matter whether there is any particular gap in time between the two specimens. All that matters is that the statutory procedure should be have been carried out.
Road Traffic Act 1972
1 Citers


 
Regina v Tate [1977] RTR 17
1977
CACD
Lawton LJ
Road Traffic, Evidence, Criminal Practice
At the close of a prosecution case for driving with excess alcohol, the appellant stated that he would not give or call evidence. He then submitted that the jury should be directed to consider only the admissible evidence of the analyst called who stated in cross examination, that two of the experiments had been carried out by a colleague. The results of those experiments were, therefore, hearsay and inadmissible. The trial judge then permitted the second analyst to be called, and the appeal was dismissed. Held: "Since 1911 there have been a number of cases before this court and its predecessor in which the problem has had to be considered. It suffices, we think, to say without going through the cases in detail, that it is now clearly established that the trial judge has a discretion whether he will allow the prosecution to call any more evidence after they have closed their case. The exercise of discretion will not be interfered with by this court unless it has been exercised either wrongly in principle or perversely."
1 Citers



 
 Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys; HL 1977 - [1977] AC 146
 
Regina v Farrance [1978] RTR 225; (1978) 67 Cr App R 136,
1978
CA

Road Traffic
The driver had a medical condition requiring him to avoid strenuous exertion. Driving uphill, his clutch failed, though he did not understand the problem. He rolled back to the kerb, and revved the engine. He knew he would be unable to push the car. He appealed against his conviction of attempting to drive a car inapable of propulsion by the engine. Held: "If somebody is sitting at the driving seat of the car either attempting to start it or attempting to put it in gear or accelerating the engine to try to make the car go forward, he is attempting to drive it, and the fact that there is some intervening factor which in the end will prevent him from fulfilling his attempt does not prevent it from being an attempt to drive."
1 Citers


 
Seddon v Binions [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep 381
1978
CA
Roskill LJ, Megaw LJ
Road Traffic, Insurance
The Court gave guidance on the proper method of interpreting a term of a motor insurance policy which defines the limitations of use subject to which the policy provides cover. Roskill LJ: "Inevitably, where one has a phrase such as 'social, domestic or pleasure purposes' used in a policy of insurance…there will be cases which will fall on one side of the line and cases which will fall on the other side. For my part, however much claims managers might wish it otherwise, I do not believe it is possible to state any firm principle under which it can always be predicted which side of the line a particular case will fall. It must depend on the facts of the particular case; and the facts of particular cases will vary infinitely in their detail." and "It seems to me that the solution to the problem can best be reached in this case by asking the question: what was the essential character of the journey in the course of which the particular accident occurred?" and "It may well be that there will be cases, as there have been in the past, where the essential character…of a particular journey was of a particular kind - and that that essential character will not be altered in the crucial respects merely because, incidental to that journey, something happens in the way of giving a lift to a friend as an act of courtesy or, to borrow Mr Justice du Parcq's expression [in Passmore v Vulcan Boiler & General Insurance Co Ltd (1936) 54 Ll L R 92], charity." Megaw LJ: "[I]n general, I should have thought that there is something that can clearly be called, as I would put it, a primary purpose, by which I intend the same meaning, I think, as Roskill LJ intended in using the phrase 'essential character of the journey'. If there be such a primary purpose, or essential character, then the Courts should not be meticulous to seek to find some possible secondary purpose, or some inessential character, the result of which could be suggested to be that the use of the car fell outside the proper use for the purposes of which cover was given by the insurance policy."
1 Citers



 
 Gregory v Kelly; 1978 - [1978] RTR 426

 
 Bird v Pearce; CA 1979 - [1979] RTR 369
 
Regina v Brentwood Justices ex parte Jones (1979) RTR 155
1979
QBD
Lord Widgery CJ
Road Traffic, Magistrates
Proceedings had begun by arrest without warrant. Lord Widgery CJ said: "that the proceedings commenced when the suspect was taken to the police station pursuant to such arrest, and when he was formally charged in the presence of a station officer, which would be the normal procedure at the station."
1 Citers


 
Chief Constable of West Midlands Police v Billingham [1979] RTR 446
1979

Bridge LJ
Road Traffic
Bridge LJ considered the meaning of the word 'accident', and, after saying that there had been many authorities for different stautory and contractual contexts, said: "It is, in my judgment, a word which has a perfectly well understood meaning in ordinary parlance, but that meaning is an elastic one according to the context in which the word is used." The attempt to define the word in Morris must be understood in relation to the particular facts of that case, and "I approach the matter here by asking whether in the ordinary man's understanding of the word, especially having regard to the mischief at which this statue is aimed, the man in the street would say in such circumstances as those with which we are concerned that an accident had occurred owing to the presence of a motor vehicle on a road."
1 Cites

1 Citers


 
Firma Stadtereinigung K. Nehlsen KG v Freie Hansestadt Bremen C-47/79; [1979] ECR 3639
6 Dec 1979
ECJ

European, Road Traffic
Transport - common policy - social provisions - regulation no 543/69 of the council - material scope - vehicles of public authorities - exclusion - vehicles of a private undertaking used to perform a public service - inclusion (regulation no 543/69 of the council, art. 4 (4), as amended by regulation no 2827/77) Pursuant to article 4 (4) of regulation no 543/69 of the council on the har- monization of certain social legis- lation relating to road transport, as amended by regulation no 2827/77, that regulation does not apply to carriage by ".. Vehicles which are used by other public authorities for public services. " That expression must be understood as covering only vehicles which are owned by or under the control of the public authority and does not extend to vehicles belonging to a private undertaking and used by the latter to perform a public service or a service in the public interest which it has undertaken to provide under a contract governed by private law.
1 Citers


 
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