swarb.co.uk - law index
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Rating - From: 1930 To: 1959
This page lists 23 cases, and was prepared on 02 April 2018.
Union Cold Storage Co Ltd v Bancroft [1931] AC 446
1931
HL
Viscount Dunedin
Rating
The House considered whether refrigeration equipment was for storage purposes or for the purposes of altering or adapting goods for sale. Held: It was for storage purposes, although the refrigeration was described as being by means of an "elaborate process" and it was accepted that a freezing process might alter the goods.
1 Citers
Kay v Burrows [1931] AC 454
1931
HL
Viscount Dunedin
Rating
The House considered whether premises (the greater part of which was used for the storage of rags awaiting processing, sorting or subsequent despatch) fell within the proviso to s.3(1) which excluded premises "primarily occupied and used [for the] purposes of storage". Held: A building is only used for storage if the purpose of keeping goods there is their storage as an end in itself: there is no such use for storage if the goods are kept there for some other purpose
A means to an end is not a purpose and end in itself.
Viscount Dunedin said: "storage in s. 3, sub-s. 1 (d), means storage as a purpose and end in itself, and that such storage as is merely a necessary and transitory incident of the manufacturing process which is being carried on does not fall within the definition. Accordingly in Burrows' case I think the premises are not "primarily occupied and used for purposes of storage."
Rating and Valuation (Apportionment) Act 1928 3(1)
1 Citers
Union Cold Storage Co Ltd v Southwark Assessment Committee (1932) 16 R and IT 160
1932
QBD
Rating
the rateability of certain cooling chambers in a warehouse used for storing food. 25% of what was undertaken there may have been freezing food and the remaining 75% storing food. Held: Macnaughten J discussed the cold storage plant and refrigerating plant in the building saying that it was "admittedly plant on the hereditament for the purpose of manufacturing operations or trade processes" (emphasis added).
1 Citers
The Montreal Light, Heat and Power Consolidated and Others v The City of Outremont [1932] UKPC 14
23 Feb 1932
PC
Utilities, Rating
Quebec - The Board was asked as to the liability for municipal and school taxes in respect of the gas mains installed under the streets.
[ Bailii ]
Townley Mill (1919) Limited v Oldham Assessment Committee [1936] 1 KB 585
1936
KBD
Lord Hewart CJ, Hawke, Lawrence JJ
Rating
Lord Hewart CJ said: "When one turns to the Third Schedule of the [1925] Act, it is apparent that it enumerates that type of machinery and plant which is conveniently described in the case as motive machinery; it is the machinery without which the mill could not begin to work, as, for example, the generation of power, heating and cooling, lifts and elevators, railways, tramlines and tracks, and other things, the foundation of that which was to become the work of the mill. When the machinery and plant referred to in the Third Schedule are eliminated, what is left is the kind of machinery which is concisely described in this case as process plant and machinery, operative plant and machinery, working and manufacturing plant and machinery."
and " . . the effect of this [1925] Act, intended to be an Act beneficial to those interested in the carrying on of industry, was to get rid of all the doctrine of enhanced value and to lay it down that what is called process plant and machinery must henceforth be disregarded where the problem is to ascertain the rateable value of the hereditament where plant and machinery are used. It is nothing to the purpose, in my opinion, to say apart from the use of the machinery and plant, there may be buildings called warehouses which for other commercial purposes do store or keep dry machinery and plant. It is not to be said that they are not to be rated because they contain machinery and plant. Of course, that could not be said. We are concerned with the rating of a hereditament which contains machinery and plant for the purpose of the carrying on of the work in that hereditament. The statute, in my opinion, makes it quite plain that in such a case and for such purposes, process plant and machinery are to be excluded."
Rating and Valuation Act 1925 24
1 Citers
Westminster City Council v Southern Railway Co; HL 1936 - [1936] AC 511
Robinson Brothers (Brewers) Ltd v Houghton and Chester-Le-Street Assessment Committee; CA 1937 - [1937] 2 KB 445; [1938] AC 321
Townley Mill (1919) Limited v Oldham Assessment Committee [1937] AC 419
1937
HL
Viscount Maughan, Lord Russell of Killowen
Rating
Section 24 of the 1925 Act was considered. Held: The House re-instated the decision at divisional level. The court described the basis upon which a property was to be valued for rating purposes. Viscount Maugham said it concerend: " a hypothetical tenant and a hypothetical rent, but . . a real and concrete hereditament". As to the legal background of the 1925 Act, he said: "The hypothetical tenant was assumed to be a tenant from year to year with a reasonable prospect of continuing in occupation; but the hypothetical rent which the tenant could give was estimated with reference to the hereditament in its actual physical condition (rebus sic stantibus), and a continuance of the existing state of things was prima facie to be presumed."
Lord Russell of Killowen said: "The plant and machinery referred to in [section 24 of the 1925 Act] include plant and machinery whose function is, not to execute any manufacturing operation or trade process, but to generate and transmit power to, or to warm, or cool, or ventilate, or light, etc., the hereditaments in question. They may be conveniently called "motive plant and machinery," while manufacturing or trade process plant and machinery may be conveniently referred to as "process plant and machinery."
and "The Lord Chief Justice . . thought that on the construction of s. 24 the matter was plain, and that on its clear language the object of the section was to get rid of the old doctrine that although machinery not forming part of a hereditament could not be rated, nevertheless the rateable value of a hereditament was to be enhanced by reference to the machinery which was in it, and which made it appropriate to the particular industry carried on therein. Under the section motive plant and machinery is to be deemed part of the hereditament which is being valued; as to process plant and machinery, no account is to be taken of its value with respect to the valuation of the hereditament."
Rating and Valuation Act 1925 24
1 Cites
1 Citers
John Menzies and Co v The Assessor for Edinburgh [1937] SC 784
1937
Lord Fleming, Lord Kilbrandon
Rating
When asking whether a structure on land was rateable, the court should ask first whether the subject structure belonged to a class or genus which was prima facie heritable. Scottish courts places great emphasis upon the general character of the structure for the purpose of its classification as either heritable or moveable.
1 Cites
1 Citers
Cole v Police Constable 443A; 1937 - [1937] 1 KB 316
Associated Cinema Properties Ltd v Hampstead Borough Council [1944] KB 412
1944
Rating
For the purposes of rating, where, in addition to legal possession, "use and enjoyment" of the hereditament is required to establish occupation so as to give rise to liability.
1 Citers
Gyton v Palmour [1944] 1 KB 426
1944
Rating
1 Citers
John Laing and Son Ltd v Kingswood Assessment Committee [1949] 1 KB 344
1949
KBD
Tucker LJ, Jenkins J
Rating
The appellant building contractors had been engaged by the Air Ministry to execute works at an aerodrome. They erected on the site, for the purpose of carrying out the contract, offices, garages, canteen for workmen and other structures. Although the site was handed over to the contractors, the conditions of the contract between the contractors and the Air Ministry specified that the execution of the work was subject to the control and direction of the Ministry's Superintending Officer. In due course the local rating authority proposed to amend its valuation list by adding the contractors' officers and other structures as a rateable hereditament. A special case was stated for the opinion of the Divisional Court on the question whether the contractors were in rateable occupation of that hereditament. Held: The contractor's appeal failed. The four conditions of rateable occupation are (i) actual occupational possession (which involves actual as opposed to intended user of the land in question); (ii) occupation or possession which is exclusive (ie if the occupier can exclude all other persons from using the land in the same way as he does); (iii) occupation or possession which is of some value or benefit to the occupier/possessor; (iv) occupation or possession which has a sufficient quality of permanence.
Tucker LJ said: "Mr Rowe has said that there are four necessary ingredients in rateable occupation, and I do not think there is any controversy with regard to those ingredients. First, there must be actual occupation; secondly, that it must be exclusive for the particular purposes of the possessor; thirdly, that the possession must be of some value or benefit to the possessor; and, fourthly, the possession must not be for too transient a period."
Jenkins J, dealing with the fourth requirement, considered that it had been met by the fact that the builders' huts had been on the land for the two years that work was being carried out there.
1 Citers
University of Glasgow v Assessor for Glasgow 1952 SC 504
1952
Lord Keith
Rating
(Lands Valuation Appeal Court) Held: Various buildings of the University which were physically separate from the main buildings, capable of being separately let and dispersed among buildings belonging to other proprietors, were properly entered on the valuation roll as separate subjects.
Lord Keith, using the Bank of Scotland Case, treated the case as a geographical one: "The common enclosure in many cases supplies a useful basis, or test, for a unum quid entry. It is the reason why a villa with its garden ground, or a mansion house with its policies, and any ancillary buildings are entered as a unum quid. The geographical conception has never been lost sight of in making up entries in the Valuation Roll, and in the case of John Leng and Co v Assessor for Dundee Lord Sands took occasion twice to refer to 'the ordinary geographical arrangement followed in making up the Valuation Roll'. There may be cases where geographical unity has to be departed from, as where premises within what would otherwise be a single entity are separately let, or lands or buildings within a common enclosure are used for separate purposes. It is not perhaps possible to lay down general rules for all cases. Something must depend on particular circumstances. But the broad general principles are as stated."
1 Cites
1 Citers
Hewson, Chapman and Co ltd v Grimsby County Borough Council; 1953 - (1953) 46 R & IT 703
Gilbert v S Hickinbottom and Sons Ltd [1956] 2 QB 40
1956
CA
Denning LJ, Morris LJ, Parker LJ
Rating
A large industrial bakery comprised a number of buildings in two blocks separated by a street. The Lands Tribunal held, overruling the valuation officer, that they constituted a single hereditament. Held: The valuer's appeal failed. The application of the test was "a question of degree and therefore of fact", and if the Lands Tribunal thought that it was one hereditament they must have had their reasons. Geographically contiguous spaces are normally to be treated as one hereditament and geographically separate spaces as distinct, but there remain "exceptional cases" where their function required a different treatment.
Denning LJ gave as examples of the treatment of separate premises as one hereditament, the case where a road bisected a nobleman's park, or agricultural land (in the days when agricultural land was rateable) or a golf course. The common feature of these cases, he thought, was that: "the two properties on either side of the road are so essentially one whole - by which I mean, so essential in use the one to another - that they should be regarded as one single hereditament."
Morris LJ thought it undesirable to lay down general principles to govern what he regarded as a "common sense assessmen". At best the closest that he came to indicating in what circumstances geographically separate spaces might be regarded as a single hereditament was in the following passage: "buildings which, though not actually enclosed together or actually contiguous, are very near together and are not separated by the presence of other buildings and are being put to one common use may be regarded as comprising one hereditament. There can be no doubt that ordinarily very great weight will be placed upon what may be termed the geographical test. But the question is always one of fact and degree."
Parker LJ gave the guidance: "Whether or not premises in one occupation fall to be entered in the valuation list as one or more hereditaments depends upon a number of considerations. Without attempting an exhaustive list, the following considerations can be mentioned:
(1) Whether the premises are in more than one rating area. If so, they must be divided into at least the same number of hereditaments as the rating areas in which the premises are situated.
(2) Whether two or more parts of the premises are capable of being separately let. If not, then the premises must be entered as a single hereditament.
(3) Whether the premises form a single geographical unit.
(4) Whether though forming a single geographical unit the premises by their structure and layout consist of two or more separate parts.
(5) Whether the occupier finds it necessary or convenient to use the premises as a whole for one purpose, or whether he uses different parts of the premises for different purposes.
Whereas a consideration of questions (1) and (2) will in certain events conclude the matter one way or the other, the same does not, I think, result from a consideration of any one of the other questions alone. The conclusion, where the considerations of (1) and (2) are not decisive, must depend on the weight to be attached on the facts of each case to the other considerations. No doubt the most important of these other considerations is whether the premises form a geographical unit. Can they be ringed round on a map?"
Parker LJ cited University of Glasgow, and said of the geographical and functional tests: "[The geographical test] is so often decisive that it is a convenient starting point to the inquiry, but it is not decisive in all cases. Thus, though the premises may form a geographical unit, the manner in which different parts are used may justify the premises being treated as several hereditaments; cf North Eastern Railway Co v Guardians of York Union [1900] 1 QB 733, 739 per Channell J. The appellant's contention, however, is that though the functional test may justify treating a geographical unit as two hereditaments, it is wholly inapplicable where the premises occupied are geographically and structurally separate. There is no doubt, I think, that in the latter case little weight will ordinarily be given to any functional connexion, but it is another thing to say that it is irrelevant. If, as is admitted, a functional connexion is a relevant consideration when considering a geographical and structural unit, I fail to see why as a matter of law it cannot be considered at all when there are separate geographical and structural units. Each case must be considered on its particular facts, due weight being given to the degree and nature of the separation on the one hand and the importance of the functional connexion on the other."
1 Cites
Berry v St Marylebone Borough Council; CA 1957 - [1958] Ch 406; [1957] 3 All ER 677
London County Council v Wilkins (Valuation Officer); HL 1957 - [1957] AC 362
United Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of England v Holborn Borough Council [1957] 1 WLR 1080; [1957] 3 All ER 281
1957
Rating
The Freemasons sought to be entitled to rating relief as having the purpose of advancing religion. To belong to the Freemasons a person did not need to practise any religion providing he believed in a Supreme Being and lived a moral life. This was viewed as laudable but not the same as advancing religion. It was noted that it might be argued that religion can be advanced by "example as well as precept" but there was no evidence before the Court that the main object of Masons was to go out in the world and, by their example, lead persons to one religion or another. There was "no religious instruction, no programme for the persuasion of unbelievers, no religious supervision to see that its members remain active and constant in the various religions they profess, no holding of religious services, no pastoral or missionary work of any kind." Held: The Court defined "advancing" religion as meaning "to promote it, to spread its message ever wider among mankind; to take some positive steps to sustain and increase religious belief." This was said to be able to be done "in a variety of ways which may be comprehensively described as pastoral and missionary."
Trustees of West London Methodist Mission v Holborn Borough Council (1958) 3 RRC 86
1958
Rating
1 Citers
General Nursing Council for England and Wales v St Marylebone Borough Council [1959] 2 WLR 308
1959
HL
Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Morton, Lord Somervell
Rating, Charity
The court considered how to decide whether the Council could claim exemption from rates. Held: The court should restrict its consideration to the purposes as set out and not look to the actual activities. The relevant clause had as its main object the advancement of nursing and not the advancement of the nursing profession and the exemption as a charity was available.
Lord Keith of Avonholm said: "In my opinion, the only way by which the main objects of the Appellant Council can be ascertained is by looking at the objects as expressed in the Act. It is by the language used that Parliament has expressed its intention, and it is with the objects for which the Council was immediately and directly constituted that we are, in my opinion, concerned and not with the results of its activities at second or third hand."
1 Citers
National Deposit Friendly Society Trustees v Skegness Urban District Council; HL 1959 - [1959] AC 293
Royal College of Nursing v Borough of St Marylebone; CA 27-Oct-1959 - [1959] EWCA Civ 1; [1959] 3 All ER 663; [1959] 1 WLR 1077
